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Abstract 
Effectiveness of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in addressing 
development-induced disasters: A comparison of the EIA processes of Sri Lanka 
and New Zealand 
 
by 
Arosh Buddika Hapuarachchi  
 
There is an on-going exponential increase in development-induced disasters globally, especially in 
low and middle-income countries. This upward trend in the occurrence of development-induced 
disasters challenges sustainable development efforts. It has been generally accepted that 
instruments such as an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reduce disaster risks of development 
projects. The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) for disaster risk reduction promotes using EIAs to 
address the disaster risk of development projects. Over 65 percent of the countries that have met 
the HFA progress-reporting obligation in the 2009-2011 reporting cycle, state that disaster risks of 
development projects are addressed by implementing EIA. However, the claims that EIA processes 
effectively address disaster risks have yet to be demonstrated empirically. It is clear that successful 
implementation of EIA processes also depends on the level of governance quality existing in a 
particular country. It is suggested that a well-conceived EIA process should reflect many of the 
elements of good governance principles including transparency, sufficient information flows, 
accountability, and stakeholder participation. Quality governance, therefore, is considered as having 
a direct bearing on why impact assessments in some countries are performing better than others. 
The influence of governance quality on the effectiveness of EIAs can be addressed by comparing the 
EIA processes of two or more countries with different levels of governance quality. In this research, 
the effectiveness of the EIA process in addressing development-induced disasters is evaluated by 
comparing the EIA processes of Sri Lanka and New Zealand. These two countries have quite different 
governance quality ratings and, therefore, offer a test of the influence of governance characteristics 
on EIA processes in addressing disaster risks.  
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In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the EIA processes of the above countries, a set of evaluation 
criteria was identified, mostly from existing literature. Eight criteria were specifically developed for 
this research. Data for the research were collected from in-depth interviews using a semi-structured 
questionnaire and focus group discussions with interviewees selected on the basis of their role, 
knowledge and expertise of the EIA process. Documents from both state and non-state actors 
relevant to the EIA process were also analyzed. Several recently conducted development projects in 
each country were used as cases to understand how the legislation is used in practice.  
It is clear that explicit reference to disaster risk is absent in environmental management policies in 
both Sri Lanka and New Zealand. Even though the New Zealand EIA process has a higher procedural 
and contextual effectiveness than Sri Lanka, both countries have lower levels of substantive 
effectiveness. Neither of the two EIA processes is found to be effective in addressing disaster risk 
because of inadequate policy integration of disaster risk into the environmental legislation that 
governs the EIA process. The results suggest more specificity is needed in legislative provisions and 
suggest a review of standard practice in using EIA to address disaster risk. The findings also imply the 
need to undertake evaluations of EIA systems elsewhere to assess their effectiveness in addressing 
development-induced disaster risks.  
 
Keywords: hazard, vulnerability, disaster risk reduction, DRR, environmental impact assessment, EIA, 
effectiveness, development-induced disasters, governance, policy integration, development, social 
impact assessment, foreign aid, donor influence. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The Global Assessment Report 2011 on Disaster Risk Reduction shows an exponential increase in 
extensive disasters over the past 20 years, especially in low and middle-income countries (UNISDR 
(United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction), 2011). The UNISDR (2009a, p. 15) 
defines extensive risk as “…the widespread risk associated with the exposure of dispersed 
populations to repeated or persistent hazard conditions of low or moderate intensity, often of a 
highly localized nature, which can lead to debilitating cumulative disaster impacts”. In contrast to 
intensive disasters, which are characterized by “…catastrophic disaster impacts involving high 
mortality and asset loss” (UNISDR, 2009a, p. 19), extensive disasters may account for only a small 
proportion of overall disaster mortality. However, they are responsible for a very significant 
proportion of damage to the assets and livelihoods of low-income groups (UNISDR, 2009b). It is 
generally understood that extensive disasters are directly constructed by mal-development practices 
such as badly planned urbanization and regional development, and environmental degradation 
(UNISDR, 2011). Therefore, extensive disasters can also be called development-induced disasters (the 
term used in this research). The impacts of development-induced disasters are expected to further 
worsen because of the increased severity and frequency of climate related hazards as a result of on-
going climate change (IPCC, 2007; Tobin & Montz, 2009).  
The upward trend in the occurrence of development-induced disasters worldwide, especially in 
developing countries, challenges efforts toward sustainable development. Many economic 
development interventions have inadvertently created new forms of hazards and vulnerabilities, 
especially in low and middle-income countries, which also have poor governance records (UNISDR, 
2011). Even though these occurrences are rarely the subject of scholarly work, they are widely 
discussed in the media. However, media reports fail to provide a complete account of development-
induced disasters or properly represent the sufferings of many millions of people. They are adequate 
to argue the importance of factoring disaster risk considerations into development planning at 
national, regional and local levels. Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development processes 
has been a topic at international conferences and in communication materials since the inception of 
the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction in 1990 (IDNDR) (United Nations, 1989). 
Different agencies and countries advocating for disaster risk reduction integration into development 
have taken different routes to address the issue within or outside existing development. These vary 
vertically, from integration of sustainable development into national development policies, to 
integration of risk assessment into local level planning, and horizontally in different development 
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sectors from education and health, to infrastructure development. These integration efforts seem to 
be serving two distinct objectives, both leading to reduced disaster risk, namely: 1) to minimize the 
disaster impact on various development sectors such as agriculture, housing and health; and 2) to 
prevent or mitigate development-induced disasters. This research will examine the second objective, 
but it will also contribute to the first objective indirectly. Evaluation of probable disaster risk of 
development initiatives and factoring those risk considerations into planning and investment 
decisions are crucial to achieving this objective.  
Development control instruments such as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Social Impact 
Assessment (SIA), Human Health Risk Assessment (HHRA), Risk Assessment (RA), Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA), the precautionary principle, and Sustainability Assessment (SA) 
(Zhang, Pei, & Lin, 2010) are used in many countries to assess and mitigate the negative 
consequences of development activities. Among these different tools, the oldest, most well 
established tool is Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (IAIA (International Association for Impact 
Assessment), 2009). Following the World Conference on Environment and Development, the ‘Earth 
Summit’, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, EIA has been actively promoted as a vehicle to achieve 
sustainable development, especially in low and middle income countries (Marara et al., 2011). In 
these countries, if Agenda 21 were fully implemented, all prescribed or significant development 
projects should undergo an environmental assessment to review the implications of such projects for 
the environment. SIA and RA are also practised in many contexts, but given a subordinate position 
compared with EIAs (Burdge & Taylor, 2012). For instance, RAs are generally practised as non-
obligatory tools and being more selectively applied to selected activities within projects (Eduljee, 
1999). Therefore, EIA can be considered the most widely available and promoted mechanism to 
address development-induced disaster risks.  
The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) progress reports and UNISDR publications (UNISDR, 2011) 
show that both the UNISDR and national disaster management authorities have relied on EIA 
processes to mitigate extensive or development-induced disaster risks. Indicator six of the fourth 
priority for action in the HFA progress monitoring framework requires the impacts of disaster risk be 
taken into account in the EIA process (UNISDR, 2014). A content analysis of the national HFA progress 
reports reveals that 72 out of 111 countries that have met the HFA progress reporting obligations in 
the 2009-2011 reporting cycle, use EIA as a mechanism to address the disaster risks of development 
projects. Twelve countries assert that EIA is the only mechanism to incorporate disaster risk into 
development planning.  
Multiple attempts to strengthen the EIA process by incorporating different dimensions such as social, 
cultural, vulnerability and risk assessment have occurred (Andrews, 1988; Brockie, 1994; Caribbean 
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Development Bank (CDB), 2004; Contini & Servida, 1992; Cope & Hills, 1998; Harrop & Nixon, 1999; 
Kværner, Swensen, & Erikstad, 2006; Morgan, 1998; Vanclay, 2003), yet hardly any effort seems to 
have been made to examine the EIA process from a disaster risk reduction perspective. Moreover, 
the effectiveness of the EIA in addressing disaster risks is yet to be researched. Effectiveness can be 
measured in terms of ‘procedural’, ‘substantive’ and ‘contextual’ effectiveness. Procedural 
effectiveness means whether the EIA process conforms to the “…established provisions and 
principles” (Sadler, 1996, p. 39), whereas substantive effectiveness means whether the EIA process 
achieves the objectives set (Sadler, 1996). It has also been suggested that successful implementation 
of any development control tool depends also on the level of risk governance that exists in a 
particular country. The influence of governance quality on development control instruments is an 
important aspect that should not be neglected. Kakonge (1998) argues that a well-conceived EIA 
should reflect many of the elements of good governance principles including transparency, sufficient 
information flows, accountability, responsibility, and stakeholder participation. Quality of 
governance, therefore, is considered an indicator of ‘contextual’ effectiveness, which has a direct 
bearing on why impact assessments in some countries are performing better than others. The 
influence of governance quality on the effectiveness of EIAs can be addressed by comparing the EIA 
processes of two or more countries with different levels of governance quality.  
1.1 Research Questions 
A potential negative effect of some forms of development (e.g., transport infrastructure) is increased 
exposure to disaster risk. If development projects are to be sustainable then proposals should be 
properly assessed to ensure that disaster risk is not increased as a result of development projects. 
EIA is one of the development control mechanisms practised in many countries including many low 
and middle-income countries. But the extent to which country-specific EIA processes include disaster 
risk considerations and how effective they are in addressing development-induced disaster risk has 
not been researched. Contextual factors such as legal and administrative arrangements as well as the 
quality of governance also have a direct bearing on the EIA process. It is generally accepted that such 
contextual and governance factors influence the involvement of participants, transparency and 
nature of EIA processes and, very importantly, EIA outcomes.  
Consequently, the goals of this research are first to explore the effectiveness of the EIA process in 
addressing disaster risks and second to assess whether the quality of governance influences the 
outcome of EIA processes. To achieve the above, the thesis sets out to address four main questions: 
 Policy Integration: how well, if at all, is disaster risk reduction (DRR) integrated into EIA 
processes? 
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 Procedural Effectiveness: assuming DRR is integrated then how well is it practised? 
 Substantive effectiveness: does the EIA process achieve the objectives set and result in DRR? 
 Contextual effectiveness: what influence does risk governance have on the substantive 
effect? 
Moreover, the research does so in the different governance contexts of Sri Lanka and New Zealand1, 
two countries that have been assessed as having quite different levels of governance quality by 
international rating indices such as the Worldwide Governance Index (The World Bank Group, 2013). 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis comprises eight chapters including the Introduction. Chapter 2 reviews the literature in 
the fields of disaster risk, environmental impact assessment, risk governance, and the evaluation of 
the effectiveness of EIA. These concepts are often considered separately and the potential inter-
relationships have not been explicitly discussed in current literature. Therefore, Chapter 2 
synthesises the above concepts into a conceptual model presented at the end of the chapter. The 
conceptual model captures linkages between the different concepts and argues that the 
effectiveness of EIA is central to address the disaster risk of development projects. Chapter 3 
presents the methodology adopted in this research and identifies evaluation criteria used in the 
comparative evaluation. A comparison of the environmental, development and disaster management 
planning contexts in Sri Lanka and New Zealand is presented in Chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6 present 
the findings for Sri Lanka and New Zealand, respectively, based on the evaluation criteria presented 
in Chapter 3. Chapter 7 conducts and presents the overall analysis of the findings presented in the 
two previous chapters. The conclusions are derived and the conceptual model is revisited in Chapter 
8 based on the findings of this research. This chapter also discusses the theoretical implications of 
this research and makes recommendations for future research.  
  
                                                          
1 My interest in EIA and disaster risk reduction arises from my work history as a disaster risk management 
practitioner in an international non-governmental organization. After shifting to New Zealand in early 2011 
together with my family, I realized that a comparative study on the effectiveness of EIA to address disaster risks 
between Sri Lanka and New Zealand was possible.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
Much literature discusses the concepts of disaster risk reduction (DRR) and environmental impact 
assessment (EIA). However, integration of DRR into environmental planning, specifically into the EIA, 
has received relatively limited attention in the DRR and EIA literature. This chapter reviews the 
literature on DRR and environmental planning in order to identify possible conceptual and practical 
connections between the two. The chapter begins with a brief account of common terms and 
concepts in DDR then moves into broader topics of factors affecting disaster risk, mal-development, 
disaster-development linkages, development control tools and, finally, the performance evaluation 
of EIA.  
2.2 Disaster and disaster risk 
According to Smith (2013), the interpretation and understanding of disaster risk has changed 
significantly over the years. Smith (2013) identifies two leading perspectives on disaster risks: the 
‘behavioural paradigm’ and the ‘development paradigm’. According to Smith (2013), advocators of 
the behavioural paradigm (e.g., Gilbert White, Robert Kates, and Ian Burton) argue that natural 
hazards are caused by human behaviour and decisions to settle and develop hazard-prone land. 
Thus, disaster management under this paradigm is generally characterised by over reliance on land-
use planning and other engineering solutions to reduce disaster risk (Smith, 2013). In contrast, the 
development paradigm is characterised by an understanding of economic dependency and social and 
political marginalization as causes of increased human vulnerability to natural hazards and increased 
disaster risks (Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 1994; Prowse & Scott, 2008; Smith, 2013). Many 
scholars have treated the development paradigm as the mainstream view of understanding disaster 
risks (Birkmann, 2006; Prowse & Scott, 2008; Tobin & Montz, 2009; UNISDR, 2005). This research 
adopts the development paradigm interpretation in defining disaster risk. 
Disasters today are viewed “…as a result of the complex interaction between a potentially damaging 
physical event (e.g., floods, drought, fire, earthquake and storms) and the vulnerability of a society, 
its infrastructure, economy and environment, which are determined by human behaviour” (UNISDR, 
2005, p. 1). Therefore, effective disaster risk reduction lies in understanding natural hazards and the 
vulnerability of society, the economy and built and natural environments to the hazards (Birkmann, 
2006; UNISDR, 2005; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). Drawing from the above, three 
different concepts: ‘disaster risk’, ‘hazards’ and ‘vulnerability’, are fundamental to understanding the 
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contributing factor for less attention being given towards development-induced disasters (UNISDR, 
2011), which will be discussed later in this chapter.  
Having this clear distinction between development-induced (extensive) and intensive risks is 
important to understanding the root causes of disaster risks we encounter today. Development-
induced disaster risk is mainly a characteristic of marginalized areas where communities are exposed 
to, and vulnerable to, recurring localised weather-related hazards, which is often associated with 
poverty, mal-development and environmental degradation. On the other hand, intensive risk is 
mainly a characteristic of large cities or densely populated areas that are exposed to intense hazards 
and have high levels of vulnerability to these hazards resulting in high mortality (UNISDR, 2011).  
A study carried out by the UNISDR (2011) comparing extensive and intensive disasters in 21 countries 
over 40 years made an alarming discovery. Twenty-five deaths or the destruction of 600 or more 
houses in any one location have been used as thresholds for intensive risk (Freire, 2010; OSSO, 
2011a, as cited in UNISDR, 2011). For the researched period, extensive risk accounts for 99.1 percent 
of all disasters that occurred in these countries with 20 percent of houses destroyed and 53.9 
percent of houses damaged during the last 40 years (Table 2.1). Moreover, compared with intensive 
disasters, 80 percent of people being affected, 83.1 percent of people injured, 45.2 percent damage 
to schools, and 55.2 percent damage to health facilities resulted from extensive disasters (UNISDR, 
2011). However, the extensive risk accounts for only 9.6 percent of deaths, whereas intensive risk 
accounts for the remainder. This significant difference in mortality has largely removed the attention 
of authorities from extensive risks.  
Table 2.1 Summary of disaster damage from 20 countries from 1971 to 2011 (UNISDR, 2011, 
p. 37)  
Risk 
Type 
Hazard 
Type 
Reports % Deaths % Houses 
destroyed 
% Houses 
damaged 
% 
Extensive  Weather-
related 
188,236 96.3 59,911 9.2 1,096,891 18.3 5,674,114 50.1 
Extensive Geological 5,565 2.8 2,861 0.4 104,451 1.7 431,613 3.8 
Intensive Weather-
related 
1,293 0.7 182,723 27.9 3,079,749 51.4 3,806,413 33.6 
Intensive Geological 464 0.2 408,303 62.5 1,717,405 28.6 1,410,417 12.5 
Total   195,558 100.0 653,798 100.0 5,998,496 100.0 11,322,557 100.0 
 
As discussed earlier, disaster risk is a product of hazards and vulnerability of human society to those 
hazards. In other words, disaster risk cannot be properly understood unless both the natural hazards 
and the social vulnerability are equally discussed and understood. The following sections discuss 
these two concepts in detail.  
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2.3 Hazards 
Disasters occur from the impact of a variety of natural and technological hazards and their 
combinations. Tobin and Montz (2009, p. 1) define environmental hazards as “…the potential 
interaction between forces of the physical environment and the human-use system such that there is 
a negative impact on society – the potential for disaster”. UNISDR (2009a, p. 16) defines hazard as 
“…a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, 
injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic 
disruption, or environmental damage”. Here, UNISDR’s definition is considered as comprehensive 
and more appropriate to this research, since it takes both natural and man-made phenomena into 
account and looks for all possible negative impacts that cause discomfort for society.  
Both natural and man-made or technological hazards can be further divided based on their origin. 
According to the EM-DAT database classification, the natural hazards category is divided into five 
sub-groups, namely geo-physical, meteorological, hydrological, climatological and biological. The 
technological hazards category has three sub groups: industrial, transport and miscellaneous 
accidents. However, there continue to be conflicting ideas in the literature on hazard definitions and 
classifications. Referring to Pointner’s (1995) and Adam’s (2006) work, Schenker-Schenker-Wicki, 
Inauen, & Olivares (2010) classify epidemics as a man-made hazard, whereas they are classified as a 
natural hazard in the EM-DAT database classification. However, in this research, epidemics like 
‘dengue haemorrhagic fever’ and ‘leptospirosis’ are considered as caused by natural agents and, 
therefore, the EM-DAT classification is adopted.  
The concepts of frequency and magnitude are crucial in estimating natural hazard risk (Alcántara-
Ayala, 2002; Alexander, 1993) in order to assess the disaster risk of a community. The potential 
damage that could be caused by a hazard is always linked to its magnitude and frequency or how 
often it is likely to occur. Wisner et al. (2004) suggest that hazard magnitude varies with degree of 
intensity and severity. Systematic data gathering for many years has enabled us to model the 
likelihood of many hazards in terms of return period [frequency] and geographical distribution. 
However, accurate models are increasingly difficult to develop because of current anthropogenic 
climate change; scholars are sceptical about the adequacy of available models for calculating the 
actual level of risk (Wisner et al., 2004). Moreover, it is recognized that natural hazard events cannot 
be controlled, but their impacts on people and their property can be reduced by systematic 
approaches to reduce the vulnerability of people and properties to such hazards (Godschalk, Beatley, 
Berke, Brower, & Kaiser, 1999). Therefore, increased attention is given to the social production of 
vulnerability in order to understand the level of risk that human societies face.  
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2.4 Vulnerability 
The term vulnerability is also used diversely in various disciplines and contexts. Birkmann (2006) 
identifies 25 different definitions for the term. Among these different definitions two in particular 
warrant discussion. Wisner et al. (2004, p. 11) define vulnerability as “…the key characteristics of a 
person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and 
recover from the impact of a natural hazard”. UNISDR (2009a, p. 30) defines vulnerability as “…the 
characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the 
damaging effects of a hazard”. Wisner et al. look at the vulnerability of an individual or group, 
UNISDR emphasizes community, system and even assets as elements in society that can be 
vulnerable to hazards. Both definitions highlight the characteristics of community that make them 
more or less vulnerable to disasters.  
People are not homogenous in their social make up. From a practical perspective, vulnerability varies 
from person to person depending on his or her social class, occupation, caste, ethnicity, gender, age, 
disability, health status, immigration status, and nature and extent of social networks (Wisner, 2009). 
Aysan (1993) identifies a strong causal relationship between vulnerability to disasters and specific 
characteristics of vulnerable groups. From Aysan (1993, pp. 11,12) the characteristics of people most 
likely to be at risk from the impact of a hazard are: 
1. Proximity/exposure: people who occupy or, for their livelihood, 
depend on areas of high hazard risk; 
2. Capacities and resources: people who have limited means and 
capacity to mobilize them in order to increase… their defences 
against hazards; and 
3. Disadvantage/marginalization: people who are peripheral or weak 
due to gender, age, ethnicity, class, etc. 
Based on the above, Aysan (1993, p. 12) lists nine causes/types of vulnerability. It is important to look 
at this list of vulnerabilities because it identifies the influence of broader socio-political and economic 
contexts in human vulnerability that otherwise are easily omitted in development planning. Aysan’s 
nine types of vulnerability are: 
I. lack of access to resources (material/economic vulnerability), 
II. disintegration of social patterns (social vulnerability), 
III. degradation of the environment and the inability to protect it 
(ecological vulnerability), 
IV. lack of strong national and local institutional structures 
(organizational vulnerability), 
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V. lack of access to information and knowledge (educational 
vulnerability), 
VI. lack of pubic awareness (attitudinal and motivational vulnerability), 
VII. limited access to political power and representation (political 
vulnerability), 
VIII. certain beliefs and customs (cultural vulnerability), and 
IX. weak buildings or weak individuals (physical vulnerability). 
Wisner (2004) argues that Aysan’s list of vulnerability types is useful to orient the perceptions of 
planners and practitioners so that vulnerable people are not neglected before, during and after a 
disaster. Consistent with Aysan’s list, Alcántara-Ayala (2002, p. 119) categorises all types of 
vulnerability into four main types as “…social, economic, political and cultural”. According to 
Alcántara-Ayala (2002, p. 119), the four types belong to human vulnerability. Alcántara-Ayala 
differentiates human vulnerability from natural vulnerability, which is characterised by the 
geographical location in which people live. However, natural vulnerability is caused by human 
vulnerability, because the geographical location in which an individual lives vastly depends on his/her 
social, economic and political status as well as cultural values.  
Poverty is also an important aspect of vulnerability because of its direct association with access to 
resources. Wisner et al. (2004) argue that poverty can be a relevant proxy to assess access to 
resources. Access and control over resources largely determine livelihood security, an important 
dimension of disaster resilience that decides how well a person faces a disaster or bounces back after 
a disaster. However, Wisner (2009) argues that even though there is a strong correlation between 
income and access to resources with vulnerability, the straightforward identification of ‘the poor’ as 
vulnerable does not help planners and activists formulate short and medium-term plans and 
demands. According to Hilhorst & Bankoff (2004, p. 2) “Not all poor people are vulnerable to 
disasters, nor are the poor all vulnerable in the same way, and some people who are not poor are 
also vulnerable”. 
It has long been recognized that disasters are not natural (not even sudden ones) because hazards 
affect different people or societies differently (Cannon, 1993). This inequality in risk is largely a 
function of the principal systems of power operating in all societies (Cannon, 1993) and the resultant 
governance mechanisms. Domestic and international governance is increasingly recognized as an 
influencing factor in social vulnerability and unequal distribution of risk in different societies. Pelling 
(2003, p. 34) states that “…inappropriate planning and legislature can exacerbate vulnerability”. The 
term ‘risk governance’ and its influence on vulnerability and disaster risk are discussed in detail later 
in this chapter. These factors are important in the context of vulnerability to understand why some 
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countries are more vulnerable to disasters than others. To illustrate these points, it is helpful to 
compare two recent significant disasters. 
In 2010, two major earthquakes hit Haiti and New Zealand. Even though the magnitude of the two 
events was similar, the consequences in the two countries were alarmingly different. While Haiti lost 
approximately 222,570 people (EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database) from this 
single event [though the final mortality figure is still not verified (Daniell, 2010)], New Zealand 
managed to cope with its disastrous event with zero casualties. Even though a lack of economic 
development and high population density accounted for much of the death toll differences, 
Ambraseys (2011), a professor of civil engineering at Imperial College, London, argues that 
corruption in the social system in Haiti greatly contributed to the unprecedented number of 
casualties there.  
It is important to look more closely at how contemporary development trends alter or increase 
existing vulnerabilities in human society. Internally Displaced People (IDP), because of massive 
development projects, is a classic example in this regard. The destruction of social networks, 
displaced from the resource bases they were relying on for their livelihood, distorted market chains, 
and forced relocation to an unknown territory with no or less knowledge about hazardous situations, 
all hamper people who have been uprooted from their traditional communities and locations, 
making them more vulnerable to future disasters. Moreover, in cases such as the destruction of 
mangroves to establish a shrimp farm or to construct a hotel can make neighbouring communities 
more vulnerable to storms or tsunamis because the natural barriers that otherwise protected them 
are no longer there (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2005b). This makes it clear 
that any development project or programme should give due recognition to the existing vulnerability 
of people and carefully assess how the proposed development project might contribute to increased 
or decreased vulnerability.  
2.5 Resilience 
The reciprocal of vulnerability, ‘resilience’ as some authors define it (De Lange, Sala, Vighi, & Faber, 
2010; Manyena, 2006), is also an important dimension in disaster risk reduction discussion. 
Resilience is more about coping with disasters rather than promising to control or avoid their 
underlying physical energies (Pelling & Uitto, 2001). In the literature, resilience is commonly viewed 
as a complex, dynamic bio-psychosocial/spiritual process dependent on life context (Greene, 
Galambos, & Lee, 2003). Though some authors define resilience as the flip side of vulnerability, 
others describe it as one of the three elements of vulnerability along with exposure and sensitivity 
(Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003). 
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UNISDR (2009a, p. 24) defines resilience as “…the ability of a system, community or society exposed 
to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and 
efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures 
and functions”. In other words, it is the ability of the community or social system to bounce back 
from a shock. As the concept of ‘disaster-proof communities’ is unrealistic, most scientists have faith 
in a more realistic goal of creating communities that can bounce back from disasters and get ready to 
face the next event (Blanco, Alberti, Olshansky, Chang, & Wheeler, 2009). In addition, many scholars 
have begun to use the term ‘resilience’ as a goal for communities, in post disaster rebuilding (Blanco 
et al., 2009).  
Adger et al. (2005) studied socio-ecological resilience to coastal disasters and describe social 
resilience, including social institutions for collective action, robust governance systems, and a 
diversity of livelihood choices as crucial assets for buffering extreme natural hazards and promoting 
social reorganization. Resilience includes not only a community’s capacity to return to the pre-
disaster state but also to advance the state through continuous learning and adaptation (Cutter et 
al., 2008).  
Even though the term resilience has mostly been used in post disaster situations, it is increasingly 
also being used in pre-disaster situations. Most communities face multiple disasters over their 
lifetime. So, bouncing back from one disaster [recovery in a post disaster situation] is also a pre-
disaster context for the next. Thus, resilience, as much as vulnerability, is an important dimension in 
DRR including development-induced disaster risks. Development actions, in an ideal situation, should 
increase the resilience of the community to various natural hazards, however, as discussed in the 
next section, in many instances they have contributed to reducing the resilience of communities by 
depleting the ecosystems and displacing already vulnerable communities from their traditional lands. 
Resilience is considered in this research as a constituent of vulnerability, low resilience leads to 
increased vulnerability.  
2.6 Mal-development: understanding the disaster development linkages 
The root causes of current disasters can be traced back to decades or even centuries old 
development decisions. Aysan (1993) states that the infamous 1991-1993 famine in Somalia can be 
traced back to the policies of the first independent government. The current earthquake risks in 
Christchurch can be traced as far back as the urbanization decision made by the Royal Charter in 
1856 (Christchurch City Council, 2010).  
Growth oriented development models and initiatives promised to reduce poverty and improve 
people’s wellbeing have been subjected to severe criticism for their inherent characteristics of 
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environmental unsustainability and socioeconomic inequality. Amin (2011) and Shiva (1988) draw on 
this eco-centric ideology and even call current development trends, which increase social and 
economical inequality and environmental degradation, ‘mal-development’. The value of Amin’s and 
Shiva’s ideas on development are more widely felt today than ever before. Increasing numbers of 
social issues, environmental degradation and economic inequality are all deep rooted in growth 
oriented economic models that countries have pursued. According to Cannon (1993, p. 94), “There is 
a widespread recognition of human destruction of the environment, and that natural hazards 
themselves can be precipitated (or exacerbated) by the pursuit of economic and social goals, which 
hitherto were seen as the normal objectives of economic growth”.  
In 2004, the UNDP’s publication, ‘Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development’ elaborates 
the complex inter-linkages between disaster and development (Table 2.2). The authors consider 
economic development and social development separately in explaining disaster development 
linkages. As per UNDP, social development includes social assets such as inclusive governance and 
health and educational infrastructure. Economic development includes economic production and its 
supporting infrastructure and the integrity of natural resources for the sustainability of resource-
dependent livelihoods. In Table 2.2, UNDP identifies three key correlations between disaster and 
development: disaster limits development, development causes disaster risk, and development 
reduces disaster risks. UNDP argues that not all development increases the risk of disaster because 
some forms of development reduce disaster risks. Therefore, one key argument in Table 2.2 is that 
development is not a risk neutral process; it either increases disaster risk or reduces disaster risk. 
This research specifically focuses on situations where development causes disaster risk.  
The upward trend in the number of development-induced disasters worldwide, as highlighted in the 
Global Assessment Report 2011, especially in developing countries, supports the argument that 
development increases the risk of disasters. Many economic development interventions have 
inadvertently created new forms of vulnerabilities, especially in low and middle-income countries 
that also have poor governance records (Benson & Twigg, 2007; UNISDR, 2011). Hence, ill-planned 
mal-development initiatives can be labelled as channels for increased disaster vulnerability and 
hazard risk, especially leading to development-induced disasters. Urbanization, deforestation and the 
filling of wetlands have changed hydrologic regimes, creating the possibility of more incidents of 
small scale flooding in many parts of the world (Tobin & Montz, 1997). Disaster risks are created over 
time by environmentally unsustainable development projects (Hilhorst & Bankoff, 2004). For 
instance, Hughey (1997) highlights how the mining industry has created pressure on fragile mountain 
environments and socially marginalized mountainous communities.  
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Table 2.2 Disaster – Development Linkages (UNDP, 2004, p. 20) 
 Economic development Social development 
Disaster limits 
development 
Destruction of fixed assets. Loss of 
production capacity, market access or 
material inputs. Damage to transport, 
communications and energy 
infrastructure. Erosion of livelihoods, 
savings and physical capital. 
Destruction of health or education 
infrastructure and personnel. Death, 
disablement or migration of key social 
actors leading to erosion of social 
capital. 
Development causes 
disaster risk 
Unsustainable development practices 
that degrade the environment and 
create wealth for some at the 
expense of unsafe working or living 
conditions for others. 
Development paths generating 
cultural norms that promote social 
isolation or political exclusion. 
Development reduces 
disaster risk 
Access to adequate drinking water, 
food, waste management and a 
secure dwelling increases peoples’ 
resiliency. Trade and technology can 
reduce poverty. Investing in financial 
mechanisms and social security can 
cushion against vulnerability. 
Building community cohesion, 
recognizing excluded individuals and 
social groups, such as women, and 
providing opportunities for greater 
involvement in decision-making, 
enhanced education and health 
capacities increases resiliency. 
 
Although analyses of development-induced disasters have rarely been subjected to scholarly work, 
the misery associated with development-induced disasters appears a “hot” topic for the media if the 
number of casualties is large enough to be of interest. The following paragraphs provide a brief 
account of how national and international media reported some development-induced disasters. 
Even though this does not provide a complete account of the misery that vulnerable people face 
today, it emphasizes the importance of re-visiting modern development interventions to incorporate 
DRR.  
The South Korean media criticized authorities after a mudslide caused havoc in southern Seoul killing 
approximately 59 people in July 2011. The media scrutinized unplanned construction in hilly areas 
that led to heavy deforestation as the cause of the destruction (Chan-Kyong, 2011; NewsFlavor, 
2011). In March 2012, TVNZ reported a deadly landslide occurred in the mountains of Papua New 
Guinea, killing at least 25 locals. The report raised questions about the safety of excavations done by 
a major US oil company, Exxon Mobil. The landslide tore through a quarry used by Exxon in January 
creating suspicion about quarry activities (TVNZ, 2012). 
Again, a number of examples can be seen in relation to the current trend of highway construction 
and new forms of vulnerabilities being created (Duryog Nivaran & Practical Action, 2008a; Miller, 
2011). Today, highways have become a symbol of modern development in most low and middle-
income countries. Governments maintain a high level of faith in their road networks as economic 
boosters in contemporary development models and invest large sums in highway development. A 
  
 15 
major portion of these investments arrives as loans from bi-lateral or multi-lateral agencies. The 
social cost of these investments, however has frequently been overshadowed by government 
propaganda.  
The 2006 floods in Colombo, Sri Lanka, which cut off the country’s capital and its only international 
airport, created flood levels of 1-1.5 m over the A3 road and raised concerns over the Colombo 
Katunayake highway that was under construction. The media reported a similar level of rain in the 
area in 1992 and 2003. However, this was the first time the residents experienced a flood of such 
magnitude (Dissanayaike, 2006). A study of recent landslide activity in the Dominical–Uvita corridor 
on the Pacific Coast in Costa Rica, suggests that recent unchecked economic development activities 
are the major cause of increased landslides in the study areas (Miller, 2011).  
The South Asia Disaster Report 2008 (Duryog Nivaran & Practical Action, 2008a) illustrates a number 
of such ‘alleged’ mal-development initiatives in the region that created problems for neighbouring 
communities. The 93 km Ahmedabad Vadodara Expressway in India was blamed for flooding in June 
2005. The flood caused havoc in 600 villages within a 5 to 25 km range of the expressway, which had 
never experienced floods before. The Indian Rs. 6 billion (approx. 120 million USD) expressway is said 
to have blocked the natural drainage path of the low-lying areas (Duryog Nivaran & Practical Action, 
2008a). Similar cases have been reported from Nepal, where road construction often exacerbates 
pre-existing slope instabilities resulting in the increased occurrence of landslides along road corridors 
(Duryog Nivaran & Practical Action, 2008a).   
Ill-planned post-disaster recovery activities also lead to new forms of vulnerabilities. Benson & Twigg 
(2007) point to an example where a new aid-funded hospital has been re-constructed at the foot of a 
volcano in the Caribbean island of Montserrat after it was destroyed by Hurricane Hugo in 1989. This 
hospital was subsequently destroyed by pyroclastic flows of a volcano, which erupted in mid-1995.  
Studies of development-induced displacement are also common. Even though these do not directly 
contribute to disaster mortality statistics, increased vulnerabilities of the affected communities 
cannot be simply neglected. In 1994, a study of World Bank-assisted development projects from 
1986-1993 concluded that annually 4 million people associated with the hydropower sector and 6 
million more people linked to transportation infrastructure projects are displaced worldwide 
(Robinson, 2003). Unfortunately, it is the disadvantaged segments of society that are most frequently 
subjected to these involuntary displacements creating suspicions about the equitable distribution of 
modern development risk. These segments are considered highly vulnerable to threats posed by 
environmental factors due to their social position, livelihood type and economic stability. In India, for 
example, a study calculated that out of 2 percent of the total population that had been displaced by 
development projects in the first 40 years of the country’s independence, 40 percent were tribal 
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people. However, the tribal community is said to be only 8 percent of the total population of India 
(Robinson, 2003).  
There are many media reports and in-depth studies about widely felt technological disasters such as 
Bopal, Chernobyl and Fukushima. The Bopal crisis in 1984 in India resulted in casualties of over 3,000 
people due to a chemical gas leak (Sriramachari & Chandra, 1997). A similar disaster happened with 
the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine resulting in 125,000 deaths directly related to the crisis and 
leaving many thousand exposed to radiation in 1996 (Liberatore, 2013). These enormous human 
tragedies question not only the lack of risk assessment inbuilt in development processes and lack of 
preparedness for any failures but also to the poor accountability and transparency of the authorities. 
History repeats; the recent Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011 (UNISDR, 2011) is very similar 
to the two previous cases. Even though the Great East Japan earthquake of magnitude 9.0 (World 
Nuclear Association, 2012) and the subsequent tsunami had triggered the Fukushima disaster, the 
main causes of the nuclear disaster are claimed to be lying in the institutional failures of political 
influence and industry-led regulation (Green Peace International, 2012). Green Peace International 
(2012, p. 1) concludes from its analysis that “It was a failure of human institutions to acknowledge 
real reactor risks, a failure to establish and enforce appropriate nuclear safety standards and a failure 
to ultimately protect the public and the environment”. Therefore, in many respects, the Fukushima 
disaster is identical to Bopal and Chernobyl. The Fukushima disaster has also shocked the world, not 
only because it happened in one of the most developed countries, which is recognized as having high 
quality governance (The World Bank, 2014), but it also shows that we often fail to learn from past 
mistakes.   
The above provides a partial account of development-induced disasters and the suffering of many 
millions of people, but the true suffering of the people involved is not captured by such simplistic 
facts. However, the examples are adequate to argue the importance of factoring disaster risk 
considerations into development planning at national, regional and local levels.  
2.7 Governance (Risk): a cause and a remedy for development disasters  
The role of governance in DRR is increasingly recognized, with the quality of governance being 
considered to have a direct bearing on why some countries have higher disaster losses than others 
(UNISDR, 2009b). The World Bank (2011) defines governance as “…traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised”. As per the World Bank, this also includes the process by 
which governments are selected, monitored and replaced. Although the World Bank’s definition is 
biased towards the formal coercive power of governments, some literature focuses on both formal 
and informal arrangements through which decisions are made and implemented in order to advance 
social goals (Guarnacci, 2012; Ming’ate, Rennie, & Memon, 2014). However, the role of governments 
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in governance and their accountability towards protection of society and the environment is a 
fundamentally accepted norm today. In particular, the concern attached to bad governance is most 
often directed at governments (Roberts, Wright, & O'Neill, 2007).  
Bad or poor governance includes practices such as corruption, manipulation of the media, disrespect 
for human rights, arbitrary application of the rule of law, actual or potential political instability, lack 
of transparency, insufficient information flows, lack of accountability and responsibility, and lack of 
stakeholder participation in decision making. Good governance is represented by the ‘presence’ of 
these elements in a society (Roberts et al., 2007). Access to information on disaster risk, particularly 
for the most vulnerable, is considered as the first step in effective DRR (UNISDR, 2011). However, 
countries with poor quality governance fail to exercise these fundamental responsibilities that lie at 
the centre of disaster resilience of any society.   
Much research has shown a statistically positive correlation between levels of corruption and their 
significant impact on government efficiency and the rule of law, two key components of risk 
governance (e.g. Ambraseys, 2011; Anbarci, Escaleras, & Register, 2005; Escaleras, Anbarci, & 
Register, 2007). Ambraseys (2011) states that differences in death tolls in different countries in 
natural events, especially earthquakes, is not only because of lack of education, scientific knowledge 
or technological capability in the country concerned, but rather are the consequences of the corrupt 
use of scientific knowledge. In general, “…more democratic, accountable states with more effective 
institutions tend to suffer lower mortality” (UNSIDR, 2011: p 141). 
Technological disasters caused by poor governance have been emphasized in the previous section, 
which reiterates the importance of the concept of governance in DRR. In other words, the way in 
which the society is governed has a direct bearing on the increased or decreased disaster risk of the 
people. This thinking has led to the development of a relatively new subject, ‘risk governance’. Renn, 
Klinke & van Asselt (2011, p. 231) define risk governance as “…both the institutional structure and 
the policy process that guide and restrain collective activities of a group, society or international 
community to regulate, reduce or control risk problems”. The International Risk Governance Council 
(IRGC) provides a broader perspective to risk governance. According to the IRGC (2008, p. 4) risk 
governance includes: 
…the totality of actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms and is 
concerned with how relevant risk information is collected, analysed and 
communicated, and how management decisions are taken. It applies the 
principles of good governance that include transparency, effectiveness and 
efficiency, accountability, strategic focus, sustainability, equity and fairness, 
respect for the rule of law and the need for the chosen solution to be 
politically and legally feasible as well as ethically and publicly acceptable. 
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According to Renn & Graham (2005), risk governance involves the ‘translation’ of the ingredient and 
core principles of governance to the context of risk and risk-related decision-making. Therefore, both 
development planning and developmental control instruments such as environmental assessment 
should be conceptualized within the context of risk governance. According to Kakonge (1998), well-
conceived EIAs should reflect many of the elements of good governance principles including 
transparency, sufficient information flows, accountability, responsibility, and stakeholder 
participation.  
Over the last few decades, the previously dominant state-based ‘top-down’ governance model has 
been quietly replaced by diverse forms of collaborative management, partnership arrangements, 
delegated authority to decentralized institutions, and community management (Lockwood, 2010). 
Similarly, the handling of societal risk problems has been shifted from a state-centric mode to multi-
strata governance systems, where the political authority for handling risk problems is distributed 
among decentralized institutions (Lidskog, Uggla, & Soneryd, 2011). The concept of risk governance, 
especially, demands bringing together a wide range of actors from regional to local level who have a 
role to play in risk related activities (Assmuth, Hildén, & Benighaus, 2010), including development 
planning.  
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) programme was developed by a World Bank research 
project. It enables assessment of cross-country indicators of governance under six composite 
indicators. These indicators are: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption (The World Bank, 2011). In addition, the European Commission (2001) identifies 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence as key good governance 
principles. In recognition of the importance of governance in DRR, the Hyogo Framework for Action 
(HFA), adopted at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe, Japan, in 2005, listed 
governance as its first priority for action (UNISDR, 2005). In this priority for action, countries are 
expected to ensure that DRR is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for 
implementation at all levels. This recognizes having national institutional and legislative frameworks 
for DRR, allocating resources to all levels and community participation in DRR. However, this does 
not explicitly cover most good governance principles listed above, which may have greatly reduced 
the effectiveness of such priorities.  
2.8 Role of the international context in risk governance 
Policies are increasingly being coordinated beyond the national level in contemporary societies. 
Internationally agreed principles, treaties, conventions, frameworks, norms and rules have an 
influence on national and subnational governments, domestic policies, civil societies, and economies 
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(Klinke, 2009). In the environmental paradigm alone, Bryner (2004) catalogues nearly 200 such 
international agreements. Although these environmental frameworks along with other economic 
instruments have successfully contributed to domestic institutional building, their contribution to 
sustainable economic development is disappointing (Bryner, 2004). Using empirical analyses of bi-
lateral investment treaties that are increasingly being used by developing countries for economic 
development, Ginsburg (2005, p. 107) states, “…under some circumstances, international devices 
may be substitutes for local institutions and lead to reductions in governance quality”.  
The influence of multi-lateral aid on economic, social and environmental management policies in 
developing countries has been a hot topic for many scholars around the world for many years 
(Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, & Rubinson, 1978; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Ortolano & Shepherd, 1995; 
Shandra, Nobles, London, & Williamson, 2004; Shandra, Shircliff, & London, 2011). Some scholars 
argue multi-lateral and bi-lateral should not be considered equally because their motives and policies 
would be different (Alesina & Weder, 1999; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984). Maizels & Nissanke (1984) 
conclude that bi-lateral aid allocations for developing countries largely depend on donors’ foreign 
economic, political and security interests, whereas multilateral aid is allocated chiefly on a recipient’s 
need criteria. For instance, Chinese investment banks usually require that at least 50 percent of the 
procurement must come from China for any project implemented in the recipient country and 
Chinese contractors are required to be in charge of managing the projects, whereas World Bank 
funding is bound with conditions related to ‘good governance and environmental protection’ 
(Campbell, Wheeler, Attree, Butler, & Mariani, 2012). The commercial nature of bi-lateral funding is 
also evident in the interest rates of some bi-lateral donors. For example, Campbell et al. (2012) argue 
that some loans from Chinese investment banks to Sri Lanka have interest rates of 6-7 percent 
compared with the World Bank’s loans 0.25-2 percent interest rates. However, some scholars are 
very critical also about World Bank funding. Woods (2000, p. 823) argues that the World Bank itself 
does not “…altogether live up to these [good governance and environmental protection] standards”; 
Ortolano & Shepherd (1995) and Rich (2013) argue that the World Bank was supporting projects with 
disastrous impacts on the environment in the late 1970s. However, most multi-lateral agencies, 
including the World Bank and the ADB, now require an EIA for projects they fund. In addition, there 
are many case studies and much literature relevant to the role of trans-national corporations in 
increasing the vulnerability of communities. Some example of these issues and problems have been 
highlighted elsewhere in this chapter.  
Of many hundreds of international treaties and conventions related to environmental management, 
the Hyogo Framework for Action warrants special mention because it provides the only international 
framework for disaster risk management. In 2005, world leaders from 168 countries gathered at the 
World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Hyogo, Japan, and endorsed a global framework for DRR 
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(UNISDR, 2005) commonly known as the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). It expects “…the 
substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets 
of communities and countries” (UNISDR, 2005, p. 3). This is expected to be achieved through three 
strategic goals, five priorities for action and four cross cutting themes (Appendix A).  
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) secretariat was 
established and made responsible for monitoring the progress of the HFA in action and providing 
technical assistance to governments to implement the HFA. The mid-term review of the HFA, 
conducted in 2011, states that significant progress is being made in the implementation of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action and that its principles have been firmly established and endorsed. However, 
the review also emphasizes some critical deficiencies in the process of implementation of the 
framework. As per the midterm review: 
“…concerns remain about the lack of systematic multi-hazards risk 
assessments and early warning systems factoring in social and economic 
vulnerabilities; the integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable 
development policies and planning at national and international level, and 
the still insufficient level of implementation of the Hyogo Framework for 
Action at the local level” (UNISDR, 2011, p. 10).  
Such deficiencies in practice risk the achievement of the expected outcome of the framework. 
UNISDR has conducted an online debate in parallel to the mid-term review in order to obtain views 
from a wider audience. This debate has included government officials, experts in the sector, 
academics and practitioners. Many argue that the voluntary nature of the framework has reduced its 
effectiveness, especially because of its inability to hold governments accountable for achieving DRR 
targets (UNISDR, 2010). Under the current system, member countries are expected to undertake 
biennial national progress reports (PreventionWeb, 2012). However, nearly half of the member 
countries have not adhered to these requirements (UNISDR, 2011). Even though many have shown 
their dissatisfaction about the voluntary nature of the HFA, Hunter (1998) argues that many 
contemporary environmental agreements have been designed in highly flexible approaches either as 
frameworks or protocols to ensure acceptance by a larger number of countries. According to Hunter, 
this approach provides countries much needed time to build domestic political support and capacity 
for stronger future actions.  
2.9 EIA as a development control mechanism 
As discussed earlier, development is not a risk neutral phenomenon; it either increases or decreases 
socio-environmental risks including disaster risks. Controlling new development interventions is 
therefore considered a crucial process within the development-planning paradigm to mitigate 
potentially negative consequences of development policies, programmes and projects. Assessing 
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potential risks of development initiatives, whether they are for residential, commercial or 
infrastructural purposes, and taking necessary measures to mitigate those risks can significantly 
improve the outcomes of such development projects for present and future generations. “Controlling 
the creation of new development areas and features, …can [also] help mitigate the potentially 
significant consequences from placing such developments too close to either natural and man-made 
hazard sources” (Barry, 2009, p. 261) and mitigate the negative impacts of such development. 
Evaluation of the probable risk of such development initiatives and factoring those risk 
considerations into planning and investment decisions are crucial to achieving this objective.  
There is a variety of environmental and risk assessment tools being used in different contexts. 
Among these different tools, the oldest and most well established is Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) (IAIA (International Association for Impact Assessment), 2009). EIA is now being 
practised in over 100 countries worldwide (Alshuwaikhat, 2005). Undertaking an EIA for 
development projects has been a lending condition of the World Bank’s loans since 1989 
(Alshuwaikhat, 2005). This has also influenced the rapid spread of EIA, especially among developing 
nations. However, the genuine intention of implementing EIAs in these political contexts to mitigate 
unfavourable consequences of development projects is still a debated topic.  
The IAIA (1999, p. 2) defines Environmental Impact Assessment as: “…the process of identifying, 
predicting, evaluating and mitigating the biophysical, social, and other relevant effects of 
development proposals prior to major decisions being taken and commitments made”. Morgan 
(1998) discusses the formal and informal aims of implementing the EIA process and identifies that 
the use of EIA in development control as one of its formal aims. According to Morgan (1998, p. 13), 
“…the essential purpose of the EIA is to identify proposals that will have unacceptable impacts on the 
environment, so that the impacts can be avoided or ameliorated by changes to the proposal… or 
proposal can be rejected”. IAIA (1999, p. 2) has identified four objectives of EIA: 
 To ensure that environmental considerations are explicitly 
addressed and incorporated into the development decision making 
process;  
 To anticipate and avoid, minimize or offset the adverse significant 
biophysical, social and other relevant effects of development 
proposals;  
 To protect the productivity and capacity of natural systems and the 
ecological processes which maintain their functions; and  
 To promote development that is sustainable and optimizes resource 
use and management opportunities.  
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often undertaken either based on a list of actions that should require EIAs for approval or based on 
the discretionary determination of relevant authorities.  
In scoping, the range of project related issues that should be addressed in the EIA report is 
determined. Scoping enables the narrowing down of the scope of the EIA report to the most 
significant issues and eliminating unrelated issues (Weston, 1997; C. Wood, 1995). This process, 
therefore, results in more focused EIA reports and increases the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
EIA process.  
Once the scope of the EIA report is determined, the report is then prepared documenting the 
findings related to impact prediction and mitigation measures. Impact prediction includes evaluation 
and assessment of the significant impacts using either qualitative or quantitative methodologies or 
both. According to Therivel & Morris (2009), impact prediction should include direct, indirect and 
cumulative impacts as well as both positive and negative impacts. Impact prediction starts with a 
description of the existing environment, listing it as the baseline condition. Then it is possible to 
assess key environmental changes that may arise in the absence of the project and if the proposed 
project were implemented. Once the significance of impacts is assessed, then mitigation measures 
can be identified to “…avoid, minimize, remedy or compensate (in that sequence)” (Therivel & 
Morris, 2009, p. 9) negative impacts.  
During the ‘review’ stage, the decision-making authority together with the public and interested 
groups reviews the EIA report to assess the quality of the report, the methodologies adopted, key 
findings and recommended mitigation measures (Therivel & Morris, 2009). According to C. Wood 
(1995), this is the only stage where public participation is formally required in most EIA systems. 
Once the grievances and comments from the public and other interested parties are heard and 
addressed, the relevant decision-making body makes its decision on project approval. However, it is 
clear from the literature that the weight given to the EIA report in the final decision depends 
considerably “…on the jurisdiction, the particular proposal and the degree of political interest 
surrounding the development in question” (Harvey & Clarke, 2012, p. 6). Finally, the environmental 
impacts of the approved project are monitored; this is done either by the project approval agency, 
the developer or both.  
2.9.2 Emerging challenges of the EIA process 
The successful enactment of EIA guidelines and legislation in many developing countries does not 
necessarily mean EIA is being implemented successfully. “In many cases, EIA has not been effective 
due to legislation, organizational capacity, training, environmental information, participation, 
diffusion of experience, donor policy and political will” (Alshuwaikhat, 2005, p. 308), all of which are 
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integral parts of risk governance in relevant political contexts. Alshuwaikhat (2005) further 
elaborates that, in many Asian countries, including Sri Lanka, EIA was introduced because of the 
influence of lending and grant-issuing conditions of multi-lateral funding agencies such as the World 
Bank, but with insufficient staffing, experience and monitoring, with evaluation inadequacies and 
even without enough baseline data. Therefore, in such contexts, EIAs are conducted only because 
they are required by government legislation and donor agencies and, as a tool to justify projects 
rather than using it as a means to derive the best decision (Momtaz, 2002; Ortolano & Shepherd, 
1995). 
Moreover, EIA itself has some deficiencies. Mulvihill & Ali (2007) conclude that conventional 
approaches to EIA and planning are characteristically deficient in addressing the full range of impacts 
and risks. Further, many scholars argue that the vulnerability of the affected groups and social 
impacts are not adequately addressed in conventional EIA processes. Modak & Biswas (1999) assert 
that EIA is most often biased towards physical and biological impacts whereas social and cultural 
impacts are given less prominence. They claim this is an unfortunate bias since sociocultural impacts 
are ones that would affect the local community in their everyday life. Modak & Biswas argue for 
proper integration of socio-cultural impacts in the EIA process. An initial review of literature revealed 
a number of independent attempts and concepts presented to strengthen EIA by incorporating 
different dimensions such as social impact, cultural impact, gender dimensions, and risk assessment, 
but in a fragmented manner.  
Among these, risk assessment has been widely discussed by many scholars including Andrews (1988), 
Brockie (1994), Contini & Servida (1992), Harrop & Nixon (1999), Morgan (1998), and Ortolano & 
Shepherd (1995). Those authors note that the concept of risk is an important dimension in EIA. 
Morgan (1998, p. 41) asserts, “…strictly speaking, all EIA is about assessing risk...”. He defines risk 
assessment as a study of particular risks to human health and safety associated with planned 
development projects especially under abnormal circumstances such as design failures. Both Morgan 
and Andrews recognize that EIA and risk assessment sometimes have fuzzy boundaries and 
overlapping procedures. However, unlike EIA, risk assessment is not generally a mandatory 
requirement (Andrews, 1988). Another version of risk assessment, hazard assessment, “…requires 
consideration of the possibility of natural hazards disrupting a project with attendant catastrophic 
consequences” (Morgan, 1998, p. 41). Again, this is considered as an abnormal condition not because 
of design failure but due to natural events. However, both risk assessment and hazard assessment in 
this perspective look at the physical impacts on project employees and neighbouring communities 
and do not suggest an in-depth investigation into the specific vulnerabilities of the communities.  
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Vanclay (2003) notes that social impacts of development projects are much broader than the limited 
aspects normally considered in EIAs (such as demographic changes, job issues, financial security, and 
impacts on family life). He proposes employing Social Impact Assessment (SIA) complementarily with 
EIA to cover the evaluation of all impacts on humans and their interaction with socio-cultural, 
economic and biophysical surroundings. Vanclay (2003, p. 7) further adds: 
SIA thus has strong links with a wide range of specialist sub-fields involved 
in the assessment of areas such as: aesthetic impacts (landscape analysis); 
archaeological and cultural heritage impacts (both tangible and non- 
tangible); community impacts; cultural impacts; demographic impacts; 
development impacts; economic and fiscal impacts; gender impacts; health 
and mental health impacts; impacts on indigenous rights; infrastructural 
impacts, institutional impacts; leisure and tourism impacts; political impacts 
(human rights, governance, democratization etc.); poverty; psycho- logical 
impacts; resource issues (access and owner- ship of resources); impacts on 
social and human capital; and other impacts on societies. 
The above definition covers most dimensions of vulnerability listed by Aysan (1993). The idea of the 
integration of social impacts has been further elaborated by the scholarly work of Kværnera et al. 
(2006) and Toro et al. (2011) who propose addressing the socio-cultural impacts of development 
planning through vulnerability assessment. Kværnera et al. (2006) suggest that the term vulnerability 
is superficially addressed in EIA. Referring to experience in Norway, they instead propose including 
vulnerability within the Integrated Vulnerability Model, which emphasizes environmental 
vulnerability and alternative development in the early stages of EIA.  
The capability of the EIA process to assess the potential disaster risk generated from development 
projects has been a subject of discussion among development agencies since the early 2000s. UNDP’s 
publication ‘Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development’ (2004), which was a pioneering 
work on this aspect, highlights the importance of making DRR explicit in planning a development to 
ensure a broad participatory decision making process that is helpful in dealing with disaster risk. The 
report claims that “…environmental impact assessment should be extended to include a risk analysis 
component” (2004, p. 104). Despite the frequent calls and emerging interest in the usage of EIA to 
tackle development-induced disasters, the effectiveness of EIA in addressing development-induced 
disaster risk is yet to be fully realized. Nevertheless, there are some notable initiatives that address 
disaster risk in the EIA process. Among these, the Caribbean Development Bank’s approach to 
incorporate Natural Hazard Impact Assessment into EIA (Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), 2004) 
can be viewed as a much clearer approach with readily available supporting information.  
The CDB (2004), in its source book on ‘the integration of natural hazards into the EIA process’ 
identifies and explains a methodology to adjust the EIA process to address the problems stated 
above (Figure 2.3). The methodology proposes assessing both hazard risk and vulnerability as a part 
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of the screening and scoping of the environmental effects. The methodology was recommended by 
the CDB to all Caribbean nations.  
 
Figure 2.3 The adjusted EIA process of the CDB (Source: CDB (2004, p. 9))  
The CDB (2004) also highlights that assessing the impacts of natural hazards was not a part of the EIA 
system in the Caribbean region by 2003. Nevertheless, Davidson (2009) asserts that identification 
and assessment of natural hazard risk is required in the current EIA system in Jamaica. It is, however, 
unclear to what extent the CDB’s proposed methodology has contributed to addressing disaster risks 
of development projects because of the lack of any independent evaluation of the proposed 
methodology.  
2.10 Assessing the effectiveness of the EIA  
Performance evaluation of environmental assessment has been considered as one of the most 
crucial components of any environmental assessment system (Sadler, 1996). There is also increasing 
attention among scholars and practitioners on the impacts of impact assessments (Cashmore, Bond, 
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& Sadler, 2009). This has led to establishment of a substantial body of literature in the area of 
effectiveness evaluation. As Cashmore et al. (2009, p. 91) note, these cover a broad range of 
concerns including “…the impact of impact assessments” on decision making as well as conditions 
that influence the effectiveness of such instruments in different political contexts.  
Performance evaluation of EIA has also been considered as “…one of the most difficult to 
conceptualize and least explored empirically” (Wang, Bai, Liu, & Xu, 2012, p. 413). Many argue that 
assessing effectiveness of impact assessment tools, especially environmental impact assessment, is 
problematic (Cashmore, Gwilliam, Morgan, Cobb, & Bond, 2004; Cashmore, Richardson, Hilding-
Ryedvik, & Emmelin, 2010; Retief, Jones, & Jay, 2008; Wang et al., 2012). They argue that evaluating 
the effectiveness of environmental assessment systems is difficult since it is unlikely that a control is 
available against which to compare the implementation of the tool, and it is not possible to judge 
likely impacts in the absence of the tool. Referring to the effectiveness of strategic environment 
systems, Wang et al. (2012, p. 413) point out two main challenges: “…the identification and 
formulation of indicators”, and “…finding ways and methods to quantify and measure conformance 
to the indicators”. C. Wood (1995) asserts that there is not a reliable quantification approach for the 
effectiveness of EIA and such an assessment would be impractical in many aspects. Quoting Bartlett 
& Baber (1989), C. Wood (1995, p. 9) further argues that it may be more desirable and feasible to 
assess the effectiveness of the EIA based on the attitudes and opinions of those directly involved 
with the EIA system. Supporting this, Wang et al. (2012) suggest that qualitative and semi-
quantitative methods are usually employed in performance evaluation of environmental 
assessments.  
Evaluation studies undertaken by academic and regulatory bodies in various political contexts have 
included examination of individual environmental assessment cases and of elements of EIA 
procedures (Jay, Jones, Slinn, & Wood, 2007; Wang et al., 2012). There are also comparative reviews 
of EIA systems (Ahmad & Wood, 2002; El-Fadl & El-Fadel, 2004; Marara et al., 2011; C. Wood, 1995). 
These comparative studies and a number of other performance evaluations have mostly investigated 
the procedural requirements of EIA (Jay et al., 2007). However, as Jay et al. (2007) describe, there is 
increasing attention placed upon evaluating EIA according to more substantive criteria, which is the 
primary concern of investors and planners.  
Sadler (1996, p.37), in his landmark research the ‘International study of the effectiveness of 
environment assessment’, defines effectiveness as “…how well something works or whether it works 
as intended and meets the purposes for which it is designed”. Sadler (1996, p. 39) identifies three 
types of effectiveness: 
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the policy”. Here, ‘sustainable development’ or ‘a fair and equitable process’ is considered the 
normative goal of EIA policy. Sadler (1996, p. 229) points out that “…emerging policy and institutional 
realities and broad societal changes are quickly reshaping the world in which EA operates”. He 
further argues that these changes in the context carry profound implications for EIA practice. This 
idea has further been developed by other scholars such as Bina (2008), Bina et al. (2011), Hilding-
Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir (2007), Runhaar & Drissen (2007) and Wang et al. (2012) into a new type of 
effectiveness, described by them as contextual effectiveness.  
Wang et al. (2012) argue that every environmental assessment system operates within a political, 
legal and administrative context, and the effectiveness of such systems depends on the context 
within which environmental assessment legislation and guidelines are understood and implemented. 
They further argue that the legal, administrative, political and cultural circumstances influence the 
participants involved, the EIA process, the EIA outcomes and the decision to conduct an EIA. The 
elements of context vary from national policy style, characteristics of the planning agency, planning 
style and political commitment to sustainable development, professional skill and learning 
motivation (Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir, 2007). Meanwhile, other scholars identify environmental 
governance and accountability as elements of the context (Bina, 2008; George, 1999; Hilding-Rydevik 
& Bjarnadóttir, 2007; Noble, 2009; Nykvist & Nilsson, 2009; Runhaar & Driessen, 2007; Wang et al., 
2012). In this context, Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir (2007) claim that the elements of context 
should be defined in relation to the question concerned. They further argue that “…the elements of 
context are ‘context’ dependent” (Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir, 2007, p. 674). Therefore, the 
plurality in definitions of effectiveness and the interchangeable manner of the terms used is common 
in the evaluation studies. As Cashmore et al. (2004) argue, this plurality requires a clear statement of 
the researcher's interpretations of effectiveness in evaluative research. Given the possible 
importance of contextual matters, such as the quality of governance, in decisions on developments, 
an evaluation of contextual effectiveness as well as the procedural and substantive effectiveness of 
EIA is critical in understanding the performance of the EIA process in addressing disaster risk. This 
research thus investigates procedural, substantive and contextual effectiveness.  
2.10.1 Procedural effectiveness 
Sadler defines procedural effectiveness as whether the environmental assessment conforms to the 
“…established provisions and principles” (Sadler, 1996, p. 39). For example, how an EIA process 
works from a procedural aspect is the extent to which it meets accepted principles such as clearly 
defined objectives, provision of support and guidance, application to socio-economic effects and 
provision for monitoring (Wang et al., 2012). Bina et al. (2011, p. 573) argue that there is a 
“…significant overlap between the idea of good practice and effectiveness”. As discussed earlier, this 
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is the most widely researched dimension of evaluation studies and a number of indicators have been 
used in such studies. Ahmed & Wood (2002), Baker & MacLelland (2003), Boyle (1998), Gallardo & 
Bond (2001), Marara et al. (2010), Noble (2008), Pölönen et al. (2011), Sadler (1996), Wang et al. 
(2012), and C. Wood (1995) all used one or several indicators for procedural effectiveness in their 
studies. Consistent with the above studies, this research investigates the legal basis for EIA processes 
and the procedural guidance available for the implementation of EIA legislation under procedural 
effectiveness in selected countries.   
2.10.2 Substantive effectiveness  
Wang et al. (2012) assert that, traditionally, a core question of evaluation studies has been whether 
the impact assessment instrument meets the purpose for which it is designed. Sadler (1996) 
describes this aspect of performance evaluation as substantive effectiveness, which he clarifies as 
being whether “…the EA [environmental assessment] process achieve[s] the objectives set, e.g. 
support well-informed decision-making and result in environmental protection?”(Sadler, 1996, p. 
39). As Baker & McLelland (2003) argue, substantive effect leads to policy adjustments to improve 
the meeting of objectives by future application of environmental assessment. For instance, future 
EIAs can be adjusted to meet a particular objective (for example, reducing disaster risk), if that 
objective is not satisfactorily being achieved in the EIAs under scrutiny. Furthermore, Pölönen et al. 
(2011) argue that substantive effectiveness cannot be achieved unless clear procedural guidance is 
available on how the EIA findings should be linked to decision-making processes of development 
planning.  
Nevertheless, most effectiveness researchers have overwhelmingly focused on procedural aspects 
and therefore little is known about substantive effectiveness (Cashmore et al., 2004). This is also 
because of the difficulties in empirically exploring substantive effect (Jay et al., 2007) and the 
plurality in interpretation of the objectives of EIAs (Cashmore et al., 2004). As Cashmore et al. (2004, 
p. 307) conclude “It is, furthermore, evident that the precise purposes of this decision tool have been 
interpreted in different ways, in part due to the diversity of scientific disciplines EIA encompasses 
and the changing nature of the human–environment relationship”. This research investigates level of 
assessment and decision-making process in EIA processes of selected countries as part of substantive 
effectiveness.  
2.10.3 Contextual effectiveness  
Performance evaluation of EIA systems based on the above dimensions, i.e., procedural, substantive, 
transactive and normative effectiveness, is described by Runhaar & Driessen (2007) as ‘direct 
effectiveness’. Runhaar & Driessen (2007, p. 3) conclude that “…conformities of formal decisions with 
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the assessment report; changes in decision-makers’ understanding or awareness of environmental 
and sustainability issues; changes in the extent to which such issues are considered in decision-
making” all are direct impacts of environmental assessments.  
However, a number of scholars argue that such direct impacts are influenced and constrained by 
many contextual factors, which they call ‘indirect effectiveness’ (Bina, 2008; Bina et al., 2011; Boyle, 
1998; Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir, 2007; Nykvist & Nilsson, 2009; Runhaar & Driessen, 2007). 
According to Bina (2008, p. 719) “…the persistent failure of planning and decision-making to deliver 
environmentally sustainable development is closely linked to the limited environmental governance 
capacity of the machinery of government”. Nykvist & Nilsson (2009, p. 15) in their study on the 
impact assessment system and sustainable development in Sweden conclude by noting “…to 
enhance the potential for integrating sustainability concerns, it seems less fruitful to develop more 
advanced and complex assessment frameworks and models than strengthening institutional arenas 
for social learning”.  
Types of effectiveness have also been used in the literature in an interchangeable manner. Bina 
(2008), Bina et al. (2011) and Wang et al. (2012) describe indirect effectiveness as incremental 
effectiveness. However, Bina (2008) and Bina et al. (2011) use the term incremental to explain both 
contextual aspects and governance capacity, but Wang et al. (2012) treat the two separately, 
categorising indirect effectiveness into contextual effectiveness and incremental effectiveness. 
Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir (2007) and Marara et al. (2011) describe indirect effectiveness as 
contextual effectiveness. Meanwhile, Fuller (1999) describes two different categories required for 
effective EIA. They are systemic measures and foundation measures. He defines systemic measures 
as “…features within the EIA system to ensure quality of the EIA process”; foundation measures are 
defined as “…features which promote good practice and underpin the successful application of the 
systemic approaches” (Fuller, 1999, p. 56). Fuller further scrutinizes this dimension and notes that 
foundation measures promote good practice and successful application of the EIA process. Here, 
Fuller states guidelines, training and capacity building and professional recognition as foundation 
measures, which is consistent with Bina’s (2008) incremental effectiveness criteria. However, in 
reviewing the literature, it is clear that criteria described under both incremental and contextual 
effectiveness are considered together in global governance indices (e.g., the Worldwide Governance 
Index of the World Bank). Consistent with Bina (2008), Bina et al. (2011) and Hilding-Rydevik & 
Bjarnadóttir (2007), this research considers both incremental and contextual aspects under 
contextual effectiveness.  
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2.11 Setting up a conceptual framework: the disaster risk incubation model  
This section summarises the different concepts discussed in this chapter and synthesises a 
conceptual model to show the inter-linkages among the concepts. Disasters occur when vulnerable 
people interact with hazards and suffer exceptional, non-routine, levels of disruption and losses that 
exceed their capacity to recover. Therefore, disaster risk is a result of hazards and vulnerability. 
Though natural processes are responsible for many hazards, mal-development leads to increased 
vulnerability and hazards risk. As highlighted in the review of relevant literature, contemporary 
development projects and programmes are responsible for shaping and reshaping of hazards and 
vulnerabilities in many parts of the world, especially in developing countries. For instance, a flood 
bund intended to reduce the flood risk of one community can significantly shift away the flood 
hazard risk from the targeted community but can create new risk in another geographical location. 
Moreover, displacing communities from their traditional grounds, destruction of livelihoods, 
increased poverty, weakened infrastructures, etc., are all deep rooted with mal-development that, in 
turn, increases the vulnerability of communities.  
Disasters resulting from the above situations, in turn, can destroy hard earned economic and social 
development achieved by a society (i.e., vital infrastructure, market links, etc.). Development control 
instruments, such as EIA, are now being closely associated with development planning in many 
countries and are expected to reduce or prevent those negative consequences. Nevertheless, a close 
examination of the EIA process and contemporary development planning reveals that disaster risk is 
given marginal focus and has received diluted attention among other different environmental goals.  
In addition, vulnerability is a product of existing or prevailing international and domestic governance 
contexts that marginalize some segments of the community and limit their capacity to withstand the 
environmental and economic stresses they encounter. While internationally driven liberal trade 
policies, multi-national corporations, bi and multi-lateral trade agreements are responsible for 
reducing the competitiveness of local businesses and natural resource dependent livelihoods 
(Grinspun, 2003), environmental and disaster management treaties and frameworks such as the HFA 
promote the DRR capacity of member countries. On the other hand, international lending agencies 
such as the World Bank and the ADB, which finance most of the development projects in developing 
countries, enforce different conditions that influence risk reduction. They demand establishing or re-
establishing good domestic governance and executing EIA for development projects if the pledged 
funds for development projects are to be released. Although these conditions have been incapable of 
shaping the domestic governance context to a significant level, such conditions have at least made 
some contribution to the integration of the environmental dimension into development planning. In 
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contrast, changes in global financial power also have an influence on domestic governance systems 
especially in countries with poor governance records (Campbell et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the national governance system is responsible for determining access to natural 
resources, information (including early warning), decision-making, education and health facilities, 
etc., which are all closely associated with vulnerability. Vulnerability is mostly characterized by a lack 
of those facilities and denied access. Therefore, disaster risk is a direct outcome of mal-development 
and poor or bad governance.   
Turner (1976, p. 381) presents the notion of disaster incubation. Building on the sequence of events 
associated with an accident, he reasons that there is an incubation period whereby there is “…the 
accumulation of an unnoticed set of events” before a disaster strikes. According to Mulvihill & Ali 
(2007), the concept of disaster incubation has later been applied by several authors to natural 
disasters:  
…for example in the case of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 ([Bakker, 2005], 
[Rydin, 2006] and [Seager, 2006]) and the 1995 Chicago heat wave 
(Klinenberg, 1999), in which analysts have noted that particular social 
groupings, such as poor African-Americans and women, were particularly 
vulnerable to the impacts of the “natural” agents because of land use and 
political decisions which put the particular groups in harms way (Mulvihill & 
Ali, 2007, p. 345) 
It is argued here that the same concept can be applied to this research and Figure 2.5 illustrates the 
inter-linkages between the different concepts discussed in this chapter and shows how disaster risk is 
being incubated by mal-development and poor governance through a process of the accumulation of 
hazard risk and increased vulnerability. It is understood that development actions create or reshape 
hazards and vulnerability, which leads to increased disaster risk (Table 2.2).  
Such disaster risk, in turn, affects development projects as well as jeopardising the development 
goals. In addition, while anthropogenic climate change poses greater threats of increased hazard risk, 
bad governance from both domestic and international mechanisms threatens to increase 
vulnerability of people in fragile environments. So, these processes incubate the level of disaster risk 
potential of vulnerable populations around the world. In order to avoid such negative consequences, 
development planning in most countries is also associated with environmental planning and an EIA is 
required before project approval. In this research, the EIA is identified as the best placed risk 
governance tool to assess hazard risk and vulnerability of affected people and to propose mitigation 
methods, which then can be absorbed by the development project. If this process is effectively done, 
development projects would not induce any more hazard risk or increase the vulnerability of people. 
However, this risk governance process cannot take place in isolation.  
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research methodology and research methods adopted in this study in order 
to address the four research questions presented in Chapter 1. The chapter starts with a discussion 
of the research methodology, provides a justification and maps the selected approach. The chapter 
also describes the identification and formulation of a set of evaluation criteria to assess the 
effectiveness of the EIA processes of selected countries before discussing and justifying the selection 
of countries for comparative review, the selection of projects and data collection methods, including 
sampling techniques. Finally, the limitations encountered in the research and the strategies used to 
overcome such limitations are presented.  
3.2  Methodology  
The research methodology justifies, guides and evaluates the methods used in data collection and 
analysis (Petty, Thomson, & Stew, 2012a). According to Sarantakos (2005, p. 30), the methodology is 
“…a research strategy that translates ontological and epistemological principles into guidelines that 
show how the research is to be conducted”. Scholars hold differing views on the types of research 
methodologies commonly used. For instance, Sarantakos (2005) identifies qualitative, quantitative 
and mixed methodologies consistent with the gathering of research data as research methodologies, 
whereas Petty et al. (2012b) recognize case study, grounded theory, ethnography, phenomenology, 
and narrative as research methodologies. Scholz & Tietje (2002) also consider a case study as a 
research methodology. However, according to Sarantakos, a case study is neither a methodology nor 
a data collection method, but a field research design. It is therefore important to develop a clear 
position on the methodology adopted at the beginning of the research. This research adopts the 
classification provided by Sarankatos (2005); the methodology adopted in this research can be 
classified as a qualitative research methodology. 
Most effectiveness research reviewed in Chapter 2 used a qualitative methodology (Baker & 
McLelland, 2003; Bina, 2008; Fischer & Gazzola, 2006; Theophilou et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012; C. 
Wood, 1995). Thus, this research does not differ from the research reviewed in Chapter 2 in terms of 
the adopted research methodology. Many scholars argue that evaluating the effectiveness of an 
environmental assessment system is difficult since it is unlikely that a control is available against 
which to compare the implementation of the tool, and it is also not possible to judge likely impacts in 
the absence of the tool (Cashmore et al., 2004; Cashmore et al., 2010; Retief et al., 2008; Wang et al., 
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2012). Therefore, much of the discourse about the effectiveness of the EIA system focuses on the 
factors that can be advanced to explain ‘why’ an EIA system is effective, and on ‘how’ EIA can be 
improved (C. Wood, 1995). According to social scientists, why and how forms of research questions 
do not require quantification but require more emphasis on the study of phenomena (Lapan, 
Quartaroli, & Riemer, 2012; Sarantakos, 2005). Therefore, qualitative research methodology is 
appropriate in such contexts as it is for this study.  
This study was conducted as a cross-country comparison. There are several cross-country 
comparative reviews of environmental assessment systems available in the literature including 
Ahmad & Wood (2002), El-Fadi & El-Fadel (2004), Marara et al. (2011), Sadler (1996) and C. Wood 
(1995). According to C. Wood (1995), a comparative review of EIA systems enables one to explain 
their nature much more clearly than by studying the system in a single jurisdiction and also enables 
better understanding of the practice of the EIA system.  
Despite its strength, qualitative methodology has a number of limitations (Petty et al., 2012b; 
Sarantakos, 2005). Subjectivity of the data and questions of validity and reliability are acknowledged 
weaknesses of qualitative methodology (Sarantakos, 2005). These weaknesses can be addressed by 
triangulation of data drawn from different sources, from different places or from different people 
and through methodological triangulation, which involves using different methods of data collection 
(Flick, 2004). In this study, methodological triangulation methods as well as multiple sources were 
used to overcome the above challenges in using qualitative methodology.  
3.3  Rationale for the research methods 
This section identifies and justifies the different research methods used at each stage of the study. 
The section first outlines and explains a research concept map for the study, which demonstrates the 
conceptualization of the research methodology and then discusses different types of research 
methods used in different stages of the study. According to Schensul (2012), a research conceptual 
map is a theoretical starting point that provides a conceptual direction for a study (Figure 3.1). As in 
Figure 3.1, the research has three distinct stages. Stage 1 involved reviewing the literature and 
developing the research methodology and is reported in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, respectively. 
The literature reviewed covered DRR, EIA, and governance and concluded by presenting the disaster 
risk incubation model that demonstrates the inter-linkages among the above concepts. The literature 
review also included identifying and finalizing the evaluation criteria and associated information 
requirements, including the selection of countries and projects.  
Stage 2 involved a field study to collect data using qualitative research methods. Collected data were 
analysed using text analysis methods; the analysis is reported in chapters 5 and 6. The rationale for 
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selecting text analysis for data analysis is discussed in section 3.7. In stage 3, a comparative analysis 
was conducted using the findings from the two countries and the disaster risk incubation model was 
revisited. Finally, conclusions were derived on the effectiveness of the EIA processes in addressing 
disaster risk. These are presented in chapters 7 and 8.  
The research questions set out in Chapter 1 required exploring the views and experience of 
participants and triangulation of those with documentary and field evidence. Therefore, it was 
necessary to discover rather than test variables and qualitative research methods were preferred for 
data collection in the field. Data collection in Stage 2 adopted four main qualitative methods: 
1. qualitative interviews, 
2. focus group discussions (FGDs),  
3. document analysis, and 
4. field observations.  
Following Bartlett & Baber (1989), C. Wood (1995) argues for assessing the effectiveness of EIA based 
on the attitudes and opinions of those directly involved with the EIA system. Interviews with key 
selected interviewees involved in the EIA systems were used as the primary method of data 
collection. Interviews were considered appropriate for the field study considering the exploratory 
nature of the research and the ability of the method for in-depth probing into matters. According to 
Sarantakos (2005), the interview method allows the handling of complex questions and provides an 
opportunity for observing the non-verbal behaviour of the interviewees.  
The interview method in this study is required to generate relevant and in-depth views of the 
interviewees. Therefore, a semi-structured interview based on the evaluation criteria was preferred 
over a structured questionnaire or unstructured interviews. Semi-structured interviews enable 
questions to be simplified based on the context including the background of respondents, which 
allows optimal communication (Alasuutari, Bickman, & Brannen, 2008; de Leeuw, 2008). The selected 
method also enabled further probing if the answer of the interviewee did not sufficiently address the 
question. In order to triangulate data, interviews were conducted with EIA experts, planners and 
community members in project-affected areas.  
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powerless groups and they mostly expressed more freely in group interviews. This enabled a broader 
picture on community members’ views on the project and its impacts to be gained. FDGs also 
enabled identification of important aspects that required further probing in qualitative interviews 
and also the identification of key informants for qualitative interviews.   
It was important to add field observation as a field research method in Sri Lanka to examine and 
triangulate points raised in interviews and FGDs. Observations also gave more insights to facilitate 
FGDs and enquire more fully during qualitative interviews. According to Yin (2011, p. 143), field 
observation is an “…invaluable way” of collecting primary data, because the method gives an 
opportunity to the researcher to see the matter of interest with his own eyes. Finally, document 
analysis was used as a research method to triangulate primary data collected from the above 
methods. Section 3.7.4 provides a list of the documents analyzed in the research. These documents 
contain useful information for this research, especially to triangulate against data gathered from 
qualitative interviews.  
It was also necessary to relate the interview questions to a real life experience in order to get a 
meaningful picture of how the EIA is being practised in the two countries. This was especially 
important in evaluating criteria relevant to procedural and substantive effectiveness. For this 
purpose, recently conducted or approved projects from Sri Lanka and New Zealand were selected for 
study. The selection of projects for case study analysis is discussed in section 3.5. 
3.4  Identification and formulation of evaluation criteria  
As argued in section 2.10, following the landmark study carried out by Sadler in 1996, there has been 
increased attention on the impacts of impact assessments (Cashmore et al., 2009). This has resulted 
in a substantial body of literature in the area of effectiveness evaluation.  
Scholarly work on evaluating the effectiveness of different impact assessment tools (e.g., EIA, risk 
assessment, strategic environmental assessment, and social impact assessment) and agency 
documents (e.g., the Caribbean Development Bank, UNISDR) on DRR and environmental 
management were reviewed. It is clear from the literature review that scholarly work on 
effectiveness research has two major challenges. One is to identify and formulate evaluation criteria 
(Wang et al., 2012); the second is to identify the types of effectiveness dimensions to be investigated 
(Pölönen et al., 2011; Sadler, 1996). Pölönen et al. (2011, p. 122) argue that determining the actual 
effectiveness of EIA is extremely difficult; instead, they investigate the mechanism behind “…the 
factors which make the instrument either more or less effective as a preventive and participatory 
environmental management tool”.  
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As argued in Chapter 2, different scholars have focused on different effectiveness dimensions in their 
effectiveness evaluations. For instance, Sadler (1996) worked on procedural, substantive, and 
transactive dimensions. Cashmore et al. (2004), Jay et al. (2007) and Theophilou et al. (2010) more 
specifically investigate the substantive effectiveness of EIA, whereas Baker & McLelland (2003) look 
at the normative dimension. Later, Bina (2008), Bina et al. (2011), Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir 
(2007), Runhaar & Drissen (2007) and Wang et al. (2012) add contextual effectiveness. However, 
Fuller (1999) uses two categories: systemic and fundamental (Chapter 2). Though C. Wood (1995) 
does not differentiate the criteria into different categories or dimensions, Ahmad & Wood (2002) 
later followed Fuller’s (1999) categories. The main weakness of Fuller’s categorisation is that both 
substantive and procedural effectiveness are combined into one category. However, a review of 
relevant literature (e.g. Baker & McLelland, 2003; Pölönen et al., 2011; Sadler, 1996; Wang et al., 
2012) suggests that the above two are distinctly different and have different influences on overall 
effectiveness. Differentiating the systemic category further into procedural and substantive 
effectiveness provides a better understanding of the influence of each dimension on overall 
effectiveness and also the inter-dependence of procedural and substantive effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the integration of disaster risk into the EIA process is increasingly 
recognized, especially under the HFA, the level of policy integration of disaster risk has not been 
evaluated as an effectiveness dimension. Therefore, it is important to have a clear idea of the range 
of effectiveness dimensions that are investigated in applications of particular effectiveness research. 
Given the possible importance of policy integration of disaster risk and contextual matters, such as 
the quality of governance in decisions on developments and their potential consequences on the 
environment, this study investigates policy integration and contextual effectiveness, as well as 
procedural and substantive effectiveness of EIA as key effectiveness dimensions. 
Wang et al. (2012) argue that a broader list of criteria is favoured against the limited number of 
criteria used in evaluation research generally, which provides a better picture about the impact 
assessment process. Wang et al. (2012) used 13 indicators in their study and C. Wood (1995) used 14 
criteria. C. Wood’s 14 criteria have later been applied by a number of scholars in many different 
contexts (e.g. Nadeem & Hameed, 2008; Panigrahi & Amirapu, 2012; Zubair, 2001). Sadler (1996) 
used 31 criteria and Ahmad & Wood (2002) implemented 24 criteria including the four foundation 
measure criteria proposed by Fuller (1999). Moreover, based on content analysis, Fischer & Gazzola 
(2006) argue that most criteria in effectiveness research of the EIA process are developed based on 
practices and experience of a few countries especially from Europe. They, therefore, argue that such 
criteria need to be tailored to the specific system of application.  
Practicality of operationalization of the evaluation criteria in qualitative interviews and the number 
of criteria required to address the research questions were driving factors in deciding the number of 
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criteria used in this study. In this study, therefore, a set of evaluation criteria was selected and 
adapted to address the research questions (Table 3.1, column 5). These form the basis for the 
analysis in chapters 5 and 6. Like previous scholarly work on effectiveness research, most evaluation 
criteria used in this study were derived from the available literature on effectiveness research; eight 
criteria relevant to disaster risks (i.e., criteria 1, 5, 8, 10, 11, 16, 21 and 22) were specifically 
developed for this study because there was little literature available on those aspects.  
The level of policy integration of disaster risks was used as the first effectiveness dimension in this 
study. Under this dimension whether DRR is an integral part of environmental assessment was 
evaluated. As discussed in Chapter 2, disaster risk is defined in this study as a compound function of 
the natural hazards and the degree of vulnerability to those specific hazards (Blaikie et al., 1994).  
In reviewing the literature, it is clear that the criteria for assessing each effectiveness dimension can 
be further grouped into clusters. As discussed in Chapter 2, under procedural effectiveness two 
criteria clusters were assessed (i.e., legal basis and guidance). Five evaluation criteria were used 
under legal basis, which cover ‘clarity’ and ‘comprehensiveness’ of legislative provisions, explicit 
‘requirements’ to cover disaster risks in the EIA process and ‘provisions for legally challenging’ 
decision outputs. In the literature review, it was also clear that legal provisions should be sufficiently 
backed by both statutory and non-statutory guidance on implementation of legislative provisions. 
Therefore, the guidance cluster included ‘guidance on public reviewing’, ‘developing terms of 
reference’, and ‘compliance monitoring’. In order to avoid any ambiguities, the entire EIA process 
from project screening to post approval monitoring was considered in both countries.  
In some literature, including Sadler (1996), ‘the level of assessment’ is considered a procedural 
dimension. However, in this study, the level of disaster risk assessment in the EIA process was 
evaluated as an aspect that directly affects the substantive effectiveness of EIA to address disaster 
risks and therefore was considered under the substantive dimension. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
substantive effectiveness is the least-researched type of effectiveness dimension (Cashmore et al., 
2004; Jay et al., 2007; Theophilou et al., 2010).  
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Table 3.1 Evaluation criteria developed and used in this study   
Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Criteria 
Cluster 
Description Source 
Evaluation Criteria3 
(Operationalization of the research) 
Research Method 
Policy integration: 
how well, if at all, 
is disaster risk 
reduction 
integrated into 
EIA processes? 
Purpose of EIA 
Disaster risk reduction is an expected 
outcome of the EIA process 
CDB (2004); 
UNISDR (2011, 
2014); Benson & 
Twigg (2007) 
(1) Disaster risk reduction is an integral 
part of environmental assessment  
Document analysis, 
qualitative interviews 
with planners and EIA 
experts/practitioners 
Procedural 
effectiveness: 
assuming it is 
integrated then 
how well is it 
practised? 
Legal basis 
EIA system based on clear and specific 
legal provisions 
Ahmad & Wood 
(2002); Bina (2008); 
Bina et al. (2011); 
Gallardo & Bond 
(2011); Marara et 
al. (2011); Nadeem 
& Fischer (2011); 
Noble (2009); 
Pölönen et al. 
(2011); Sadler 
(1996); C. Wood 
(1995) 
(2) The EIA system is based on clear 
and specific legal provisions 
Document analysis, 
qualitative interviews 
with planners and EIA 
experts/practitioners 
(3) The impacts of all significant 
actions are assessed 
An explicit requirement to cover all 
environmentally significant proposals 
and consideration of alternatives 
(4) Alternative methods and locations 
are considered  
(5) EIA reports contain a section on 
disaster risk 
Responsibility and accountability 
(6) There is an opportunity for appeal 
or legally challenge the process or 
decision output 
Guidance  
Extent to which the EIA meets accepted 
principles such as public notification of 
meetings, provision of access to 
information and use of appropriate 
consultation techniques  
Baker & McLelland 
(2003); Marara et 
al. (2011); Noble 
(2009); Sadler 
(1996); Wang et al. 
(2012); C. Wood 
(1995) 
(7) EIA reports are subjected to public 
review 
Document analysis, 
qualitative interviews 
with planners, EIA 
experts/practitioners 
and community 
representatives in the 
selected project areas 
of Sri Lanka  
Guidance on application of procedures, 
including proposal-specific terms of 
reference 
(8) ToR for the EIAs carries specific 
requirements regarding hazard 
assessment and vulnerability 
assessment 
Procedures to support monitoring and 
follow-up of process outcomes and 
decisions for corrective action 
(9) Guidance is available to support 
compliance monitoring taking place 
and it is being implemented 
 
                                                          
3 These criteria provide the basis of the analysis in chapters 5 and 6 
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Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Criteria 
Cluster 
Description Source 
Evaluation Criteria  
(Operationalization of the research) 
Research Method 
Substantive 
effectiveness: 
does the EIA 
process achieve 
the objectives set 
and result in 
disaster risk 
reduction? 
Level of 
assessment 
Technical soundness of screening, 
scoping and impact assessment 
Boyle (1998); 
Gallardo & Bond 
(2011); Noble 
(2009); Sadler 
(1996); Wang et al. 
(2012); C. Wood 
(1995)  
(10) Screening of actions for disaster risks 
is taking place 
Document analysis, 
qualitative 
interviews with 
planners and EIA 
experts/ 
practitioners 
The level/scale of assessment is 
appropriate and sufficient 
(11) Hazard and vulnerability assessments 
are conducted as a part of impact 
identification 
Decision-
making  
Visible linkages to decision making (e.g., 
approval, permitting, etc., based on 
submission of report)  
Bina et al. (2011); 
Noble (2009); 
Runhaar & Driessen 
(2007); Sadler 
(1996); Theophilou 
et al. (2010); van 
Doren et al. (2013); 
Wang et al. (2012); 
C. Wood (1995) 
(12) Findings of the EIA influence the final 
decision (van Doren et al., 2013) Document analysis, 
qualitative 
interviews with 
planners and EIA 
experts/ 
practitioners 
EIA fostering environmental protection 
(Conformity)  
(13) Planners use the EIA report as a 
reference document in project planning 
(van Doren et al., 2013) 
Contextual 
effectiveness: 
what influence 
does risk 
governance have 
on substantive 
effect?  
Consultation 
and public 
participation  
Consultation and public participation 
take place within the assessment system 
leading to action 
Arnstein (1969); 
Baker & McLelland 
(2003); Boyle 
(1998); Gallardo & 
Bond (2011); 
Hilding-Rydevik 
(2006); Noble 
(2009); Pölönen et 
al. (2011); 
Theophilou et al. 
(2010); C. Wood 
(1995)  
(14) Consultation and participation are 
taking place before and following EIA 
report publication 
Document analysis, 
qualitative 
interviews with 
planners, EIA 
experts/ 
practitioners and 
community 
representatives in 
the selected project 
areas of Sri Lanka 
(15) Feedback from consultations is 
incorporated into project planning 
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Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Criteria 
Cluster 
Description Source 
Evaluation Criteria  
(Operationalization of the research) 
Research method 
Contextual 
effectiveness: 
what influence 
does risk 
governance 
have on 
substantive 
effect?  
Policy context 
Legal provisions given by other 
legislation to control development 
projects/programmes influence the 
outcome of the EIA process 
Ahmad & Wood 
(2002); Wang et al. 
(2012)  
(16) Legal provisions given by other 
legislation to control development-
induced disaster risks do influence the 
outcome of the EIA process 
Document analysis, 
qualitative interviews 
with planners and EIA 
experts/practitioners 
Transparency 
and 
accountability 
Subject to independent checks and 
verification  
Bina (2008); Bina et al. 
(2011); Boyle (1998); 
IAIA (2002); Marara et 
al. (2011); Noble 
(2009); Pölönen et al. 
(2011); van Buuren & 
Nooteboom (2009); 
Wang et al. (2012); C. 
Wood (1995)  
(17) EIA assessment processes and EIA 
reports are subjected to independent 
checks and verification  
Mechanisms to ensure impartiality/ 
independence of assessment 
review 
Access to information  
(18) Decision-making and approval stages, 
(setting out what is required of 
proponents and government agencies and 
when) are made clear to all 
Document analysis, 
qualitative interviews 
with planners, EIA 
experts/practitioners 
and community 
representatives in the 
selected project areas of 
Sri Lanka 
Transparency in assessment 
process  
Political will  
Political will and genuine 
commitment at all levels  
Ahmad & Wood 
(2002); Bina (2008); 
Bina et al. (2011); 
Boyle (1998); IAIA 
(2002); Marara et al. 
(2011); van Doren et 
al. (2013)  
(19) Political support is available for the 
EIA process  
Document analysis, 
qualitative interviews 
with planners and EIA 
experts/practitioners 
 
Coordination  
Inter-agency coordination and 
cooperation at all stages of the EIA 
process 
(20) Inter-agency coordination and 
cooperation is available across sectors and 
different levels (national/local) of 
government departments at all stages of 
the EIA process 
(21) Disaster management agency is 
involved (receive information and get 
coordination) in all stages of the EIA 
process  
Funding 
conditions  
Reduction of project-induced 
disaster risk is a condition of 
international lending  
UNISDR (2011); Benson 
& Twigg (2007) 
(22) Funding agencies carry specific 
funding conditions to curtail the disaster 
risk of the project 
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In reviewing the literature, it is clear that many scholars consider EIA as one element in 
environmental protection policy or an element in the sustainable management of natural resources 
policy (Heinma & Põder, 2010; Sadler, 1996; C. Wood, 1995). For instance, the purpose of New 
Zealand’s Resource Management Act 1991 is to promote the sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources (s.3) and the purpose of the Act should be considered in approving development 
projects (s.104). However, measuring the substantive effectiveness of EIA in terms of fostering 
environmental protection or sustainable management of natural resources is difficult. A number of 
other aspects (i.e., plans and regulations) influence environmental protection. Because of the above 
difficulty, many scholars have limited their focus to the influence of EIA on well-informed decision-
making (e.g. Heinma & Põder, 2010; Runhaar & Driessen, 2007; Sadler, 1996; van Doren, Driessen, 
Schijf, & Runhaar, 2013). This study followed a similar approach and investigated the influence of EIA 
on decision-making and its influence on project planning.  
According to Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir (2007, p. 674), “…the elements of context are ‘context’ 
dependent” and should be decided based on the context of the research. In this study the following 
criteria clusters are used. They include public participation, policy context, transparency and 
accountability, political will, coordination and funding conditions. Public participation in EIA report 
reviewing is also a procedural requirement in many EIA systems. However, consultation and public 
participation in the rest of the EIA process is largely determined by the level of governance quality 
existing in a particular country depending on the acceptability of public participation in decision-
making. Therefore, public participation is also a contextual factor.  
Ensuring public health and safety is also an objective of development and other specific legislation 
(i.e., disaster management Acts) in most countries. Therefore, the influence of such legislation in 
addressing disaster risks of development projects should be considered to understand the influence 
of EIA in addressing disaster risk separated from the influences of legislation. Many scholars have 
identified lack of transparency and accountability of agencies, lack of political support, and poor 
coordination among agencies as key factors that contribute to poor effectiveness of EIA processes 
(e.g. Bina, 2008; Bina et al., 2011; Che, English, Lu, & Chen, 2011; Marara et al., 2011). Therefore, 
criteria relevant to accountability and transparency, political will and coordination among agencies 
were also selected.  
Finally, Sri Lanka, being a middle-income country, still depends on multi and bi-lateral funding for 
development projects, especially for transport and hydropower generation. It is the general 
perception that multi-lateral agencies such as the World Bank and the ADB promote environmental 
planning when development aid and loans are dispersed; these agencies also have significant 
negotiation power over recipient countries (Bornschier et al., 1978; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; 
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Ortolano & Shepherd, 1995; Shandra et al., 2004; Shandra et al., 2011). Therefore, the effectiveness 
of EIA processes of countries whose economies largely depend on multi-lateral funding cannot be 
assessed without considering the influence of such agencies on environmental planning processes. In 
this context, the influence of funding conditions has been considered here as an evaluation criterion.  
3.4.1 Measuring criteria conformity 
As discussed earlier, measuring and quantifying the effectiveness of impact assessment tools is one 
major challenge in effectiveness research (Wang et al., 2012; C. Wood, 1995). However, many 
scholars, including Wang et al. (2012) and C. Wood (1995), use Likert scales to measure conformance 
to criteria using attitudes and opinions of those directly involved with the EIA system. Likert scales 
have different forms and structures but commonly use 5-point assessment scales. According to Allen 
& Seaman (2007), it is advisable to use as wide a scale as possible. Following Likert (1932), Clason & 
Dormody (1994, p. 31) argue that the number of alternatives in a scale is “…open to manipulation”. 
Scholars have used different types of scales in effectiveness evaluation research varying from three 
to six alternatives. For instance, C. Wood (1995) and El-Fadl & El-Fadel (2004) use 3-point scales, 
Theophilou et al. (2010) use a 4-point scale, Marara et al. (2011) use a 5-point scale, and Bina et al. 
(2011) and Sadler (1996) use 6-point scales. In this study, a 5-point Likert scale was used to measure 
criteria conformance (see Table 3.2). The five-point scale provided the required detail for 
comparative review between the two countries while reducing potential over-complication caused 
by a higher number of alternatives (e.g., 7-point).  
Table 3.2 Scale value against the criteria conformity 
Likert scale value Measure of criteria conformity 
Fully 
Data gathered from all research methods/sources agree that the evaluation criterion 
is met beyond reasonable doubt. 
Mostly 
Data gathered from over half of the sources/methods agree that the evaluation 
criterion is met.  
Reasonably 
Data gathered from half of the sources/methods agree that the evaluation criterion 
is met, but the other half disagree that it is met. 
Limited 
Data gathered from fewer than a half of the sources/methods agree that the 
evaluation criterion is met. 
No 
Data gathered from all research methods/sources agree that the evaluation criterion 
is not met beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
3.5 Selection of countries 
Many scholars have conducted cross-country comparisons in evaluation research because such 
comparisons are capable of providing a clearer picture of the strengths and weaknesses of impact 
assessment systems (Ahmad & Wood, 2002; El-Fadl & El-Fadel, 2004; Marara et al., 2011; Sadler, 
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1996; C. Wood, 1995). It is clear from the literature that such comparisons would be more useful if 
the EIA system of a particular country is compared with the same from the countries with more 
established environmental management practices and a higher level of quality governance. As 
argued in Chapter 2, successful implementation of development control tools, including EIAs, 
depends on the level of quality governance existing in a particular country. The influence of 
governance on the effectiveness of the EIA process is one of the research questions of this study. 
Therefore, in this research, it was intended to compare the EIA processes of two or more countries 
with different levels of governance quality. However, limitations encountered in the study in terms of 
resources and time available limited the detailed empirical comparison to two countries.  
Sri Lanka and New Zealand were selected for the study based on several factors identified as 
important to achieve answers to the research questions in Chapter 1. These include: differences in 
the level of governance quality in the two countries, appropriateness of the existing environmental 
planning framework in the two countries for answering the research questions, and the accessibility 
of EIA-related information. As reported in Chapter 1, both Sri Lanka and New Zealand claim that their 
country’s EIA processes are capable of addressing project induced disaster risk (Disaster 
Management Centre, 2011; Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, 2011). Moreover, 
the difference in levels of quality governance in these two countries were considered sufficient to 
assess the influence of governance on the effectiveness of the EIA process as per the arguments 
discussed in previous sections. Sri Lanka consistently shows poorly in the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators of the World Bank, whereas New Zealand shows higher levels in all indicators (The World 
Bank Group, 2013) (Table 3.3).  
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) were developed by a World Bank project and are 
updated annually for 215 countries (The World Bank, 2014). These include: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption (The World Bank, 2011). Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2008, 
pp. 7-8) define these six indicators as: 
1. Voice and Accountability (VA) – measuring perceptions of the extent 
to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media.  
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV) – measuring 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.  
3. Government Effectiveness (GE) – measuring perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
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degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies.  
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ) – measuring perceptions of the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development.  
5. Rule of Law (RL) – measuring perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence.  
6. Control of Corruption (CC) – measuring perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests.  
Table 3.3 A comparison of the Worldwide Governance Indicators for Sri Lanka and New 
Zealand (The World Bank Group, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomas (2010) argues that these indicators are widely used by researchers and aid agencies to 
measure the governance quality of different countries. According to Kauffmann et al. (2008), there is 
a margin of error caused because of unavoidable uncertainty associated with sources in measuring 
governance quality. They argue that margin of error should be taken into account in cross country 
Governance Indicator Year 
Percentile Rank 
(Sri Lanka) 
(0-100) 
Percentile Rank  
(New Zealand) 
(0-100) 
Voice and Accountability 
2010 30.3 97.2 
2011 30.0 98.6 
2012 29.9 98.1 
Political Stability / Absence of Violence 
2010 17.9 91.0 
2011 24.5 97.2 
2012 22.7 97.2 
Government Effectiveness 
2010 48.8 96.7 
2011 52.1 98.1 
2012 45.9 96.2 
Regulatory Quality 
2010 45.9 98.6 
2011 50.2 100.0 
2012 48.3 98.6 
Rule of Law 
2010 53.6 98.1 
2011 52.6 98.6 
2012 52.1 98.6 
Control of Corruption 
2010 43.3 99.5 
2011 44.5 99.5 
2012 51.7 99.5 
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comparisons, especially if the margins of error of two countries overlap, then the data do not reveal 
statistically significant differences in governance. Such overlaps do not exist for indicator values 
between Sri Lanka and New Zealand, since the levels of governance quality between the two 
countries are very different.  
Many researchers have criticised the aggregation methodology used for WGI construction (e.g. 
Apaza, 2009; Christiane & Oman, 2006; Langbein & Knack, 2010; Thomas, 2010). These critiques have 
been regularly contested and sometimes partially agreed upon by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Mastruzzi, 2007). Despite such critiques, almost all agree that measuring governance quality is a 
studious task and the WGI should be used cautiously in research work. In this research, the WGI was 
used as one of the criteria to select the two countries. Level of governance quality of these two 
countries is significantly different. Therefore, the above-mentioned methodological limitations in 
constructing the WGI have little or no influence on the findings of this study.  
Table 3.3 compares WGIs for the 2010-2012 period between Sri Lanka and New Zealand. In Table 3.3, 
percentile rank indicates the rank of the relevant country in the respective governance indicator 
among all countries in the world. According to the WGI, New Zealand shows a consistently higher-
level of governance quality than Sri Lanka.  
In addition to the above, according to Bührs & Bartlett (1993, p. 12) “…New Zealand is claimed to be 
a world leader in environmental policy development” with respect to some policy initiatives 
undertaken in the late 1980s and early 1990s. C. Wood (1995) concludes that the EIA system and 
domestic legal framework of New Zealand is stronger than in other researched countries, because 
the RMA 1991 provides a comprehensive legal framework. Therefore, in this research, New Zealand’s 
EIA system was considered as one of the best systems available for comparative analysis.  
Accessibility to required data sources and limitations in resources and time were also considered in 
selecting New Zealand and Sri Lanka. Being my native country, I had easy access to data sources in Sri 
Lanka at a low cost. The exposure I had to the EIA process and disaster risk management procedures 
in Sri Lanka over a decade was also considered an advantage in selecting Sri Lanka. As a disaster risk 
management specialist for an international non-governmental agency, I have led a national dialogue 
with relevant ministries in Sri Lanka to incorporate disaster risks into impact assessment tools.    
3.6 Selection of projects 
As mentioned earlier, case study analyses were conducted for selected projects in Sri Lanka and New 
Zealand to relate the questions to real life contexts. A purposive sampling technique was executed in 
selecting projects for case study analysis to ensure the availability of sufficient information for 
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subsequent analysis. The potential significance of the project in terms of economic and social 
development, actual and potential disaster risks, and the project completion date were considered as 
the main factors in selecting the projects. Primarily, transport and hydropower projects were 
selected because of their potential significance in terms of social, economic and environmental 
impacts. Projects that were recently completed or being implemented were favoured, considering 
the ease of obtaining expert views and public opinion on the EIA process of such projects. It was 
expected that both the experts and the public would be able to recall the EIA process of a project 
recently completed. A maximum 5-year limit was adopted because it was assumed that, with time, 
some of the extensive disaster risks of the project would become a routine experience of the people 
and people tend to accept those effects making it difficult to identify such effects in an interview. The 
projects chosen were a hydropower dam and a transport project in Sri Lanka, and in New Zealand, 
three roading projects, two hydropower projects, one water storage project and a lake drainage 
project (Table 3.4).  
Table 3.4 Summary project information from Sri Lanka and New Zealand 
Project Key details 
Sri Lanka  
The Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project (UKHP) The project started operations in 2012 with an annual 
output of 409GWh  
The Southern Transport Development Project 
(STDP) 
The expressway has been operating since November 
2011 
New Zealand  
The Waitohi Irrigation and Hydro Scheme (WIHS) The resource consent was granted in August 2013 
The Transmission Gully Project (TGP) The consent was approved in 2012 
The Basin Bridge Project  The resource consent application was lodged with the 
Environmental Protection Authority in 2013  
Ara Tūhono Pūhoi to Wellsford Road The resource consent application was lodged with the 
Environmental Protection Authority in 2013. The 
consent decision is expected in the second half of 2014 
Ruataniwha Water Storage Scheme The resource consent was granted in June 2014 
Artificial Opening of Wairewa/Lake Forsyth Resource consent application was lodged with 
Canterbury Regional Council in February 2013 
Wrights Road Storage Ponds in Christchurch Resource consent application was lodged with 
Canterbury Regional Council in November 2013 
  
The two projects selected in Sri Lanka have received significant public attention because of their 
potential environmental impacts including disaster risks. It was necessary to conduct interviews and 
focus group discussions with community members and also field observations to substantiate 
document evidence and interview data in Sri Lanka, because of a lack of impartial document 
evidence on the two projects. Even though this has improved the quality of data, it has limited the 
enquiry to two projects due to time and resource limitations. In contrast, the public submissions, 
agency reports and even public hearing proceedings of the selected projects in New Zealand are 
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3.7.1 Human ethics  
One of the main criticisms of qualitative research is that “…the nature of research … allows close 
contact with respondents [and] can lead to ethical problems” (Sarantakos, 2005, p. 46). Therefore, it 
is important to ensure that all necessary measures are taken to avoid any inconvenience to the 
participants and avoid any circumstances that might pose a risk to the participants as a result of 
participating in the research.  
Within this context, under the Lincoln University Human Ethics Policy (LUHEP), all research that 
involves human participants that is carried out by students of the university is required to obtain 
approval from the Lincoln University Human Ethics Committee (HEC) before commencement of field 
activities (Lincoln University, 2010). It is also a requirement under the LUHEP to submit a copy of the 
questionnaire and seek approval before the commencement of the study. Therefore, a semi-
structured questionnaire was developed and submitted along with the human ethics application to 
the HEC in October 2012. The HEC gave approval for the field survey on 7 December, 2012 (see 
Appendix B for the HEC approval letter). 
3.7.2 Sample selection and conducting qualitative interviews 
Considering the intensity of the study and the complex nature of the questions to be asked of 
respondents, face-to-face in-depth interviews using a semi-structured questionnaire were used in 
both countries (see Appendix C for questionnaire for planners and experts). In New Zealand, 
qualitative interviews were conducted with planners and EIA experts; in Sri Lanka, in addition to 
planners and EIA experts, qualitative interviews were conducted with selected community members 
(Table 3.5), using a separate semi-structured questionnaire (see Appendix D for questionnaire for 
community members).  
Samples drawn for the qualitative interviews in both Sri Lanka and New Zealand were based on non-
probability sampling techniques. Considering the exploratory nature of the research, purposive 
sampling was carried out to select interviewees relevant to the research topic (Sarantakos, 2005). 
Planners and experts were selected based on their role in the EIA process and project planning. 
Knowledge and expertise of the interviewees about the EIA process of the selected projects was also 
used as a criterion in identifying the interviewees.  
Five planners (i.e., a CEA (Central Environmental Authority) planner, two RDA (Road Development 
Authority) planners, a UKHP planner, and a DMC planner) and four experts (i.e., legal, disaster 
management, and two EIA experts) were interviewed from Sri Lanka. Six planners and six EIA experts 
were selected from New Zealand. Planners represented a district council, a regional council, a major 
developer and three national agencies, namely, the Department of Conservation (DoC), a national 
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hazard management agency and the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA). Two of the six 
experts are social scientists. Three of the remaining experts are: an EIA expert, a hearing 
commissioner, and a retired Environmental Court (EC) judge. The perceptions of one of the 
supervisors of this research, who is a hearing commissioner, were also used where needed [listed as 
an EIA expert in Table 3.5]. 
Table 3.5 Interviewee categories and sample sizes for qualitative interviews  
Interviewee category 
Number of interviewees 
from Sri Lanka 
Number of interviewees from 
New Zealand 
Total number    
of 
interviewees 
National and local level 
planners responsible for 
the EIA process 
/development planning 
5 (CEA planner, two RDA 
planners, UKHP planner, 
DMC planner) 
6 (hazard planner, two local 
council planners, EPA planner, 
DoC planner, environmental 
planner of a major developer) 
11 
EIA practitioners and 
experts  
4 (legal expert, disaster 
management expert, two 
EIA experts) 
6 (two EIA experts, two social 
scientists, hearing 
commissioner, environmental 
court judge) 
10 
Civil society groups/ 
community leaders 
living in project area  
17 - 17 
Total respondents  26 12 38 
 
The selection of the community members in project-affected areas in Sri Lanka was done using a 
snowball sampling technique. The term ‘community’ does not have a standard definition in literature 
and scholars have treated the term based on the context in which the term is used. In this study, 
MacQueen et al.’s (2001) definition of community is considered appropriate to describe the 
communities from which members were selected for the interviews and the FGDs. According to 
MacQueen et al. (2001, p. 1936), a community is “…a group of people with diverse characteristics 
who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical 
locations or settings”. Project-affected community members in selected project areas are confined to 
a distinct geographical location and with close social ties.  
Two different methods were adopted in screening and selecting community members for qualitative 
interviews. In STDP, first, the project-affected districts and divisional secretariat (DS) divisions were 
identified based on newspaper archives, the national disaster event database, and inputs from 
national and district level disaster management officials. Bandaragama and Dodangoda DS divisions 
in Kalutara district were selected for data collection. Then, highly affected villages were identified 
using district disaster management data, disaster relief distribution data and inputs from social 
services officers of the respective divisional secretariat divisions. Grama Niladharis (village officers) of 
the identified villages were contacted and consulted with the permission of the divisional secretariats 
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to identify affected community groups. FGDs were then held with the community members; 11 key 
informants for in-depth interviews were identified during the FGDs (see section 3.7.3). 
In the UKHP, first, the permission of the project director was sought because the resettlement sites 
were still under the control of the project. Then, based on the project resettlement plan and 
information from environmental activists, community groups were identified from Kotmale DS 
division of the Nuwara Eliya district. However, initially I was accompanied to the project-affected 
areas by the project officials, which obstructed free discussions with community members. 
Therefore, I waited till the weekend to start the FGDs and qualitative interviews with community 
members without the influence of the project staff. This also limited the number of FGDs and 
number of qualitative interviews conducted in the UKHP project sites, but the quality of data was 
considered high. One FGD and six qualitative interviews were conducted in the Kotmale DS division.  
Qualitative interviews in Sri Lanka were carried out from 17 December 2012 to 25 January 2013. 
Initially, selected planners and EIA experts were contacted either by email communication, via phone 
calls or meeting them physically. They were briefed about the research and provided with a research 
information sheet that includes the research objectives, nature of the interview and anonymity of 
data gathered. Then, a suitable time and venue were fixed for the interviews. Similarly, selected 
community members were met and basic information about the research was verbally conveyed to 
them before agreeing on a time and venue for qualitative interviews. Some interviews were 
conducted at the project sites because the interviewees wanted to show specific project impacts on 
the environment. Probing and revisiting of responses was done in both countries to explore and 
inquire further into important aspects raised by the interviewees (while their anonymity was 
maintained). All interviews were digitally recorded and notes were also taken on the consent of the 
interviewees. Some planners and community members opted to answer sensitive questions, 
especially related to political support and influence, off the record. Such interview data were not 
used in the final analysis, considering the safety of both interviewees and the researcher. 
In New Zealand, qualitative interviews were carried out in two rounds. After conducting initial 
analysis of collected data, it was decided to conduct a further round of interviews to substantiate the 
data gathered in the first round. Planners and EIA experts for the second round were selected based 
on the interviews in the first round. The first round was carried out from 25 April to 30 May 2013 and 
the second round from 1-30 September 2013. Like in Sri Lanka, planners and EIA experts were 
contacted and the research information sheet was shared with them before requesting 
appointments for interviews. In two cases, the experts favoured online interviews over physical 
meetings because of the flexibility of such interviews to fix an appropriate time. Other interviews 
  
55 
 
were conducted in person. Like in Sri Lanka, all interviews were digitally recorded with the consent of 
the interviewees.  
3.7.3 Sample selection and conducting FGDs 
In addition to in-depth qualitative interviews, FGDs were held with community members in Sri Lanka. 
During both FGDs and interviews with the community members, their experience relevant to a 
particular project was investigated. The FGDs enabled a better understanding of project-induced 
disaster risks experienced by the community members, making it easy to structure the questions 
effectively for in-depth interviews. The method was also favoured in this research because of prior 
experience I had in conducting FGDs on various topics in similar contexts. 
FGDs are considered in the research methodology literature as a key research method of data 
collection. According to Yin (2011), the method is especially popular among researchers because of 
its ability to gain efficiency (i.e., listening to several participants at the same time). However, the 
method has its own limitations including loss of depth (Yin, 2011). Since the method was used as a 
complementary method with qualitative interviews, the above limitation was avoided in this study. 
According to Finch, Lewis, & Turley (2014, p. 213), the standard size of a focus group is around six to 
eight people. However, according to Krueger & Casey (2009, p. 67), smaller groups of four to six are 
increasingly popular because they are easy to recruit and operate. In this study, smaller groups (i.e., 4 
– 6) were usually used for the above two reasons. In addition, pairs and triads were also used in this 
research to improve the richness of collected data. According to Finch et al. (2014, p. 213), when a 
smaller group with fewer than four people is used, it loses some of the qualities of group discussions, 
but is still effective when the participants know each other well.  
Recruitment of participants for FGDs was done after visiting the project-affected areas several times 
and getting used to the community and its issues. Informal leaders, who had played a leading role in 
organizing public protests and campaigns against two selected development projects, were identified 
after talking to members of the community. All FGDs were organized at short notice with the above 
informal leaders. This minimised any political interference with the discussions and made it easy to 
obtain spontaneous responses from the participants. Timing and venues are two important factors in 
conducting FGDs (Yin, 2011). Most FGDs in this study were conducted either during lunchtime or 
after 5pm, when people were usually at home. Altogether, two FGDs, one triad and one paired 
interview were conducted in the Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) area and one FGD 
and one paired interview were conducted in the Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project (UKHP) area. 
Triads and paired interviews were added to substantiate data collected in the FGDs and to identify 
key informants for in-depth interviews. Using snowball samples generated from both FGDs and 
triads/paired interviews avoided getting trapped into one line of inquiry in selecting interviewees for 
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in-depth interviews. FDGs in Bandaragama and Dodangoda were held either in the houses of 
community leaders or community halls. In Kotmale DS division, a local place of worship was selected 
as the meeting point because it was the only public space available in the location.  
After briefing the participants about the objective of the discussion and other information as per the 
Human Ethics requirements of Lincoln University, discussions were moderated using the semi-
structured questionnaire developed for community members, as a discussion guide (Appendix D). 
Participant numbers, dates of FGDs and DS divisions in which FGDs were held are listed in Table 3.6.  
Table 3.6 Participants in the FGDs  
Project 
Divisional Secretariat (DS) 
division 
Date 
Number of 
participants 
Southern Transport Development 
Project  
Dodangoda DS division 
2013.01.03 4 
2013.01.04 3 
Bandaragama DS division  
2013.01.05 5 
2013.01.06 2 
Upper Kotmale Hydropower 
Project  
Kotmale DS division  
2013.01.16 6 
2013.01.19 2 
Total number of participants 22 
 
3.7.4 Document analysis  
As reported earlier, document analysis was also used as a research method. Document analysis 
covered funding strategies of key funders in Sri Lanka, relevant legislation and EIA reports. These 
documents can be categorized into three levels, namely: international, national and local, and project 
level. Table 3.7 lists the secondary information sources reviewed in this study. Documents at the 
international level were retrieved from the Internet. In New Zealand, national, local and project level 
documents were available online. However, in Sri Lanka most project-related documents, local 
council reports, and local database information were not available online. Such documents were 
copied with the permission of the relevant agencies or purchased during data collection.  
Table 3.7 Document sources for secondary data analysis  
International level National and local level Project level 
 Funding strategies and 
environmental assessment 
requirements of the World 
Bank, the ADB and the JICA  
 HFA progress reports of Sri 
Lanka and New Zealand  
 EIA review reports 
 Relevant journal articles  
 Disaster management and 
environmental management 
related policies, acts and bills  
 National and local disaster 
databases  
 Reports from advocacy 
groups 
 Newspaper articles on 
environmental and 
development issues 
 Project EIA reports 
 Reports and articles from 
local advocacy groups, and 
newspaper articles on the 
environmental issues of 
selected projects 
 Local council reports on 
disaster relief in Sri Lanka 
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3.7.5 Field observations 
Field observations were conducted before the FGDs and concurrently with them and qualitative 
interviews with community members. During this process, I stayed close to the selected DS divisions 
and at least one week was spent in each DS division. This helped me to familiarize myself with the 
project and the community and so to obtain a clear idea about project impacts. Field observations 
were done both with informal leaders of the community and by myself. Conducting field observation 
visits with informal leaders helped me to use the knowledge of community members to get a better 
understanding of project impacts in a short time. Field observations were captured in videos, 
photographs and field notes.  
3.8  Data analysis 
Data analysis was a reiterative process. An initial text analysis was done using collected project 
related documents, newspaper articles and other agency documents using the evaluation criteria 
listed in Table 3.1. This analysis was helpful in getting a better understanding of the projects and then 
fine-tuning the semi-structured questionnaire, which was later deployed in field surveys in both 
countries.  
A Computer-Aided Data Analysis (CADA) programme (i.e. NVivo 10.0) was used primarily to record, 
store and organize data. NVivo 10.0 was also used as the analysis support tool. Interviews and FGDs 
were later transcribed and loaded into NVivo 10.0 together with notes taken during the interviews. 
In addition, observation notes, data from agency and government databases, photos, videos, agency 
and public documents, and quantitative data from secondary sources such as relief distribution data, 
damage assessment data and infectious disease statistics were all loaded into NVivo 10.0. Selected 
sections of videos were also converted to text form by transcribing the conversations and 
descriptions were added to photos explaining the observations captured in the photo. In this sense, 
all materials were converted into text form before analysing and coding them. 
In NVivo, 22 different nodes were created, which represented the evaluation criteria developed for 
the study. Then, loaded materials were screened and unwanted text was removed (i.e., cleaning) 
before preliminary text analysis was done and findings conceptually organized and coded into the 
respective nodes (Figure 3.3). This preliminary analysis was used as a guide for further data 
collection, processing and analysing until saturation was achieved. After data saturation was 
achieved, a final analysis was conducted using text analysis methods.  
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secretaries of all relevant divisional secretariat divisions was necessary before entering any village for 
data collection. This ‘unhelpful’ situation limited the depth and width of inquiry on some occasions, 
especially during the interviews with planners. The resultant data from planners can therefore be 
seen as being closer to a government perspective rather than fully reflective views of those involved. 
However, these data were checked using FGDs, community interviews and expert interviews to 
overcome this limitation.  
3.10  Chapter Summary  
This chapter explained the research methodology and research methods used in this research along 
with the selection of case studies, interviews, data collection and data analysis. As discussed, a 
qualitative research methodology was adopted as the overall framework to guide data collection 
methods and strategies. Given the weaknesses of the qualitative methodology, multiple methods 
and data sources were used for data triangulation to improve the validity and reliability of the data 
collected and the subsequent analysis undertaken. NVivo 10.0 was used in this research as a 
computer aided data analysis programme with the collected data analysed using text analysis 
methods. Table 3.8 summarises the methods used in the study against the research questions set out 
in Chapter 1. The next chapter explains the environmental and disaster management context in Sri 
Lanka and New Zealand.  
Table 3.8 A summary of the research questions and research methods  
Research question Research method/s 
1. Policy Integration: how well, if at 
all, is DRR integrated into EIA 
processes? 
 Policy/document analysis  
2. Procedural Effectiveness: assuming 
DRR is integrated then how well is it 
practised? 
 Document analysis  
 Qualitative interviews with planners and experts 
 Focus Group Discussions 
3. Substantive effectiveness: does the 
EIA process achieve the objectives set 
and result in disaster risk reduction? 
 Qualitative interviews with planners, experts, and affected 
groups 
 Focus Group Discussions 
 Field observations 
 Document analysis, database analysis 
4. Contextual effectiveness: what 
influence does risk governance have 
on substantive effect? 
 Qualitative interviews with planners, experts, and affected 
groups 
 Focus Group Discussion 
 Document analysis  
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Chapter 4 
The Legislative and Institutional Context for Disaster and 
Environmental Management in Sri Lanka and New Zealand 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an overview of the legislative and institutional context for disaster and 
environmental management in Sri Lanka and New Zealand. This establishes the basis of institutional 
constraints and processes that frame the findings reported in Chapters 5 and 6. The chapter starts 
with the Sri Lankan legislative context followed by the New Zealand context.  
4.2 The disaster and environmental management context of Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka is an island nation in South Asia. The country’s population in 2013 was approximately 21 
million, with a population density of 323 per square km (The Department of Census and Statistics Sri 
Lanka, 2011). The total land area4 is 62,710 square km (The World Bank, 2013a). Sri Lanka is a lower 
middle-income country with per capita annual income of US$2836 in 2012 (CBSL (The Central Bank of 
Sri Lanka), 2012). However, in 2010, 8.9 percent of the population was still living under the national 
poverty line (The World Bank, 2013c). The country has the highest level of human development in 
the region and sits at 92nd in the World’s Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2013).  
4.2.1 Structure of the government  
Sri Lanka consists of nine provinces. Each province has either two or three districts with the 
exception of Northern Province, which has four districts. Altogether, the country has 25 districts that 
are further divided into Divisional Secretariat (DS) divisions. Each DS division comprises several 
Grama Niladhari (GN) divisions, the lowest tier of government administration. There are 331 DS 
divisions and 14,022 GN Divisions (Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs of Sri Lanka, 
2013). On average, each GN division consists of 368 households. Therefore, a GN division is formed 
by a combination of several villages or a part of a village based on population density and 
geographical distribution.   
Sri Lanka has twin streams of government (Duryog Nivaran & Practical Action, 2008b). One is a three-
tiered devolved system whereas the other is a decentralized system (Figure 4.1). Public 
administration is a function of the decentralized system of the government, where district 
                                                          
4 Land area is a country's total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental 
shelf, and exclusive economic zones. 
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The 13th amendment provides three different lists to clarify functions held by central and provincial 
governments. List 1 provides the functions of provincial governments; List 2 identifies the functions 
that remain under central government; and, List 3 identifies those functions shared by both the 
central and provincial government or ‘concurrent’ functions. Protection of the environment is a 
concurrent function. The North Western Provincial Council is the only council that has used this 
provision. The council passed its own environmental statute, which is identical to that being 
implemented by central government in the rest of the country (Gammanpila, 2008). The council has 
its own provincial Environmental Authority to implement the provisions in its statute and administers 
IEEs and EIAs for the North Western Province (FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations), 2013).  
In 1987, through the Pradheshiya Sabha (Divisional Council) Act (No. 15 of 1987), local councils were 
also established in rural areas. These were meant to overlap the divisional secretariat divisions and it 
was “…expected that these institutions would perform those functions that could best be handled at 
the rural level, with the Divisional Secretariat acting as the administrative arm of the Pradeshiya 
Sabha” (Leitan, 2010, p. 10). However, this development never took place and today’s decentralized 
system dominates over the devolved system. The Divisional Secretariat has become the focal point 
for public administration in rural areas (Leitan, 2010), limiting the role of Pradeshiya Sabhas to 
providing basic services related to roads and thoroughfares, public health and sanitation, public 
markets and public utilities (Leitan, 2010; UNESCAP, n.d.).  
4.2.2 Disaster management legal and institutional framework  
Sri Lanka, together with other South Asian countries, shares the highest number of natural disaster 
related fatalities in the World (UNISDR, 2011). The South Asia Disaster Report 2008 describes the 
region as the world’s disaster hotspot (Duryog Nivaran & Practical Action, 2008a). According to the 
Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2011, of the total population exposed to 
flood risk in the world, approximately 65 percent live in South Asia and the population exposed to 
flooding is growing annually (UNISDR, 2011)(Table 4.1). 
Though animal attacks, droughts, floods, landslides, fires and strong winds are common causes of 
disasters in Sri Lanka, droughts and floods have been responsible for the largest number of affected 
people in the country over the last four decades (Figure 4.2). Here, the term disaster is interpreted as 
“…the actual or imminent ocurrence [sic] of a natural or man-made event, which endangers or 
threatens to endanger the safety or health of any person or group of persons…, or which destroys or 
damages or threatens to destroy or damage any property…” (Disaster Management Act No. 13 of 
2005, s.25). 
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Table 4.1 Flood exposure of different regions in the world (million people per year) (Source: 
UNISDR (2011, p. 26))  
Region 
Year 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
East Asia and the Pacific 9.4 11.4 13.9 16.2 18.0 
Europe and Central Asia 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 
Middle East and North Africa 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 
OECD countries 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 
South Asia 19.3 24.8 31.4 38.2 44.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.8 
World  32.4 40.6 50.5 60.5 69.4 
 
Animal attacks are considered a major disaster in Sri Lanka because of the higher number of events 
and casualties reported each year. Even though the national disaster event database (i.e., 
Desinventar.lk) does not specify the types of animal attacks in Sri Lanka, Gunaratne & Premarathne 
(2006, pp. 2-3) state that 558 people were killed by elephant attacks alone during the 1991-2001 
period. The 2004 Boxing Day Indian Ocean tsunami killed nearly 36000 people in coastal areas of the 
country, making it the biggest disaster the country has ever experienced. Post tsunami evaluations of 
DRR have revealed the lack of disaster preparedness, the absence of building standards, lack of city 
planning and zoning regulations, and weak local governance as reasons for the high mortality (UNEP 
(United Nations Environment Programme), 2005a). Taking the lessons from the tsunami, the Sri 
Lankan government, with the support of the UN and other international agencies, has taken DRR to a 
new level by passing the Disaster Management Act 2005 (Pelling & Holloway, 2006) and the National 
Disaster Management Strategy 2005. Even though the Act is highly emergency management 
oriented, the national strategy has extended beyond emergency management and has proposed a 
number of initiatives for risk reduction including introducing a system of Disaster Impact 
Assessments (DIA) parallel to the existing EIA process.  
The Disaster Management Act (DM Act) No.13 of 2005 covers “…the establishment of the national 
council for disaster management; the disaster management centre; the appointment of technical 
advisory committees; the preparation of disaster management plans; the declaration of a state of 
disaster; the award of compensation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. As 
per the Act, the National Council for Disaster Management is charged with the strategic direction of 
disaster management in Sri Lanka. The National Council consists of the president, the prime minister, 
the opposition leader, ministers in charge of key portfolios, chief ministers of all provincial councils 
and five opposition members as proposed by the Speaker in consultation with the opposition leader. 
Functions of the council include: to formulate a national policy and programme on the management 
of disasters, to prepare and formulate a National Disaster Management Plan and National Emergency 
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Operation Plan based on the national policy and programme, and to monitor the implementation of 
the National Disaster Management Plan and the National Emergency Operation Plan to facilitate 
emergency response, recovery, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in the event of any disaster. 
 
Figure 4.2 Common disasters in Sri Lanka (% events recorded since 1974) (based on 
www.desinventar.lk accessed on February 15, 2014)  
The Ministry of Disaster Management was established in 2005 to lead strategic planning for disaster 
management, followed by the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) the same year. The centre was 
tasked with implementation of the National Disaster Management Plan and the National Emergency 
Operation Plan (Ministry of Disaster Management, 2005). Figure 4.3 shows the institutional 
arrangements under the DM Act 2005.  
 
Figure 4.3 Disaster management institutional arrangement for Sri Lanka (Source: Ministry of 
Disaster Management (2005, p. 6)) 
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The Act is largely dominated by content related to emergency management and does not provide a 
framework for overall risk reduction. In the same year that the DM Act was enacted, the Ministry of 
Disaster Management launched the National Disaster Management Strategy called ‘Towards a safer 
Sri Lanka: a road map for disaster risk management’. The strategy identifies the integration of 
Disaster Impact Assessment (DIA) into the approval process of all development projects as one 
outcome (Ministry of Disaster Management, 2005). Volume II of the strategy, which consists of a set 
of project proposals to achieve the objectives in the strategy, was published the following year. 
Volume II proposes the introduction of a DIA system in Sri Lanka and states: 
...at present, impact of a project on the environment is considered through a 
well-established Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) process. However 
the impact of the same project on life and properties is not assessed 
properly and mitigation measures are not identified. Conducting disaster 
impact assessment (DIA) should be made mandatory for specified 
development projects as in the case of EIA. In order to minimise delays in 
the approval process, criteria for undertaking DIA could be included in the 
EIA process (MDM&HR (Ministry of Disaster Management and Human 
Rights), 2006, p. 169).  
As reported above, under section 4 of the DM Act, one of the functions of the National Council for 
Disaster Management is to formulate a national policy and programme on the management of 
disasters. Based on these requirements, the National Disaster Management Policy was drafted by the 
Ministry in 2013. The draft policy document has also reiterated the setting up of a “…mechanism to 
evaluate potential disaster impacts of projects in relation to all public and private sector 
investments” as one of the national strategies for disaster management (Ministry of Disaster 
Management, 2013b, p. 6). Therefore, the approach towards curtailing development induced 
disaster risk has been consistent since 2005. The DMC, with the support of the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), is in the process of developing a DIA system in Sri Lanka. Under this 
system, a checklist has been developed for road construction projects (Mohamed, 2013). Despite the 
above, the DMC in its progress report to the UNISDR on the implementation of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action for the 2009-2011 reporting cycle claimed that disaster risks of development 
projects are addressed through the EIA process (DMC, 2011).  
4.2.3 Planning framework and integration of disaster risk 
After developing and presenting its first Poverty Reduction Strategy paper5 in 2002 entitled 
‘Regaining Sri Lanka’, Sri Lanka presented ‘Mahinda Chintana’ or ‘Thoughts of Mahinda’, the election 
manifesto of President Mahinda Rajapaksha as its strategic development policy framework for the 
                                                          
5 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) member 
countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as donors. PRSPs describe the 
country's macroeconomic and social development policy framework at a minimum of a three-year period.  
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2005-2015 period. The policy framework has a separate section on disaster management. Even 
though the said section is largely dominated by emergency management and public awareness, it 
also mentions that “Existing laws on the aspects of safety, licensing and enforcement for the 
protection of public safety, properties and environment will be reviewed and strengthened” 
(Department of National Planning, 2010, p. 159). It is required under the present regime that all line 
ministries including the Ministry of Disaster Management serve the ‘Mahinda Chintana’ by preparing 
their annual plans to achieve the targets of the documents.  
The Town and Country Planning Amendment Act (No.49 of 2000), which amended the original Town 
and Country Planning Ordinance (No. 13 of 1946), required development of a National Physical 
Planning Policy and Plan to promote and regulate integrated planning of economic, social, physical 
and environmental aspects of land use in Sri Lanka. Under the provisions of the Act, the National 
Physical Planning Department (NPPD) was established and has since developed and published the 
National Physical Planning Policy and Plan in 2010. This document has given significant emphasis to 
DRR. The purpose of the policy and plan is to provide “…a broad framework to secure Sri Lanka‘s 
place in the global economy by promoting economic growth” (NPPD, 2010, p. 8). The policy is 
expected to promote sustainable development. More importantly, the policy is based on guiding 
principles including applying the precautionary approach towards activities whose effects on the 
environment are scientifically not well established but may be a serious threat to the environment 
(NPPD, 2010).  
Objectives 1 and 2 of the policy are directly related to risk reduction. Objective 1 states: “Protect the 
environment through limiting development in fragile areas, the Protected Area Network and areas of 
local and regional areas of environmental significance” (NPPD, 2010, p. 25). Objective 2 expects to 
“Ensure that the people of Sri Lanka live in areas that are safe from natural disasters and the effects 
of global warming including rising sea level” (NPPD, 2010, p. 35). The National Physical Plan also 
anticipates providing guidance for the preparation and implementation of regional, district and local 
plans and it is the responsibility of the NPPD to assist in the preparation of such plans. The 
implementation of the National Physical Plan relies on the preparation and implementation of the 
regional, district and local plans. However, information regarding the status of the district and local 
plans is not available.  
Under the Urban Development Authority Act No. 41 of 1978, the Urban Development Authority 
(UDA) was established to promote the integrated planning and implementation of economic, social 
and physical development of urban areas as prescribed by the Minister. The Town and Country 
Planning (Amendment) Act 2000 also requires the UDA to follow any guidelines formulated on its 
behalf by the NPPD in carrying out integrated planning and physical development in urban areas 
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(s.16). However, there are no clear, explicit connections between these pieces of development 
planning legislation and the DM Act 2005.  
4.2.4 Environmental management in Sri Lanka 
The Sri Lankan constitution, enacted in 1978, carries two separate articles related to environmental 
conservation (Zubair, 2001), Articles 27 and 28. Article 27 (14) states that “The state shall protect, 
preserve and improve the environment for the benefit of the community”. Article 28 (f) requires that 
“…the exercise and enjoyment of rights and freedoms is inseparable from the performance of duties 
and obligations”, and accordingly it is a fundamental duty of every person in Sri Lanka to protect 
nature and conserve its riches.  
The National Environmental Act (NEA) 1980 recommended the adoption of EIA in Sri Lanka. 
However, EIA was introduced only in 1988 after the National Environmental (Amendment) Act, 
(NEAA) No. 56 of 1988 was enacted. Under the NEAA 1988, the Central Environmental Authority 
(CEA) is responsible for coordinating the implementation of EIA and the approval of the projects with 
the relevant project approval agencies. The provisions of these Acts came into full effect after a 
series of capacity building programmes between 1991 and 1997 under the financial assistance of the 
United State Agency for International Development (USAID) (Zubair, 2001). Part IVC of the NEAA 
1988 introduces a section about project approval. It is required, according to the Act, that all 
prescribed projects undertake an EIA. A full description of the provisions of the NEAA 1988 and 
gazette notifications on prescribed projects is set out in Chapter 5. Despite the established legislation 
for EIA, Zubair (2001) identifies a number of shortcomings in the provisions of the Act including 
inadequate provision for public participation, loopholes because of the list of prescribed projects, 
lack of tolerance standards, conflicts of interest for project approval agencies, problems with 
environmental data and inadequate post-EIA monitoring, that seriously threaten the effectiveness of 
the EIA process.   
The NEA 1980 has provisions to establish the Central Environmental Authority (CEA) of Sri Lanka. In 
1988, the NEAA introduced the EIA process to Sri Lanka and has made the CEA responsible for 
governing the EIA process. The NEAA also supplemented the powers, functions and duties of the CEA 
(provided by the NEA 1980) by adding to “…require the submission of proposals for new projects and 
changes in or abandonment of existing projects, for the purpose of evaluation of the beneficial and 
adverse impacts of such proposals on the environment” (NEAA, 1988, s 5 (4)(h)). Part IV C of the 
NEAA 1988, entitled ‘Approval of Projects’ has made it mandatory to conduct an Initial 
Environmental Examination (IEE) or Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for projects with 
significant environmental impacts or ‘prescribed projects’. Part IV C of the NEAA 1988 was later 
amended in 2000 by the National Environmental (Amendment) Act No. 53 of 2000.  
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Despite these earlier enactments, the Sri Lankan EIA process did not begin until the Gazette 
extraordinary No. 722/22 of 1993 and the National Environmental (Procedure for approval of 
projects) Regulations, No.1 of 1993 were passed by Parliament. The Gazette listed 13 government 
agencies who could act as project approving agencies (PAA) and a list of prescribed projects that 
either IEEs or EIAs should be conducted for, before an approval is given. The list of PAAs was later 
amended in 1995 and 2004 taking the list of agencies who can act as PAAs to 23. The list of 
prescribed projects was amended in 1995 and 1999 to extend the range and type of projects that 
required environmental assessment.  
The National Environmental (Procedure for approval of projects) Regulations, No.1 of 1993 specified 
the EIA procedure for Sri Lanka. These regulations were later amended by Gazette extraordinary No. 
1159/22of 2000. This amendment provided provisions for PAAs to approve projects that require IEEs 
without subjecting them to public review.  
EIA procedure  
The following summarises the EIA process of Sri Lanka under the NEAA and associated regulations 
(see also Figure 4.4). In Figure 4.4, the numbers in circles depict the maximum number of days given 
for the different steps:  
 Once a Project Proponent (PP) submits preliminary information about a project to an appropriate 
Project Approving Agency (PAA), the PAA should within six days acknowledge in writing the 
receipt of preliminary information. The EIA regulations also specify that a project proponent 
should not act as a PAA for its own project. 
 Screening of the project occurs to decide whether an IEE or EIA is required for the project. PAA 
should subject the preliminary information received to environmental scoping to set Terms of 
Reference (ToR) for either an IEE or EIA. The PAA may consult state agencies and the public in 
this process. The PAA should inform the PP in writing of the ToR within 14 days for an IEE or 30 
days for an EIA.  
 The PP should submit the required number of copies of IEE or EIA reports to the PAA.  
 Upon receipt of the IEE Report, the PAA should within 21 days: 
“i. grant approval for the implementation of the proposed project subject to 
specified conditions; or 
ii. request the project proponent to submit an Environmental Impact 
Assessment Report; or 
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iii. refuse approval for the implementation of the proposed project with 
reasons for doing so.” (NER, 1993, s. 8 as amended by Gazette 1159/22, 
2000). 
 Upon receipt of an EIA report, the PAA should determine within 14 days whether the 
requirements of the ToR are sufficiently addressed in the report. If not, it should request the PP 
to address those gaps. The PAA may appoint a Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) to advise 
the PAA on evaluation of the EIA report. The PAA should invite written comments by the public 
on the EIA report by publishing a notice in the gazette and in one national newspaper published 
daily in the Sinhala, Tamil and English languages. Thirty working days should be given to the 
public to comment on the report. Once comments from the public are received, the PAA may 
hold a public hearing.  
 The PAA should forward the comments from the public to the PP within six days after completing 
the public phase. The PP should respond to such comments in writing to the PAA.  
 Upon receipt of such responses from the PP, the PAA should, within 30 days either: 
“i. grant approval for the implementation of the proposed project subject to 
specified conditions: or 
ii. refuse approval for the implementation of the proposed project with 
reasons for doing so” (NER, 1993, s. 13).  
 The NEAA 1988 contains provisions for PPs to appeal PAA’s decisions to the Secretary of the 
Ministry of Environment if an application is rejected.  
 The PAA should publish in the Gazette and in one national newspaper published daily in the 
Sinhala, Tamil and English languages the approval of any project.   
 The PAA should, within 30 days of approval of a project, forward a monitoring plan to the CEA.  
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In addition to the NEA 1980, the Fauna and Flora Protection (Amendment) Act No.49 of 1993 and the 
Coast Conservation Act No. 57 of 1981 both contain provisions for conducting EIAs in Sri Lanka. The 
provisions for EIA in the Fauna and Flora Protection (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 1993 have further 
been amended by the Fauna and Flora Protection (Amendment) Act No. 22 of 2009. As per sub 
section 9A(1) of the Amendment Act 2009, no development activity of any description whatsoever 
should be carried out within a distance of one mile of the boundary of any national reserve without 
obtaining the prior written approval of the Director-General of the Department of Wildlife 
Conservation. Any such activity seeking the approval of the Director General should accompany 
either an Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) or EIA, as the case may be. Further, as per the 
Amendment Act 2009, such an EIA or IEE report should be subjected to the review of the general 
public as well as a technical committee. The technical committee has 60 days to make its comments; 
the public has 30 days. Within 60 days of the receipt of both public and technical committee 
comments and after considering those, the Director-General of the Department of Wildlife 
Conservation can decide whether a permit should be issued authorizing the applicant to carry out the 
development activity.  
In contrast, according to section 14 of the Coast Conservation (Amendment) Act No. 64 of 1988, 
“…no person shall engage in any development activity other than a prescribed development activity 
within the Coastal Zone except under the authority of a permit issued” by the Director of the Coast 
Conservation Department (CCD). Therefore, the CCD is the final authority in determining whether to 
permit a development activity within the coastal zone as per the provisions given in the Act. Here, 
"Coastal Zone" is defined in the Act as an: 
…area lying within a limit of three hundred metres landwards of the Mean 
High Water line and a limit of two kilometres seawards of the Mean Low 
Water line and in the case of rivers, streams, lagoons, or any other body of 
water connected to the sea either permanently or periodically, the landward 
boundary shall extend to a limit of two kilometres measured perpendicular 
to the straight base line drawn between the natural entrance points thereof 
and shall include the waters of such rivers, streams and lagoons or any 
other body of water so connected to the sea (Coast Conservation Act, 1981, 
s.42). 
According to the Act, the Minister in charge of the subject may, “…having regard to the effect of 
those development activities on the long term stability, productivity and environmental quality of the 
Coastal Zone” (Coast Conservation Act, 1981, s.8), prescribe the categories of development activity 
that may be allowed within the coastal zone without a permit issued by the Director of CCD. Such 
activity should not, however, include any development activity already listed under the NEA as a 
prescribed activity, which is required to be subjected to an IEE or EIA (CEA, 2008). 
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As per section 16 of the CCA 1981, once an application is received for a permit, the Director of CCD 
may require the applicant to furnish an EIA relating to such development activity. Upon receipt of the 
EIA report, the Director of CCD should: 
(a) submit a copy of such assessment to the Council [Coast Conservation 
Advisory Council - The Council is an inter-department, inter-disciplinary 
advisory body] for its comments, if any; and 
(b) by notice published in the Gazette, notify the place and times at which 
such assessment will be available for inspection by the public, and invite the 
public to make its comments, if any, thereon. 
According to the CCA, the Council and the public have 60 days and 30 days, respectively, to provide 
comments on such assessments. The Director of CCD should make the decision related to the 
approval or rejection of the proposed development activity within 60 days after he/she receives 
comments from the public and the council (Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2 Summary comparison of EIA requirements under different legislation in Sri Lanka 
 
National Environmental 
(Amendment) Act, No. 
56 of 1988 
Fauna and Flora 
Protection 
(Amendment) Act No. 
22 of 2009 
Coast Conservation Act 
No. 57 of 1981 
Requirement for EIA  
EIA is mandatory for all 
activities prescribed by 
the Act 
EIA is required for any 
activity within one mile 
of the boundary of any 
national reserve 
EIA is at the discretion of 
the Director for any 
activity, which is not 
prescribed as permitted 
by the Act within the 
coastal zone 
Approval authority Project Approval Agency 
Director-General of the 
Department of Wildlife 
Conservation 
Director of Coast 
Conservation 
Department 
Review by a Technical 
Advisory Committee  
Not mandatory 
Wildlife Advisory 
committee has 60 days 
to review an EIA 
Coast Conservation 
Advisory Committee has 
60 days to review an EIA 
Reviewing by the public  Only EIAs 
Both IEEs and EIAs 
should be subjected to 
public reviewing 
Only EIAs 
 
On the other hand, the Fauna and Flora Protection (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 1993 (FFAA) provides 
provisions requiring either an IEE or EIA, as the case may be, before an approval is given to any 
development activity of any description whatsoever proposed to be established within a distance of 
one mile of the boundary of any national reserve. Such activity is required to have written approval 
from the Director-General of the Department of Wildlife Conservation. The Act also states: 
Every application for approval, under subsection (1) to commence a 
development activity shall be accompanied by an Initial Environmental 
Provision 
Act 
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Examination or Environmental Impact Assessment, as the case may be, in 
terms of the National Environmental Act, No. 47 of 1980, relating to such 
development activity. The Director shall have regard to such environmental 
impact assessment in deciding whether or not to grant approval for the 
commencement of the development activity to which that assessment 
relates (FFAA, 1993, s.13). 
Even though the Fauna and Flora Protection Act is considered stronger than the other two Acts in 
terms of the provisions for the EIA process, the Fauna and Flora Protection Ordinance covers only 
approximately 13 percent of the country (IUCN Sri Lanka & the Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources, 2007). Therefore, this study is limited in its scope to the EIA process in the National 
Environmental Act 1980. 
4.2.5 Case Studies  
As reported in Chapter 3, two projects from each country were selected for detailed assessment in 
this study. This section introduces the two projects selected from Sri Lanka. They are the Southern 
Transport Development Project and the Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project. These two projects will 
be extensively referred to in Chapter 5 when the findings from Sri Lanka are reported.  
Project I – The Southern Transport Development Project  
The Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) is the first access-controlled expressway in Sri 
Lanka. It connects the country’s capital to the southern province (Ministry of Highways, Ports and 
Shipping, 2013). The project was funded by three major donors including the JICA, the ADB and the 
Chinese EXIM Bank. The road crosses through four major river basins and also goes over 100 small 
and large wetlands and paddy fields (Withanage, 2004); the project area is known to be a historical 
flood plain (University of Moratuwa, 1999b). The road also passes through a number of villages and 
home gardens and required the demolition of over 1200 houses (Withanage, 2004). This action 
created many controversies and construction delays and the government had to secure additional 
funding from the donors to match the additional cost incurred because of design changes and delays. 
The road is expected to provide many benefits including an increased growth rate in the 
economically deprived southern province of the country and the promotion of tourism in south-
western and southern coastal areas (Ministry of Highways, Ports and Shipping, 2013). 
An EIA was initially conducted in 1996 for the original road alignment called the ‘Original RDA [Road 
Development Authority] Trace’. However, this proposal was discontinued because of a lack of 
funding and for political reasons. Later, in 1998, feasibility studies prepared for a second attempt 
proposed an alternative alignment for the road called the “Combined Trace”. This trace deviated by 
about 40 percent from the original RDA trace. A detailed EIA was conducted for this trace (University 
of Moratuwa, 1999b). However, in the latter stages of the project, the alignment was changed and a 
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new alignment was proposed, known as the “Final Trace”. The final trace was not subjected to a 
detailed EIA, but an environmental study in 2000 and a social impact assessment in 2002 were done 
for the 29.3km section of the road (approximately one quarter of the total length), which was funded 
by the ADB (ADB, 2008). The expressway was opened in November 2011.  
Project II – The Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project  
The Upper Kotmale Hydro-Power Project (UKHP) is located in the central province of Sri Lanka. It is 
the third largest hydroelectric dam in the country (ABB (ABB Switzerland Ltd), 2013). Even though the 
original project concept was conceived in 1968, the initial feasibility of the project was conducted 
only during the 1985-1987 period. The EIA report for the UKHP was published in September 1994; it 
identified key environmental and social issues including “…impacts on waterfall aesthetics due to 
stream flow reductions, social impacts due to resettlement of affected people, possible effects on 
ground water due to tunneling [sic], impacts due to de-watering of streams on downstream water 
uses and impacts on bio-diversity” (UKHP, 2004). The project planned to tap water from at least five 
world-class waterfalls that lie within the project area, which created an extensive public outcry 
against the development (Kodituwakku & Moonesinghe, 2005). The project was approved in 1998 
subject to seven mitigatory measures, which were later gazetted in the National Environmental 
(Upper Kotmale Hydro-power Project – Monitoring) Regulations No. 1, 2003. The proposed 
mitigatory measures included establishment of a monitoring committee, maintenance of stream 
flows over the waterfalls, development of a watershed management plan, an assessment of 
biodiversity, monitoring of groundwater levels and mitigation of the landslide risk of the area (Upper 
Kotmale Hydro-power Project – Monitoring Regulations No. 1, 2003). In 2005, because of strong 
protests from professionals, environmentalists, politicians and the general public, the Cabinet 
decided to limit the scope of the project to only one feeding stream called “Kotmale Oya”. This has 
reduced the annual energy generation but also saved four major waterfalls in the area. The 
hydropower project was completed in 2012 with financial support from the JICA.  
4.3 The disaster and environmental management context of New Zealand 
This section describes the disaster and environmental management legislative and institutional 
context of New Zealand. New Zealand is an island nation in the southwest Pacific Ocean. Its total land 
area is 271,000 square kilometres (Statistics NZ, 2013a) and its estimated 2013 resident population 
was 4,470,800 (Statistics NZ, 2013b). This makes the country low in population density with only 16 
persons per square kilometre. Compared with the rest of the world, New Zealand is in 196th position 
in terms of population density. The country is considered a high income country (The World Bank, 
2013b) with a per capita GDP of NZ$ 47,487 [Approximately US$ 35,527] (Statistics NZ, 2013b). New 
Zealand sits 6th in the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2013) and in 2012 shared first place 
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in the Corruption Perception Index (meaning it is perceived as least corrupt) with Denmark 
(Transparency International, 2014). According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, New Zealand 
consistently shows a high level of achievement; it stands in the 90th percentile (among highest 
ranking countries) in all governance indicators (The World Bank Group, 2013).  
The geographic location of New Zealand makes it one of the most seismically active countries in the 
world. The country lies across the boundary of the Australian and Pacific tectonic plates (OCDESC 
(Officials’ Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination), 2007). Between 1992 and 
2007, New Zealand experienced over 30 earthquakes measured at or above 6 on the Richter scale 
(GNS Science, 2009). The February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch is considered the world’s 10th 
biggest earthquake of all time in terms of the financial value of the damage (The OFDA/CRED, 2014). 
Other than earthquakes, the country is also subjected to frequent floods, storms, volcanic eruptions 
and drought (Table 4.3).  
Table 4.3 Major disasters and their impacts in New Zealand 1900 – 2012 (Source: EM-DAT: 
The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database6) 
Disaster type 
No of 
disasters Mortality Affected 
Damage US$ 
(000) 
Drought 2 0 0 1,700,000 
Earthquake (seismic activity) 8 459 620186 24,737,669 
Epidemic 2 6700 1 0 
Extreme temperature 1 0 0 200,000 
Flood 34 31 28387 436,300 
Industrial Accident 4 29 14145 0 
Mass movement wet 1 0 600 2,466 
Storm 11 65 3997 73,600 
Transport Accident 6 469 20 0 
Volcano 2 150 70 0 
Wildfire 1 0 130 0 
 
4.3.1 Environmental management in New Zealand 
Environmental management and resource development in New Zealand are governed mostly by the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). The RMA is considered a holistic integrated piece of 
legislation (Bührs & Bartlett, 1993; Memon & Perkins, 2000). The Act replaced many other statutes, 
notably the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
(Ericksen, Berke, Crawford, & Dixon, 2003). New Zealand’s local government reforms also occurred in 
                                                          
6 For a disaster to be entered into the EMDAT database at least one of the following criteria must be fulfilled: 
10 or more people reported killed, 100 or more people reported affected, the declaration of a state of 
emergency or a call for international assistance. 
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tandem with resource management reforms resulting in a three tiered structure for governance 
comprising central government, regional and territorial authorities (Ericksen et al., 2003) (see section 
4.3.2).  
The purpose of the RMA is to promote sustainable management of natural and physical resources. 
However, many scholars argue that realizing the expected results of the RMA is challenging because 
of a complex set of reasons, “…including confusion about the RMA mandate, limited local planning 
capability and weak local plans and inadequate involvement of central government in addressing 
these capacity building needs” (Glavovic, Saunders, & Becker, 2010, p. 685). Ericksen et al. (2003) 
suggest weaknesses in local planning are a symptom of fundamental problems of governance and 
recommend improving local planning capacity. 
4.3.2 Planning framework under the RMA 
The RMA provides a range of instruments from the national to local level to promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources (Figure 4.5). At the national level, central government 
can provide overall direction to local councils to prepare policy statements and plans through 
national environmental standards (ss. 43, 45, 46) and national policy statements (s 62), which also 
ensure consistency of plans across the country. At the regional level, every regional council must 
prepare a regional policy statement (s.62) to provide the basic direction for resource management in 
the region by setting up of the objectives and policies for the region. In addition, every regional 
council must also prepare a regional coastal plan (if relevant) and may prepare a regional plan (s.67) 
for the region; every territorial authority7 is required to prepare a district plan for the district (s.75). 
Regional and district plans assist respective local authorities to implement the provisions of the RMA. 
Therefore, regional and district plans form a crucial part of sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources in New Zealand. The above instruments are designed in a hierarchical order 
(Canterbury Regional Council v Banks Peninsula District Council ((1995)1B ELRNZ 415) to achieve 
integrated management of natural and physical resources.  
                                                          
7 District or City council 
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Figure 4.5 Planning Framework under the RMA (Source: MfE (2012, p. 5))  
National environmental standards and national policy statements  
Under sections 43 and 44 of the RMA, central government may make regulations, known as National 
Environmental Standards (NES), that prescribe different technical standards, methods or 
requirements for environmental matters. The purpose of these standards is to ensure a clean and 
healthy environment especially promoting clean air, water and soil. The New Zealand government 
has already developed regulations on air quality standards, sources of human drinking water 
standards, telecommunications facilities, electricity transmission, and assessing and managing 
contaminants in soil to protect human health (MfE, 2013a).  
Section 45 enables the Minister for the Environment to initiate the preparation of National Policy 
Statements (NPS) (other than the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement) for the purpose of 
announcing objectives and policies for matters of national significance that are relevant to achieving 
the sustainable management of physical and natural resources. The Minister can recommend NPSs 
for different matters including anything which, because of its uniqueness, or the irreversibility or 
potential magnitude or risk of its actual or potential effects, is of significance to the environment of 
New Zealand (s.45). Therefore, even though it is not specifically mentioned, the Minister can initiate 
preparing a national policy statement for natural hazard management under the above provisions. 
Ericksen et al. (2000, p. 125) suggest that the Minister has the authority to prepare a NPS on natural 
hazards under the provisions in section 24 of the Act, which lists the functions given to the Minister 
under the RMA. However, it is clear none of these provisions makes it mandatory for the Minister to 
do so. Therefore, even after 22 years of the enactment of the RMA, a NPS specifically on natural 
hazards is yet to be seen in New Zealand. The Technical Advisory Group (TAG) report on the RMA 
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principles (Dormer et al., 2012), recommends developing an NPS or NES on natural hazards and 
expects such regulation would provide national guidance to local authorities on the management of 
natural hazards. In the summary of proposals for the next phase of RMA reforms, the Minister for the 
Environment has not indicated that the above recommendation by the TAG will be considered as it 
is. However, she did specify that decision makers are required to consider natural hazards in their 
deliberations under the proposed new sections to the RMA (MfE, 2013b). The proposed reforms 
predict that further guidance, either statutory or non-statutory, on natural hazards will be 
considered after passing the Bill.  
NPSs are currently in place for electricity transmission, freshwater management and renewable 
electricity generation. There is also a mandatory New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (NZCPS) (led 
by the Department of Conservation (DoC)). The purpose of the coastal policy statement is to state 
policies in order to achieve the sustainable management of physical and natural resources in relation 
to the coastal environment. The first NZCPS was promulgated in 1994. The NZCPS has two brief 
sections one on adoption of a precautionary approach to activities with unknown but potentially 
significant effects; the second is on recognition of natural coastal hazards (DoC (Department of 
Conservation), 1994). A review of the NZCPS 1994 was carried out in 2004 and concluded that “…the 
coastal hazard related NZCPS policies need to be changed and added to, if the NZCPS is to be 
effective in promoting sustainable coastal hazard management in New Zealand in the future” 
(Jacobson, 2004, p. 109). The NZCPS promulgated in 2010 addresses this concern and provides more 
elaborate policies on coastal hazard management. One of the objectives of the NZCPS is to ensure 
that assessment of coastal hazard risks takes into account climate change and risks are managed by 
locating new development away from hazard prone areas. Other policies address the hazard risks of 
existing development (DoC, 2010). For this purpose, the NZCPS provides a planning horizon of 100 
years. Further, the NZCPS also explicitly requires adopting a precautionary approach “…towards 
proposed activities whose effects on the coastal environment are uncertain, unknown, or little 
understood, but potentially significantly adverse” (policy 3) (DoC, 2010). 
Regional policy statements and regional plans 
The RMA requires that each regional council prepares a Regional Policy Statement (RPS) for its 
region. The purpose of the RPS is to provide an overview of the resource management issues of the 
region and policies and methods to achieve integrated management of the natural and physical 
resources of the whole region in order to achieve the sustainable management of those resources. 
According to the RMA 1991, it is the function of regional councils to control the use of land for the 
purpose of avoidance and mitigation of natural hazards. The land can be the bed of a freshwater 
body or seabed as well as terrestrial land. Section 62 requires regional councils to specify in the RPS 
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the objectives, policies, and methods for the control of the use of land to avoid or mitigate natural 
hazards or any group of hazards.  
In addition, every regional council is required to prepare a regional coastal plan for all coastal marine 
areas of the region. Even though it is not mandatory for regional councils to prepare regional plans 
for other areas, any regional council can at any time initiate preparation of a regional plan. The 
purpose of the preparation, implementation and administration of regional plans is to assist a 
regional council to carry out its functions to achieve the sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources. Section 67 requires the regional plan to give effect to any national policy 
statement, any New Zealand coastal policy statement, and any regional policy statement. Section 65 
enables regional councils to consider the desirability of preparing a regional plan, among other 
things, whenever any threat from natural hazards arises or is likely to arise.  
Regional councils can include regional rules in plans to carry out its functions and to achieve the 
objectives and policies of regional plans. Regional rules help control the use of land; the taking, use, 
damming, and diversion of water, and discharges to the environment. Regional rules can define 
whether the above-mentioned activities in the region are permitted, controlled, discretionary, 
restricted discretionary, non-complying, or prohibited within the region. These different classes of 
activities (except for prohibited activities) require different tests to decide whether they should be 
approved (Table 4.4).   
Table 4.4 Class of activity and tests required under the RMA (based on the RMA, 1991) 
Class Test required 
Permitted  
A resource consent is not required for the activity if it complies with the requirements 
specified in the Act and does not contravene a NES, regulation, plan, or proposed plan. 
Controlled 
A resource consent is required for the activity and the consent authority must grant a 
resource consent except for subdivision consents under special circumstances. The 
consent authority's power to impose conditions on the resource consent is restricted to 
the matters over which control is reserved. Controlled activities are specified in a plan. 
Restricted 
Discretionary  
A resource consent is required for the activity specified in a plan and the consent 
authority's power to decline a consent, or to grant a consent and to impose conditions on 
the consent, is restricted to the matters over which discretion is restricted. If granted, the 
activity must comply with the requirements specified in the relevant plan.  
Discretionary 
A resource consent is required for the activity specified in a plan and the consent 
authority may decline the consent or grant the consent with or without conditions; and If 
granted, the activity must comply with the requirements specified in the relevant plan.  
Non-complying  
A resource consent is required for the activity specified in a plan and the consent 
authority may decline or grant the consent, with or without conditions, but only if the 
consent authority is satisfied that the adverse effects of the activity on the 
environment will be minor.  
Prohibited  
No application for a resource consent may be made for the activity specified in a plan and 
the consent authority must not grant a consent for it. 
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Saunders (2012) suggests the tests required for the above classes of activities vary, generally 
according to the level of risk that such a class of activity can have on the environment. The lower the 
level of risks the more permissive the planning regime. However, a recent study of 11 RPSs suggests 
they are not based on any systematic risk assessments (Saunders, Beban, & Coomer, 2014).  
District plans  
Every territorial authority is required to prepare a district plan for its district. The purpose of the 
district plan is to assist territorial authorities to carry out their functions in order to achieve 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources. Like regional plans, territorial authorities 
may include district rules in district plans. In making a rule, the territorial authority should have 
regard to the actual or potential effect on the environment of activities including, in particular, any 
adverse effect. 
Like regional plans, territorial authorities too may categorize activities as permitted, controlled, 
discretionary, restricted discretionary, non-complying or prohibited and also make rules in its plan or 
proposed plan for each class of activity. In making any plan or policy statement, an assessment, 
essentially a strategic environmental assessment, is required of the effects of making (or not making) 
the rule or policy statement (RMA, 1991, s.32). However, it is clear that district plans are also rarely 
subjected to systematic risk assessments in New Zealand. According to Saunders et al. (2014, p. 21), 
only 4.3 percent of 67 territorial authority plans they had reviewed have information on systematic 
risk assessments.  
Resource consenting process  
Even though the direct provisions related to assessment of environmental effects are confined to 
Schedule 4 of the RMA, the remaining provisions of the RMA should also be closely studied to 
understand the EIA process in New Zealand. The EIA process is tightly associated with the resource 
consent process. Therefore, this section describes the consent application process and identifies 
connections between that process and the EIA process.  
Section 87 of the RMA defines five types of resource consents. They are: land-use consents, sub-
division consents, coastal permits, water permits and discharge permits. The consenting authority in 
charge of an application varies based on the type of ‘resource consent’ or its significance. Central 
government is responsible for matters of national significance. Territorial authorities are responsible 
for land use and sub-division consents; regional councils are responsible for other consents, 
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essentially those that deal with common pool resources. Unitary authorities8 are responsible for both 
district and regional council functions (MfE, 1999).  
Sections 30 (regional councils) and 31 (territorial authorities) of the RMA specifically provide 
provisions enabling regional councils and territorial authorities to control the use of land for the 
purpose of avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards. Regional councils are also responsible for the 
control of the use, development or protection of land in the coastal marine area (i.e., between mean 
high water springs and 12 nautical miles offshore) in the region in conjunction with the Minister of 
Conservation. This includes the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards. According to section 31 of 
the RMA, every territorial authority has functions for the control of any actual or potential effects of 
the use, development, or protection of land for the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards. 
Therefore, under the RMA, functions of controlling the use of land, coastal marine area or the bed of 
a water body in order to avoid or mitigate natural hazards are given to local authorities. According to 
the above provisions, regional councils are given the control of the use of land to avoid and mitigate 
natural hazards; it is the function of territorial authorities to control any actual or potential effects of 
the use of land. It is difficult to control any actual or potential effects of the use of land without 
controlling the use of land. There is clearly a potential overlap, duplication and administrative 
conflicts if, for instance, different levels of local government disagree over the use of land and its 
effects on vulnerability to natural hazards. This was specifically addressed by the Environment Court 
in Canterbury Regional Council v Banks Peninsula District Council ((1995)1B ELRNZ 415). The court 
found that the role of the regional council is to exercise controls “…where appropriate on a regional 
basis, rather than by individual territorial authorities”. The decision further stated, “…one way of [the 
regional councils] doing this would be by the control of the erection of buildings or structures in a 
flood plain (Canterbury Regional Council v Banks Peninsula District Council ((1995)1B ELRNZ 415, pp. 
12-13).   
According to section 88, any person can apply to a relevant consent authority for a resource consent. 
However, it should be made in a prescribed form and manner. As per sub section 88 (2)(b), an 
application for resource consent must include an AEE in such detail as corresponds with the scale and 
significance of the effects that the activity may have on the environment. This is required to be done 
in accordance with Schedule 4 of the RMA. Figure 4.6 shows different stages and timeframes for 
processing a resource consent application. 
As per sub section 88(3), if an application does not include an adequate AEE, the “…consent authority 
may, within 5 working days after the application was first lodged, determine that the application is 
                                                          
8 A unitary authority is a territorial authority that has the responsibilities, duties, and powers of a regional 
council 
  
82 
 
incomplete and return the application, with written reasons for the determination, to the applicant”. 
Once the application is accepted, if the consent authority decides that it requires further information 
to make a decision on the application, the consent authority may request further information at any 
time before a hearing has taken place (s. 92). 
The RMA specifies three possible routes for a resource consent application. They are public 
notification, limited notification and non-notification. According to section 95, a consent authority 
must make its decision on one of these three routes within 10 working days after an application is 
first lodged and execute its decision. Any application, which in the consent authority’s view has 
adverse effects on the environment that are more than minor, should be notified to the public. 
Public notification means that notices are published in a newspaper and are placed at the site. These 
provide information about the application and where to find more information and about the 
processes for the public to get further information or make submissions. Under section 95(b), if the 
consent authority does not publicly notify an application for resource consent, it may decide to limit 
notification to those people it decides are affected. In Figure 4.6, both public notification and limited 
notification are shown together. When the above two situations do not apply (i.e., when effects are 
minor or less), a consent authority may avoid notifying the application. Submissions on an application 
must be made within 20 working days after the application is notified (s.97). 
There are provisions for combined hearings in cases of two or more applications (s.103) and joint 
hearings if two or more consent authorities are involved (s.102). Section 104 specifies the decision-
making tests for resource consents:  
when considering an application for a resource consent and any submissions 
received, the consent authority must…have regard to– 
a) any actual and potential effects on the environment of allowing the 
activity; and 
b) any relevant provisions of— 
a. a national environmental standard: 
b. other regulations: 
c. a national policy statement: 
d. a New Zealand coastal policy statement: 
e. a regional policy statement or proposed regional policy 
statement: 
f. a plan or proposed plan; and 
c) any other matter the consent authority considers relevant and 
reasonably necessary to determine the application. 
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Figure 4.6 Processing of resource consents in New Zealand under the RMA (Adapted and 
updated from MfE (1999, p. 7))   
Section 104 also provides for a consent authority to disregard an adverse effect of the activity on the 
environment when forming an opinion under section 104 (a) above if a national environmental 
standard or the plan permits an activity with that effect. Section 108 allows a consent authority to 
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specify any conditions related to the approval of a resource consent. As per section 114, a consent 
authority must ensure that a notice of decision on an application for a resource consent is served on 
the applicant, persons who made submissions, and other persons and authorities that it considers 
appropriate.  
Section 120 of the RMA provides for either the applicant or any person who made a submission on 
the application to appeal, within 15 days after the decision is served to them, to the Environment 
Court against the whole or any part of a decision of a consent authority on an application for a 
resource consent. However, since the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 supersedes the 
provisions of the RMA, there is no right of appeal against any decision made under that Act. Since the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 is a specific case and relevant only to a small area of New 
Zealand, this chapter will not discuss it any further. As per section 128, a consent authority may 
review the conditions of a resource consent to deal with any adverse effect on the environment that 
may arise from the exercise of the consent that it is appropriate to deal with at a later stage.  
In addition to the above, section 100 of the Resource Management (Simplifying and Streamlining) 
Amendment Act 2009 introduced the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and an exclusive 
process to handle proposals of national significance. Under section 144A (1) of the RMA as amended 
by the Resource Management Amendment Act 2011 (2011 No 19), the Minister in charge of the 
subject (i.e., the Minister for the Environment or Minister of Conservation if the application is related 
to a coastal marine area) can also request the EPA to advise him or her on whether an application is a 
proposal of national significance.  
Section 142 outlines a set of criteria that may be used to decide whether a proposal is nationally 
significant. According to sub section 142(3), among other things if the proposal: “(i) has aroused 
widespread public concern or interest regarding its actual or likely effect on the environment 
(including the global environment); or…(viii) will assist the Crown in fulfilling its public health, 
welfare, security, or safety obligations or functions” then the Minister may consider such proposals 
as nationally significant. Under section 142, such proposals originally lodged with local authorities 
can be ‘called in’ by the Minister by making a direction to refer the matter to a Board of Inquiry for 
the decision; or refer the matter to the Environment Court for decision. It is the responsibility of the 
EPA to provide the Board of Inquiry or Environment Court with all information relating to the matter 
and any submissions received (MfE, 2014). Therefore, once a consent application is referred either to 
a Board of Inquiry or the Environment Court, the EPA’s role changes to a supporting and advisory 
role.  
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4.3.3 Natural hazard management in New Zealand 
New Zealand, in its national progress report on the progress of HFA implementation for the 2011-
2013 reporting cycle, claims that a strong national legislative framework is in place for addressing 
hazard risk management and disaster risks of development projects through the EIA process 
(MCDEM (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 2013)). The report emphasizes the 
Resource Management Act 1991, the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002, and 
the Building Act 2004 as three core Acts that promote risk reduction. The National Hazardscape 
Report (OCDESC, 2007, p. 8) describes these three Acts as “…key pieces of legislation influencing and 
promoting integrated environmental management and recognition of hazards and risks”. According 
to the report, none of these Acts has priority over the others, they sit alongside each other and other 
legislation (OCDESC, 2007). Moreover, the National Hazardscape Report identified several other Acts 
that address specific aspects of hazard and risk management in New Zealand. They are the 
Biosecurity Act 1993, the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941, the Environment Act 1986, 
the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, the Local Government Act 2002, the Health 
and Safety in Employment Act 1992, the Maritime Transport Act 1994, the Health Act 1956, and the 
Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977 (OCDESC, 2007). 
Glavovic et al. (2010) and Saunders (2012) argue that of these Acts, five key pieces of legislation in 
New Zealand are directly related to natural hazard planning. They are the RMA 1991, the LGA 2002, 
the CDEM Act 2002, the Building Act 2004 and the Local Government Official Information and 
Meetings Act 1987 (LGOIMA). However, they also point out a lack of clear connection between these 
Acts and argue that these policies and laws should be better aligned, where appropriate, to facilitate 
a more holistic and coordinated governance approach to natural hazard management (Figure 4.7).  
According to the above scholars, there is a range of tools and mechanisms provided from the above 
legislation available for planners for hazard risk reduction. These include: regulatory planning tools 
under the RMA such as National Policy Statements, Regional Policy Statements, Regional Plans, 
District Plans, and the resource consent process; community plans under the LGA 2002 such as 10-
year Long-Term Plans (LTP) that include a description of the community outcomes of the local 
authority's district or region; building codes and project information memoranda (PIM) under the 
Building Act 2004; land information memoranda (LIM) under the LGOIMA; and Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management Group Plans under the CDEM Act 2002. The following sections elaborate 
further on the provisions of the above Acts.  
  
  
86 
 
The Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM) 
The CDEM replaced the Civil Defence Act 1987 and was enacted to improve and promote the 
sustainable management of hazards in a way that contributes to the social, economic, cultural, and 
environmental well-being and safety of the public and also to the protection of property (s. 3). The 
Act further aims to “…encourage and enable communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk” (s.3b) 
and to “…require local authorities to co-ordinate, through regional groups, planning, programmes, 
and activities related to civil defence emergency management across the areas of reduction, 
readiness, response, and recovery…” (s.3d). The Act defines hazard as “…something that may cause, 
or contribute substantially to the cause of, an emergency” and risks as “…the likelihood and 
consequences of a hazard” (s. 4).  
Section 12 of the Act requires that a Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (CDEMG) be 
established in every region. Every territorial authority must be a member of a CDEMG. Section 17 
outlines the functions of such groups including to identify, assess, and manage those hazards and 
risks and identify and implement cost-effective risk reduction. The Act, however, does not provide 
clear provisions about how risk reduction can be done; the National CDEM Strategy seeks to address 
this.  
According to the National CDEM Strategy “…the New Zealand integrated approach to CDEM can be 
described by the four areas of activity, known as the ‘4Rs’”: reduction, readiness, response and 
recovery (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008a, p. 5). Moreover, according to the national strategy, 
risk reduction is expected to be handled through local RMA plans and other instruments at the 
national level. Therefore, as per the risk management strategies of New Zealand, risk reduction 
should be dealt with through different planning instruments provided by other legislation including 
the resource consent process of the RMA. Nevertheless, there is no further guidance available on 
how reduction is included in the RMA (Saunders, Forsyth, Johnston, & Becker, 2007).  
It can be argued that local CDEM groups can take measures to incorporate risk reduction into 
regional and district plans. However, this must be done through the normal planning process of the 
RMA since there is no special provision for CDEMGs to have an influence on RMA plans.  
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Figure 4.7 Key Acts and responsibilities and areas for improved connections for hazard management in New Zealand (Source: Saunders (2012, p. 
87)) 
 
 
 
  
    
 
88 
The Local Government Act 2002 (LGA) 
As reported earlier, under sections 30 and 31 of the RMA, functions controlling the use of land, the 
coastal marine area or the bed of a water body in order to avoid or mitigate natural hazards are 
given to local authorities. In this context, the LGA plays a direct role in hazard and risk management 
in New Zealand. Section 10 of the LGA lists the purpose of local governments as: 
(a) to enable democratic local decision-making and action by, and on behalf 
of, communities; and 
(b) to meet the current and future needs of communities for good-quality 
local infrastructure, local public services, and performance of regulatory 
functions in a way that is most cost-effective for households and businesses. 
As per section 11A, in performing its role, a local authority must have particular regard to the 
avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards as one of its core services to its community. Section 39 
provides specific governance principles that each local authority should adhere to in performing its 
roles. Sections 76 to 81 of the LGA list matters relevant to decision making. As per section 77, a local 
authority must try to identify all reasonably practicable options for the achievement of the objective 
of a decision. Under section 78, a “…local authority must, in the course of its decision-making process 
in relation to a matter, give consideration to the views and preferences of persons likely to be 
affected by, or to have an interest in, the matter”. Public participation in decision-making is given a 
prominent place in the LGA; section 82 lists a set of principles to be followed in any consultation 
exercise.   
As per section 93, every local authority must prepare a long-term plan (LTP) describing the activities 
of the local authority and the community outcomes of the local authority area. Further, every local 
authority must also prepare an annual plan to operationalize the long-term plan (s.95). Clause 2 (2) 
of Schedule 10 of the LGA lists several activities, including flood protection and control works, that 
can be considered as groups of activities in LTPs. Clause 2(1)(a) requires local authorities to identify 
sub-activities within the group of activities to operationalize the group activity. Therefore, risk 
reduction measures can be included in LTPs; Glavovic et al. (2010) argue that there is a need to 
ensure that risk reduction is prioritised in these plans in order to ensure that the annual plan 
provides resources sufficient to take action.  
The Building Act 2004 
The Building Act 2004 was enacted to regulate building work to ensure the safety and integrity of 
structures (OCDESC, 2007). According to sections 12 and 13 of the Building Act, regional authorities 
have become the building consent authority for dams whereas territorial authorities are responsible 
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for other buildings. Section 71 of the Act permits consent authorities to refuse to grant building 
consent, if: 
(a) the land on which the building work is to be carried out is subject or is 
likely to be subject to 1 or more natural hazards; or 
(b) the building work is likely to accelerate, worsen, or result in a natural 
hazard on that land or any other property. 
However, if the building consent authority is satisfied that adequate provision has been made to 
protect the land, building work or other property referred to above from natural hazards then the 
building consent may be granted. As per section 71, natural hazards in the above context mean: 
erosion (including coastal erosion, bank erosion, and sheet erosion); falling debris (including soil, 
rock, snow, and ice); subsidence; inundation (including flooding, overland flow, storm surge, tidal 
effects, and ponding); and slippage. According to section 32, if an owner of land is considering 
carrying out building work and a building consent is required for that work, he can apply for a PIM 
(Project Information Memorandum). Once the application is lodged, a territorial authority must issue 
a PIM within 20 working days; it should include natural hazard features of the land known to the 
territorial authority but are not listed in the district plan.  
Subsection 7 of the Act lists provisions on the safety of dams. Dams should be classified as low 
potential impact; medium potential impact or high potential impact based on assessed damage level 
and population at risk. Accordingly, an owner of a large dam must first classify the dam according to 
potential impact from a dam breach and inform the relevant regional council. The Building (Dam 
Safety) Regulations 2008 (SR 2008/208) provide dimensions for a ‘large’ dam. The dam classification 
table is given in schedule 1 of the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2008 (Table 4.5).  
According to the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2008, the assessed damage level is based on the 
number of residential houses likely to be damaged because of a dam break, damage to critical 
infrastructure, the time period required to restore critical infrastructure, damage to the natural 
environment and the community recovery period. Owners of medium or high potential impact dams 
should prepare a dam safety assurance programme, which includes, among others, safety reviews of 
the dam, a monitoring plan and also an emergency action plan. According to the regulations:  
The purpose of a Dam Safety Assurance Programme is to assist the owner of 
a large dam to ensure good safety management of the dam through the life 
of the structure and to manage the resolution of any potential deficiencies 
that may arise (Department of Building and Housing, 2008, p. 16).  
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Table 4.5 ‘Potential impact’ classification matrix for large dams in New Zealand (Source: the 
Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2008, Schedule 1)  
Assessed 
Damage Level 
Population At Risk (PAR) 
0 1 to 10 11 to 100 More than 100 
Catastrophic High potential 
impact 
High High High 
Major Medium 
potential impact 
Medium/high 
(See note 4) 
High High 
Moderate  Low potential 
impact 
Low/medium/high 
 (See notes 3 & 4) 
Medium/high 
(See note 4) 
Medium/high 
(See notes 2 & 4) 
Minimal  Low potential 
impact 
Low/medium/high 
(See notes 1, 3 & 4) 
Low/medium/high 
(See notes 1, 3 & 4) 
Low/medium/high 
(See notes 1, 3 & 4) 
 
Notes:  
1. With a PAR of 5 or more people, it is unlikely that the potential impact will be low.  
2. With a PAR of more than 100 people, it is unlikely that the potential impact will be medium.  
3. Use a medium classification if it is highly likely that a life will be lost.  
4. Use a high classification if it is highly likely that two or more lives will be lost.  
Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 (LGOIMA) 
The LGOIMA was enacted in order to promote open and participative governance by local 
authorities. Under the Act, local authorities are required to make publicly available the official 
information held by such authorities. This is a key mechanism for ensuring transparency and 
accountability of local government processes and decisions; there is equivalent legislation (the 
Official Information Act 1982) applicable to central government.  
In addition, according to section 44A of the Act, any person can request a LIM in relation to matters 
affecting any land in the district of the authority. After receiving an application for a LIM, the 
territorial authority within 10 working days should issue a LIM with any “…special feature or 
characteristic of the land concerned, including but not limited to potential erosion, avulsion, falling 
debris, subsidence, slippage, alluvion, or inundation” (s.44A(2)(a)), which is known to the territorial 
authority but is not already listed in the district plan.  
4.3.4 Case studies  
As per the research carried out in Sri Lanka, two projects from New Zealand were selected. This 
section describes the two projects, namely: the Waitohi Irrigation and Hydro Scheme (WIHS) and the 
Transmission Gully Project (TGP). Assessment was based on relevant document analysis from the two 
projects and also from interviewing project-related officials from relevant consenting authorities. 
These two projects will be extensively referred to in Chapter 6 when the findings from New Zealand 
are reported.  
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Project I – Waitohi Irrigation and Hydro Scheme (WIHS) 
The WIHS involves an approximately NZ$380 million investment in North Canterbury for the purpose 
of irrigating nearly 60,000 ha and generating hydropower (Harris Consulting, 2012). The project is 
expected to create over 3300 new jobs for the Canterbury region (Hurunui Water Project, 2013). The 
scheme is a cascade of four storage dams. The Hurricane Gully Dam is the largest and is designed to 
store 95 percent of the total capacity of the scheme (Rivett, Morgan, & van Dusschoten, 2012).   
The Hurricane Gully site was selected by a project developer as the best site along the river for a 
large storage area with a minimized volume of the dam structure. The project engineering report 
also admitted that the project area is located in a tectonically very active zone (Rivett et al., 2012). As 
per the requirements under the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2008, a dam break analysis was 
undertaken for the Hurricane Gully dam. The results of the analysis show the impact of a potential 
dam break would be catastrophic and the potential impact category of the dam is high (Rivett et al., 
2012). Despite this, the scheme was approved by the Canterbury Regional Council in August 2013 
(Hurunui Water Project, 2013).  
Project II – Transmission Gully Project  
The Transmission Gully project is a planned 27 km expressway forming an alternative inland route 
connecting the MacKays to the Linden segment of the Wellington Northern Corridor (NZTA (New 
Zealand Transport Agency), 2009). The project involves lands under the administrative jurisdiction of 
four separate territorial authorities, Wellington City Council, Porirua City Council, Upper Hutt City 
Council and Kapiti Coast District Council (Rae & Crack, 2011). In September 2011, the Minister for the 
Environment confirmed the project is of national significance and directed it to a Board of Inquiry as 
per s.171 of the RMA.  
The project is expected to deliver a number of benefits including improved route security and 
resilience of Wellington’s State Highway network (McGimpsey, Crack, Rickard, & Hall, 2011). The 
proposal was considered controversial because of long-standing public and media attention over 
potential impacts of the project on the environment (Dwyer, Howie, McMahon, & Mitchell, 2012). 
The geotechnical engineering report of the project identifies a number of hazards in the project area 
including slope instability, debris floods and flows, earthquakes and ground shaking, fault rupture, 
earthquake-induced landslides, liquefaction and tsunami (Brabhaharan, 2011). In June 2012, the 
Board of Inquiry granted resource consent for the project subject to conditions (Dwyer et al., 2012).  
4.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the disaster and environmental management legislative and 
institutional contexts of Sri Lanka and New Zealand. It reveals that both Sri Lanka and New Zealand 
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are significant in the international hazardscape because of the high hazard risks they face. In this 
context, both countries have enacted disaster management legislation but the legislation is inclined 
towards emergency management rather than overall risk management. In addition, both Sri Lanka 
and New Zealand claim that they are addressing the disaster risks of development projects through 
the implementation of the EIA process.  
In Sri Lanka, separate provisions are available in the Coast Conservation Act 1981, the Fauna and 
Flora Protection Act 2009 and the National Environment (Amendment) Act 1988 to implement the 
EIA process. However, it is clear that none of the above has explicit links with the Disaster 
Management Act. In New Zealand, even though the planning framework is more closely attached to 
the resource consenting and the EIA processes than in Sri Lanka, the Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management Act has no explicit links to either the planning framework or the EIA process. Attempts 
are seen in both countries to bridge this gap to ensure more sustainable environmental and disaster 
risk management approaches. In Sri Lanka, under the National Physical Planning Policy and Plan 
2010, DRR has been given a prominent place in land use planning. In New Zealand, DRR is handled by 
five main pieces of legislation including the Building Act and the Resource Management Act. 
However, inter-connections among this legislation are weak and implicit. Moreover, the above Acts 
are more inclined towards a hazard management approach than disaster management. The next two 
chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) report the country-specific findings on the effectiveness of EIA processes 
in addressing development induced disaster risks.  
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Chapter 5 
The Effectiveness of the EIA process in Addressing Development-
Induced Disaster Risk in Sri Lanka 
5.1 Introduction  
Using the analytical framework proposed in the literature review (see Figure 2.5), this chapter 
reports on the effectiveness of the EIA process in Sri Lanka in addressing development-induced 
disaster risk. The chapter starts with a brief account of the methods used in data collection and then 
moves to the details of the findings.  
In this chapter, findings from the data collected using the methods set out in Chapter 3 are 
presented under four main sections that reflect the effectiveness dimensions set out in Table 3.1 
(i.e., policy integration, procedural effectiveness, substantive effectiveness and contextual 
effectiveness). Each section presents the document analysis and interview results of the experts and 
planners, including reference to the case studies. Data based on the community interviews are 
presented in relevant sections. Summary tables with findings reported against relevant criteria are 
presented at the end of each effectiveness dimension with a full summary table at the end of the 
chapter.   
5.2 Policy integration  
As discussed in Chapter 2, integration of disaster risk considerations into development policies and 
planning with a special emphasis on disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness and vulnerability 
reduction is one of the three strategic goals of the Hyogo Framework for Action (UNISDR, 2005). The 
HFA monitoring framework of the UNISDR identifies making DRR an integral objective of 
environment related policies and plans and creating procedures to assess the disaster risk impacts of 
major development projects are crucial means to reduce the disaster risk of societies (UNISDR, 
2014). This section presents the findings related to funding conditions and the integration of disaster 
risk into EIAs in Sri Lanka.  
5.2.1 Integration of disaster risk into EIA legislation 
This section covers criterion 1 (see Table 3.1) and investigates whether DRR is an integral part of the 
EIA process.  
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Disaster risk reduction in the EIA process 
Integration of DRR into the development process has become a widely discussed topic both among 
environmentalists and disaster management experts in Sri Lanka. However, there seems to be little 
coordination and communication between these two groups. The Disaster Management Centre 
(DMC) is trying to incorporate DRR into the development process by introducing a Disaster Impact 
Assessment process, which is expected to be implemented through development agencies, the 
Central Environmental Authority (CEA) believes that disaster risk is already addressed in the current 
EIA process. The CEA, however, is concerned that the support of the DMC is not adequate to obtain 
the best results. The CEA planner described this in saying: 
What I understand is; DMC is handling natural disasters, not project induced 
disasters. That's why they do not come [participate in the scoping 
committee]. But while you are talking about the natural disasters you 
cannot discuss about EIA. Those two cannot be integrated. We are very 
clear, in EIA you can discuss development induced predictable disasters only. 
Unpredictable natural disasters cannot be discussed within EIA. Truly, we do 
not like to use the term ‘disaster’ in the EIA process, because disaster is an 
unpredictable event. Therefore, it cannot be discussed within EIA. EIA is for 
predictable disasters.  
On the other hand, the DMC planner argued that the current EIA process does not sufficiently 
address development-induced disaster risk. The DMC planner stated:  
EIA has been here for about 20 years in Sri Lanka. Under the EIA there is a 
disaster risk assessment to some extent. But it is not detailed enough when 
current development process is considered. It is not sufficient to make 
decisions on disaster mitigation. The CEA is not flexible to change the 
existing process as well. EIA consultants are also familiar with the current 
system. Therefore we are trying to assess disaster risk independently. 
As reported in Chapter 4, the DMC in its National Strategy for Disaster Management, has identified 
the establishment of a Disaster Impact Assessment (DIA) as one proposed action to curtail 
development-induced disasters in the country (MDM&HR (Ministry of Disaster Management and 
Human Rights), 2006). However, the national strategy has not clearly elaborated what the DIA means 
in the Sri Lankan context and how it can be operationalized in accordance with the existing EIA 
process.  
The National Environmental Act (NEA) 1980 does not categorise humans as a part of the 
environment when defining the term ‘environment’. The NEA defines the environment as “…the 
physical factors of the surroundings of human beings including the land, soil, water, atmosphere, 
climate, sound, odours, tastes and the biological factors of animals and plants of every description” 
(NEA, 1980, s.33). In addition, whether development-induced disaster risk is a part of the EIA process 
[or not] is decided by the extent to which DRR is emphasised in the purpose of EIA, which thus 
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governs the level of attention given to disaster risk during scoping and impact identification 
processes. The purpose of the EIA process is not clearly articulated in the NEA 1980 or any of its later 
amendments. The National Environmental (Amendment) Act (NEAA) 1988, which introduced the EIA 
process to Sri Lanka, has two references that can be related to the purpose of EIA in Sri Lanka. The 
Act defines the EIA report as: 
“Environmental impact assessment report” means a written analysis of the 
predicted environmental project and containing an environmental cost-
benefit analysis, if such an analysis has been prepared, and including a 
description of the project, and includes a description of the avoidable and 
unavoidable adverse environmental effect of the proposed prescribed 
project; a description of alternative [sic] to the activity which might be less 
harmful to the environment together with the reasons why such alternatives 
were rejected, and a description of any irreversible or irretrievable 
commitments of resources required by the proposed prescribed project 
(NEAA, 1988, s. 12(b)).  
The NEAA (1988) also points out that it is one of the functions of the CEA to evaluate “…the 
beneficial and adverse impacts” (NEAA, 1988, s. 5(4)(h) of development proposals that are submitted 
for their approval. Therefore, the EIA process of Sri Lanka does not have an explicit reference to the 
development-induced disaster risks of the project, but uses broad terms such as “adverse impacts” 
or “avoidable and unavoidable adverse environmental effect”. The disaster management expert and 
the two EIA experts identify this as a weakness of the Act. In contrast, the legal expert commented: 
There is a problem of using the term "disaster", as it has been difficult to 
define the term. But in the definition of EIA says "probable and possible 
environmental consequences". When you say consequence, it is broader 
enough to bring disaster impacts too into it. It is better than you trying to 
limit yourself to a word that has already made confusions over its definition.  
The CEA also strongly believes that the broader definition of the EIA report in the NEAA 1988 is 
sufficient and it implicitly covers project-induced disaster risk. The CEA planner stated that, “If it 
[disaster risk] is predictable, it is already in the EIA process”. However, answering the same question 
as to whether development-induced disaster risk is sufficiently covered in the purpose of the EIA 
process in Sri Lanka, the second EIA expert argued: 
No. It is not sufficient. Can you show me a single EIA report that has 
conducted an extensive assessment on disaster risk? No. In Sri Lankan 
system if it is not explicitly mentioned then they [developers and EIA 
consultants] do not take it seriously. They would argue that you did not ask 
me to do a disaster risk assessment. So, you have to put it in. There is no 
harm even if it is a repetition.  
According to the DMC planner, the use of EIA in DRR is not completely ignored. The interviewed 
experts had divided views. The CEA planner and the legal expert argued that disaster risk is implicitly 
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mentioned under the broader term of “adverse environmental effects” of a development project. 
They also argued that there is a greater chance of addressing all negative impacts of a development 
project, including that of disaster risk, if the general terms are used over specific terms in the EIA 
process, but others argued otherwise. The EIA experts and the disaster management expert argued 
for more explicit treatment of DRR in the EIA laws and process.  
Summary 
The findings show criterion 1 is met to a ‘limited’ extent in the Sri Lankan EIA process. It is clear that 
disaster risk is not explicitly integrated into the EIA legislation in Sri Lanka. There is an implicit 
reference to disaster risk under the “avoidable and unavoidable adverse environmental effects”, but 
most experts argued it is not sufficient. Table 5.1 summarises the criterion findings for the 
integration of disaster risk reduction in the EIA process in Sri Lanka.  
Table 5.1 A summary of the criterion findings for policy integration  
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(1) Disaster risk 
reduction is an integral 
part of environmental 
assessment. 
Limited 
Disaster risk is not explicitly integrated into the EIA process. An 
implicit reference to disaster risk is given in the definition of the EIA 
report as “avoidable and unavoidable adverse environmental 
effects”. People are not considered as a part of the environment. 
 
5.3 Procedural effectiveness  
This section reports the legal basis of, and guidance given for, the EIA process in Sri Lanka and the 
extent to which such legal provisions and EIA guidance are being implemented in Sri Lanka.  
5.3.1 Legal basis  
Five different criteria are evaluated in this section (see Table 3.1). These are: (2) clarity of the legal 
provisions, (3) whether the impacts of all significant actions are assessed, (4) consideration of 
alternatives, (5) whether EIA reports contain a separate section on disaster risk, and (6) opportunities 
for legally challenging a consent authority’s decision.  
Legal basis for the EIA process  
Both the planners and experts interviewed believe that the Sri Lankan EIA system is sufficiently 
backed with clear and specific legal provisions, except for a few ‘loopholes’ in the legislation. The 
legal expert stated: 
Yes, to a greater extent the provisions are clear and comprehensive. But 
there are about three gaps in the provisions. 
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First, there is not a provision to obtain public participation before the EIA 
report is opened for public comments, especially at the ToR setting stage. 
There is no mechanism, but if the public have serious objections at the start 
of the project, public participation is obtained, but it is not required by the 
law. So the public get only 30 days period to get involved in the EIA process.  
Second, if an approval for an EIA was not given, according to clause 23.dd of 
the NEAA 1988, the project proponent can appeal to the Secretary of the 
Ministry of Environment. However, if the approval is incorrect or unjust the 
same provision or equal right is not available for the public. This is very 
serious when IEE is conducted. Even the 30 days public comment phase is 
not there for IEE. In such cases people only come to know about the project 
when the implementation is started.  
Third, in the monitoring stage, when you identify a wrong doing, there is no 
provision to cease the project immediately. Currently, the CEA suspends the 
approval. Then they [the CEA] obtain a court order. That should not be the 
way. If there is an unforeseen danger due to a project, there should be a 
provision to obtain an injunction within a day. Sometimes, it may not be due 
to irresponsibility of the project proponent, but due to other unavoidable 
reasons or due to changes in the context or due to a reason, which was not 
identified earlier. These are the main weaknesses of the Act.  
The lack of provision for public participation in the EIA process was also emphasised by the disaster 
management expert and the second EIA expert. They also identified the lack of provision for the 
public to appeal against an approval decision of the PAA as one such inadequacy of the Act on public 
participation. Nevertheless, all experts perceive a larger socio-political gap in the rule of law in the 
country that affects the effective implementation of the EIA rather than the few gaps in the EIA 
legislation. The second EIA expert stated:  
I think EIA law is very comprehensive in terms of legal and policy provisions. 
But the current situation is, EIA process is not taking its full cycle [does not 
implement the full provisions of the legislature]. That is the only issue. As 
[with] any other law of this country, enforcement of the EIA and other 
scientific assessment do not happen properly. 
Assessing the impacts of all significant actions   
The National Environmental Regulation (NER) No. 1, 1993, in its list of prescribed actions, identifies 
the following as highly sensitive environments: 
any erodable area declared under the Soil Conservation Act (Chapter 450) 
any Flood Area declared under the Flood Protection Ordinance (Chapter 
449) and any flood protection area declared under the Sri Lanka Land 
Reclamation and Development Corporation Act, No.15 of 1968 as amended 
by Act, No. 52 of 1982. 
60 meters from the bank of a public stream as defined in the Crown Lands 
Ordinance (Chapter 454) and having a width of more than 25 meters at any 
point of its course.  
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any reservation beyond the full supply level of a reservoir (NER, 1993, Part 
III). 
The above list was amended by the Gazette extraordinary 859/14, 1995, to add two more 
environments as sensitive: 
within 100 meters from the boundaries of, or within, any area declared as a 
Sanctuary under the Fauna and Flora Protection Ordinance (Chapter 469). 
within 100 meters from the high flood level contour of, or within, a public 
lake as defined in the Crown Lands Ordinance (Chapter 454) including those 
declared under section 71 of the said ordinance. 
Any prescribed project irrespective of its magnitude, if located wholly or partly within the areas 
specified in the above, should require an approval from an appropriate PAA and should undergo 
either an IEE or EIA. All these surroundings except the area within 100 m from the boundary of a 
sanctuary are also considered as highly disaster prone environments. However, the NEAA 1988 does 
not explicitly require an assessment of disaster risk of any development project in any of the above 
situations.  
The NER 1993 also provides a set of projects identified by the regulations as ‘prescribed projects’, 
which require an IEE or EIA before approval. This list has been amended several times. However, this 
list has serious limitations. The experts and planners interviewed argued that some potentially high-
risk activities are not included in the NEA 1993 as ‘prescribed projects’. For example, the widening of 
the 105 km Mahiyangana-Kandy AA 026 national highway, completed in May 2012, has been 
criticised by most experts interviewed as a project that has created many new disasters in the area. 
The disaster management expert stated: 
Even though the road [national highway AA026] has been constructed, 
there is no use as there are landslides and rock falling along the road. So 
there is no safety. There is no meaning of the investment if the road is not 
safe for the commuters. An EIA was not done for this project as it was an 
expansion of an existing road and such projects are not listed as prescribed 
projects.  
The location of the road was considered highly landslide prone even before the recent expansion. 
However, the above concern of the disaster management expert was not shared by the CEA planner 
who stated:  
EIA is done only for new roads. EIAs are not being done for expansions. But 
in [the] Mahiyangana-Kandy expansion a small assessment was done. [The] 
Wildlife Department has given the approval as the road has encroached to a 
part of the wildlife area.  
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Both EIA experts were also concerned that the Sri Lankan EIA process is overwhelmingly focused on a 
few key project components, even though some crucial project actions, such as temporary access 
and supply routes for project sites and resettlement locations, are left unattended without being 
subjected to an environmental study. For example, the Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project (UKHP), 
completed in July 2012, is criticised by the re-settlers, the media and EIA experts for not giving 
enough attention to the landslide risk of the resettlement sites. Similarly, the supply routes of the 
Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) have increased the flood risk of the area 
(Hettiarachchi, Silva, & Thambiah, 2010).  
The 1994 EIA for the UKHP paid little attention to the landslide risk of the location. The description of 
landslide risk in the EIA report was limited to two lines. Even though the report (CEB (Ceylon 
Electricity Board), 1994, p. 4-19) pointed out that landslide zones are concentrated on both banks of 
the Kotmale oya, sub section 4.2.1.8.2 of the EIA report on landslide hazards states, “…based on the 
information presented above [history of landslide in the area], areas where significant landslides 
might be induced by the project are limited to the Penstock - Powerhouse - Tailrace area and to the 
Thalawakele pond” (CEB (Ceylon Electricity Board), 1994, p. 4-19). The EIA report has no reference to 
the resettlement locations. A detailed review of project documents reveals that the resettlement 
locations had not been identified in the pre-feasibility stage of the project. However, because of 
unprecedented attention to the environmental issues of the UKHP, pressure from the residents in 
the project location, and environmental groups, approval for the project was given under strict 
conditions. These conditions were later legalized by the government via the National Environmental 
(Upper Kotmale Hydro-power – Monitoring) Regulations No. 1 2003. The regulations list seven 
mitigatory measures that should be undertaken by the project. Landslide mitigation is identified, as 
one such mitigatory measure required of the project. Regulation (5A) states:  
The Project Proponent shall in consultation with the Monitoring Committee, 
the Central Environmental Authority, the National Building Research 
Organization and the Geological Survey and Mines Bureau adopt a plan to 
mitigate as far as possible the risk from landslides in known high risk areas 
within the area comprising the project and set out safeguards to minimize 
such risks. These measures shall be implemented as and when the need to 
do so arises. A geological information base shall be mainted [sic] of all this 
information in order to prevent as far as possible all danger from such risks. 
The Monitoring Committee shall supervise all action being taken in this 
regard.  
A close examination of the Monitoring Committee meeting minutes of the project shows that, even 
though the construction of permanent facilities for the re-settlers was commissioned in September 
2005, mapping of landslide prone areas had not been initiated even by February 2006. This indicates 
that the re-settlers have been relocated without a proper study of the landslide risk. In 2008, a 
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provincial correspondent of the Lakbima Newspaper, writing an article about the environmental 
impacts of the project, also stated that the resettled areas of the projects are infamous for landslide 
risks (Munaweera, 2008). This was re-emphasized in my interviews with community representatives. 
A community member stated: 
The project was dragging until 2005 due to the protest from 
environmentalists and the people. In 2005, under the present government, 
the Minister of Power and Energy visited and informed the people about the 
importance of the project and started the project. Then they have 
constructed these houses very quickly, as they wanted to acquire lands for 
the project. 
They had pre-selected two, three hills for resettlement and we were asked 
which one you like. This one [location] is comparatively flat. There is an 
original village closer to this hilly area called Devsiripura. We also had been 
to there. So we did not see a serious landslide risk here at that time. But 
after we came here, now there is a risk for about 7-8 houses situated in the 
slopes. There are water springs appeared in front of houses, saturated 
grounds and cracks in the houses. They might have constructed those 
houses in filled lands.  
Consideration of alternatives  
According to the NEAA 1988, an EIA report should also provide “…a description of alternatives to the 
activity [proposed project] which might be less harmful to the environment together with the 
reasons why such alternatives were rejected” (NEAA, 1988, s. 12(b)). However, the EIA experts argue 
that the above requirement is not adequately addressed in the current EIA process. The first EIA 
expert from his experience in Technical Evaluation Committees (TEC), stated:  
Most of the time when the alternatives are proposed, they [developers] give 
their proposal with two other obviously inappropriate options without 
making a deeper analysis of more reasonable alternatives. Therefore, the 
best or more appropriate option may not be on the table during the 
decision-making.  
The legal expert too was concerned about lack of attention to assessment of alternative options in 
the EIA process. According to the legal expert, even though some attention is given to alternative 
sites for a proposed project, alternative methods are rarely assessed. EIA reports of both the UKHP 
and the STDP have sections on project alternatives. These list both site alternatives and alternative 
methods of carrying out the project. For instance, one of the alternatives for the STDP is 
improvement of the existing railway from Colombo to Matara (University of Moratuwa, 1999b). 
However, such analyses are not detailed and, for instance, the approved design of the UKHP, which 
was selected due to public pressure, was not considered in the EIA report. Most experts interviewed 
argued that the information provided in the EIA reports on project alternatives is misleading. Zubair 
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(2001, p. 474) argues that the UKHP EIA report avoided more viable options in the analysis of project 
alternatives, instead other non-viable alternatives had been “cursorily” examined.  
Separate section on disaster risk in the EIA report  
There is neither a legal requirement nor standard practice to incorporate a separate section in EIA 
reports on disaster risk. The CEA planner and the legal expert argued that the term disaster itself is a 
subjective term. Therefore, any attempt to separate disaster-related impacts into a separate chapter 
will lead to confusion over classification of environmental impacts as disasters and non-disasters. 
However, the disaster management expert and the EIA experts argued otherwise. They supported 
having a separate chapter on disaster risk, saying even if it is a repetition of facts in the EIA Report, 
incorporation of a chapter on disaster risk provides a better chance to identify project-induced 
disaster risks.  
Opportunity for appeal against the approval decision 
Clause 23dd of NEAA 1988 provides rights for the person or body of persons aggrieved to appeal 
against the decision of the CEA if the CEA refuses to grant approval for any prescribed project 
submitted for its approval. However, this privilege is available only to the project proponent. Based 
on the provisions of the NEAA 1988, the public does not have an equal right to appeal against an 
approval decision. The legal expert describing these provisions stated:   
This is against the constitution of the country. Constitution says everyone is 
equal in front of the law. This clause was included in the NEAA 1988 and 
there has not been any attempt to correct this. Sometimes, proponents are 
giving wrong information and get the approval and people will be helpless, 
as they cannot appeal against the decision. 
As reported in Chapter 4, the Constitution of Sri Lanka has two clauses relevant to environmental 
protection (i.e., Articles 18 and 27(14)). In addition, any citizen of the country is entitled to a set of 
fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of movement and of choosing his residence within 
Sri Lanka (Article 14(1)(h) of the Constitution). The Constitution also guarantees the right to petition 
the Supreme Court against the infringement or imminent infringement of the fundamental rights by 
executive or administrative action (Article 17). These provisions are being used by the public and civil 
society campaigners against decisions of the CEA. The second EIA expert stated “Most of the time the 
community seeks the assistance of civil society groups for these [filing fundamental case in the 
Supreme Court] as the cost of the court process is too high for them to afford”. Giving evidence on 
the involvement of the Supreme Court in some of the petitions filed by civil society groups, the 
expert stated: 
Upper Kotmale Hydropower project when they started there was no EIA. 
Then EFL [Environmental Foundation Limited., a civil society lobby group] 
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and few others went to the Supreme Court. And said that this massive 
project has started without an EIA. Yes, it is a government project. But does 
not matter. Every project must abide by the law. Then Supreme Court has 
ordered to conduct a comprehensive biodiversity assessment for UKHP, in 
addition to the EIA. EIA was done in 1994. If you look at the initial EIA of 
UKHP environment is only one paragraph. Supreme Court has also ordered 
to conduct the biodiversity assessment through an independent agency. 
Then they selected IUCN country office.  
So IUCN did a thorough study on biodiversity assessment with a monitoring 
plan and presented to the Supreme Court. Then Supreme Court asked to use 
the document as a part of project development document and set aside 
finances for the plan and implement it.  
Summary 
According to the criteria findings, criterion 2 is ‘mostly’ met, and criteria 3, 4, 5, and 6 are met to a 
‘limited’ extent in Sri Lanka. Table 5.2 summarises the criteria findings for procedural effectiveness of 
the EIA process in Sri Lanka. 
Table 5.2 A summary of the criteria findings for the legal basis  
Criteria Evaluation Justifications 
(2) The EIA system is 
based on clear and 
specific legal 
provisions. 
Mostly 
Legal system is clear and comprehensive to a greater extent. 
However, a few gaps have been identified in this research. These 
include, insufficient provisions for public participation, lack of 
provisions for the public to appeal against a decision. 
(3) The impacts of all 
significant actions are 
assessed. 
Limited 
The prescribed project list provided in the NER 1993 has limitations. 
Some projects, for example expansion of existing roads, are not 
considered as prescribed projects in the law. Even though most of the 
prescribed projects can also be categorised as projects that increase 
disaster risk, assessment of disaster risk is not required under the EIA 
law.  
(4) Alternative 
methods and locations 
are considered. Limited 
Consideration of alternatives is required under the NEA. Even though 
the NEA is not clear about requirement of both alternative methods 
and locations, in practice both alternative methods and locations are 
included in the EIA reports. However, a detailed assessment of 
alternatives has not been conducted in the studied EIA reports. 
(5) EIA reports contain 
a section on disaster 
risk. 
Limited 
More obvious visible hazard risks such as flood risk are included as 
part of anticipated environmental effects. However, the vulnerability 
of affected people is not included in the EIA reports. 
(6) There is an 
opportunity for appeal 
or legally challenge the 
process or decision 
output. 
Limited 
A developer can appeal against the decision to the secretary of the 
Ministry of Environment. However, the public cannot appeal against 
an approval decisions under the provisions of the NEA 1980. 
Currently, provisions of the Constitution are used to challenge 
decisions. 
 
The EIA process is supported by specific legal provisions but there are a few gaps identified in this 
study. EIA reports are required only for projects listed as prescribed projects under the NER 1993. 
Generally, EIA reports do not contain a separate section on disaster risks, however, more obviously 
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visible hazard risks are included in the EIA reports. Consideration of alternatives is required under the 
NEA. Both alternative methods and locations are considered in the studied projects. However, a 
detailed assessment of alternatives has not been incorporated in EIA reports. Under the NEA, 
provisions are not available for the public to appeal against an approval decision.  
5.3.2 Guidance on EIA  
Guidance on the EIA process is provided in the National Environmental (Procedure for approval of 
projects) Regulations, No. 1 of 1993. This section reports: (7) the provisions for public reviewing of 
the EIA reports, (8) the requirements for hazard and vulnerability assessment, and (9) monitoring of 
project actions in different stages of the EIA process (see Table 3.1).  
Public reviewing of the EIA report  
As per the National Environmental Regulations (NER) 1993, once the EIA report is submitted by the 
project proponent, the Project Approving Agency (PAA) should determine whether the EIA report has 
sufficiently addressed the ToR provided by the PAA. If not, the PAA should ask the proponent to 
substantiate the report with further information (Figure 4.4). Once the PAA receives the EIA report 
(after adjustments made, if any), the PAA should notify the public by publishing a notice in the 
government Gazette and one national newspaper published daily in Sinhala, Tamil and English and 
invite the public to make written comments within 30 days. The NER 1993 also recommends that the 
public should be informed about the times and places at which the EIA report can be accessed. The 
NER further instructs that:  
It shall be the duty of a Project Approving Agency, upon completion of the 
period of public inspection or public hearing, if held, to forward to the 
project proponent comments received for review and response, within six 
days. The Project Proponent shall respond to such comments in writing to 
the Project Approving Agency (NER, 2003, s.12). 
According to the CEA, these instructions are duly followed and copies of the EIA reports are kept in 
the library of the CEA in Colombo and the divisional secretariat office and/or local authority of the 
concerned area. The Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) then evaluates both public comments 
and the measures and explanations of the project proponent to see whether the public comments 
are true and valid and the measures taken by the proponent are adequate to address the public 
concerns, before approval is recommended. If the public request further clarification about the 
project, the CEA decides whether to conduct a public hearing in a venue in the affected area; people 
who have submitted written comments will be invited for the public hearing. Nevertheless, the 
community representatives interviewed had neither seen the EIA report nor participated in any 
public hearings. A community representative from Kumaragama village, one of the resettlement sites 
of the UKHP, stated that: “No, we have not seen those reports. Some said they write a book on the 
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project and some said they are doing a report. We have not seen any of these after that. There were 
a number of assessments done”. 
The 30-day public phase of the EIA process is highly criticised by most experts, saying it is not 
effective and the CEA is not taking proper measures to make the best use of it. The legal expert 
stated:  
Yes, but it [public comments phase] is useless as the EIA report is full with 
technical jargon. Sometime, people do not know whether project EIA is 
available in the DS [divisional secretariat] office, as advertisements related 
to those are published in government newspapers. People do not usually 
read those newspapers. People check it only if they are directly affected 
from it. It is costly to take a copy as the report is too large. People do not 
have required technical knowledge to understand these. Sometimes the 
language used there [EIA report] cannot be understood.  
Substantiating this, the first EIA expert stressed that: “If such EIA reports cannot be understood by 
TEC members, how does a villager understand these[?]”. Nongovernmental lobby groups play an 
important role in this process, especially by informing and educating the public on the environmental 
risks of proposed projects. According to the second expert, there are many instances where they 
have organized campaigns against apparently environmentally unsound projects and organized the 
public to provide comments on EIA reports. These campaigns have resulted in changes to project 
design or scale and, in some limited cases, even stopped the projects, partly because of public 
protests. For example, a compliance review was carried out by the ADB on the STDP and a number of 
alterations to the project implementation were made after several NGOs, led by the Joint 
Organization of the Affected Communities on Colombo-Matara Highway, lodged a complaint to the 
ADB head office in Manila, Philippines, saying the project was violating the ADB’s operational manual 
on the environment. The request for a compliance review cited many allegations of violations of the 
ADB’s environmental policy. Some excerpts from the “Request for compliance review” are listed 
below: 
… ii). Notification of the EIA to the public was done only through the 
Government owned newspapers. No attempt was made to advise the local 
people who might be affected.  
iii). CEA Public meetings - two along a stretch of 128 Kilometres is 
inadequate. Attendance for many would be almost impossible, for example 
the people of Kurundugahetekma [a city in Southern province] would take 
about 4 hours by public transport to get to the meeting in Panadura [a city 
in Western province where one public hearing took place], further more the 
cost would also be a factor.  
iv). Those being affected were not advised that the EIA was available in the 
Pradeshiya Sabha [Local Authority] or the Divisional Secretariat in 
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Bandaragama or Galle. Even if it were, a programme of educating the 
villagers on the rationale behind the road should have been carried out prior 
to the final traces being decided.  
vi). The first people in the South heard was when Notices under the Land 
Acquisition Act were issued to them more than a year after the EIA was 
issued and long after the Loan was approved.  
vii). In the North some were told of its possibility more than one year after 
the EIA was issued and many, almost two years after it was issued.  
ix). People were informed, they were not consulted, they were only told their 
homes and lands would be lost (National Building Research Organization, 
2013, pp. 2-3). 
The NEAA 2000 removed the earlier provisions given by the NEAA 1988 to subject IEE reports to 
public review. According to the CEA planner, the government then decided to relax the IEE process to 
allow implementation of small and medium scale power generation activities because of the on-
going power crisis then. However, the legal expert described the above amendment as a drawback to 
the Sri Lankan EIA system. He stated: 
This has started in the 2000 Act. It said an IEE does not require public 
comments, but there is no clear guidance in the law saying what are the 
projects to be considered under EIA or IEE. So, they [project proponents and 
PAAs] use IEE to take the approval for the projects without informing the 
public. Now this system has been in operation for the last 10 years.  
A separate clause on disaster risk in the ToR 
A disaster risk assessment is not required under the Sri Lankan EIA process. Therefore, a separate 
clause requesting a hazard and vulnerability assessment does not appear in the ToRs set for EIA 
studies. NEAA 1988 and NER 1993 broadly ask for positive and adverse environmental impacts in the 
EIA process. Based on the above, the CEA, as a practice, does not include disaster risk assessment in 
the ToR. The CEA planner also denied any need for a separate clause for DRR in the ToR saying that:  
No, we do not have DRR as a separate clause in ToR. We see disaster impact 
as a part of environmental impact. We ask the developer to discuss the 
impacts to the environment due to the project. We mainly consider the 
impacts of the project on the environment. It is the duty of the developer to 
assess the environmental impacts on the project and incorporate it into the 
project feasibility study.  
However, this discussion led to a larger issue of setting ToRs for the EIA studies during the scoping 
committee meetings. The CEA planner explained the scoping process and setting up of the ToR as: 
We scope the project and provide the ToR. So we have to clearly identify the 
scope. There is a misunderstanding among the developers that they cannot 
do anything beyond the ToR. There is nothing like that. ToR is just a 
guideline. When we say impacts of a project, we cannot identify impacts 
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clearly by having a one day scoping meeting. So we say in broad terms. For 
instance, in a road project we broadly say "identify the hydrological 
impacts”. Then the EIA consultant should go to the field and spend about 
one year and he should know to identify those impacts and report them.  
Nevertheless, most experts have a different opinion on this process. They denied the effectiveness of 
a general ToR for every study, saying that it does not match with the on-the-ground reality. The first 
EIA expert criticised the scoping process of the CEA saying:  
They have a model ToR and they keep using it for any project proposal they 
get. This ends up asking totally irrelevant questions in the ToR. For example, 
sometimes they ask a question about impact on trees in spray area. Spray 
area is only relevant if there is a water fall close by. If you are asking a 
question on spray area in a project, which is not close to a waterfall, it 
implies that they have not scoped the project properly. So, the first step of 
the EIA process does not take place properly. Project is not scoped properly. 
Then the assessment is not delivering appropriate results for the decision-
making, as the ToR governs the EIA. If the ToR asks about 60 percent 
unnecessary stuff, while asking only 40 percent of important information, 
then there is only 40 percent information that serves the decision-making.  
The second EIA expert and the disaster management expert wanted a separate clause in the ToR for 
disaster risks saying, “Even if it is a repetition of the information presented in the EIA report; still this 
will lead to a better assessment”.  
Compliance monitoring  
Often, the CEA gives approvals subject to conditions that should be followed by the project 
proponents in the implementation of the project. Adherence to such conditions by the proponents is 
therefore highly important to minimize any negative environmental and social impacts from the 
projects. Hence, post EIA project monitoring plays a significant role in the success of the EIA process. 
As per the NEA 1980 and its amendment in 1988, the CEA is responsible for and given the required 
provisions to monitor projects for their compliance with conditions. However, this process is often 
subjected to criticism by the public. The legal expert stated that; “There is no proper monitoring 
mechanism to check the compliance of the approval conditions. So, the entire process is deviating 
from the faith of the public.” The first EIA expert describing his experience in TECs stated:   
As an example take eco-flow of a dam project. We are arguing for days in 
the TEC committees about the importance of the eco-flow and recommend 
a particular diameter of the opening. But I have seen in an approved project 
that developer has blocked the opening and there was a zero flow. We had 
been arguing on this for days but the reality is zero flow.  
The expert further argued “What is the meaning of this process without monitoring?”. Though 
accepting these criticisms, the CEA planner stated: 
  
    
 
107 
Yes, there is a responsibility upon us on monitoring. It is wrong if we stay 
aside after giving approval. We have to monitor the approval conditions. It 
is our duty.  
But, there is a problem. When you give an approval for an EIA, it is a site 
clearance. When site clearance is given and when the project is being done, 
monitoring should happen through an Environmental Protection Licence 
[EPL] as a legal tool. Licence is given to start operations. But there is a 
problem as licence is not required for every project, which gets EIA approval. 
Licences are required only if there is an emission or discharge. That is a 
problem of our Act. When we take a highway, licence is not required. Only 
need an initial approval. But for industries, once you get the initial approval, 
before you go for the operation you need to take a licence. When licence is 
given we can do monitoring, because it is legally binding. The problem with 
environmental protection licence is that, in a licence you check only 
pollution side of it, only emissions, discharges, noise and vibrations. Because 
those have standards. So we can check whether the standards are met. For 
others we have to go for monitoring.  I accept that monitoring is weak.  
In addition, the CEA planner pointed out to a lack of trained staff to conduct onsite monitoring and 
insufficiency of the EIA report as reasons for poor post EIA monitoring. The CEA planner stated 
further:   
EIA report is largely on generic terms, because specific levels cannot be 
given. That's why we rely on approval conditions for project monitoring. 
But, with those approval conditions, we cannot monitor either. If you see 
those approval conditions, for instance in a highway project we may have 
given a condition asking a detailed hydrological assessment and ask the 
developer to construct culverts and bridges based on the assessment. It is 
not mentioned where those to be constructed. So, when a monitoring visit 
was done only with an approval letter, it is not effective. It does not have 
detail information. The WB and ADB ask for an EMP [Environmental 
Management Plan] with the EIA, but we do not. We ask developers to 
identify the environmental impacts and identify the mitigatory measures, 
but the detailed technical information is not there in those mitigatory 
measures.  
Project EMPs are the biggest problem. Our developers are not trained to 
develop an EMP. So we do not get EMPs properly. Only in donor-funded 
projects do we get sound EMP.  
However, the CEA does not have any plans currently to rectify the weaknesses of project monitoring. 
Both EIA experts were not convinced that the monitoring process is weak due to insufficient 
provisions of the Act or any other reasons given by the CEA. The first EIA expert stated:  
In any EIA the chapter six is on monitoring. There is about monitoring team, 
etc. But monitoring is not taking place. The CEA says they [EIA division of 
the CEA] do not have money and people. But the CEA is charging a 
registration fee when a developer applying for an EIA approval. This is to 
cover administration costs and other expenses for TEC committee etc. I have 
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asked the director of the EIA division to charge monitoring cost too from the 
developer.  
There was a World Bank funded project to promote rural energy. It was 
implemented with the NDB [National Development Bank of Sri Lanka]. In 
that project, after the EIA was done; NDB had hired independent 
consultants to do the compliance monitoring. They have done it because the 
CEA did not do proper monitoring. That is a workable model and it is being 
done in this country. So, why it cannot be done by the CEA. They cannot say 
they do not have money or people just because they do not want to do it. 
Some community members interviewed expressed their willingness to engage in the project 
monitoring. According to them, engaging in project monitoring will give them more opportunity to 
understand the project impacts and also to ensure that the project is done according to the 
conditions set by the authorities. The disaster management expert also stated that community 
participation in project monitoring is important. The expert described the current disaster 
management system in the country and said vigilance over new disaster risks is one of the tasks of 
the village disaster management committees. The expert believes that a coordinated programme 
between the DMC and the CEA can develop such community mechanisms for project monitoring. 
However, some environmental experts are sceptical about this. The first EIA expert stated:  
I have not seen that professional discipline among community. From what I 
saw, if the community member benefits from the project, even if he saw 
some mismanagement of the project he used to disregard it. Due to the 
poverty prevailing in these villages by giving a simple bribe these people can 
be misused.  
The legal expert also argued that most officials are comfortable if the communities are not involved 
in project works. According to the NEAA 1988, project approval and approval conditions should be 
made available to the public. However, everyone including the CEA planner, accepted that the above 
does not happen in practice. The legal expert stated: 
Yes, according to the law project approval should be available for the 
community. But it does not happen most of time. Currently, some actions 
against projects will be taken only if the community have identified negative 
impacts of the project and protested against the project. Otherwise it is very 
rare that a government agency is involved in a monitoring of project and 
take actions.  
Summary 
According to the findings, criteria 7 and 9 are met to a ‘limited’ extent in Sri Lanka but criterion 8 is 
not met. Even though public review of the EIA report is a legal requirement, sufficient measures are 
often not in place to facilitate public participation. A general ToR is issued for EIA reports; it does not 
require hazard and vulnerability assessment. The NEA is clear about compliance monitoring and the 
responsibility lies with the CEA. However, compliance monitoring is currently weak through a lack of 
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capacity and motivation. Table 5.3 summarises the criteria findings for guidance of the EIA process in 
Sri Lanka. 
Table 5.3 A summary of the criteria findings for EIA guidance   
Criteria Evaluation Justifications 
(7) EIA reports are subjected 
to public review. 
Limited 
Public review of EIA reports is legally required but measures 
are not sufficient to make maximum use of it. The conduct of 
public hearings is not consistent. The public is not often 
provided with information related to project impacts in simple 
language. 
(8) ToR for the EIAs carries 
specific requirements 
regarding hazard assessment 
and vulnerability assessment. 
No 
A general ToR is used in most occasions. ToRs generally do not 
have a reference on disaster risk. 
(9) Guidance is available to 
support compliance 
monitoring taking place and it 
is being implemented. 
Limited 
The CEA is legally mandated with a monitoring function. 
However, monitoring is not taking place adequately. Poor 
motivation of the authorities is identified as the key issue. 
 
5.4 Substantive effectiveness 
Substantive effectiveness of the EIA process is considered the least explored area in effectiveness 
research. This section reports the level of disaster risk assessment in the EIA process and the 
influence of the EIA process on project approval and final project design.  
5.4.1 Level of assessment  
The technical soundness of screening, scoping and impact identification in the EIA process is 
considered the key element for its effectiveness. Weaknesses in scoping and poor attention towards 
disaster risk in scoping were reported earlier. This section reports: (10) screening of actions for 
disaster risks, and (11) whether hazard and vulnerability assessments are conducted as a part of 
impact identification.  
Attention to disaster risk in screening of project proposal 
The process for screening of proposals in the Sri Lankan EIA process is not clear and is considered 
vague. The legal expert stated that: “There is no clear guidance in the law describing what are the 
projects to be considered under an EIA or IEE”. Screening of proposals happens at two stages. Project 
proposals are screened based on the prescribed project list provided in the Gazette extra-ordinary 
No. 722/22 of 1993. Deciding whether an IEE or EIA is required is left to the discretion of the 
appointed PAA and it is done during the scoping process. The guidance for implementing the EIA 
process, which was published by the CEA in 2006 states: “…as part of the scoping process the 
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appropriate PAA should: … determine whether PP should be asked to prepare an IEE or EIA, unless an 
adequate IEE has already been presented” (CEA, 2006, p. 9).  
There is no legal requirement in the NEA 1980 or any of its later amendments to conduct a risk 
assessment or any other assessment to assess risk involved with projects. As discussed in the 
previous section, the CEA planner believes that “…a description of the avoidable and unavoidable 
adverse environmental effects of the proposed prescribed project” is sufficient to cover the disaster 
risks of the project and it is being done in the current EIA process. The CEA planner explained: 
Yes, we address the requirement of risk assessments. But here we do it 
within EIA process. Recently, a project proposal was submitted for approval 
called the Advance Surfactant Manufacturing Industry at Mathugama. They 
produce sulphuric acid as well. We told him [the developer] to assess risk for 
sudden chemical emissions and asked for a preparedness plan. That is the 
reason for rejecting the proposal; he gave mitigatory measures for 
environmental impacts. He said this is the emission and I take these 
measures to control the emission. So, he can mitigate the impacts of his 
industry. But he cannot mitigate the disaster. He has done a risk assessment 
and his findings were listed in the EIAR. He has told [us] in the EIA report 
that in an accidental sulphuric emission, it can disperse to a range of 5 km 
and this is lethal. So, that has been enough for us to reject the proposal.  
It is evident that the CEA identifies the risk of chemical industries and gaseous plants in the screening 
and scoping process and gives more attention to preparedness plans in the EIA report. However, 
such a requirement is not seen in other infrastructure development projects such as dams and 
highways. For instance, neither an early warning system nor flood preparedness plan was requested 
in the EIA report of the UKHP. In this context, the UKHP’s environmental management documents 
such as the watershed and environmental management plans, do not contain any reference to the 
risk involved with dam failure or emergency spillway opening. According to the first EIA expert, an 
early warning system is yet to be established for the UKHP to alert downstream communities in the 
event of a spillway opening, even two years after the commissioning of power generation.  
Hazard and vulnerability assessment in impact identification 
Neither hazard nor vulnerability assessments are conducted in the Sri Lankan EIA process to assess 
the probable development-induced disaster risk of a proposed project. Nevertheless, specific hazards 
such as landslide risk or flood risk are assessed to some extent in the two case studies. Close scrutiny 
of EIA reports from the UKHP and the STDP reveals that such assessments are also not sufficiently 
detailed to provide a clear picture of the disaster risk of a project. Vulnerability assessments are not 
conducted, even in their simplest form, in the process of impact identification.  
For instance, in the EIA report of the STDP, it was identified that flood risk was the major concern of 
the project since over 40 percent of the proposed road lay over known flood plains. The EIA report of 
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the STDP provided detailed maps and an assessment of existing drainage canals, irrigation and flood 
protection structures, retention areas and water bodies along the proposed expressway project area. 
The EIA team also conducted a flood survey to obtain data at identified control points on the 
maximum flood experienced, the most frequent flood, the inundation levels and the period of 
inundation. However, these data were not converted to a flood hazard map or to a projected flood 
hazard map for a 25-year return period flood (for which the expressway had been designed) in the 
EIA report to understand the extent of the flood risk in the upstream area of the expressway project.  
Based on the above assessment, the EIA report of the STDP proposed to make the road design flood 
proof. The EIA report states: “…in fact, the proposed traces [proposed road sketch] cover 
approximately 40 [percent] of its length over retention areas. This would create the necessity to raise 
the road surfaces to substantial levels as the road being designed for a particular return period” 
(University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 6-18). The report further pointed out that:  
The raising of earth embankment would cause interference to the natural 
balance of flood flows across the road thus leading to increased flood 
threats at the upstream sides of the road. The choking of flood openings 
would cause delays in the passage through the proposed road embankment 
thus creating increased duration of the inundation period.  
A major part of the proposed project trace will lie on the low flood plains of 
the major rivers and hence create blockage of streamflow to a greater 
extent especially at major rivers due to the mildness of the slopes 
encountered in the flood plains. A significant proportion of streamflows 
would be moving to and fro [sic] from the road centreline at the flood plains 
of the major rivers in the project area due to the large network of branches 
merging at the flood plains. As such, a very significant impact on 
streamflow movement would take place due to the road embankment of 
the proposed project and hence the construction of bridges and culverts 
along the trace (University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 6-18). 
Further, the EIA report did not sufficiently attempt to calculate the increased severity and frequency 
of the flood hazard due to the road construction except for saying that:  
In regions where the proposed Expressway crosses flood plains, the 
encroachment of flood level into new regions would be greater than 10 
[percent] of the initial retention depth unless the proposed new Expressway 
cross section width is less than one tenth of the cross sectional width of the 
detention area (University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 6-18). 
However, the EIA report of the STDP has no reference to the existing and future vulnerabilities of the 
people due to flood hazard. The unavailability of a proper flood hazard map and the failure of the EIA 
team to identify the existing flood vulnerability of the people has led to an underestimate of the 
flood disaster risk along the expressway.  
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The EIA report indicates that the population in the divisional secretariat divisions, in which the 
proposed project is located, is growing. It says the average annual growth rate in the project area 
was 3.0 percent during the period 1970 to 1996, while the national population growth rate was 
around 1.2 percent (University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 5-46). This means there will be more pressure 
for housing and other developments. The EIA report did not attempt to examine the relationship 
between increased population pressure and the vulnerability of the marginalized groups in the 
project area, which is characterised as a flood plain.  
The report also indicates that nearly 15 percent of the houses in the project area are less than 50 
square metres, and 47.1 percent of houses are between 50-100 square metre floor area (University 
of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 5-49). Visits to the project area reveal that these houses are mostly poorly 
engineered and belonged to low-income groups. Such houses are incapable of withstanding 
prolonged floods. Nevertheless, the EIA report does not look at either the number of vulnerable 
houses within the existing flood zones or the increased percentage of such houses in the new flood 
zones due to increased flood levels. 
The EIA report also states that nearly 31 percent of the project area comprises paddy fields and 
marshy lands. It has been estimated that approximately 403 ha of paddy lands will be crossed by the 
expressway (University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 5-35). In some areas, these paddy lands are small 
blocks of lands, less than 20 ha, but in some areas they are larger blocks or ‘yaya’ with 20-80 ha of 
land. The report has looked only at the paddy lands directly affected by the expressway due to filling; 
it overlooked the vast area of paddy lands that will be uncultivable due to increased flood risk.  
The flood risk is getting worse for some marginalized communities with limited access to the main 
townships. Panape, a small village with 80 households in Bandaragama DS division, is located within 
500 m of the expressway. A woman, who has cultivated leafy vegetables for many years to support 
her family, described the new threats to its livelihood as: 
There are about five people in this village who engage in leafy vegetable 
cultivation. We have been doing this cultivation for the last 15-20 years. It 
takes about one month to harvest the leafy vegetables. When the area gets 
flooded at that time, the entire crop gets destroyed. Earlier our parents used 
to say that there is Christmas flood in December and New Year flood in 
April. But now it is not like earlier. This area gets always flooded when there 
is some rain. Last year on many occasions we got floods.  
There is another person who is cultivating banana and his lands also get 
affected - water logged for about two to three weeks. So we fear to put up a 
crop. You do not know what will happen to the crop till you get it into the 
house.   
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The EIA report does not provide any information regarding the frequency of floods in the project 
area. A community member from Dodangoda Divisional secretariat division explained her experience 
of flood frequency during the data collection of this study. She stated: 
Flood is a common event for us. I remember in 1966 about 10-15 houses in 
our village were destroyed due to flood. Then in 1967 we got a flood even 
one foot higher than previous year. We usually get floods when Rathnapura 
[a town in upstream] is flooded. Then 1972, 1978 and 1982 all these were 
large floods, then again in 1989, where my aunt’s house was also destroyed. 
Thereafter, in 1992, which is not a very big flood. Water came only up to my 
doorstep. Then in 1998. My house was two feet underwater due to 2002 
flood. Thereafter in 2007. After 2007 there are no large floods because 
there were not any heavy rains reported in upstream areas.  
The above comment shows that the area is getting a significant flood every 4-6 years. However, the 
EIA report for the STDP completely ignored the frequency of the flood hazard. Even though people in 
the area are used to these large floods, the new situation created by the expressway project is 
beyond the accepted level for most of them. A self-employed man from Panape village stated:   
Now the village roads get flooded every time. If there is rain for two days 
roads get flooded. There were floods in this area earlier too. But definitely 
the level is high now. Earlier water used to drain from about 3 km stretch of 
paddy lands. Now it does not drain like previously. They have put only three 
eight feet culverts along the entire 3 km stretch. So, water does not drain 
for days. Water level is also high and takes four to five days to recede. This 
village get isolated as all three access roads get flooded. We do not have 
even a cooperative shop [government run village boutiques] in this village.  
The increased flood risk around the expressway has already started disturbing the routine work of 
people in the area. School children find it difficult to attend school on many days. A once-in-5 year 
event in the past has become a routine experience. A mother of two from Panape stated:  
Students in the village have to go to Bandaragama [closest town] for a 
school. They used to travel by boats during the flood time. There had been 
an accident about five years ago and one person was killed after his boat 
capsized. After that, parents are concerned of sending students to school 
during flood time. So, kids lost two to three weeks of studies every year.  
A RDA planner, who had played a key role in the STDP, accepted the communities’ concern and 
stated that: 
We kept bridge openings [of the expressway] based on the existing Colombo 
–Galle Road [the expressway constructed in parallel to the existing highway, 
but towards the inland]. Exact assessments were not done. We got the 
openings of the old Galle road and some were kept for this. But in these 
areas, water flows very fast. So, there can be even higher flows under the 
bridges [these are the access points for the community roads]. During a high 
flood time, several houses closer to the bridges can be washed away. 
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Farmers in the area are facing a new threat because of prolonged water inundation of their paddy 
fields. Leptospirosis has become a common risk for many farmers. People in Kimmanthudawa and 
Panape villages in Bandaragama DS division and most places in Dodangoda DS division complain 
about the spread of Leptospirosis and dengue in close proximity to the expressway. Local health 
officials from the Medical Office of Health (MOH) office in Dodangoda also suspect close linkage 
between the spread of Leptospirosis and the expressway project. However, district health officials 
rejected such claims saying the data available to them do not prove such a relationship. They also 
claim that increased dengue cases in the area reflect the upward trend of dengue cases throughout 
the country. District Leptospirosis data show a downward trend in the number of patients over the 
years since 2008. The district authorities were not able to provide a breakdown of such data to 
village level, but local level data collected from the MOH Office in Dodangoda show a completely 
different picture. Of 16 Leptospirosis patients reported in the Dodangoda area since 2012, eight 
cases were reported from villages close to the expressway. Before 2012, disaggregated data to the 
village level are not available with local health officials for further analysis of this issue. Even though 
the chances of waterlogging in the project area had been predicted in the EIA report, further analysis 
on the probable environmental impacts of the waterlogging, such as the above, were not identified 
in the report.  
Summary 
Both criteria (i.e., 10 and 11) used to evaluate the level of assessment of the EIA process are met to a 
‘limited’ extent in Sri Lanka. Screening of projects is based on the prescribed project list provided in 
NER 1993. The list is not explicitly based on disaster risks. In addition, even though hazard 
assessment is being done to some extent, vulnerability assessments are not conducted. Hazard 
assessments lack the depth and breadth required for DRR. Table 5.4 summarises the criteria findings 
for the level of assessment of the EIA process in Sri Lanka. 
Table 5.4 A summary of the criteria findings for the level of assessment  
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(10) Screening of actions for 
disaster risks is taking place. 
Limited 
Screening of project proposals is based on the prescribed 
project list in NER 1993. Screening of proposals to decide 
whether an IEE/EIA is necessary is an opaque process and is 
done at the discretion of the PAA. 
(11) Hazard and 
vulnerability assessments 
are conducted as a part of 
impact identification. 
Limited 
Hazard assessments for more obvious visible hazards are done 
to some extent, but such assessments are not detailed enough 
to assess the frequency and magnitude of the hazard risks. 
Vulnerability assessments are not done. 
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5.4.2 Decision making process 
The effectiveness of the EIA process also depends on the extent to which the development planning 
process is influenced by the findings of the EIA. This section reports on criterion (12), to what extent 
project approval depends on the findings of the EIA process, and (13), the extent decision makers 
rely on the EIA process during project planning (see Table 3.1).  
Influence of EIA on project approval  
Perceptions of respondents on the influence of the EIA process on project approval vary significantly 
based on their role in the EIA process. For instance, the CEA planner saw the EIA process as the only 
factor deciding whether a project is approved. However, the EIA experts I interviewed had a different 
argument. The first EIA expert stated: 
When we go to the field to conduct EIAs, sometimes they [government] 
have already laid the foundation stone to start the project. I went for an EIA 
study in a place called Kuda Gal Amuna project, in Yala block 5 [the second 
largest national park of Sri Lanka]. When we went to the field, the 
foundation stone has already been laid and they have even constructed an 
access road to the project site. That means they have already started the 
project and what is the purpose of conducting an EIA.  
The CEA planner argued that although some government projects are proposed with a pre-
judgement on the approval, most projects proposed by non-state actors are subjected to a full EIA 
process and decisions are based on the EIA process outcomes. For example, the CEA planner 
highlighted the Advance Surfactant Manufacturing Industry at Mathugama, which had been 
proposed by Advance Surfactant Group, India. According to the CEA planner the project proposal was 
rejected based on the findings of the EIA report.  
All interviewed experts argued that the influence of EIA on project approval should be discussed in 
the larger context of environmental governance of the country. According to the legal expert, the 
influence of the EIA report on approval decisions has been declining over recent years compared 
with the first five years of EIA operation in Sri Lanka. The legal expert stated:  
When we look back the last 20 years of EIA implementation, first 5-6 years 
was very successful. After that, time to time the EIA process was subjected 
to different political influences. Therefore, the public has lost their faith in 
the EIA process. They also do not respect the EIA process compared to the 
past. So, it is highly dangerous situation, I am not sure whether this will also 
become a useless process. 
There is a collapse of rule of law in the country at the moment. When the 
rule of the law is collapsed the influence of tools like EIA will become zero. 
At the beginning, when the EIA was initiated, there was a big influence from 
the EIA on project approval, about 70 percent [3.5 out of 5 in the scale]. It 
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was getting lower and lower and now it has gone even lower than 50 
percent [2 out of 5 in the scale]. It never went back up.  
Most interviewed experts hold the above position (i.e., the influence of the EIA process declining 
over the years). They consider the influence of the EIA process on project approval is low in Sri Lanka. 
They believe that the reduction of EIA’s influence on project approval is a result of corruption in the 
authorities and the depletion of public interest and trust in governance arrangements. Describing the 
situation the second EIA expert stated, “The decisive effect of the EIA is no more there; that is 
unfortunate. If these tools are failed, then the public will try to get the law into their hand”. 
The second EIA expert also argued that the major advantage of the EIA process is having a public 
phase, where activists can inform the public about the project and organize them to take action 
against the adverse impacts of the project. The expert stated:  
The approval decision can be influenced, not through PAAs, but through the 
public. If the citizens get organized, decisions can be influenced. Our 
problem is, public hearing process taking place very quietly. As an 
organization, we have lawyers’ team who keep an eye on newspapers. So 
we always comment on EIA reports and participate in hearings.  
The CEA planner also accepted that the EIA does not significantly influence the approval of most 
government-sponsored projects. The CEA planner stated: 
For instance RDA [Road Development Authority] has a predetermination to 
construct a road. So, in public sector projects, government has already 
made a decision to carry out the project. Even in some private sector 
projects, government has already decided. At those incidents we can do 
only few things. 
At the same time, the CEA planner was pointing out a larger issue of development decision making in 
Sri Lanka. According to the planner, the decision-making process of development projects is not 
clear. The planner stated: 
Who is taking the decision? That is our major problem. Now we have an 
unnecessary burden, as there is no other approval for development projects. 
So we have become the only approval agency. That should not be 
happened. We should take only environmental decision. But none of other 
government organizations take their responsibility. They forwarded 
everything for environmental approval from CEA. Once the CEA gives the 
approval others will follow it. This is a gap in the Act too. We are in the 
process of amending the Act. The term PAA is incorrect. When they see the 
term PAA, all other agencies stay away from their responsibilities. We do 
not give project approval. We give only environmental approval.  
Most experts interviewed believe that higher emphasis given to the EIA process in a project’s 
approval is a positive dimension of the environmental laws of the country. The legal expert stated, 
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“Yes, it should happen like that. This [EIA] should be the decision tool. But it has gone to a level that 
EIA has also become a just another report. That is our problem”.  
Influence of EIA on project planning  
The influence of an EIA on the final project design is as important as the influence of an EIA on the 
project approval. If the EIA is unable to influence alterations to the project design to prevent or 
mitigate adverse impacts it does not serve its purpose. The CEA believes that alterations to the 
project’s activities as suggested by an EIA highly depend on the commitment of the project staff. The 
CEA planner stated, “It totally depends on personnel. If there is a good project director, things will be 
taken seriously”.  
It is also evident that, despite many weaknesses in scoping and impact identification in the EIA 
process, even identified environmental impacts have not been adequately considered in the project 
design. For example, although there are a number of deficiencies, the EIA of the STDP identified that 
the proposed expressway crosses four major flood plains in the southwest of the country. The EIA 
report also states that of the four major flood plains, the Kalu Ganga flood plain appeared to be very 
significant. Highlighting feedback from the community, the EIA report suggested incorporating 
measures to mitigate floods in Kalu Ganga flood plain. The report states: 
One of the suggestions made by people in Serupita (Dodangoda), 
Lewwandura (Matugama) and Panwila (Walallawita) GND [Grama 
Niladhari Divisions – village administrative divisions] is an elevated highway 
for the areas that are prone to flooding. They fear that constructing of the 
highway through low lands in the area may aggravate floods, which is 
already a threat to houses in these GND (University of Moratuwa, 1999b, p. 
7-3).   
However, the first RDA planner accepted that even though the flood risk is mentioned in the EIA 
report, flood risk in some areas has not been identified by the project design team and the required 
measures are not incorporated into the design. The RDA planner stated: 
According to the consultant's design I think he has not identified correctly 
that the trace is on a flood plain in Kalutara [Kalu Ganga flood plain]. In the 
case of Bentara Ganga [another flood plain in the project site], he has 
identified that it is on a flood plain and designed about 750 m stretch of the 
expressway on piers extending both sides of the bridge. This has not been 
done in Kalu Ganga. There is about 500 m on the flood plain and Kalu ganga 
overflows at this stretch. This flood comes in about 10-years intervals. This 
will be an issue. People protested and said they do not like this. They said if 
this is done they will be affected. There had been a flood in 2007. Trace was 
halfway constructed at that time, and entire area got flooded. So if a similar 
flood comes again, the drainage structures we provided in Kalu ganga will 
not be sufficient. In other places it will be OK.  
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Interviews with community members in the STDP project area also revealed the lack of action against 
flooding in the design, even though flood risk is highlighted in the EIA report. A community 
representative from Kimmanthudawa [Kalu Ganga flood plain] explained: 
The 2007 floods affected even project equipment. All drainages were 
blocked due to the project and during the flood project sites were 
inundated. After that they [contractors] constructed a dam using large 
boulder up to the flood level and road was constructed on top of it. So the 
earth is filled only above the flood level. This dam was constructed from 
Kolamadiriya to Kadiragoda [two villages in the high flood risk areas of Kalu 
Ganga flood plain]. Floodwater used to drain from more than a half a km 
stretch previously, now being limited to three 8 feet culverts and Kapu Ela [a 
flood control canal] culvert, which is about 60 feet wide. 
A retired schoolteacher from Kalutara, who is affected by frequent floods due to the expressway 
construction, suggested during the interview, “They could have constructed this on pillars, at least 
from Bandaragama to Dodangoda. If so, water will flow freely”.  
Both the STDP and the UKHP provide examples of changes made to project designs due to public 
protests during and after the EIA process. The proposed road layout of the STDP was changed three 
times due to public protests. Moreover, according to the second EIA expert, the much criticized 
design of the UKHP with an annual power generation capacity of 531.9 GWh was reduced to 409 
GWh due to public protests. The EIA report of the UKHP did not identify the above design change as 
an option to reduce the impact on five waterfalls that were originally proposed to be tapped for the 
project. In April 2007, the Cabinet of ministers decided to reduce the project to only Kotmale oya 
because of public protests, limiting its power generation to 409 GWh (The Institute of Engineers Sri 
Lanka, 2013). However, community members interviewed for this research from both the STDP and 
the UKHP project sites complained that the voices of politically influential segments of the 
community were heard over the deprived segments in such changes.  
Summary 
The findings show that both criteria 12 and 13 are met to a ‘limited’ extent in the Sri Lankan EIA 
process. It is clear that the EIA process is not a decisive tool for most government sponsored projects 
and the influence of the EIA process on project approval is declining recently. The findings of the EIA 
reports of the studied projects are ignored in project planning, which has caused significant 
environmental impacts, including disaster risks. Table 5.5 summarises the criteria findings for 
decision-making of the EIA process in Sri Lanka. 
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Table 5.5 A summary of the criteria findings for decision-making  
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(12) Findings of the 
EIA influence the 
final decision. Limited 
It is clear that most government-sponsored projects in Sri Lanka are not 
subjected to systematic environmental scrutiny. EIA is influential in 
some projects proposed by private entrepreneurs, but not a decisive 
factor in most projects proposed by the state agencies and political 
authorities. 
(13) Planners use the 
EIA report as a 
reference document 
in project planning. 
Limited 
Design changes are made in some projects based on the findings of the 
EIA. This is mostly done because of public protests rather than the 
findings of the EIA report. There are some cases where the findings of 
the EIA report have been ignored in project design. For example; the 
STDP.   
 
5.5 Contextual effectiveness 
The importance of effective domestic governance arrangements in the EIA process is emphasized by 
most experts and planners interviewed in this research. Some experts argued that the improvement 
of the domestic governance system is the prime requirement to address disaster risk of projects. A 
senior environmental lawyer stated: “If the system is improved then the disaster issue will be 
automatically addressed”. This section reports consultation and public participation, the influence of 
the legal provisions contained in other Acts, transparency and accountability aspects of the EIA 
process, political will, and the coordination of line agencies on the effectiveness of the EIA process to 
incorporate disaster risk. 
5.5.1 Consultation and public participation 
As reported in Chapter 2, consultation and public participation are essential ingredients of an 
effective EIA process. This section reports on criteria (14), the perceived level of consultation and 
public participation in the EIA process, and (15), to what extent developers respond to public 
submissions (see Table 3.1).  
Consultation and public participation 
Space for the public to engage in the EIA process was seen as the most promising aspect of the EIA 
process by almost all experts interviewed. However, most are also sceptical about the full use of the 
public phase in the Sri Lankan EIA process. The legal expert, describing the opportunities for public 
participation in the Sri Lankan EIA process, stated: “Public participation can be obtained in scoping, 
public reviewing of EIA reports and monitoring stages of the EIA process”. However, the above 
expert acknowledged a lack of full use of such opportunities in those stages. The legal expert further 
stated: “This system has been developed to keep away the community and reduce the workload of 
the authorities. Such a supreme attitude is there”. 
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Conversely, the CEA planner argued that it is difficult to engage the public in all those stages. The CEA 
planner believes it is sufficient to provide a 30 working day period for the public to review EIA 
reports because that is what is legally prescribed. The CEA planner stated: 
It is not even compulsory to consult community in impact identification. 
Secondary information is sufficient for the EIA process. But we ask 
developers to go to the field when they carry out EIAs and study the area 
and talk to the people. But we feel that study teams do not talk to the 
people. They discuss only among themselves. I do not see that they go and 
meet the people. 
Most experts demand public participation in the scoping process, where the ToR for an EIA is 
decided. They believe that it will broaden the scope of the EIA report and will also be helpful in 
prioritising the most important impact areas on which the EIA should focus. The guidance for 
implementing the EIA process in Sri Lanka, a brief developed by the CEA with financial support from 
the USAID, recommends that the scoping process involves a series of formal and informal meetings 
with a sample of people who may be directly or indirectly affected by the proposed project or people 
who may have special knowledge of the project area and its environment (CEA, 2006). The guidance 
note reports such a sample “…may include government officials, local farmers, merchants, teachers, 
physicians, religious leaders, or representatives from non-governmental organizations among other 
people” (CEA, 2006, p. 7). However, it is evident that such public involvement does not take place in 
the current scoping process as recommended in the guidance note. Instead, divisional secretaries 
[meso level of the government administration] and local authority representatives participate in the 
scoping process representing community interests. Most experts believe that the current practice of 
getting the public representatives involved in the scoping is not sufficient as they are often unaware 
of project impacts. The legal expert stated: “It is the responsibility of DSs [divisional secretaries] to 
convene CBOs [Community Based Organizations] before attending the scoping committee and 
getting informed about the issues. That is being done very rarely. They are not aware or informed 
about their role in the scoping committee.” 
Even though it is not legally mandated, both EIA experts and community members see the impact 
identification stage as a good opportunity for the public to get involved in the EIA process. 
Community members also believe that the community should be consulted and given due 
recognition in the impact identification stage of the EIA process. A community member from 
Kimmanthudawa, Kalutara, who has been affected due to increased flood risk from the STDP stated: 
“Officers coming from Colombo do not know where water does flow, but we know. They have not 
talked to us”. Although the EIA reports of both the STDP and the UKHP show the involvement of 
affected groups in the impact identification process, community members interviewed do not feel it 
was sufficient.  
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The community members state that the community consultations were largely conducted to either 
inform the people about the benefits of the project or to convince them. A chief incumbent of a 
village temple in Dodangoda division recalling that a community consultation took place in his 
temple stated: “They tried to convince us. It [the meeting] took place in the temple. An engineer 
came to talk to us. When we asked questions he got really annoyed. He tried to convince his idea and 
did not listen to us”. Similar statements are reported in other areas of the STDP and also for the 
UKHP project site.  
As presented in section 5.3.2, the public hearing process takes place irregularly and as the second EIA 
expert expressed “…very quietly”. Similarly, as discussed under the monitoring section, public 
participation in post-EIA monitoring does not take place in the Sri Lankan EIA process. Most of the 
community members interviewed expressed their frustration with the EIA process. The above chief 
incumbent further stated: “Nothing is happening no matter how much we asked. They do not listen 
to us. It is like playing the Veena to deaf elephants”. A self-employed community member from the 
Bandaragama division stated: “Our demands are not big, but those are important for us. Officers do 
not feel those, as those are not important for them. But we do. We have to live with those every day. 
If they come to grass root level and talk to the people, these problems could have been avoided”.  
Incorporation of public comments  
The influence of public comments in the EIA process is also unclear for most experts. The legal 
expert, explaining the influence of the public hearing process, stated: 
According to the law, all public comments should be forwarded to the 
project proponent. Project proponent should address those and written 
explanations should be given. Then TEC [Technical Evaluation Committee] 
should evaluate whether public comments are true and serious and whether 
the measures and explanations of the project proponent are sufficient to 
address community concerns, before approval is given. There is a problem 
as we never see the project proponent’s reaction and explanations for public 
comments. So we do not know whether or not they take actions for these 
public comments.  
As reported for criterion 18, the TEC proceedings are not publically available. According to the CEA 
planner, genuine public comments are forwarded to the project proponent and the project 
proponent addresses those public concerns. However, it was revealed by the interviews with the 
members of the project areas that most of their grievances have not been addressed in projects. The 
community members of both studied projects have extensively described various protests they had 
undertaken to pressurize project staff and authorities to get their demands delivered. According to 
them, most attempts failed. The legal expert also emphasized the risk that would emerge through 
neglecting the public phase of the EIA process: 
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If these tools are failed, then the public will try to get the law into their 
hand. For one example, there was a project proposal to construct a 
powerhouse at Lanudorakoda, at Kithulgala in Kelani River [second largest 
river of the country]. The EIA was approved, but people engaged in a 
massive protest. Then the political authority was also taken the side of the 
people. They always get the side, which have more power. This time it was 
the public. As a result the project was abandoned. It was done by force. But 
it should not be the way forward. 
Summary 
The criteria findings show that though criterion 14 is met to a ‘limited’ extent, it is difficult to 
measure criterion 15 because of a lack of transparency in the decision making process. Public 
participation is legally required only at the EIA report review; therefore public participation is 
minimal in other stages of the EIA process. It is unclear whether project proponents respond to 
public comments received in the EIA report review because of the lack of transparency of the TEC 
proceedings. Table 5.6 summarises the criteria findings for consultation and public participation in 
the EIA process in Sri Lanka. 
Table 5.6 A summary of the criteria findings for consultation and public participation  
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(14) Consultation and 
participation are 
taking place before 
and following EIA 
report publication 
Limited 
Public participation is legally required only at public review of EIA 
reports. The public is not sufficiently consulted or participation is not 
adequately encouraged during scoping, impact identification and 
monitoring stages. Public consultation is done to educate the public 
on project benefits rather than listening to their concerns. However, 
public protests and campaigns, both self-initiated or supported by 
environmental NGOs, have a significant influence on project 
implementation.   
(15) Feedback from 
consultations is 
incorporated into 
project planning 
Unclear 
According to the CEA, project proponents respond to public 
comments. However, interviews with community members suggest 
that most demands by the public have not been addressed in projects. 
This cannot be verified because the TEC reports are not accessible to 
third parties other than the CEA and the developer. 
5.5.2 Policy context 
As reported in Chapter 4, a number of other Acts and policies govern development planning and 
disaster management in Sri Lanka. This section reports on criterion (16), the influence of such 
legislation on the EIA process in addressing disaster risks (see Table 3.1). 
Disaster management policy context  
In addition to the NEA 1980, both the Fauna and Flora Protection (Amendment) Act (FFPAA) No. 49 
of 1993 and the Coast Conservation Act (CCA) No. 57 of 1981 also require EIAs before approving 
relevant projects. According to the legal expert:  
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EIA is first introduced by the Coastal Conservation Act in 1981. In 1993, 
when the CEA was struggling to bring the current EIA process, Wildlife 
[Wildlife Department] has brought forward an EIA process under the 
Wildlife Protection Act. So, CCD [Coast Conservation Department] and 
Wildlife have established two separate EIA systems within their purviews. 
Even today, the strongest EIA system can be seen within the Wildlife 
Department.  
Nevertheless, the FFPAA 1993 covers only a limited land area of the country. Therefore, as reported 
in Chapter 4, this research covers only the EIA process provided under the NEA 1980. It is also clear 
that none of the above three Acts has provisions to assess the disaster risk of development projects. 
A comparison of the EIA processes of all three Acts was provided in Chapter 4. On the other hand, 
the National Strategy for Disaster Management (NSDM) in 2006 identified the importance of the 
establishment of Disaster Impact Assessment in order to assess the disaster risk of development 
projects. However, neither the NEA 1980 nor the CEA has recognized the above requirement of the 
national strategy. Therefore, a lack of coordinated support and a lack of explicit provisions from both 
the DM Act and the NEA 1980 on the DIA system has already created much confusion among 
development planning agencies and has increased the coordination challenges between the DMC 
and CEA.  
Summary 
Criterion 16 is met to a ‘limited’ extent in Sri Lanka. Two other Acts (i.e., CCA 1981 and FFPAA 1993) 
have provisions for separate EIA processes. However, neither have specific provisions to address 
disaster risks. The DM Act 2005 is largely emergency management legislation. Even though the 
NSDM has provisions for addressing the disaster risk of development projects, the DMC does not 
have any influence on the EIA process. Table 5.7 summarises the criterion findings for the influence 
of disaster management policy context on the EIA process. 
Table 5.7 A summary of the criterion findings for disaster management policy context  
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(16) Legal provisions given by 
other legislation to control 
development-induced 
disaster risks do influence the 
outcome of the EIA process. 
Limited 
None of the other three Acts reviewed in this research has any 
provisions to control development-induced disaster risks. The 
NSDM does carry provisions to develop a DIA system but does 
not have any authority to influence the EIA process. 
5.5.3 Accountability and transparency 
This section reports on criteria (17), whether the EIA assessment process and EIA report is subjected 
to independent verification, and (18), whether the decision making process is made clear to all 
interested parties in Sri Lanka.  
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Independent verification  
It is a common practice that the CEA or other relevant PAAs appoint a Technical Evaluation 
Committee (TEC) for every EIA to assess the technical soundness of the EIA report and assist the PAA 
in the approval process. Explaining the TEC structure, the CEA planner stated:  
We invite all relevant stakeholders. We also include DSs [Divisional 
Secretaries] and LAs [Local Authorities] to represent the public interest. 
…other than that, in some areas, we do not have expertise within the 
government agencies. At those times, we take subject experts.  
Usually, a senior officer of the respective PAA chairs TEC meetings. It is the responsibility of the TEC 
to evaluate EIA reports forwarded to them for their comments. In this process, the TEC is expected to 
assess whether the given EIA report has sufficiently addressed the ToR issued by the CEA. The TEC 
also reviews the public’s comments and the outcome documents of public hearings, if such have 
been held, against the responses of the project proponent to the public comments. If the 
information is not adequate to make a decision, the TEC requires the project proponent to provide 
additional information. Based on the review process, the TEC forwards its recommendations to 
decision-making levels of the respective PAAs, for instance, the Chairman of the CEA. Therefore, the 
TEC report is an internal document that is not accessible to the public.  
Most experts and planners interviewed believe that the TEC is a decisive structure in the Sri Lankan 
EIA process. The legal expert stated, “Public comment is just one critical factor of EIA. The TEC should 
be more decisive than public comments and be able to influence the process. We cannot expect 
technical expertise from a lay person”. However, the first EIA expert expressed his concerns about 
the effectiveness of the TEC and stated: 
Whether EIA is done properly or not is decided by who is sitting in the TEC. 
In some cases TEC members have not read the EIA report, or have not 
participated in the field visits organized by the PAA or did their homework 
before sitting on the committee. TEC members should visit the site. Then 
only they will understand the real environmental impacts of the project. So 
the conclusion can be wrong if the TEC is not aware or expertise enough to 
evaluate an EIA. 
If you look at EIA reports approved by some TECs, those have wrong 
information provided. For instance, a salt factory in Trincomalee [A coastal 
district in the Eastern province of the country], which was approved by a 
TEC. When I checked the list of species listed in the EIA report, half of those 
animals are not available in Sri Lanka. So, the expert in the TEC should have 
noticed this. It means neither EIA practitioners nor TEC members were 
qualified enough to evaluate the EIAs. So, there are times where EIA is 
successful and sometimes it is totally unsuccessful. That depends on the EIA 
practitioner as well on the evaluator in the TEC. Even though the 
practitioner has not done his work properly, if the evaluator does his job 
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properly this could have been avoided. Most times TECs are not competent. 
So from an incompetent TEC we cannot expect a good result.  
Making the approval clear to all  
According to the NEA, the PAA should publish the approval, where such approval is granted for the 
implementation of any prescribed project, in the Gazette and in one newspaper each in Sinhala, 
Tamil and English languages. However, the conditions attached to the approval are not legally 
required to be made public. Most approvals are attached with conditions and mostly the public does 
not have access to those conditions. Some experts see this as a drawback of the Act, which also 
affects post-EIA project monitoring. The CEA planner stated:  
Conditions can be accessed by the interested parties. We have written in 
conditional approval asking the developer to keep the approval letter in the 
site and give access to the community. But they do not do it. The CEA also 
does not keep a copy of the approval letter in the library [the CEA library is a 
public space].  
The CEA planner further stated that “It is not legally required to disclose the conditional approval. So, 
the proponent can show it only if he is willing to do so”. The second EIA expert complained that even 
they could not obtain conditional approval letters, and stated:  
Theoretically the approval should be accessible for the public. A copy of the 
letter should be displayed in the project site office. But practically, not only 
the community, even government agencies cannot access some of the 
approval letters. For example; Wildlife Department was the monitoring 
agency for the Mattala Airport project; even they are not allowed to enter 
into the project site. That is the situation. They have to gain permission from 
the defence ministry to enter into the project site.    
Summary 
The findings show criterion 17 is ‘reasonably’ met in the Sri Lankan EIA process. Criterion 18 is met to 
a ‘limited’ extent. EIA reports, public comments and developers’ responses to the public comments 
are assessed by technical evaluation committees. A TEC is a multi-agency mechanism and most 
planners and experts interviewed considered it an important aspect of the Sri Lankan EIA process. 
However, lack of transparency and poor commitment have reduced the effectiveness of TECs. Lack of 
transparency is seen in many stages of the Sri Lankan EIA process. Even though the project approval 
is publicly available, any conditions attached to the approval are not available to the public. Table 5.8 
summarises the criteria findings for transparency and accountability of the EIA process in Sri Lanka. 
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Table 5.8 A summary of the criteria findings for transparency and accountability  
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(17) EIA assessment 
processes and EIA 
reports are subjected 
to independent 
checks and 
verification. 
Reasonably 
The EIA reports are assessed by a TEC, which is a multi-agency 
mechanism. Almost all planners and experts interviewed believed 
that this is an important aspect in the EIA process. But a lack of 
transparency and poor commitment of the state agencies and 
experts make the TEC ineffective in some cases. 
(18) Decision-making 
and approval stages 
are made clear to all. 
Limited 
Approval decisions are published in government Gazette and local 
newspapers. However, any conditions attached to the approval are 
not available to the public. 
 
5.5.4 Political will 
Support from the political authorities is a key influence for the success of any EIA process. This 
section covers criterion (19), whether such support is available in Sri Lanka (see Table 3.1).   
Political will 
Most experts interviewed consider that having the support of the political authority for the EIA is one 
unusual feature in the Sri Lankan EIA process. The second EIA expert interviewed rated political will 
for the Sri Lankan EIA process as “zero”. He further stated: “They [politicians] see this [EIA process] as 
a barrier for development and corruption. They see this is important only for environmentalists. They 
see us as people against development”.  
Community members also expressed their disappointment and frustration over the negligence of the 
political authority at both the local and national level on their issues. They believe that most 
development projects are being implemented with the blessing of politicians. The chief incumbent of 
a village temple in Kalutara area said: “Even MPs [members of parliament] are afraid to voice against 
these developments, as those are initiated at the top level.” Both the STDP and the UKHP are 
considered by many as politically motivated projects. Experts argued that the feasibility of these 
projects was not properly studied because the decisions had already been made to implement the 
projects. The first EIA expert stated: 
Problem is they are trying to do development on political objectives. They 
try to justify and legalize the political projects through EIAs. One of the 
reasons behind the failure of EIAs is unnecessary urgency of the authorities 
as project deadlines are decided based on political motives. Those motives 
are not sustainable.   
Planners and government officials did not answer any questions related to the political will on the 
EIA process. The CEA planner added: 
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I can say one plus point. All politicians are at least aware that an EIA is 
required for a larger project. They also know that in an EIA everything is 
checked in details. That's why they say if the EIA approval is given 
everything is OK.  
Some experts believe that giving greater emphasis to the disaster risk of a development project 
would reduce unwarranted political interference in the EIA process. The disaster management expert 
stated: “There is a heightened development-induced disasters in the country in recent past. So, if the 
risk is too high on human lives they [politicians] are not prepared to touch it. Politicians are afraid of 
disaster risk than any other impact on the environment”.  
Summary 
Criterion 19 is met to a ‘limited’ extent in the Sri Lankan EIA process. There is minimal political 
support for the EIA process and some politically influenced projects evade environmental scrutiny. 
Table 5.9 summarises the criteria findings for political will in the EIA process in Sri Lanka. 
Table 5.9 A summary of the criterion findings for political will 
Criteria Evaluation Justifications 
(19) Political support 
is available for the 
EIA process. 
Limited 
Political support for the EIA process is low. Some government-
sponsored projects evade systematic environmental scrutiny. Still, 
there is some respect among politicians towards the EIA process since 
public protests could emerge on socially unacceptable projects.   
 
5.5.5 Coordination  
The National Environmental Regulation 1993 and its later amendments identify 23 different state 
agencies as PAAs in the Sri Lankan EIA process. The Fauna and Flora Act and the Coastal Conservation 
Act also provide provisions to conduct EIAs in Sri Lanka. According to the EIA legal framework, 
scoping committees and TECs comprise multi-level and multi-agency participation. Therefore, 
coordination and cooperation among these agencies is highly important for the above committees to 
be effective. The current EIA processes require different government departments, both at national 
and local level, to work together for smooth functioning of the Sri Lankan EIA process. This section 
covers criteria (20), inter-agency coordination, and (21) involvement of the DMC in the EIA process 
(see Table 3.1).  
Inter-agency coordination 
After the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) was established through the DM Act 2005, the DMC 
began to play a role in the development planning process. It has identified that development-
induced disaster risk should be addressed to reduce the disaster risk of communities. As reported 
earlier, the National Strategy on Disaster Management proposes a disaster impact assessment 
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system in Sri Lanka, in which the DMC will have to play a key role. According to the DMC planner, 
initially, the DMC attempted to incorporate disaster risk into the current EIA process of the country, 
but did not succeed because of resistance from the CEA. Later, the DMC re-started the DIA process 
but with a different approach. The DMC planner stated that “Here, we attempt to do it through a 
developer”. In this, the DMC is working with the Road Development Authority (RDA) in a pilot project 
to incorporate disaster risk assessment into RDA projects. The pilot project is financed by the JICA 
under its Disaster Management and Capacity Enhancement Project (DiMCEP). According to the 
second RDA planner, JICA is one of the key funders in road sector development; therefore the RDA is 
obliged to support this pilot project. 
Lack of coordination and cooperation among state agencies in working on development processes 
was very evident during the interviews with government planners in different agencies. According to 
the DMC planner, lack of support from the CEA and EIA planners has compelled them to look for 
other strategies to work around project-induced disaster risks and to develop a separate system. The 
proposed DIA does not have any links to the current EIA system in Sri Lanka or look at EIA as a 
credible mechanism to collect the required crucial information on disaster risk for detailed design 
approval. However, it has already created much confusion among state agencies and experts. The 
second RDA planner stated: “This is a nuisance. For the same project we have to develop different 
documents for different state agencies and even for donors”.  
Though strongly criticising the DMC’s attempt to introduce a separate system, the CEA planner was 
not willing to improve the current EIA process to incorporate disaster risk. According to the CEA 
planner: “It [disaster risk] is already being addressed”. Therefore, the CEA considers the growing 
concern over project-induced disaster risk as an issue of coordination rather than a technical gap in 
the current EIA process. The planner further stated: “Coordination with other agencies is very good, 
but not with the DMC. It is not sufficient.” The second EIA expert saw this as a common problem in 
the Sri Lankan administrative system. The expert stated: 
It is an inherent issue of Sri Lankan institutes. Nothing to do with CEA. It had 
been really difficult to bring Forest Department and Wildlife Department to 
one table to discuss the matters related to the environment. No one wants 
to talk to other organizations and learn from their expertise.  
The second RDA planner supported the above statement, as he expressed his dissatisfaction over the 
poor coordination among agencies in the EIA process and the disaster impact process.  
Involvement of the DMC in the EIA process 
The on-going mistrust and poor relationship between the DMC and the CEA surfaced in the 
interviews I had with the two agencies. It was clear that even when opportunities exist for greater 
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coordination, they appear not to be taken up. The interviewed CEA planner strongly opposed the 
involvement of the DMC in a proposal for strengthening or improving the existing EIA process. The 
CEA planner agreed that the DMC can play a significant role within the current EIA process by 
assisting to set up the ToR and reviewing and commenting on the EIA reports. However, according to 
the CEA planner, the DMC does not play such a role in the current EIA process. The CEA planner 
added: 
When we invite them [the DMC] for TEC meeting, they do not at least come 
to TEC meetings. We invite them for scoping committee. They do not come. 
We ask them to come for scoping committee to decide the ToR, but they do 
not. They are even not giving comments for EIA reports.  
The DMC planner had a different view. Even though the DMC planner was still hopeful about some 
dialogue between the two agencies, the planner believes that a lack of flexibility and preparedness to 
change is the problem in CEA. Therefore, the DMC planner seemed more comfortable working 
directly with developers, such as the RDA, without getting involved with CEA. The DMC planner also 
accepted that the lack of in-house capacity has restricted DMC from participating in scoping 
committees.  
Summary 
The findings show that criterion 20 is met to a ‘limited’ extent but criterion 21 is not met in the Sri 
Lankan EIA process. Coordination among agencies is a challenging task in the EIA process and the 
DMC is not a part of the current EIA process. The DMC has initiated a separate DIA system, which 
could aggravate coordination issues among agencies. Table 5.10 summarises the criteria findings for 
coordination of the EIA process in Sri Lanka. 
Table 5.10 A summary of the criteria findings for coordination 
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(20) Inter-agency coordination and 
cooperation is available across sectors 
and different levels (national/local) of 
government departments at all stages 
of the EIA process 
Limited 
There are 23 different PAAs under the NEA. 
Therefore, inter-agency coordination is required in 
the EIA process, especially at scoping and TECs. 
Coordination with provincial governments was not 
studied in this research. Lack of coordination among 
agencies, especially the DMC was visible in the 
interviews. 
(21) Disaster management agency is 
involved (receive information and get 
coordination) in all stages of the EIA 
process  
No 
The DMC does not play an active role in the EIA 
process. 
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5.5.6 Funding conditions 
This section covers criterion 22 of the analytical framework, which is the influence of funding 
agencies and funding conditions on the EIA process.  
DRR as a part of funding conditions 
The conditions attached to development funding are not a new phenomenon in developing 
countries. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and JICA include conducting 
environmental assessments as a condition attached to their development assistance. These three 
institutions together provided nearly 45 percent of all foreign aid received by Sri Lanka in 2012 (CBSL 
(The Central Bank of Sri Lanka), 2012). Table 5.11 shows the annual lending from 2008 to 2013.  
Table 5.11 Foreign borrowing for Sri Lanka from 2008 to 2013 (Source: CBSL (The Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka), 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) 
Lender and project 
Amount disbursed (US$ millions) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Asian Development Bank 247 243.5 306.3 262.5 292 279 
International Development Association 
(World Bank) 
95.3 148.1 144.5 195.7 166 171 
Nordea Bank Denmark A/S 28.6 24.8 30.8 38.6   
Government of Japan (JICA) 262.9 295.1 302.9 346.4 367 265 
Government of France 20.8 19.4 50.2    
Kingdom of Spain 20.1      
Government of the People’s Republic of China 40.4 291.4 103.7    
HSBC Bank PLC (UK) 32.4 98 77.4    
HSBC Limited (Hong Kong) 26.3      
European Investment Bank 28.7 21.2   33  
Dunske Bank A/S 14.1      
Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG 27.7      
Government of India  30  201.2 26.1 189 
AB Svensk Export Credit Corporation  22 28.5    
Export-Import Bank of China   692.2 333.5 615 810 
Government of Republic of Korea   36.7 26.6 43 36 
Calyon Credit Agricole (CIB)   17.1 18.5   
China Development Bank Corporation   152.8 75.4 229 129 
Australian and New Zealand Investment Bank    35.7   
Export Development Bank of Iran    17.1 49  
Government of the Russian Federation      65 
Rabobank of Netherlands      55 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
     32 
Total Lending 844.3 1193.5 1943.1 1551.2 1820.1 2031 
 
The World Bank, ADB and JICA have operational procedures regarding environmental assessment. 
For instance, the World Bank carries out environmental screening of project proposals and classifies 
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funding proposals as category A, B, C and FI based on type, location, sensitivity, and scale of the 
project and the nature and magnitude of potential environmental impacts (The World Bank, 1999). 
The above categories require different levels of assessment. A project is categorized as category A if 
it is likely to have significant adverse impacts on the environment and is requested to have a 
comprehensive environmental assessment. A project where less adverse impacts on the 
environment are predicted is in category B, which is required to have a narrower environmental 
assessment than a category A environmental assessment. A proposed project is classified as category 
C if it is likely to have minimal or no adverse environmental impacts. No environmental assessment is 
therefore required for a category C project. Category FI is for investments that involve a financial 
intermediary and in such cases an appropriate environmental assessment is required. According to 
Operational Manual 4.01 on environmental assessment of the World Bank, it is the responsibility of 
the recipient country to carry out the environmental assessments. Like the World Bank’s operational 
procedures, both ADB and JICA have a screening process for their development lending; projects are 
categorised into A, B, C and FI (ADB, 2003; JICA, 2010). As indicated in Table 5.12, this categorization 
is based on very similar criteria to the World Bank ones and with similar requirements. None of the 
WB, ADB or JICA operational procedures on environmental assessment pays special attention to 
development-induced disaster risk. Nevertheless, the Safeguard Policy Statement 2009 of the ADB 
requires: 
… project teams, through social and environmental screening and 
classification, to gauge the extent of exposure of projects to natural hazards 
or their potential to exacerbate risk; to assess the risk of natural hazards for 
projects that are found to be highly exposed to natural hazards or have high 
potential to exacerbate risk; to conduct an alternative analysis of prevention 
and mitigation measures; and to include appropriate structural and non-
structural mitigation measures in project design and implementation (ADB, 
2009, p. 86).  
Further, in the latest country partnership strategies issued for the 2012-2016 funding cycle for Sri 
Lanka, both ADB and the World Bank emphasise not only environmentally friendly development, but 
also the importance of integrating disaster and climate risk into development planning processes. 
The World Bank has identified mainstreaming of DRR into the development process as one of its 14 
Analytic and Advisory Activities (AAA) proposed for the 2012-2016 Country Partnership Strategy 
period: 
The World Bank will continue to engage in this area [environmentally 
friendly economy], seeking opportunities to support the mutually reinforcing 
aspects of economic growth and environmental sustainability as well as 
ensuring compliance to environment-related safeguards.  
The ongoing AAA on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management looks to 
strengthen Sri Lanka’s early warning system and the capacity of 
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Government to assess risks, integrate disaster risk reduction into the 
planning process and prepare post-disaster assessments (The World Bank, 
2012, p. 62). 
Table 5.12 A comparison of the categorization of projects of ADB, WB and JICA  
Organization Category and criteria used 
Category A Category B Category C Category FI 
ADB Projects with 
significant 
adverse 
environmental 
impacts. An 
environmental 
impact 
assessment (EIA) 
is required.  
Projects with some 
adverse environmental 
impacts, but of lesser 
degree and/or 
significance than 
category A projects. An 
initial environmental 
examination (IEE) is 
required.  
Projects unlikely 
to have adverse 
environmental 
impacts. No EIA 
or IEE is required.  
A financial intermediary 
is involved. The 
financial intermediary 
must apply an 
environmental 
management system.  
The World 
Bank 
The project is 
likely to have 
significant 
adverse 
environmental 
impacts. The 
borrower is 
responsible for 
preparing an EIA.  
Potential adverse 
environmental impacts 
of the project are less 
adverse than those of 
Category A projects. 
The scope of 
environmental 
assessment is narrower 
than that of a Category 
A EIA. 
The project is 
likely to have 
minimal or no 
adverse 
environmental 
impacts. Beyond 
screening, no 
further EIA action 
is required for a 
Category C 
project. 
A proposed project is 
classified under this 
category if it involves a 
financial intermediary. 
An appropriate EIA for 
each subproject is 
required.  
JICA Proposed projects 
with significant 
adverse impacts. 
An environmental 
impact 
assessment (EIA) 
is required. 
 
Potential adverse 
impacts are less 
adverse than those of 
Category A projects. 
The scope of 
environmental reviews 
is narrower than that of 
Category A projects.  
Projects are likely 
to have minimal 
or little adverse 
impact. No EIA is 
required. 
JICA’s funding of 
projects is provided to 
a financial intermediary 
or executing  
Agency. Environmental 
reviews are conducted 
by the JICA.  
 
Similarly, the ADB, in its Country Partnership Strategy, states that: “…all investments will be designed 
to be resilient to climate change and ADB will endeavour to tap other sources of funds for climate 
change” (ADB, 2011, p. 4). However, neither the World Bank nor ADB have clearly articulated how 
DRR is mainstreamed into the development planning process.  
The influence of the funding conditions from the ADB, the World Bank and JICA to implement 
environmental planning is very evident in the Sri Lankan context. This means that some projects, 
which are not covered under the National Environmental Act (NEA), are at least required to undergo 
an EIA under conditions set by the funders. For example, expansion and widening of existing roads is 
not categorised as a prescribed project under the Gazette extra-ordinary No. 722/22 of 1993. 
Nevertheless, the World Bank in 1993 agreed with the CEA to require projects that are like the above 
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Summary 
The findings show that criterion 22 is ‘mostly’ met in the Sri Lankan EIA process. It is clear that the Sri 
Lankan EIA process is influenced by the policies and demands of the development funders and some 
agencies are also increasingly looking for disaster risk and climate change impacts in development 
projects. However, the influence of such agencies is decreasing due to the changes in the foreign 
development aid flow to the country. Table 5.13 summarises the criterion findings for funding 
conditions in Sri Lanka. 
Table 5.13 A summary of the criterion finding for funding conditions 
Criteria Evaluation Justifications 
(22) Funding agencies carry 
specific funding conditions 
to curtail the disaster risk of 
the project. 
Mostly 
Conditions set by the funders significantly influence how projects 
are done in Sri Lanka. The latest funding strategies also 
emphasize disaster risk and climate change. However, the 
increased influence of Chinese funding has negative implications 
on implementing the full EIA process, therefore on addressing 
disaster risk. 
 
5.6 Chapter Summary  
This chapter reports the effectiveness of the Sri Lankan EIA process to address project-induced 
disaster risk. The findings show that most criteria are either met to a limited extent or not met in the 
Sri Lankan EIA process. Exceptions to the above can be seen only in criteria 2, 14, 17, and 22. The EIA 
process is backed with clear and specific legislation. Nevertheless, the legislation has several gaps 
that have limited its effectiveness. As reported earlier, even though a lack of transparency and poor 
commitment of the state agencies reduce its effectiveness, having a TEC in place is considered an 
important aspect of the EIA process. It is also difficult to verify whether developers address public 
comments because of the above-mentioned poor transparency of the TEC process. The influence of 
multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies on assessing the disaster risk of development projects is highly 
visible in the EIA process. These agencies are also increasingly looking for disaster risk and climate 
change impacts in development projects. However, the influence of such agencies is decreasing 
because of changes in foreign development aid flow to the country. Table 5.14 summarises the 
findings of the empirical study under the evaluation criteria identified in Table 3.1. The next chapter 
will present the data collected from an empirical study carried out in New Zealand on the 
effectiveness of the New Zealand EIA process to address project-induced disaster risk. 
 
 
  
    
 
135 
Table 5.14 A summary of the findings for the Sri Lankan EIA process against the criteria in Table 3.1 
Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Criteria 
cluster 
Criterion Evaluation Comments 
Integration Purpose of EIA (1) Disaster risk reduction is an 
integral part of environmental 
assessment. 
Limited Disaster risk is not explicitly mentioned in the EIA legislation.  
Procedural Legal Basis  
(2) The EIA system is based on clear 
and specific legal provisions. 
Mostly Legal system is clear and comprehensive to a greater extent. However, a few gaps 
have been identified in this research. These include, insufficient provisions for 
public participation, lack of provisions for the public to appeal against a decision.  
(3) The impacts of all significant 
actions are assessed. 
Limited The prescribed project list provided in the NER 1993 has limitations. Some 
projects, for example expansion of existing roads, are not considered as 
prescribed projects in the law. Even though most of the prescribed projects can 
also be categorised as projects that increase disaster risk, assessment of disaster 
risk is not required under the EIA law. In addition, sub-activities of main 
development activity (i.e., supply routes) are often not subjected to an EIA.  
(4) Alternative methods and 
locations are considered. 
Limited Consideration of alternatives is required under the NEA. Even though the NEA is 
not clear about requirement of both alternative methods and locations, in practice 
both alternative methods and locations are included in the EIA reports. However, 
a detailed assessment of alternatives has not been conducted or incorporated in 
the studied EIA reports. 
(5) EIA reports contain a section on 
disaster risk. 
Limited More obvious visible hazard risks, such as flood risk are included as part of 
anticipated environmental effects. However, the vulnerability of affected people is 
not included in the EIA reports.  
(6) There is an opportunity for 
appeal or legally challenge the 
process or decision output. 
Limited A developer can appeal against the decision to the secretary of the Ministry of 
Environment. However, the public cannot appeal against an approval decisions 
under the provisions of the NEA 1980. Currently, provisions of the Constitution are 
used to challenge decisions.  
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Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Criteria 
cluster 
Criteria Evaluation Comments 
Procedural Guidance  
(7) EIA reports are subjected to 
public review. 
Limited Public review of EIA reports is legally required but measures are not sufficient to 
make maximum use of it. The conduct of public hearings is not consistent. The 
public is not often provided with information related to project impacts in simple 
language. 
(8) ToR for EIAs carries specific 
requirements regarding hazard 
assessment and vulnerability 
assessment. 
No A general ToR is used in most occasions. ToRs generally do not have a reference 
on disaster risk.  
(9) Guidance is available to support 
compliance monitoring taking place 
and it is being implemented. 
Limited The CEA is legally mandated with monitoring function. However, a monitoring is 
not taking place adequately. Poor motivation of the authorities is identified as 
the key issue.  
Substantive 
Level of 
Assessment 
(10) Screening of actions for 
disaster risks is taking place. 
Limited Screening of project proposals is based on the prescribed project list in NER 
1993. Screening of proposals to decide whether an IEE/EIA is necessary is an 
opaque process and is done at the discretion of the PAA. 
(11) Hazard and vulnerability 
assessments are conducted as a 
part of impact identification. 
Limited Hazard assessments for more obvious visible hazards are done to some extent, 
but such assessments are not detailed enough to assess the frequency and 
magnitude of the hazard risks. Vulnerability assessments are not done. 
Decision 
Making  
(12) Findings of the EIA influence 
the final decision (van Doren et al., 
2013). 
Limited It is clear that most government-sponsored projects in Sri Lanka are not 
subjected to systematic environmental scrutiny. EIA is influential in some 
projects proposed by private entrepreneurs, but not a decisive factor in most 
projects proposed by the state agencies and political authorities. 
(13) Planners use the EIA report as 
a reference document in project 
planning (van Doren et al., 2013). 
Limited Design changes are made in some projects based on the findings of the EIA. This 
is mostly done because of public protests rather than the findings of the EIA 
report. There are some cases where the findings of the EIA report have been 
ignored in project design. For example; the STDP.   
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Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Criteria 
cluster 
Criteria Evaluation Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contextual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consultation 
and Public 
participation 
(14) Consultation and participation 
are taking place before and 
following EIA report publication. 
Limited Public participation is legally required only at public review of EIA reports. The 
public is not sufficiently consulted or participation is not adequately encouraged 
during scoping, impact identification and monitoring stages. Public consultation 
is done to educate the public on project benefits rather than listening to their 
concerns. However, public protests and campaigns, both self-initiated or 
supported by environmental NGOs, have a significant influence on project 
implementation.   
(15) Feedback from consultations is 
incorporated into project planning. 
Unclear According to the CEA, project proponents respond to public comments. 
However, interviews with community members suggest that most demands by 
the public have not been addressed in projects. This cannot be verified because 
the TEC reports are not accessible to third parties other than the CEA and the 
developer. 
Policy context  (16) Legal provisions given by other 
legislation to control development-
induced disaster risks do influence 
the outcome of the EIA process. 
Limited None of the other three Acts reviewed in this research has any provisions to 
control development-induced disaster risks. The National Strategy for Disaster 
Management does carry provisions to develop a Disaster Impact Assessment 
system but does not have any authority to influence the EIA process. 
Transparency 
and 
accountability  
(17) EIA assessment processes and 
EIA reports are subjected to 
independent checks and 
verification. 
Reasonably The EIA reports are assessed by a TEC, which is a multi-agency mechanism. 
Almost all planners and experts interviewed believed that this is an important 
aspect in the EIA process. But a lack of transparency and poor commitment of 
the state agencies and experts make the TEC ineffective in some cases. 
(18) Decision-making and approval 
stages, (setting out what is 
required of proponents and 
government agencies and when) 
are made clear to all. 
Limited Approval decisions are published in government Gazette and local newspapers. 
However, any conditions attached to the approval are not available to the 
public. 
  
    
 
138 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Criteria 
cluster 
Criteria Evaluation Comments 
Contextual 
Political Will (19) Political support is available 
for the EIA process. 
Limited Political support for the EIA process is low. Some government-sponsored projects 
evade systematic environmental scrutiny. Still, there is some respect among 
politicians towards the EIA process since public protests could emerge on socially 
unacceptable projects.   
Coordination 
(20) Inter-agency coordination and 
cooperation is available across 
sectors and different levels 
(national/local) of government 
departments at all stages of the EIA 
process. 
Limited There are 23 different PAAs under the NEA. Therefore, inter-agency coordination 
is required in the EIA process, especially at scoping and TECs. Coordination with 
provincial governments was not studied in this research. Lack of coordination 
among agencies, especially the DMC was visible in the interviews. 
(21) Disaster management agency 
is involved (receive information 
and get coordination) in all stages 
of the EIA process. 
No The DMC does not play an active role in the EIA process. 
Funding 
conditions  
(22) Funding agencies carry specific 
funding conditions to curtail the 
disaster risk of the project. 
Mostly Conditions set by the funders significantly influence how projects are done in Sri 
Lanka. The latest funding strategies also emphasize disaster risk and climate 
change. However, the increased influence of Chinese funding has negative 
implications on implementing the full EIA process, therefore on addressing 
disaster risk. 
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Chapter 6 
The Effectiveness of the EIA Process in Addressing Development-
Induced Disaster Risks in New Zealand 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter reports the effectiveness of the New Zealand EIA process in addressing development-
induced disaster risks, using the analytical framework proposed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.5) and the 
criteria formulated in Chapter 3 (Table 3.1). The chapter starts with an introduction, moves to detail 
the findings and finally summarises the findings.  
The perceptions of six planners and six EIA experts on the New Zealand EIA process were used as the 
key empirical data for this chapter. Table 6.1 lists the experts and planners interviewed and the 
generic titles used to refer to them in this chapter.  
Table 6.1 Planners and experts interviewed and generic title used 
No. Planner/ expert Generic title used 
1 Regional council planner Regional planner 
2 District council planner District planner  
3 Environmental planner of a major energy company Development planner 
4 Planner from Department of Conservation Conservation planner 
5 Planner from a national hazard management agency Hazard planner 
6 Planner for the EPA EPA planner 
7/8 Two social scientists First social scientist and second 
social scientist 
9 EIA expert First EIA expert 
10 Hearing commissioner Hearing commissioner 
11 Retired EC judge EC judge 
12 One thesis supervisor Second EIA expert 
 
Like the Sri Lankan case, interview data were supplemented with document analysis from 
government and agency publications, project documents, legislation, policies, journal articles and 
newspaper reports, where appropriate. In this chapter, the findings from the collected data will be 
presented under four main headings that reflect the effectiveness dimensions of the analytical 
framework (i.e., policy integration, procedural effectiveness, substantive effectiveness and 
contextual effectiveness). Each section presents the document analysis and interview results of the 
experts and planners. Summary tables with criteria findings are presented at the end of each 
effectiveness dimension and a full summary table is at the end of the chapter.  
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6.2 Policy integration  
According to the national progress report (MCDEM, 2011) submitted to the UNISDR by the New 
Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCEDM) on the progress of 
implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) for the 2009-2011 reporting cycle, 
development-induced disaster risk is integrated into the existing EIA process. This section will 
investigate the details of this claim and see to what extent disaster risk is factored into the New 
Zealand EIA process.  
6.2.1 Integration of disaster risk into EIA legislation 
This section covers criterion 1 and investigates to what extent disaster risk is integrated into the EIA 
process.  
DRR in the EIA process 
The Environmental Impact Assessment process in New Zealand is largely governed by the Resource 
Management Act (RMA) 1991. As noted in the Chapter 2, the RMA is considered a comprehensive 
environmental management framework that promotes “…the sustainable management of natural 
and physical resources” (RMA 1991, s.5). Sustainable management in the RMA context means: 
…managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical 
resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to 
provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being and for their 
health and safety while— 
a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding 
minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future 
generations; and 
b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems; and 
c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities 
on the environment.” (RMA, 1991, s. 5(2)).  
Sub section (c) above is directly related to the purpose of an EIA process. Therefore, sub section (c) 
can be identified as a direct provision shaping the EIA process within the RMA. Schedule 4 of the 
RMA sets out the minimal requirements of the EIA process in New Zealand. The EIA report in the 
RMA context is called an ‘Assessment of Effects on the Environment’ (AEE), but mostly from hereon I 
will refer to it as an EIA report. The term ‘environment’ has been broadly defined in the RMA as:  
a) ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and 
communities; and 
b) all natural and physical resources; and 
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c) amenity values; and 
d) the social, economic, aesthetic, and cultural conditions which affect 
the matters stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) or which are affected by 
those matters” (RMA, 1991, s. 2) 
Therefore, in the RMA, people and communities are considered as a part of the environment and 
when the Act says avoiding, remedying and mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the 
environment, it should also be read as any effects on the people and communities, which is an 
important dimension of DRR. In addition, the term ‘effect’ is also given a broad scope in the RMA, 
but “…in a non-exhaustive way…” (Dye v Auckland RC (2001) (7 ELRNZ 209)) as:  
a) any positive or adverse effect; and  
b) any temporary or permanent effect; and 
c) any past, present, or future effect; and 
d) any cumulative effect which arises over time or in combination with 
other effects— 
e) regardless of the scale, intensity, duration, or frequency of the 
effect, and also includes— 
f) any potential effect of high probability; and 
g) any potential effect of low probability which has a high potential 
impact. (RMA, 1991, s.3) 
Sub sections (e) and (f) above are therefore legally required to be a part of any EIA report under the 
RMA. Some experts interviewed for this research argued that these requirements refer to disaster 
risks in the RMA, as disasters can also be described under those explanations. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the UNISDR has used similar descriptions in defining “extensive” and “intensive” types of 
disasters (UNISDR, 2009a). However, the same terms can also be used for any other environmental 
impacts without being specific reference to disaster risks. The interviewed experts and planners had 
different views over the provisions in the RMA on disaster risks. For instance, the regional planner 
described integration of disaster risk in the EIA process as: “It starts with the definitions of words 
used in the fourth schedule. … effects are defined very comprehensively. That includes things that 
can happen with very low probability with high consequences.”  
According to the regional planner, disaster risk is more explicit and if there is a risk of disaster 
because of a proposed project it is covered as part of ‘effects’. Clause 2(f), Schedule 4, requires 
“…any risk to the neighbourhood, the wider community, or the environment through natural hazards 
or the use of hazardous substances or hazardous installations” to be addressed by an EIA report. This 
  
142 
 
is a more specific reference to natural hazards in the RMA than the broad definition of effects as set 
out in section 3 (g) (noted above).  
According to the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) report on the principles of the RMA (Dormer et al., 
2012, pp. 21-22), the management of natural hazards is explicitly provided for in a number of 
sections of the RMA. The report emphasises that sections 2, 30, 31, 59-62 and 106 are directly 
related to natural hazard management. The term ‘natural hazard’ is defined in section 2 of the RMA 
as “any atmospheric or earth or water related occurrence (including earthquake, tsunami, erosion, 
volcanic and geothermal activity, landslip, subsidence, sedimentation, wind, drought, fire, or 
flooding) the action of which adversely affects or may adversely affect human life, property, or other 
aspects of the environment”. Section 30 refers to the control of the use of land for the purpose of 
the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards as a function of regional councils. Section 31 refers to 
“…the control of any actual or potential effects of the use, development, or protection of land, 
including for the purpose of... the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards” (s. 31 (1) (b)) as 
functions of territorial authorities. This may appear as though the regional and territorial authorities 
may have particularly conflicting roles but, as reported in Chapter 4, the Environment Court clarified 
the role of the two councils early in the life of the RMA.  
Sections 59–62 are relevant to regional policy statements and under section 62, regional councils 
should specify in the regional policy statement “…the objectives, policies, and methods for the 
control of the use of land… to avoid or mitigate natural hazards or any group of hazards”. Further, 
according to section 106, a consent authority may refuse to grant a subdivision consent in special 
circumstances, including where land is likely to be subjected to erosion, subsidence, slippage, or 
inundation. However, section 106(2) allows granting such subdivision consent subject to conditions 
for the purposes of avoiding, remedying, or mitigating the effects. 
Nevertheless, the interviewed experts argued alternatively that disaster risk in the EIA process is 
more implicit than explicit. The first social scientist stated: “It is not a specific requirement. It is more 
an implicit requirement in New Zealand. The guidance [the RMA provisions] about hazards for 
instance, are on physical hazards”. According to the social scientist, hazard assessment does not 
investigate the vulnerability of people or effects on society. The social scientist added:    
…it [disaster risk] is not an effect, not a specific reference [to disaster risk] in 
Part 2 of the Act, which talks about the purpose and principles although 
there are indirect references. I think in schedule 4, there are lots of deficits 
in terms of [disaster risk]. I think it is not emphasized as much as …it could 
be. 
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Summary  
The findings show, criterion 1 is met ‘reasonably’. Hazard risk is explicitly integrated into several 
places in the RMA, including Schedule 4. However, it is clear that such provisions concern hazard risk, 
but not disaster risks. Table 6.2 summarises the criterion findings for the integration of DRR into EIA 
in New Zealand. 
Table 6.2 A summary of the criterion findings for policy integration 
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(1) Disaster risk 
reduction is an integral 
part of environmental 
assessment. 
Reasonably 
The EIA process is required to address natural hazards risks. 
However, neither disaster risk nor vulnerability of affected people is 
required to be assessed.  
 
6.3 Procedural effectiveness  
This section covers the legal basis in more depth and the guidance for the EIA process in New 
Zealand and the extent to which legal provisions and regulations are being implemented in New 
Zealand. 
6.3.1 Legal basis  
Five different criteria are evaluated in this section in relation to the RMA provisions (Table 3.1). They 
are: (2) clarity of the legal provisions; (3) whether impacts of all significant actions are assessed; (4) 
the consideration of alternatives; (5) whether EIA reports contain a separate section on disaster risk; 
and (6) the opportunities for legally challenging a consent authority’s decision. 
Legal basis for EIA 
It is a general perception among the interviewed planners and experts that most provisions of the 
RMA for the assessment of environmental effects are clear. However, the experts argued that some 
ambiguities exist. The first EIA expert added: “Case law can be quite important as well. Those 
decisions might point the way” [to resolving any ambiguities]. The expert further argued: “… 
[however, it is] still possible for people to do what I regard as quite ineffective assessments. Other 
times you get developers who will do very comprehensive assessments”. According to all the experts, 
the above difference in depth of assessment is a result of the capacity of assessors and their 
experience with the existing EIA process. The first EIA expert further argued that the process 
depends on whether the applicant anticipated they would be required to provide information, in 
which case they volunteer it, or thought council might not note it and so left it to the awareness of 
the council staff to specifically request DRR relevant information.  
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The general view of the experts was that developers would tend not to include information that 
might lead to adverse outcomes of their application. According to the experts, although that attitude 
of developers results in inadequate EIA reports, there are checks along the way at council review, 
hearing and Environment Court stages where further information can be requested. The hearing 
commissioner argued: “… commissioners often nowadays ask for more information. …and then 
obviously when you get to the Environment Court stage, that process is also a quite big check in 
terms of the comprehensiveness of the information”.  
Despite the consensus among most planners and experts on the provisions of the RMA for EIA 
reporting, some showed their discontent about Schedule 49. Local council planners argued Schedule 
4 of the RMA is too specific and some consent applications do not align properly with the list of 
matters that should be included in an EIA report given in Schedule 4. Local council planners seem to 
be more comfortable with a broader framework where they can more easily fit different consent 
applications. For instance, the regional planner described Schedule 4 as:  
I think the fourth schedule is probably the only area where we wish for more 
clarity around. The fourth schedule is often used by lawyers as a checklist 
for EIA. Here it is often used to undermine EIA. Those who want to provide 
good EIA are often pointed to the fourth schedule to say, what you are 
dealing with is not mandated by the RMA. I wish the fourth schedule was bit 
clearer about what it intends to do. Not a shopping list of what to include in 
the EIA.  
Nevertheless, most experts interviewed have an alternative view. The first EIA expert stated, “… the 
problem with the fourth schedule is that it is too broad and undiscriminating. Essentially the matters 
that need to be considered are just a re-statement of the definition of environment, the definition of 
effects. …it is setting the broadest possible nets”. According to this expert, this broadness has made 
the EIA process rely on practitioners to narrow the focus down on important issues (i.e., make the 
details appropriate to the significant scale of the impacts). The expert further argued:   
That means you are entirely relying on the skills of a very diverse 
practitioner community. Some of them are engineers, some of them are 
surveyors, some are planners, some are environmental scientists, most of 
them will not have had any impact assessment training. Therefore, how the 
assessments have been done, is very dependent on what influences those 
people [have] at the time and how they tackle the work.  
The hearing commissioner argued that the current issues seen in the EIA process are far greater than 
an issue with Schedule 4 or lack of guidance on EIA reporting. The commissioner further argued that 
                                                          
9 It is important to note that schedule 4 of the RMA has been amended by the Resource Management 
Amendment Act (RMAA) 2013, after these interviews were conducted. However, clauses 1 and 2 of the RMA 
remain unchanged in the amendments.  
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the RMA is inherently deficient of some vital ingredients that make any impact assessment tool 
effective. The commissioner stated: “When you move from the old style of impact assessment into 
the RMA, the fourth schedule really diminished the coverage. It reduces the need for consultation. It 
reduces the scope of the inquiry”. However, the second EIA expert strongly denied this claim saying 
“I cannot find any logical or empirical basis for this view”. 
Assessing the impacts of all significant actions   
Coverage of activities in an EIA system is an important dimension in the potential effectiveness of the 
EIA process to address disaster risk. In other words, even if the legal provisions and guidance of the 
system are clear, if the system does not cover the whole spectrum of activities that potentially can 
increase disaster risk, then it diminishes the effectiveness of the whole system.  
As reported in Chapter 4, under the RMA provisions there are five types of resource consents, which 
theoretically cover all activities (except fishing) that affect the environment. They are: land-use 
consents, sub-division consents, coastal permits, water permits and discharge permits. Therefore, 
any resource user should obtain a resource consent before he/she engages in any such activity 
unless it is a permitted activity. As per section 88 of the RMA, any such resource consent application 
must also be accompanied with an EIA report in accordance with Schedule 4 of the RMA. So, almost 
all development actions, unless they are permitted or prohibited in the relevant district or regional 
plans, will be subject to a standard scrutiny process to check for any environmental effects.  
In addition, an assessment of actual or potential effects prepared in accordance with Schedule 4 
must take into account relevant cumulative effects “…of the development as a whole” (Burton v 
Auckland CC [1994] NZRMA 544 (HC)) and “…even those arising from associated activities which did 
not require consent in themselves” (Harris, 2004, p. 102). Cumulative effects also include considering 
effects of the activity in combination with existing activities, but not future activities requiring 
consent (Maassen, 2010).  
Consideration of alternatives   
Schedule 4 of the RMA requires inclusion of “…a description of any possible alternative locations or 
methods for undertaking the activity” in the EIA report if the proposed activity “…is likely to…result in 
any significant adverse effect on the environment”. This provision has been elaborated in detail in ‘A 
guide to preparing a basic assessment of environmental effects’ (MfE, 2006). According to the guide, 
it is important to “…consider alternatives in the widest possible way” (MfE, 2006, p. 24) only if the 
proposal is likely to cause significant adverse effects. Even though it is specifically not required under 
the RMA, the guide says that complex applications require considering alternative locations, 
including the option of not proceeding. Further, the guide has given more emphasis to alternative 
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locations but not the methods. The guide further warns developers not to use identification and 
analysis of alternatives as a means to merely dispose of alternatives in favour of a selected option by 
the developer. However the term ‘significant’ is seen as being very debatable among the planners 
and experts interviewed. This has been made clear in Meridian Energy Ltd v Central Otago District 
Council ([2010] NZRMA 477), where the High Court ruled that if the consent authority concludes that 
an adverse effect of a proposed activity is likely to be significant then the consent authority and the 
Environment Court are entitled to seek a description of any alternative locations for the proposed 
development activity. However, accepting that under section 104(c); the consent authority can look 
at the description of alternative sites and methods in making the decision, the High Court ruled out 
the need for an explicit and comprehensive cost benefit analysis on alternative locations. Here too, 
alternative methods were not discussed.  
It is evident that both in the Transmission Gully Project and the Waitohi Irrigation and Hydro Scheme, 
alternative options were not considered adequately even though both projects are considered to 
have substantial adverse effects on the environment. For instance, the engineering report for the 
WIHS (Rivett et al., 2012) provides alternative dam locations but does not provide any details on any 
alternative methods for the proposed activity. Similarly, in the TGP, the EIA report has restricted 
itself to alignment options for the proposed highway.   
Separate section on disaster risk in the EIA report  
In all seven EIA reports reviewed from New Zealand, a section or a chapter was allocated to hazard 
risk. In most cases, natural hazard risk was identified as a key area of effects and separate studies 
were commissioned to assess hazard risks. For instance, in the WIHS, a separate study was carried 
out on the engineering features of the project covering geological and hydrological aspects; it also 
investigated natural hazard risks. In addition, a separate analysis was conducted of potential breaks 
in all three dam projects considered (i.e., the WIHS, Wrights Road Storage Ponds and Ruataniwha 
Water Storage Scheme) as per the requirements of the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2008. 
However, even though a cultural impact assessment and an economic impact assessment were done 
for the WIHS, neither a social impact assessment nor vulnerability assessment was prepared for the 
scheme. Similarly, in the TGP, Technical Report No. 03 addresses geotechnical engineering aspects of 
the project; it also covered hazard risks. Unlike the WIHS, in TGP a social impact assessment was 
carried out and presented separately in Technical Report No. 17. However, the social impact 
assessment did not relate to the findings of the hazard assessment and there is no reference to 
hazards in this report.  
It is clear in all reviewed EIA reports that the geophysical studies on natural hazards are clearly 
disconnected from social studies. Both social and cultural assessments do not refer to the natural 
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hazard risks of the project. Therefore, both studied projects contain a hazard assessment but lack 
detailed disaster risk or vulnerability assessments. This will be further reported under the criterion 
on hazard and vulnerability assessment in impact identification.  
Opportunity to appeal against an approval decision 
Under the RMA section 120, the applicant or consent holder, or any person who made a submission 
on the application has a right of appeal to the Environment Court against the whole or any part of a 
decision of a consent authority on an application for a resource consent. Section 274 lists persons 
who can be a party to any proceedings before the Environment Court. The EC judge, explaining the 
provisions for appeal against the decisions of consent authorities, stated: 
If [an application is] publicly notified, anyone can make a submission 
anywhere in the country. Submitters are entitled to take the matter into the 
Court if the consent is granted; if the consent is refused the applicant is 
entitled to take the matter to the Court. Within the confines of limited 
notification10 the same applies. The only other way an application gets into 
the Environmental Court is that it is a non-notified application and the 
consent is refused or it is granted with a condition that the applicant does 
not like. Then the applicant can appeal to the Environment Court. So in non-
notification, the public never get to go to the Court.  
The interviewees, regardless of their role in the development planning process, argued that the 
provision in the RMA for appeals against consent or notification decisions is a very important feature 
of the RMA in order for it to achieve its objectives. They also argued that decisions of the 
Environment Court have been useful in interpreting the RMA provisions and have later become part 
of environmental law in New Zealand.  
The interviewees also emphasized that the EIA “…process requires lots of judgements”. Therefore, as 
the first EIA expert stated: “Having that legal, pretty fair-minded organization [the Environment 
Court] in the background is really really important”. The regional planner, referring to the 
importance of having the Environment Court, stated: 
If anybody thinks that a decision was wrong. It is a judgement call. … [for 
instance] talk about effects being major and minor; those are clearly 
discretionary and very debatable. What's minor or what’s major. The 
decision therefore can be appealed to a court and a judge can look at that 
decision and see if it is a reasonable one or not. 
                                                          
10 Limited notification is when the consent authority decides not to publicly notify an application, but if 
there are any affected people, affected protected customary rights group or affected customary marine 
title group, then the consent authority must notify such affected persons unless a rule or national 
environmental standard precludes this. Regardless of rules or national environmental standards, a consent 
authority must notify any affected protected customary rights group or affected customary marine title 
group.  
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Summary 
According to the findings, criterion 2 is ‘mostly’ met. The New Zealand EIA process is backed with 
specific legal provisions and the EIA process is well integrated into development planning. However, 
Schedule 4 lacks the clarity that most planners and experts expected. Criteria 3 and 6 are ‘fully’ met 
in the EIA process (Table 6.3). It is a legal requirement that all development activities (unless 
permitted or prohibited) are subject to an EIA. Therefore the EIA has a wide coverage of activities. 
There are also adequate provisions to legally challenge a consent decision by any party involved in 
the EIA process. However, criteria 4 and 5 are ‘reasonably’ met. Even though the RMA is clear and 
explicit about the requirement for consideration of alternatives, in practice, consideration of 
alternative methods is weak. EIA reports have a separate section on hazard risk, but disaster risk has 
not been estimated.  
Table 6.3 A summary of the criteria findings for the legal basis  
Criteria Evaluation Justifications 
(2) The EIA system is 
based on clear and 
specific legal provisions. 
Mostly 
The EIA process is based on specific provisions provided in 
Schedule 4 of the RMA. It is the general perception among most 
planners and experts that Schedule 4 is too broad and unspecific.  
(3) The impacts of all 
significant actions are 
assessed. 
Fully 
Five types of resource consents are listed in the RMA. These 
theoretically cover all possible development activities. Any activity, 
unless it is permitted or prohibited, should require an EIA report to 
accompany any resource consent application. In addition, effects 
arising from associated activities and cumulative effects are also 
included in the EIA process. 
(4) Alternative methods 
and locations are 
considered. 
Reasonably 
The RMA is clear about the requirement of alternative methods 
and locations. However, in practice, consideration of alternative 
methods is weak. The High Court ruled out the need for explicit 
and comprehensive cost benefit analysis on alternative options.  
(5) EIA reports contain a 
section on disaster risk. 
Reasonably 
Hazard (risk) assessments are being done in detail in most cases 
and presented in a separate section of the EIA report or as a 
separate report. However, neither vulnerability assessment nor 
disaster risk is estimated and included in the EIA report.   
(6) There is an 
opportunity for appeal 
or legally challenge the 
process or decision 
output. 
Fully 
Provisions are available for any aggrieved party to appeal against 
the decision or part of it to the Environment Court.   
 
6.3.2 Guidance on EIA  
There is no specific government policy or regulation that contains guidance on the EIA process. 
Schedule 4 of the RMA provides general guidance for the information required in an EIA report and 
matters that must be addressed in an EIA report. Guidance on the EIA process is also provided by the 
Ministry for the Environment and relevant local councils. The Ministry for the Environment’s 
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publication ‘A guide to preparing a basic assessment of environmental effects’ (MfE, 2006) and a 
series of guides ‘An everyday guide to the RMA’ (MfE, 2012) provide more detailed information on 
the EIA process. In addition, the Quality Planning website (http://www.qualityplanning.org.nz 
accessed on June 12, 2014) also provides important information for resource management 
practitioners. This section includes three criteria: (7) public review of EIA reports, (8) requirements 
for hazard and vulnerability assessment, and (9) compliance monitoring of resource consents.  
Public review of the EIA reports  
As reported in Chapter 4, there are three possible routes that a consent application can follow after 
it has been lodged with a relevant consent authority, namely: public notification, limited notification 
and non-notification. As per section 95A of the RMA, “…a consent authority may, in its discretion, 
decide whether to publicly notify an application for a resource consent for an activity”. However, the 
consent authority must publicly notify an application if “…the activity will have or is likely to have 
adverse effects on the environment that are more than minor”; or “the applicant requests public 
notification of the application”; or “a rule or national environmental standard requires public 
notification of the application” (RMA, 1991, s.95A (2)). Further, section 95B requires the consent 
authority to notify the application to any affected person in situations where public notification is not 
considered necessary (e.g., where a neighbour might be affected by shade from a proposed new 
shed). Explaining the opportunities given for the public to review EIA reports, the first EIA expert 
stated: 
Formally, the people can get involved in the process through the formal 
submission under the Act, which is that when an application is notified. 
Then they have an opportunity to put up their submissions.  
According to the regional planner, the notification decision is made based on the criteria given in the 
RMA, which is “…again a judgement call”. The regional planner argued that the notification decision, 
therefore, has to be made by people who are competent to make it. The planner stated “It is done in 
the regional council, usually by the senior staff”. However, the EC Judge stated that if an application 
is not publicly notified, provisions are limited to appeal against such decisions. The Judge further 
added, “You can only challenge the decision of notified or not notified in the High Court [in a process] 
called a judicial review. You cannot challenge a notification decision in the Environment Court. It is a 
weakness of the Act”.  
According to the conservation planner, most often it is organized community groups who afford to 
review and comment on EIA reports. The conservation planner further stated:  
In New Zealand, it [public review] relies a lot on environmental groups or 
community groups. Organized groups. There are a lot of such groups. We 
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have some bigger ones like Forest and Bird, ECO [Environment and 
Conservation Organisations of New Zealand]. Then every community has its 
own little groups. So, quite often the duties for those groups, who are the 
motivated individuals, try to deal with these things. 
The hearing commissioner, however, argued most of the public submissions are not based on 
genuine reasons and do not have a proper base. The commissioner further stated:  
…most of the submissions that the public bring through are opposed to 
development. Most of the reasons why they are opposed to it are it is a 
change. That is the starting point and now they look for reasons. Climate 
change, or tsunami or something. So it is retrofitting if you like, rather than 
principal concern.  
Accessibility of the documents is a fundamental requirement for the success of public review of an 
EIA report. According to the regional planner “The public can request …copies of AEE [EIA report] to 
be viewed”. Sub section 35(5) of the RMA requires local authorities to make consent applications 
available in the local authority and, as per section 10(1) of the Local Government Official Information 
and Meetings Act 1987, any person can request a local authority to release such information. The 
RMA does not specify how and where an EIA report of a consent application should be made 
available for the public to view. However, under Schedule 1, Forms 12 of the Resource Management 
(Forms, Fees, and Procedures) Regulations 2003, the consent authority is required to include in a 
public notice of a resource consent application where the application (including the EIA report) can 
be inspected by the public. In addition, as a practice, EIA reports of larger projects are usually made 
available online at the consent authority’s website. These provisions will be further reported in 
subsequent sections.  
A separate clause on disaster risk in the ToR 
The specific term ‘ToR’ (Terms of Reference) is not used in the RMA. According to the regional 
planner, “It is the scope of the AEE [EIA report]” in the RMA context, hence, clauses 1 and 2 of 
Schedule 4 can be considered as a general ToR. The MfE (2006) guidance note on preparing an EIA 
report advises applicants not to use this as a blue print for their EIA reports but to use it as a guide. 
As noted under criterion 1, clause 2(f) requires that “…any risk to the neighbourhood, the wider 
community, or the environment through natural hazards…” must be addressed by an EIA report. 
According to the regional planner interviewed, natural hazard risk should be considered in the 
scoping process.  
According to local council planners interviewed, the RMA process makes applicants think seriously 
about their development proposal. This is also emphasised in the MfE guidelines. The guideline says 
“An AEE [EIA report] should be seen as part of the process of shaping your proposal” (MfE, 2006, p. 
8). Nevertheless, some planners who demand more clarity in guidance on EIA processes argued that 
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gaps in assessments can result through deficiencies of the scoping process. The first EIA expert 
argued: 
The Fourth Schedule really does not give them [practitioners] any firm 
guidance on how to go from the big picture down to specific issues. So I 
think that's where we lack real assistance from the legislature, from the 
statutory procedures. 
Setting up the scope of an EIA report is the responsibility of the applicant and, according to the RMA, 
the applicant may consult regional or district council staff in this process. The regional planner, 
explaining the responsibility of scoping an EIA report, stated: 
It is the developer’s job. If they choose to come to us. They do not have to. 
But if anybody asks me should they? I would say for anything with a decent 
size absolutely they should. But if they have a very competent team of 
professionals, there is no reason why they have to come to us.  
Therefore, the scope of an EIA report does not require consent from a relevant local authority and is 
not subjected to an independent or a public review before the full assessment is started. The 
development planner argued that most EIA reports fall short of the required quality because of poor 
emphasis given to the scoping process. Explaining the gaps in the EIA process, the planner added: 
… [in an EIA report] first all you have to do is an assessment of what the 
place is like. So describe the environment and that's people, …everything. 
Then you need to understand very clearly what the changes are going to be. 
This is where people fall out. Then you need to say what is the implication of 
change and we missed that step. It does not matter [the level of 
implications]. Is it catastrophic, is it quite serious and then what can you do 
about it. Then … you have to make a judgement call as to what is the right 
response. That is the spirit of the process.  
According to the first social scientist, the implication of change could be a social effect, which is 
mostly being left out. The social scientist argued that Social Impact Assessments (SIAs) are not being 
done in most cases and, therefore, vulnerability is also not being addressed. According to the social 
scientist, social effects are not scoped adequately in the early stages of the EIA process.  
Therefore, a deficiency in scoping can lead to poor and inadequate EIA reports. As the scope of the 
EIA report is not subjected to any reviews, the public have to wait until the formal public notification 
stage to see whether the whole spectrum of effects has been covered in the EIA report, including 
social effects. However, according to the hearing commissioner “Unless, the application is publicly 
notified then nobody gets to look at the AEE [EIA report] except the consent authority”. The 
interviewed local council planners argued that the review of adequacy of the EIA report by council 
staff should lead to the identification of any deficiencies in the EIA report. Nevertheless, the 
commissioner argued, “But it [inadequacy] is not a ground for refusing a consent. Inadequacy in the 
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AEE [EIA report] may lead to the exercise of discretion because the effects have not been adequately 
addressed…”. In addition, according to the experts, most resource consent officers are trained in 
biophysical sciences and not in social aspects.   
According to the first social scientist, “Normally the understanding that a social report is needed and 
could come from a number of different sources. It usually comes from, for instance, the legal team or 
planning team who are advising [the developer] on what kind of assessment is required”. When 
these concerns were put to the first EIA expert, he responded that some legal teams who work on 
behalf of developers do not have an interest in a full spectrum of effects as they try to obtain the 
consent with minimum effort. The expert added: 
… [The social scientists] are really concerned about how communities relate 
to issues, how they see the proposed project, how they view potential 
consequences and so on. So that's what they feed back into the decision-
making process, but they are not always asked for that input. So the big 
problem about SIA in relation to development is whether the project 
manager is going to scope the assessment in a way that will allow for SIA, 
or health impact assessment or cultural impact assessment. All the softer 
areas that traditional impact assessment in this country tended to not 
include. So a lot of those decisions are really down to one or two critical 
people and the consultants who are hired by the developers or the 
environmental lawyer who works for the developer on how to get their 
project through the RMA with the least fuss. They will influence the studies 
that they carried out and set boundaries on the assessments.  
The expert further added:  
… a good example [is]… Meridian Energy … was pushing a project called 
Project AQUA on the Waitaki River. …the AEE [EIA report] for that project 
initially did not look at social impacts and it did not look at health impacts. 
But both of those areas became very important the longer the project was 
being discussed and proposed and so on. At the end they had to commission 
a SIA to plug the gaps in the original AEE [EIA report]. They were on the 
verge of commissioning a health impact assessment because the district 
health board was really concerned about the health issues. When I 
questioned the consultants [Boffa Miskell] who managed that process for 
Meridian….  They …said well we did originally propose that to Meridian, but 
their environmental management lawyer said …do not do that, just do what 
is required, required by the RMA. Clearly, social impacts were important, 
but do not have any institutional sort of recognition and the same for health 
impact assessment at that time. So, those were left out.  
The experts argued that the scope of EIA reports is influenced by a few strong personnel in 
companies or the consultants hired by them. One expert stated, “[The entire process] depends on 
how they see it”. Therefore, most experts are concerned about the scoping process in New Zealand. 
As reported in the Chapter 2, inadequacy of the scoping process has already been raised by some 
scholars. However, none has identified the importance of a more streamlined process that leads to 
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consensus building on the scope of an EIA report. The experts interviewed for this study argued for 
integration of disaster risk into impact assessment, thinking that disaster risk would be assessed as a 
part of impact assessment. More empirical evidence on this issue will be reported in section 6.4.1.  
Compliance monitoring  
A workable definition for compliance monitoring under the RMA context is available in the 
‘Handbook of Environmental Law’ (Harris, 2004). According to Harris (2004, p. 94), “…compliance 
monitoring involves monitoring the compliance of resource users with permitted activities, standards 
and conditions placed on resource consents”. He further states, “…review and monitoring conditions 
are routinely placed on a consent” (Harris, 2004, P. 94). Sub section 35(2) of the RMA lists the 
monitoring function of a local authority as “…every local authority shall monitor… (d) the exercise of 
the resource consents that have effect in its region or district...”. Lynch (1997, p. 60) in her 
evaluation of monitoring under the RMA, states “Section 35(2) is very broad leaving much open to 
different interpretations”. ‘The monitoring guide’ of the Ministry for the Environment, gives a more 
detailed explanation about section 35(2): 
The monitoring of resource consents has two components. Firstly, 
compliance monitoring checks that the consent holder is meeting the 
stipulated conditions and regulations. Secondly, impact monitoring checks 
that the environmental effects of the activity are as predicted in the 
application (MfE, 1996, p. 20). 
Under section 36, a local authority may fix charges payable by holders of resource consents to enable 
the local authority to carry out of its functions in relation to monitoring and supervision of resource 
consents. However, Harris (2004, p. 94) reports:  
The amount of effort varies between local authorities and the variation is 
(1) a product of the philosophy of the consent authority and whether they 
place conditions on the consent, (2) the type of the consent, (3) the local 
importance given to the resource, (4) whether consent holders are charged 
for monitoring, and (5) budget priorities of the council. 
Even if the project is nationally significant and the EPA is involved in the initial stages, monitoring is 
left for local councils. The EPA planner added: 
… the decision on nationally significant proposals once it is made is given 
back to the council. The EPA does not have a monitoring or compliance role. 
If we look at the Transmission Gully Project, for example, once the decision 
on that has been made the consent was sent back to the relevant district 
councils as well as regional councils. The obligation for monitoring and 
compliance with those conditions now rests with those councils. 
So, the RMA leaves the responsibility for monitoring mainly at the local authority level. Schedule 4, 
however, does not clearly demarcate the responsibility of monitoring between the consent authority 
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and the applicant. Instead, Schedule 4 states that the applicant should include in his/her consent 
application a description of how, once the proposal is approved, effects will be monitored and by 
whom, where the scale or significance of the activity’s effects are such that monitoring is required. 
Therefore, the current EIA process requires developers to think about their monitoring plan before a 
consent application is lodged. This could lead to incorporating the monitoring plan as part of the 
consent approval. The regional planner explained:  
If you are the developer and you come to me and say I want to do this 
development and you want to put some storm water into the river and 
storm water is very clean. Then the question I have for you is how do you 
know that it is clean? How will you confirm afterwards that it is clean? You 
will say I will test it 10 times per year [and] two of those events will be when 
flooding, and the other eight might be every month…, that goes in as a 
condition into your consent. That does not stop you doing more but you 
can’t do less. It also does not stop us coming and checking or duplicating 
what you do by looking over your shoulder.  
The regional planner also stated it is the responsibility of both the council and developer to monitor 
resource consents, but the planner put more weight on the developer. The planner further stated:  
[For] any monitoring after the consent is granted, the first responsibility is 
on the developer. So they should make sure that the dam is built to the right 
height, size and all done properly, but if they violate that, the regional 
council should also be out there either to make sure the developer does 
proper monitoring or doing independent monitoring. But there is a move 
towards putting more of that ownership on the developer, on the use of the 
resource.  
Some larger developers also believe that monitoring is a responsibility of the developer and they 
welcome the responsibility that they are given to monitor project impacts. The development planner 
stated: 
…I want to know it [monitoring] was done properly. So I would not be 
comfortable if someone else is doing that. … it is our responsibility to do it 
properly. The government, the council has a responsibility to regulate that I 
do it properly. Not to manage it. 
The views of small and medium size developers are not available in this research, since they were not 
selected as a sample group for the study.   
Summary  
According to the findings, criterion 7 is ‘fully’ met. There are adequate measures in place for public 
review of the EIA report. However, public notification is a decision of the consent authority, which 
can be challenged only in the High Court. Criterion 8 is met to a ‘limited’ extent in the New Zealand 
EIA process because of a lack of explicit requirements in the RMA to consider disaster risk in the 
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scoping process. Setting up the ToR is a function of the developer. There is no mechanism available 
for public review of the ToR or for subjecting the ToR to an independent review. Criterion 9 is 
‘mostly’ met. Guidance on compliance monitoring is explicitly provided. Both local authorities and 
developers are legally required to monitor project impacts. Table 6.4 summarises the criteria findings 
for guidance for the EIA process in New Zealand. 
Table 6.4 A summary of the criteria findings for EIA guidance  
Criteria Evaluation Justifications 
(7) EIA reports are 
subjected to public 
review. 
Fully 
The public can review and make submission on notified applications. 
The public notification decision is taken by the consent authority, 
which can be challenged only in the High Court.  
(8) ToR for the EIAs 
carries specific 
requirements regarding 
hazard assessment and 
vulnerability assessment. 
Limited 
Setting up the ToR for the EIA report is the responsibility of the 
applicant. There is no mechanism for public review or independent 
review of the ToR. Social issues, especially vulnerability assessments 
are not conducted in any of the reviewed projects, which suggests 
that such requirements are not included in the ToR.  
(9) Guidance is available 
to support compliance 
monitoring taking place 
and it is being 
implemented. 
Mostly 
The RMA explicitly requires local authorities to conduct compliance 
monitoring. In addition, Schedule 4 implicitly requires developers to 
conduct monitoring. In practice, both the interviewed developer and 
consent authorities conduct compliance monitoring.    
 
6.4 Substantive effectiveness 
As reported in Chapter 2, the substantive effectiveness of an EIA process is considered as the least 
explored area in effectiveness research. This section covers the level of assessment and decision-
making of the EIA process.   
6.4.1 Level of Assessment  
As stated in section 5.4.1, the technical soundness of screening, scoping and impact identification is a 
key element of an effective EIA process. This section reports on criteria (10) screening of actions for 
disaster risks, and (11) whether hazard and vulnerability assessments are conducted as a part of 
impact identification.  
Attention to disaster risk in screening of project proposal 
As reported in Chapter 4, section 87A of the RMA lists six classes of activities: permitted, controlled, 
discretionary, non-complying, restricted discretionary and prohibited. Regional and district plans 
follow the above classification in categorizing potential development activities in their areas. These 
consent classes also influence the content of EIA reports required to be submitted with consent 
applications. According to the MfE (2006, p. 5): 
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Knowing the status of an activity and the type of the consent required is a 
critical step in determining the effects of an activity and, therefore, the basis 
of the AEE. The activity’s status should give you an indication of what needs 
to go into the AEE: 
 controlled or restricted discretionary applications – by stating the 
area of discretion, the council’s plan also states the effects it is 
concerned about. Your AEE need only address these effects 
 discretionary or non-complying activities – for these activities, your 
AEE may need to be more substantial. This is because all your 
activity’s environmental effects (not just those stated in the plan) 
determine the degree of impact, and hence the comprehensiveness 
of your AEE.  
Consent applications are required to be screened based on the consent classes. Therefore, the 
responsibility of screening of development activities rests with the project proponent or consent 
applicant. According to the first EIA expert:  
That screening is entirely based on how the planning authority views 
different types of development. So in the district plan they will set their rules 
as to what is not to be allowed at all, what is to be permitted as of right. 
Then between those two extremes are discretionary, and controlled and 
non-complying. So it is really done on activity type. 
According to the EIA Guide, these classes are generally ranked according to the expected effects they 
might have on the environment (MfE, 1999), but “…it is known that variation does exist between the 
approaches of different regions” (Nixon & Peterson, 2011, p. 6). The first EIA expert contested MfE’s 
claim that activity classes are based on the effects they have on the environment. The expert argued: 
It [classes of activities] is supposed to be based on some sort of effects 
analysis that goes into developing the plan. But experience suggests... that 
the effects based plans are still to be seen. They are not coming through 
very strongly at the moment. So you are not really getting a sense of 
consent process and the categorisation of development types is itself being 
informed by the ideas of, “we need to control both the social impacts and 
the risk area”. It seems to be still sort of old-fashioned town and country 
planning thinking. Residential v industrial, rural v urban so on. So I do not 
think it got very sophisticated. So, I think the question is whether the people 
should be looking at the social impacts of their activity or whatever. If it is 
non-complying then they should be looking at the full range of potential 
impacts. …I think there we lack skills, guidance, awareness and so on.  
In a recent study, GNS Science claimed that district plans and regional policy statements have very 
low or no information on systematic risk assessments within their plans (Saunders et al., 2014). In 
that study, GNS Science reviewed the policy statements and plans of 11 regional councils and 67 
territorial authorities to assess the provisions of such policies and plans for natural hazard 
management. The study found that only 4.3 percent of the district plans and none of the regional 
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policy statements have systematic risk assessments to be conducted (Saunders et al., 2014, p. 21). 
The first EIA expert further argued that unless regional councils make deliberate attempts to identify 
potential disaster risks of development activities and take the necessary steps to include those into 
regional and districts plans, disaster risks will not be reflected in the screening process. The EIA 
expert further stated:  
… for instance the development induced risk issues may not be considered 
unless they come in under other procedures with the regional council 
classifying lands as flood prone, and that somehow is then transmitted into 
the district plan. So I think a lot of those issues depend on the higher order 
planning and policy type mechanisms. I am not sure the current status of 
impact assessment in this country is consistently rigorous enough to pick up 
on those issues.  
Hazard and vulnerability assessment in impact identification 
As per the conceptual model used in this research, conducting a systematic hazard and vulnerability 
assessment is fundamental in assessing the disaster risk of development proposals. This section 
reports the use of such assessments in impact identification in New Zealand and the adequacy of 
current practice.  
Under clause 2, Schedule 4, an EIA report must address the effects on different aspects of the 
environment and therefore a number of assessments are warranted. These can include risk 
assessment, social impact assessment (SIA), economic impact assessment, cultural impact 
assessment, health impact assessment (HIA) and even recreational impact assessment. Some experts 
argue that an EIA report is a combination of all these assessments including cumulative impacts. The 
regional planner stated: 
I heard over the years that we should have cumulative impact assessment, 
SIA, risk assessment and all these different assessments. …EIA covers all of 
them. We make it very complicated for ourselves if we start to have 
different branches coming off. There is no reason why EIA cannot have a 
social impact section and a disaster impact section. Ultimately, when you 
are thinking every environmental impact is really also a social impact.  
The Environment Court, in Clifford Bay Marine Farms Ltd v Marlborough DC (2003), outlined the 
approach to assessing risk. The Court held that each potential effect raised in the evidence should be 
assessed qualitatively (or preferably quantitatively) in the light of the principles of the RMA, and the 
objectives and policies of the relevant instruments (e.g., relevant plans) as to: (a) probability of 
occurrence; and (b) force of impact. The Court also suggested a five-step process to assess risk:   
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1) Identify the risks - All the relevant risks caused by a proposed 
activity must be identified. Relevance is determined by reference to 
the principles, objectives and policies. 
2) Identify the consequences - For each relevant adverse effect this 
may require estimation of the impact or magnitude of the effect 
and this needs to be assessed in the context of: 
 the spatial scale of the impact; 
 the temporal scale of the impact (how long it will take to show 
and how long it will last); 
 any other relevant 'dimension'. 
3) Estimate the probability of harm - Simply because an effect on the 
environment occurs, this does not mean it will be adverse. That 
depends on the sensitivity of the species or resources being 
affected, and on the amount and duration of the exposure to the 
activity causing the effect. This step is very likely to involve a value 
judgement by the deciding authority.  
4) Evaluate the significance of a risk - This also involves a value 
judgement under the objectives and policies of the relevant plans 
(and under Part II of the Act). If a risk is adverse then the steps (and 
their costs) which can be taken to avoid, remedy or mitigate the 
adverse effects must be analysed. Such an evaluation may also need 
to consider the existing environment. 
5) A comparative risk assessment - All the relevant risks will then be 
assessed in relation to each other. All these evaluations then 
become part of the Court's overall weighing of the evidence (Clifford 
Bay Marine Farms Ltd v Marlborough DC C131/2003, pp. 30-31).  
Step 3 above discusses the sensitivity of the potentially affected species and resources. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, the sensitivity of the receiving environment is closely associated with vulnerability. So, 
the above steps are consistent with the disaster risk assessment framework (i.e., R = H x V) used in 
this research. However, the specific mention of species and resources appears to support the 
experts’ views reported earlier in this chapter (section 6.3.2) that the emphasis is on the biophysical 
and natural rather than the human and social.  
The remainder of this section investigates the risk assessment approach of the seven reviewed 
projects with special consideration of the Transmission Gully Project (TGP) and the Waitohi Irrigation 
and Hydro Scheme (WIHS) in light of the above approach and the disaster risk assessment framework 
proposed for this research. Detailed hazard assessments have been conducted for all seven projects 
studied, including the TGP and the WIHS. However, none of the seven projects has a vulnerability 
assessment within the context of the EIAs despite the fact that all projects are considered to have 
substantial hazard risk on affected groups. For instance, though firmly emphasizing the likelihood of 
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a dam breach is very minimal (Rivett et al., 2012), an engineering study was done for WIHS to 
identify the risk in a possible dam breach event. That study states: “The project area is located in a 
tectonically very active zone on the east side of the Alpine Fault which forms the convergent 
boundary between the Australian (west) and Pacific (east) tectonic plates” (Rivett et al., 2012, p. 12). 
Appendix B of the Engineering Report for the WIHS is dedicated to a dam break assessment. 
According to Morgan & Memon’s (1993) definitions reported in Chapter 2, this is a risk assessment. 
Appendix B identified that of four proposed dams in the scheme, risk associated with a possible dam 
break exists only for the Hurricane Gully dam. According to the report, the Hurricane Gulley reservoir 
holds approximately 95 percent of the total storage of the proposed scheme (Rivett et al., 2012). The 
report describes the dam and reservoir characteristics as:  
The proposed dam is 105 m in height with a top crest level at RL [Reduced 
Level] 505 m and a proposed normal operating level of RL 500 m. At normal 
operating level the total reservoir storage volume has been calculated to be 
232 Mm³ based on topographical data. The base width of the dam is 
restricted by the narrowness of the valley topography with the river having 
formed a gorge within the valley (Rivett et al., 2012, p. B-2). 
According to the report, the distance between the Hurricane Gully dam and the Hurunui river mouth 
is 82 km. The report further describes the risk of possible dam breach as: 
The flood inundation map indicates that extensive lengths of road would be 
inundated, including several bridges. This includes both the SH1 [State 
Highway] and SH7 bridges along with the main north railway line. No major 
settlements are located downstream of the dam, and only scattered rural 
dwellings and farm buildings are likely to be affected. Two minor 
settlements are indicated on the map: Hurunui consists of several buildings, 
and Hurunui Mouth has a cluster of holiday dwellings adjacent to the coast. 
Severe environmental damage would also be expected throughout the 
length of the downstream river channel and floodplain areas due to the size 
of the flood wave and expected inundation areas (Rivett et al., 2012, p. B-
10).  
The assessment considered a normal sunny day dam breach, which the report considered as a worst-
case scenario. Based on the assessed damage level and population at risk due to a break in the 
Hurricane Gully dam, a possible event is categorized as a high potential impact event. The report 
says: 
The Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2008 [Explained under INDICATOR 
16] necessitates identification of the population at risk (PAR). The PAR is 
defined as those people affected by floodwater depths greater than 0.5 m. 
….The number of dwellings affected has been derived from aerial 
photography of the inundated areas (Google Earth) to ensure estimates are 
accurate. The maximum number of dwellings considered at risk from the 
dam break has been determined as 85. With an assumed average of 3 
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persons per dwelling the PAR will be approximately 255 (Rivett et al., 2012, 
p. B-10). 
As per the report, because of the nature of the downstream topography of the Hurricane Gully 
reservoir, water will move quickly and the whole length of 82 km (from the dam to the river mouth) 
will be covered in less than six hours. A risk assessment of this kind is important information for 
emergency management authorities.  
It is important to look at whether the findings of the risk assessment give any assistance to the 
emergency management authorities in a crisis. In this context, the report lacks detail about either 
the demographic details of the population or detailed assessment of the types of houses they live in 
(i.e., whether the houses are single storeyed, or multiple storeyed). Some houses in the flood path 
will be more vulnerable than others that are marginally away from highest flow. The occupants of 
some houses may have easier access to safe routes and safe locations than others. None of that 
information is available in the risk assessment conducted for WIHS, which is usually within the scope 
of a vulnerability study. As reported earlier, even though a cultural impact assessment has been done 
for the WIHS, a social impact assessment has not been done. The cultural impact assessment (Vial & 
Hill, 2012), available in the WIHS application is largely dominated by water rights and the customary 
rights of user groups. 
Medium and large dams in New Zealand should comply with the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 
2008 (see criterion 16). According to the above regulations, an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) should 
be prepared for such dams. The New Zealand Society on Large Dams (2000) provides guidelines for 
developing an EAP for larger dams. According to the guidelines, although the EAP requires an 
inundation map to be included, which is the hazard map for the area; it does not have any reference 
to vulnerability assessment (New Zealand Society on Large Dams, 2000).  
Similarly for the TGP, the EIA report identified that the project area is prone to different hazards 
(McGimpsey et al., 2011). In Technical Report No. 3 of the EIA report, which is a geotechnical 
engineering report, a detailed hazard assessment has been carried out and required measures have 
been proposed to protect the proposed highway from any possible natural hazards. According to 
that report, the project area is prone to primary hazards such as earthquakes and storms. The report 
further notes that such primary hazards have the potential to induce a number of secondary hazards 
within the project area, such as earth slips, liquefaction, rock falls, storm induced slope instability, 
debris flows, and flooding (Brabhaharan, 2011). The EIA report of the TGP summarises the findings of 
the geotechnical report and states:  
Debris flows have previously affected the existing SH1 near Paekakariki 
during major storm events. The most recent event was in October 2003, 
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which also caused debris flows in a number of tributary gullies on the 
western flank of Te Puka Stream valley. Debris flows remain a risk, 
particularly where there are colluvium deposits in the Te Puka and Horokiri 
Stream valleys. …Flood events with potential to cause damage to properties 
have been known to occur in the following flood plains: 
• Te Puka Stream and Wainui Stream; 
• Horokiri Stream; 
• Pauatahanui Stream and Lanes Flat; and 
• Kenepuru Stream (McGimpsey et al., 2011, p. 105). 
The geotechnical report raised concerns about potential earthquake induced landslides and stressed 
that those can be influenced further by the height and slope of cuttings formed for the TGP 
(Brabhaharan, 2011). Because of the anticipated high social impacts, the EIA report for TGP also 
included a social impact assessment (SIA) (Technical Report 17). However, the SIA for TGP did not 
investigate the vulnerability of the people in this environment and how their existing vulnerabilities 
would be reshaped by the new project. The SIA report was limited to noise and vibration 
(construction and operational phases); air quality (construction phase); traffic and access 
(construction phase); amenity (operational phase); recreation (construction and operational phase) 
and other socioeconomic issues (Ray & Crack, 2011), but disaster risk is neglected. There is no visible 
link between the hazard assessment and the SIA. This, therefore, does not fulfil the requirements of 
a vulnerability assessment as stated in Chapter 2. The first social scientist explaining the vulnerability 
assessments in SIA in New Zealand stated:  
We do not use specific vulnerability terms in New Zealand. If it is a good 
social impact assessment, that would consider those issues. It would 
consider how the particular sector of the population based on their income 
or other point of view [is] …vulnerable.  
This social scientist reported that they sometimes consult local authority officials to get an idea 
about the scope of the study but usually it is based on their own expertise and understanding of the 
context. However, the interviewed social scientists are confident that if a SIA is done for a project, 
vulnerability assessment can also be covered under the SIA. The first social scientist added:  
… if SIA is done properly then you will look at physical risk and then you will 
address vulnerability issues absolutely as part of social assessment. That 
would be a major contribution of SIA. We argue as well for integrated 
assessment approaches. So if you are building a road or hydro project or 
whatever, …you are integrating potential for physical risks… and if social is 
integrated into the assessment that is the point you will absolutely look at 
those vulnerability issues.  
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The above social scientist argued that conducting a SIA for every development project is very unlikely 
even though social effects are identified in initial scoping stages. SIAs have been done only in four of 
the seven projects (i.e., Basin Bridge Project, Ara Tūhono Pūhoi to Wellsford Road, Ruataniwha 
Water Storage Scheme, TGP). None of those has clear, explicit links to hazard assessments done in 
the EIA report. The social scientist further added:  
Obviously that [ignoring social effects] happens a lot. That comes back to 
the quality of the process. … checks and balances are important, through 
things like hearings or legal processes or abilities to appeal or whatever they 
might be.  
The regional planner argued that current checks in the system are sufficient to address issues such as 
vulnerability. According to the regional planner: “All those effects are real. There is no reason 
therefore why they can't or why they should not be considered, as part of the analysis of the 
hazard.” The planner added further that: “…if it [vulnerability] was not done, that is usually what 
comes out then when you start to have public meetings, and people pointed out for you to consider 
the impacts on average, but not on different social groups.” The hearing commissioner, supporting 
the concern of social scientists on an inadequate emphasis on SIA, argued some multinational 
corporations have their own SIA tools and they usually do rigorous SIAs in their proposals. The 
commissioner further stated:  
The other agency that does it [SIA] regularly is NZTA [New Zealand 
Transport Agency]. They look at social impacts of roads and motorways and 
they are generally done very badly. … if you go to the Fourth Schedule there 
is nothing in there. That is a strong trigger for SIA. The regional council is 
usually for major developments, a lead consenting agency and some of 
them are social impact oriented and some are not. For instance, Waikato 
Regional Council has had a head social scientist on the regional council 
forever. So they tend to put questions to the applicant involved during 
formal or informal screening.  
The commissioner further argued that some regional councils do not have social scientists or people 
oriented toward social impacts. So such councils do not tend to put more emphasis on social effects 
in the EIA process. The experts also argued that local councils are more inclined to assess biophysical 
effects over social issues. The first EIA expert added:   
…the regional councils tend to still focus on bio-physical, so anything that, in 
particular risk and hazard type things, they will tend to be looking more… at 
the bio-physical aspects, rather than really drilling down and looking at the 
social consequences, to any greater extent.  
As stated earlier, according to the regional planners, social issues can be raised even in the later 
stages of the EIA process when resource consent applications are notified. Local council planners also 
argued that consent authorities can request SIAs even at later stages under section 92, where they 
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are allowed to request further information. However, according to the first EIA expert: “That comes 
back to the quality of the staff in the council, how active they are, their knowledge to understand 
and readiness to listen to the local community”. The first social scientist, commenting on whether 
the public can ask for a SIA in later stage of the EIA process, stated: 
… if there is an opportunity for formal public involvement and if the public 
actually point out these issues, and that leads to the requirement. That's 
fine, it is good. Even at a later stage, but it is not perfect. …it is happening in 
this country. Social being brought in at a very late stage.  
Nevertheless, the hearing commissioner stated the above provisions are mostly used for technical 
issues rather than social issues. The commissioner added:  
… if the council is contesting it [consent application at a hearing] they will 
have evidence. The law provides we as commissioners can direct further 
inquiries of someone, …[to say] this is fine, but we do not understand this. 
This is a gap, please go and fill this gap. That provision is not often used. I 
am not familiar with it being used for SIA. It is mostly around technical 
issues.  
The commissioner further argued for better provisions in the regional and district plans to take care 
of social effects. As noted earlier, some experts believe that the public does not pay enough 
attention to local plans when they are notified, but the commissioner stated: 
...the plans can be more explicit about requiring it. So that can be an 
avenue. Plans are reviewed time to time, and that is an avenue for the 
public or professional organizations to put pressure on the regional councils 
to make the plans more explicit about taking account of social effects. That 
could be done.  
Summary  
The findings show that both criteria 10 and 11 are met to a ‘limited’ extent in New Zealand. Even 
though screening is based on consent classes in relevant policies and plans, those consent classes are 
not based on systematic risk assessment. In addition, even though hazard assessments are done in 
the EIA report, vulnerability assessment or disaster risk is not estimated. It was also revealed that 
social impacts are often left out in impact identification. Table 6.5 summarises the criteria findings 
for level of assessment.  
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Table 6.5 A summary of the criteria findings for level of assessment  
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(10) Screening of actions 
for disaster risks is taking 
place. 
Limited 
Screening is based on the classes of activities (i.e., permitted, 
controlled, discretionary, restricted discretionary, non-complying, 
prohibited). The findings suggest that the above classes of activities 
are not based on systematic risk assessments.   
(11) Hazard and 
vulnerability 
assessments are 
conducted as a part of 
impact identification. 
Limited 
Hazard assessments are done in detail. Social impacts are left out in 
most cases. Therefore, vulnerability is not assessed in such cases. 
Social impact assessments are also disconnected from hazard 
assessments in the reviewed projects.   
 
6.4.2 Decision making  
The role of the EIA process in consent decisions and the role of EIA findings in project planning are 
important to any effectiveness research; those two aspects demonstrate the actual influence of the 
EIA process on development decision making. This section reports on criteria (12) to what extent 
project approval depends on the findings of the EIA process, and (13) the extent to which decision 
makers rely on the EIA process during project planning (see Table 3.1).  
The influence of EIA in project approval  
There was a difference among planners and experts about how they perceive the EIA in terms of its 
influence on project approval. Planners and most experts considered the influence of the whole EIA 
process, including submissions and further information requests, on the project approval. In contrast, 
the hearing commissioner and the EC judge limited their views to the EIA report. In this study, the 
whole EIA process is considered, with special attention to the EIA report.  
It is evident that the influence of the EIA report on consent approval varies based on the decision 
pathway that the consent application takes in the decision making process and the decision making 
authority. As reported in Chapter 4, the decision related to a resource consent could be the decision 
of the relevant council, hearing committee or the Environment Court. The hearing commissioner, 
describing the influence of EIA (i.e., EIA report) on the final decision, stated “Almost none”. However, 
the commissioner further added, “…small proposals are considered entirely by the staff of the 
regional councils or district councils. They rely on the EIA [report] totally. That is all the information 
they get. If the EIA [report] is not sufficient they can go back and request further information”.   
Most other experts and planners claimed that the EIA process has the highest level of influence on 
the decision. The first EIA expert stated: “I would say under the RMA it is the only influence. There 
are obviously other influences, e.g., financial matters. But you have to have the consent”. According 
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to the regional planner, in addition to the EIA report, more sources of information are also 
considered in the decision-making process. The planner added:  
…three sources of information [are used] if it [consent application] goes to a 
hearing and two sources if it is not notified. If it is not notified there is an 
officer report done, which means council staff prepare a report, which may 
or may not rely on the EIA. …if you go to a hearing you have that report 
[officer report], and the EIA and also the public submissions. They again can 
comment on the EIA whether they agree or not, also on the officer’s report, 
whether that's a good report or not.  
The EC judge, in explaining the influence of EIA reports on consent decisions, stated that the EIA 
report, “…has an influence but it is not critical”. The judge further added: 
When it comes to the actual hearing, the consent authority or decision 
maker is actually required to first of all to look at other things like objectives 
or policies and rules of relevant statutory plans and give weight to those 
and ultimately to the matters in Part 2 of the Act, … those are actually the 
determining factors. Ultimately, will this achieve the purpose of the Act? 
Now the AEE [EIA report] will assist the formulation of judgement. But what 
often happens is, if there are inadequacies in the AEE as prepared by the 
applicant, and those are picked up by the submitters then the applicant 
tends to address those in the course of presenting their case to the consent 
authority.  
The hearing commissioner, describing the status of the regional and district plans, stated: “The plan 
has got a very high legal status”. The commissioner further argued: “In New Zealand, risk matters 
come out of both the plans and policy making not just through the AEE [EIA report]. The AEE is just 
one element of the assessment of effects overall”. The commissioner added: 
…the regional plans or policy statements have got a great deal of influence 
on the decisions. [For instance], in Otago, the regional plan has a good 
section on natural hazards. That is flooding, landslides. …but it also provides 
as one of its rules that if the person wanting to do a development 
understands the risk of the hazards and can mitigate against it, then they 
can undertake the activity in a hazardous area. So, as a decision maker we 
have to put weight on that...   
Explaining the on-ground reality of planning and resource consenting processes the EC judge argued: 
…of course the resource consent process is …ideally coming after the 
planning process rather than before. It is the plans that should dictate what 
activities required consents, or what kind of consents should be or so forth. 
But …in a lot of our planning, planning is catching up. The resource consent 
process just carries on, whether the plans are adequate or not. Starting to 
get around the other way [only] now [plans coming before applications for 
development]… 
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The first EIA expert stated that the EIA report “…does not have any status at all in the Environment 
Court”. The Environment Court in Transit New Zealand v Auckland Regional Council ([2000] NZEnvC 
285) held that the Court is better assisted by direct evidence (that can be tested by cross-
examination) of any such effects, than it could by derivative evidence based on what it is claimed 
should have been, but was not, contained in a document prepared often some time before. The EC 
judge added:  
The Environment Court is required to have regard to the hearing 
commissioner’s decisions. The commissioner’s decision will address the AEE 
[EIA report]. There is case law saying you cannot challenge the AEE [EIA 
report] in an appealing process because you can only challenge the 
submission to the local authority. But that does not stop the Court from 
addressing issues that might arise out of the AEE [EIA report].  
The first EIA expert stated “Yes, there is an influence [of the EIA report], but it was sort of quite 
different person to person as to the degree and nature of that influence”. Using psychosocial 
methods, Schijf (2003, pp. 291,292) investigated the influence of environmental effects information 
on resource consent decision-making in New Zealand and stated: “…results demonstrated vividly that 
the EIA information features in the mental maps that decision-makers construct of the decision that 
they need to make”. However, the influence of an EIA report on the consent decision is diminished 
by the increased amount of information the decision makers get from other sources during the EIA 
process that expose inadequacies of poorly done EIA reports (Schijf, 2003).  
Influence of EIA on project planning  
Most planners and experts interviewed are confident that the EIA report findings are used in project 
designs. According to them, the EIA process is articulated in a way that the EIA report influences the 
shape or design of a development activity. Developers also believe in the use of the EIA report to 
shape investment plans. The development planner argued: 
If you are smart, you down play those problems [environmental issues 
identified in the EIA report] yourself. … so then you refine [the proposal] as 
you go. Use information in making the decisions. …If you do not, you are just 
making it more difficult for you in succeeding with your proposal.  
Planners argued that consent decisions usually have conditions attached that are intended to require 
actions that mitigate potential negative environmental effects. The regional planner stated: 
If they [developers] do an EIA, that puts out that “we are going to do a 
subdivision” or “we are going to build a dam”, these are all the impacts and 
this is how we are going to mitigate those, then get the consent. Now all the 
things that they put in the EIA ideally should translate into conditions on the 
consent. So yes, you can build a dam but it can't be any wider than this, 
higher than that and it must be built to certain strength [etc.].  
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According to the planner, even though the conditions are not in place that is not an excuse for 
developers not to adhere to required measures to curtail the effects of the development activity. The 
regional planner argued, “If some of those conditions do not capture something in the EIA, under 
New Zealand law they are still required to do it”. However, the above is more relevant to physical 
design changes or biophysical effects management. There seems to be less attention to social 
impacts and using the findings of an EIA report to manage social effects. Emphasizing the inadequacy 
of social impact management in New Zealand, the first social scientist stated: 
There is increasing awareness of areas of EIA follow up and monitoring. In 
New Zealand, it is entirely dependent on the decision. So the decision could 
be the commissioner’s decision, the council decision or Environmental Court 
decision. Increasingly, you see attention paid to the conditions that are put 
on the consent. So the conditions that are put on the consent might be on 
reducing risk or whatever from some sort of physical disaster and those 
conditions now increasingly are tied up to environmental management 
plans, formal environmental management plans. We see some request for 
social impact management plans. … [this is a] quite philosophical 
recognition that the decision is only part of the processes. …and that for it 
to really be an effective decision then you have to have conditions and you 
have to have environmental management plans. [However] We are not 
really taking the lead on social impact management plans…  
Summary  
The findings show that criterion 12 is ‘mostly’ met in New Zealand. Even though the influence of the 
EIA report on project approval varies based on the decision pathway and the quality of information in 
the report, eventually, project approvals are based on the findings of the EIA process. However, 
consent authorities are required to disregard any adverse effect of the activity if a national 
environmental standard or the plan permits an activity with that effect. Criterion 13 is fully met. The 
EIA process has been designed in a way that EIA findings eventually shape project design. Table 6.6 
summarises the criteria findings for decision-making in the EIA process. 
Table 6.6 A summary of the criteria findings for decision making  
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(12) Findings of the 
EIA influence the 
final decision. 
Mostly 
The influence of the EIA report on final consent depends on the decision 
pathway that a consent application takes. Local councils primarily rely 
on the EIA report. When notified, public submissions and an officer’s 
report are also considered in making final decision. At the 
Environmental Court, the EIA report has quite a low profile. In addition, 
when considering the full EIA process, decisions are based on the EIA 
process. However, provisions of the national environmental standards 
and plans are superior to the EIA findings.  
(13) Planners use the 
EIA report as a 
reference document 
in project planning. 
Fully 
The findings of the EIA process are translated into conditions of the 
resource consents. Many believe that the EIA process influences the 
shape of the development activity.  
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6.5 Contextual effectiveness 
Like the Sri Lankan case, the importance of strong domestic governance arrangements for an 
effective EIA process is emphasized by most of the experts and planners interviewed in New Zealand. 
This section reports public participation in the EIA process, the influence of legal provisions given by 
other Acts, transparency and accountability aspects of the EIA process, political will and coordination 
of line agencies on the effectiveness of the EIA process to incorporate disaster risk.  
6.5.1 Consultation and public participation 
As reported in the Literature Review, consultation and public participation are essential ingredients 
of an effective EIA process. This section reports on criteria (14) the perceived level of consultation 
and public participation in the EIA process and (15) to what extent the developers respond to public 
submissions.  
Consultation and public participation in the EIA process 
The RMA does not define the term ‘consultation’. However, consultation has been defined by the 
Court of Appeal in the judgement on Wellington International Airport Ltd v Air New Zealand in 1992. 
According to the judgement, “Consulting involves the statement of a proposal not yet finally decided 
upon, listening to what others have to say, considering their responses and then deciding what will 
be done”. The Court of Appeal further states: 
Implicit in the concept is a requirement that the party consulted will be (or 
will be made) adequately informed so as to be able to make intelligent and 
useful responses. It is also implicit that the party obliged to consult, while 
quite entitled to have a working plan already in mind, must keep its mind 
open and be ready to change and even start afresh. Beyond that, there are 
no universal requirements as to form. Any manner of oral or written 
interchange which allows adequate expression and consideration of views 
will suffice. Nor is there any universal requirement as to duration. In some 
situations adequate consultation could take place in one telephone call. In 
other contexts it might require years of formal meetings. Generalities are 
not helpful (Wellington International Airport Ltd v Air New Zealand [1993] 1 
NZLR 671). 
Based on the above definition, consultation occurs before producing an EIA report and during public 
review of the EIA report. The first social scientist describing the opportunities available for the public 
to participate in the EIA process stated that other than the formal submissions when a resource 
consent is notified:  
…there is also guidance in the Act to say that in undertaking of primary 
resource consents and even for council preparing a plan that they should 
undertake consultations for the interest of affected parties. So there is clear 
guidance. The process requires consultation.  
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Under section 36A of the RMA, neither the applicant nor local authority has a duty to consult any 
person about a consent application. However, according to clause 6(3) of Schedule 4, an applicant is 
obliged to report as to the persons identified as being affected by the proposal, but does not 
“…oblige the applicant to consult with any person” or “create any ground for expecting that the 
applicant will consult with any person”. Therefore, it is evident that there is no statutory requirement 
for an applicant to consult the public or affected parties before an application is lodged for resource 
consent. However, the MfE (1999) recommends consultation at early stages of the resource consent 
process and the Environment Court has commented that it is “…foolish for a party not to consult 
those with those with a known interest in a proposal...” (Watercare Services Ltd v Auckland Council 
[2011] NZ EnvC 155 at 33).  
Moreover, according to section 95E, persons who have given written approval to the activity saying 
they have no objections are not considered as affected persons by the consent authority. So the 
developers have a strong incentive to obtain written permission from potentially affected people, 
which requires some level of consultation and participation at the early stage of project planning.  
Provisions for public participation after a consent application is lodged with a relevant consent 
authority are clearly provided in the RMA. Section 95 of the RMA provides for public notification or 
limited notification of applications. As reported earlier, the RMA does not specify how and where the 
proposal or consent application with EIA report should be made available for the public to view, but 
the public must be notified about where it is available. This provides an opportunity for the public to 
get formally involved with development proposals and raise their concerns. Even though public 
notification is subject to the discretion of the consent authority, major developments with more than 
minor effects on the environment are legally required to be publicly notified. However, according to 
Barton & Shaw (1999, p. 15), “…consultation is not required under the RMA when a proposed project 
is a permitted activity in the relevant plan”. This is because public consultation as to what activities 
are “permitted” is required to be done during the plan-making process.  
Despite all the above provisions in the RMA and LGA 2002, public concern over a lack of adequate 
consultation can be witnessed even today. The recent public outcry against the proposed 
Ruataniwha dam in Central Hawke’s Bay is an example of such inadequacies in public consultation. 
On 8 August 2013 (during the writing of this thesis), Radio New Zealand reported, “Ngati Kahungunu 
Incorporation chairperson Ngahiwi Tomoana says his tribe did not have enough time to consider the 
council's proposal [the Ruataniwha dam]”. 
The proposed dam is a part of the Tukituki Catchment Proposal (EPA, n.d.) and will be located on the 
Makaroro River in Central Hawke’s Bay (Goodier, 2013). According to the dam break assessment:  
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The proposed dam is approximately 83 m high at the river’s deepest point, 
approximately 500 m long, and has a crest width of 8 m. The dam is 
proposed to be a Concrete Faced Rockfill Dam (CFRD), which consists of bulk 
coarse rockfill material, with a concrete face slab on the upstream side 
(Goodier, 2013, p. 5). 
The dam break assessment concludes the dam is in the high potential impact category (PIC) with 
more than 1000 people at risk in an event resulting from a dam breach. As reported in Chapter 4, 
according to the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2008, owners of dams with high PIC should 
prepare a Dam Safety Assurance Programme including an emergency action plan. The dam break 
assessment for the Ruataniwha dam recommends “…such a plan should ideally have a buffer zone 
and include any and all of the potentially affected properties, taking into account the existing 
potential flow paths” (Goodier, 2013, p. 35). A social impact assessment for the Ruataniwha dam 
does not go into details of the risk and vulnerability of the population but referred to the dam break 
analysis and says: 
While technically there is a low risk of failure, perceived risk can have a 
negative psychological effect on people living downstream and on the river 
flood plain, particularly in a seismically active region. Some people may 
continue to experience this “dread” risk, emphasizing the importance of 
providing ongoing, quality, lay information on technical components of the 
project (Taylor Baines and Associates, 2013, p. 31). 
Interestingly, the SIA appears more concerned about ‘dread’ risk as a psychosocial effect rather than 
addressing the vulnerability of the community. Radio New Zealand, on 30 July 2013, quoted a 
community member from Waipawa, who referred to the dam break analysis and said: “[She is] angry 
that Central Hawke's Bay District Council and Hawke's Bay Regional Council are not actively informing 
the public about the potential damage” in a possible dam break. The news article has also quoted a 
water resource engineer saying, “The report is a worst-case scenario. … [and] a breach would be 
highly unlikely if the dam is built, and if a breach were to happen there would be enough time to 
evacuate the town”. However, this controversy shows the public is yet to learn the project related 
risks of the Tukituki Catchment Proposal. Meanwhile, quoting a local leader, Gullery (2013, August 2) 
reported that the local community was prepared to oppose the project considering “…inadequate 
consultation, selective information release” and other aspects of the project.   
Like the early stages of the EIA process, consultation or public participation is not legally required in 
latter stages of the EIA process. The first social scientist, in explaining the opportunities for the public 
to participate in the monitoring processes of the EIA process, stated: 
It would depend on the conditions. I do not think there is anything 
mentioned in the legislation that says it should happen, but I have seen 
conditions …where there is a requirement for community inputs and the 
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council or the judge might say in finalizing the conditions there should be 
community inputs. There are monitoring or community liaison committees 
…for community inputs to that management planning stage.  
Incorporation of public comments  
The RMA has no provisions to guarantee that the views of the public obtained during a consultation 
process are integrated into the document or proposal concerned. However, most planners and 
experts interviewed argued that public submissions are considered in decision making and amending 
the project. According to the regional planner, genuine public interests are translated into conditions 
of the consent, making the relevant parties obliged to carry them out. The first EIA expert stated: “If 
there is an opportunity for formal public involvement and if the public actually point out these issues, 
and that leads to a requirement [condition in the consent]”. Further, according to the first social 
scientist, “People can contest the process itself and say there was not adequate consultation 
undertaken”.  
The hearing commissioner stated that even though public participation is ensured in the consent 
granting process (for notified consents), its influence is very limited in most cases in the EIA process. 
The commissioner stated: “In short, the public can knock on the door but normally the door is shut to 
them in terms of these particular issues”. Explaining his position the commissioner elaborated:  
… even if you know there are significant effects and a lot of the public 
opposed to it, if it is in the plan and provided for in the plan, so virtually our 
hands are tied, as decision makers we have to grant it. But we could put lots 
of conditions on it. …the public cannot question what is in the plan; they can 
question only what the developers put forward. If the developers have got 
any inconsistency with the plan, the public can challenge those. They can 
introduce marginal changes.   
According to the commissioner: 
The public do not pay lots of attention when the plan [regional and district] 
is being made. So, when a new development comes along, they may want to 
change the development, but actually the plan provides for it to go ahead. 
So they have got a very small chance of making an influence at all.  
Summary  
The findings show criteria 14 and 15 are ‘reasonably’ and ‘mostly’ met, respectively, in New Zealand. 
Even though it is recommended in the guidance notes and case law to involve the public in early 
stages of the EIA process, evidence for public participation in early stages is lacking. However, public 
submissions during the EIA report review process are given due recognition and considered together 
with other relevant information in decision-making. Table 6.7 summarises the criteria findings of 
public participation and consultation in the EIA process.  
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Table 6.7 A summary of the criteria findings for consultation and public participation  
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(14) Consultation and 
participation are 
taking place before 
and following EIA 
report publication 
Reasonably 
Public participation in early stages (i.e. screening, scoping, ToR setting) 
of the EIA process is not legally required.  However, the case law and 
guidance recommend the public participation in scoping. Similarly, 
public participation at monitoring stage is also not required under the 
RMA. There is clear guidance on public participation once an 
application is notified.  
(15) Feedback from 
consultations is 
incorporated into 
project planning 
Mostly 
Public submissions are considered together with the EIA report and 
officer reports in decision-making processes at the hearing. However, 
public views cannot override provisions in the plans.  
 
6.5.2 Policy context 
As reported in Chapter 2, the RMA is considered an integrated legal framework for environmental 
planning and management. However, the RMA is also supported by several other statutes. It is 
important that disaster management related legislation is also considered to understand its role in 
the EIA process. This section is based on the legislative framework investigated in Chapter 4 and 
reports on criterion (16) the influence of disaster management policy context of the EIA process in 
addressing disaster risks.  
Disaster management policy context  
Other than the RMA, Chapter 4 identified four other pieces of legislation related to hazard and risk 
management in New Zealand. These are the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA), Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEMA), The Building Act (2004) and Local Government Official 
Information and Meetings Act 1987 (LGOIMA). As noted in Chapter 4, none of the above legislation 
has any direct provisions for the RMA’s EIA process. However, all pay special attention to the natural 
hazard risk in development planning processes.  
Moreover, as reported in Chapter 4, there is very limited linkage between these Acts on provisions 
related to natural hazards. For instance, the purpose of the CDEMA requires local authorities to co-
ordinate planning, programmes, and activities for risk reduction, which is clearly linked to the subject 
of this research. However, the Act does not provide any further information on this except that it has 
been identified that cost effective risk reduction is a function of local Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Groups (CDEMG). According to the National CDEMA strategy, risk reduction is expected 
to be handled through local RMA plans and other instruments at a national level. However, there are 
no visible links between CDEMA and the RMA to perform the above requirements. Neither provisions 
nor guidance is available for local authorities to use CDEMG plans in resource management (Dormer 
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et al., 2012). The hazard planner described the lack of coherence between the RMA and the CDEMA 
as a clear drawback of the procedures. 
Findings of this study concur with the findings of the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) report on RMA 
principles (Dormer et al., 2012) on the lack of inter-legislation linkages to address natural hazard risk. 
The TAG report provided several recommendations to improve such inter-linkages among the Acts. 
They include, among others: “…alignment of the definition [of natural hazard] across all relevant 
legislation, in particular to take account of the differing “return periods” for natural hazards” 
(Dormer et al., 2012, p. 26); requiring regional authorities to specifically refer to CDEMG 
management plans in preparing regional policy statements; and “…to give regional councils the lead 
function of managing all the effects of natural hazards (while retaining the usual ability to delegate to 
territorial authorities as and when appropriate)” (Dormer et al., 2012, p. 28).  
Summary  
Criterion 16 of the analytical framework is ‘mostly’ met in New Zealand. Four other Acts have direct 
provisions for natural hazard management. However, inter-linkages between these, especially 
between the RMA and CDEMA, are weak. Table 6.8 summarises the criterion findings for the disaster 
management policy context.  
Table 6.8 A summary of the criterion findings for disaster management policy context 
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(16) Legal provisions given by 
other legislation to control 
development-induced 
disaster risks do influence the 
outcome of the EIA process. 
Mostly 
All four Acts (i.e., LGA, CDEMA, The Building Act, LGOIMA) 
reviewed have direct provisions to avoid and mitigate natural 
hazards. However, the inter-linkages between the above Acts is 
weak, especially between the CDEMA and the RMA.  
 
6.5.3 Accountability and Transparency 
This section reports on criteria (17) whether the EIA process and EIA report is subject to independent 
verification and (18) whether the decision making process is made clear to all interested parties.  
Independent verification  
Under section 92, in normal circumstances, a consent authority may assess the consent application 
and “…request the applicant for the consent to provide further information relating to the 
application”. Even though this also requires the consent authority to assess the submitted 
information, the above cannot be considered as an independent verification. In addition, under the 
RMA, provisions are available to commission a report on an EIA if the consent authority is satisfied 
that “…the activity for which the resource consent is sought may, in the authority's opinion, have a 
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significant adverse environmental effect” and the applicant is notified and he or she agreed to the 
commissioning of a report (RMA, 1991, s. 92 (2)). According to the second EIA expert, commissioning 
a report “…might be particularly relevant where an initial request for further information has not 
yielded satisfactory results”. The expert further added that, “The requirements for the applicant’s 
approval reflects the reality that the applicant has to pay for the commissioned report. If the 
applicant refuses then the report is not obtained and the application proceeds to formal consultation 
and decisions”. According to the regional planner, independent reports are commissioned for 
“…selected major projects, because most of the other times councils just rely on their own 
expertise”. Most experts interviewed argued that the above process is an independent process to 
acquire further information and it can also lead to a review of the EIA report.  
It is clear that at hearings of publicly notified applications the EIA report is subjected to some sort of 
verification through independent experts. The regional planner stated: 
Council will use its own technical staff for small projects. In some instances 
…council hire consultants. They charge the developer for that. So there 
would be independent expertise used. If they thought they have a different 
point of view from the developer, then the council put those experts up at 
the hearing stage if actually they work on a different point of view. Based 
on what I experienced… it is a contested process.  
The second EIA expert disagreed with this line of argument and stated, “No cross-examination of 
submitters or experts is allowed at council hearings. Instead the commissioners take a more 
inquisitorial role, which means much depends on their expertise and the ability of submitters to 
identify issues for commissioners”.  The above, however, applies only for notified applications. 
Similarly, at the Environment Court, each party can challenge the information provided by the other 
and cross-examination of witnesses is allowed. As reported earlier, the status of the EIA report is 
quite low at this stage of the EIA process, leaving little opportunity for an independent verification of 
the report. According to the first EIA expert, in theory the Environment Court reads the previous 
reports then summarizes it in the Environment Court hearing process. Nevertheless, a contested 
process permits a better opportunity for verifying the effects of an activity on the environment. 
However, both the conservation planner and the second EIA expert argued that success of a 
contested process also depends on whether the parties involved in the processes are sufficiently 
resourced.  
Making the approval clear to all  
Provisions in the RMA, LGA and LGOIMA are together expected to ensure the information on 
resource consents, decision and conditions are made available to the public as of right. Sub-section 
35(5) of the RMA provides a list of information that should be made available by local authorities. 
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This includes consent applications, decisions and records of all resource consents granted within the 
local authority area. As per sub section 10(1) of the LGOIMA, “Any person may request any local 
authority to make available to that person any specified official information” kept in the local 
authority. Furthermore, under section 39 of the LGA, “…a local authority should ensure that the 
governance structures and processes are effective, open, and transparent”.  
According to the EC judge “…after the decision is made it is a public document”. Explaining the 
opportunities available for the public to access information on consent decisions and conditions, the 
regional planner stated: 
The whole process is public. The public can ask for any information that was 
used to make any decision [including] not to notify. They can ask for copies 
of the EIA. Details of the application. Anything they want to know they can 
find out. Even the information, which the regulator does not want to see 
released, has to be released by the law unless it relates to someone’s 
privacy. 
The hearing commissioner, explaining the transparency of the process, stated “Although it is not 
specifically required in the law or any formal procedure, commissioners can make the process more 
transparent by having an open and transparent decision making approach”. However, the 
commissioner doubts whether every commissioner takes such an open and transparent decision-
making approach. According to the MfE (2004), some hearing committees make their deliberations in 
public, which is less common. It is clear that the manual of the MfE training programme ‘Making 
good decisions’ has given more emphasis to private deliberations. According to the training manual, 
“Although the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 promotes ‘open 
government’, the law has no presumption that deliberations on quasi-judicial matters will be held in 
public” (MfE, 2004, p. 153).   
Summary  
The findings show that criterion 17 is ‘reasonably’ met and criterion 18 is ‘fully’ met in New Zealand. 
There is no provision for independent review of the EIA report. However, the findings of the EIA 
report can be verified in the case of commissioning expert reports. Sufficient measures are required 
to be taken to ensure that all related information regarding a consent approval is available for the 
public. Table 6.9 summarises the criteria findings for accountability and transparency of the EIA 
process. 
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Table 6.9 A summary of the criteria findings for the accountability and transparency  
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(17) EIA assessment 
processes and EIA 
reports are subjected 
to independent 
checks and 
verification. 
Reasonably 
There are no clear provisions for an independent review of the EIA 
reports. In some cases, councils commission a report, which provides 
an independent verification of EIA findings. During public hearings and 
in the Environment Court proceedings, EIA report findings are often 
subjected to independent review through the submissions of different 
experts.  
(18) Decision-making 
and approval stages 
are made clear to all. 
Fully 
Once the decision is made, it is considered a public document. The 
RMA requires local councils to make available consent decisions. The 
provisions of the LGA and the LGOIMA promote open government 
concepts, which require all information related to consent decisions 
and conditions be made publicly available.  
 
6.5.4 Political will 
Support from the political authority is a key influence for the success of any EIA process. This section 
covers criterion (19), whether such support is available in New Zealand. 
Political will  
Even though political pressure can be seen on some consent applications, it is clear that mostly such 
pressure does not affect decisions on resource consents. The experts and planners argued this is due 
to opportunities available in the EIA process to contest and appeal decisions. As reported earlier, 
most experts believe that having the Environment Court in the process is a major advantage to make 
the EIA a more transparent and accountable process. The first social scientist stated “…some 
environmentalists just say the Environment Court often does go [decide] in favour of development”. 
According to the social scientist, experience shows this is not always the case. The social scientist 
further stated that there are examples where the Environment Court has turned down politically 
influenced projects.  
Further, most experts and planners interviewed in this study were keen to see strong political 
support not only for the EIA process, but also largely for the RMA. It is clear most experts are 
disappointed and dissatisfied about current developments. Most believe that political support is not 
consistent and many raised their concerns over intensified political influence against existing RMA 
provisions. Most interviewed experts criticized the current government’s attitude towards the RMA 
and its intention to amend the RMA to facilitate more economic development. The experts argued 
that the RMA is seen in some circles of the government as a barrier to economic development. The 
first EIA expert, explaining the political pressure on the EIA process, stated: 
…it is not consistent. There is a strong political campaign or political agenda 
to say that RMA is blocking the development and …environmental 
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assessment procedures are holding things up. They want to get rid of that or 
reduce it. That push back is probably stronger now than it has been for a 
long time because we [have] been in an economic downturn and therefore, 
development is seen as a solution to that economic downturn. So there is a 
quite lot of political pushback about EIA. That pushback is at national level. 
There is also regional and local level as well. So there can be pushback from 
local government politicians …also there is pressure on staff and so forth to 
allow consents. So there is definitely a political influence.  
According to the first social scientist, “Local councils might be [more] vulnerable to certain 
government pressure”. Meanwhile, controversies around current amendments to the RMA have 
generated broad scale resistance from opposition parties, many non-state actors and environmental 
groups. During the second reading of the Bill in Parliament, an opposition Member of Parliament 
criticized the Bill saying: 
… [this] bill in the context of a range of plans that the Government appears 
to have to, as it sees it, balance the environment against development 
agendas. …that is a wrong-footed way of approaching environmental 
protection (New Zealand Parliament, June 25, 2013).   
Many environmental groups raised concerns over the Bill saying the new reforms will “…weaken core 
environmental protections and reduce community input into decision making” (Forest and Bird, 
2013, p. 1). Some activists argued that proposed reforms have not been subjected to adequate 
consultation. An environment lawyer stated: “Attempts to convince the government to extend the 
consultation period fell on deaf ears” (Thomsen, 2013). The Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society 
argued in its campaign against the Bill that reforms would also curtail provisions for the Environment 
Court. They argued:  
Reducing the Environment Court’s role in resource management, by limits 
on appeal rights in some cases and the scope of appeals. The Environment 
Court provides important independent expert oversight of consent and 
planning processes, and ensures high quality outcomes are achieved (Forest 
and Bird, 2013, p. 3). 
Meanwhile, one of the architects of the RMA 1991, constitutional lawyer Sir Geoffrey Palmer in 
raising his concerns over the reforms said: “Government's proposed changes will seriously 
undermine environmental protection” (Radio New Zealand, May 27, 2013). Regardless of these 
criticisms, the government went ahead and passed the Resource Management Amendment Act 
(RMAA) 2013 and is preparing for the next phase of reforms.  
The RMAA 2013 does not have any specific provisions regarding natural hazards. However, the next 
phase of reforms has paid clear attention to natural hazards. According to the Resource 
Management Summary of Reform Proposals 2013 (MfE, 2013b, p. 12), “A requirement for decision-
makers to consider natural hazards in their deliberations is proposed to be added to the principles in 
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the proposed new section 6 of the RMA”. This would elevate natural hazards to being a matter of 
national importance and ensure they were not overlooked in decisions. The reforms also propose to 
look at both the likelihood and impact of hazards in planning for natural hazards. Even though the Bill 
is yet to be drafted, the reform proposal suggests that “This change will give greater weight to 
natural hazards in decision-making and mean natural hazards are considered early and up front in 
resource planning” (MfE, 2013b, p. 12). However, neither the Technical Advisory Group report for 
the Minister for the Environment on proposed reforms nor the reform proposals suggest any 
changes to the existing EIA process to better address disaster risk of development projects.  
Summary 
Criterion 19 of the analytical framework is ‘reasonably’ met in New Zealand. It has been shown that 
some development projects are supported politically, but such influences do not affect the approval 
decision. Support from the political authorities to the EIA process is weak at the moment. Table 6.10 
summarises the criterion findings for political support for the EIA process.  
Table 6.10 A summary of the criterion findings for political will  
Criteria Evaluation Justifications 
(19) Political support 
is available for the 
EIA process. Reasonably 
Political pressure is presents for some consents. However, such 
political interest does not affect the approval decision. The presence 
of the Environment Court in the process is crucial in reducing such 
influences. Political support is not consistent for the RMA and is 
currently weak.  
 
6.5.5 Coordination  
EIA is a multi-stakeholder process. Different agencies both at central and local government levels 
have to work together to achieve its objectives. Therefore, the success of any EIA process depends 
on the level of coordination existing among these agencies. This section covers criteria (20) the level 
of coordination among relevant agencies in New Zealand for effective implementation of the EIA 
processes and (21) involvement of the disaster management agency in the EIA process.  
Coordination  
In the EIA process, several agencies are often involved in a resource consent application of any 
significant scale. So, it is a normal circumstance where staff of a local authority or the EPA work 
together with their counterparts in other relevant agencies when such an application is lodged for 
resource consent. According to the planners and experts, matters get more complicated when there 
are differences in regional or district plans. Explaining cross border differences of regional policy 
statements and regional plans, the regional planner stated: 
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Maybe a region can put its own flavour on its regional policy statement. 
Because some say we want to go much tighter than the national policy 
statement ...for instance have a special area we want to keep cleaner. 
Another council may say we want to attract more industries to promote 
more jobs.  
The planner, nevertheless, denied any possibility of significant inconsistency among regional and 
district plans as “Both have to meet the national policy statement and the RMA”. Moreover, the 
regional planner, in explaining the coordination among regional councils and territorial authorities, 
added: 
We are all friends. So we just talk to each other and if there are cross 
boundary [projects] between regions, …the RMA provides for joint 
processes. So you simply have one hearing and both councils appoint the 
panel and both abide by the decision. More commonly it is territorial 
authority and us [regional council] once again there is a joint process in 
place.  
According to most interviewed experts, coordination among agencies is a complex relationship 
beyond a matter of friendship. The Technical Advisory Group report for the next phase of RMA 
reforms suggests that one of the reasons for ineffectiveness of local authorities to plan for natural 
hazards is “Shortcomings in governance and inter-governmental cooperation – including a lack of 
effective coordination between district and regional councils, and the activities of planners and 
emergency management staff…” (Dormer et al., 2012, p. 24).  
However, various provisions of the RMA require consent applications to be referred to other relevant 
agencies where appropriate. For instance; under section 107f, a consent authority is required to 
provide a copy of any aquaculture related application to the Ministry of Fisheries11; applications 
affecting navigation should be referred to Maritime New Zealand under section 89A; and, as per 
section 117, a consent authority must promptly provide a copy of an application to carry out a 
restricted coastal activity to the Minister of Conservation. Therefore, interagency coordination is 
explicitly required among different agencies in the EIA process.  
Commenting on the coordination in the EIA process, the first social scientist stated: “I would not say 
coordination is perfect by any means”. The first EIA expert, in explaining the issues of coordination, 
added: “It is because these organizations are built in silos. [So,] they keep focused on their activities”. 
According to the regional planners, a consent application is not referred to all relevant agencies 
unless the consent of such agency is required to grant the resource consent. In all other cases, other 
                                                          
11 Now within the Ministry of Primary Industries  
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agencies would come to know about the application when it is notified. The regional planner further 
added: 
We can [also] ask [the applicant] to go and consult …relevant authority and 
can ask them to get written approval if we think their [other agencies’] 
interests are affected. If publicly notified they can make submissions. If they 
are not happy with the decision they can also appeal.  
It is clear that there is no mechanism to make all agencies formally informed and get them involved 
in resource consent processes. The first social scientist argued that such mechanisms have been tried 
from time to time but expected results were not achieved. The social scientist stated: 
There was a big push a few years ago under the sustainability agenda, to 
have more formal response between government agencies around 
sustainability. There was more push to get the agencies to work more 
closely together, like economic development, environment, Iwi 
development, social. Major ministries …to get them to work more closely 
together. That discussion has just quietly gone away.  
Most interviewed experts argued that the drive for a more coordinated effort in resource 
management and environmental planning has not been completely redundant. The first social 
scientist stated: “There is a bunch of things going around climate change”. Some experts, including 
that social scientist, were optimistic of reviving a coordination mechanism for different development 
agencies around climate change adaptation and mitigation.  
According to the first EIA expert, not only the agencies but also technical teams working on an EIA 
report do not engage in a coherent way. The expert stated: 
We still tend to break it [EIA report] all up to lots of different technical 
areas. …I do not see lots of good cases where people work in a very highly 
integrated way. That because often there is so many different technical 
areas and expertise so they go and do their own things. I think that 
…integration should start at the beginning of the process not the end. We 
always argue that social assessment people have a key role to play in 
integration.  
Involvement of the disaster management agency in the EIA process 
The projects reviewed in this study clearly show that disaster risk is significantly involved in all cases 
and even emergency management plans are required for the WIHS and the Ruataniwha Water 
Storage Scheme. According to the CDEMA, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
(MCDEM) and its representatives in regional or district councils are responsible for managing such 
emergencies with relevant other stakeholders. Therefore, the above-mentioned emergency plans 
should be able to provide required information for the emergency management staff of the MCDEM. 
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However, the interviewed planners and experts in this study could not recall any cases where the 
MCDEM was involved in a consent application. The regional planner stated:  
I guess they rely more on everybody else to do their job properly. I cannot 
recall ever them [MCDEM] being involved and make a submission to a 
project. They probably focus on consequences of these. …if it is a district 
council area and if those disasters are more local then the Ministry is not 
involved. If the district council will do it via the engineers, they would 
probably, if they have suspicions concerns or problems, they could have 
given an input to that.  
Nevertheless, the first EIA expert argued that local councils “…have got a very strong reputation of 
not talking to each other across the divisions”. The development planner interviewed, pointed out, 
even though the MCDEM is not involved in the EIA process, it gets involved in emergency situations 
resulting from development projects. The development planner added, “Recently, there was a flood 
in one of our catchments. A big flood event and in order to manage it… [the MCDEM] ordered us to 
discharge more water than our consent allowed us to do”. All the experts and most planners 
interviewed have just one statement to be made in terms of the role of the MCDEM in the EIA 
process. They said: “…the MCDEM could be more involved”.  
Summary  
The findings show that criterion 20 is ‘reasonably’ met, but criterion 21 is ‘not’ met. Coordination 
among different agencies has been a challenge in the New Zealand EIA process while the MCDEM 
does not currently participate in the EIA process. Table 6.11 summarises the coordination of the EIA 
process.  
Table 6.11 A summary of the criteria findings for coordination  
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
(20) Inter-agency coordination and 
cooperation is available across sectors 
and different levels (national/local) of 
government departments at all stages 
of the EIA process 
Reasonably 
There is no mechanism to inform all relevant 
agencies on consent applications other than where 
consent of such agencies is required to make a 
decision. Therefore, coordination among different 
agencies is not assured in the process.  
(21) Disaster management agency is 
involved (receive information and get 
coordination) in all stages of the EIA 
process  
No 
The MCDEM is not apparently involved in the EIA 
process. Most planners and experts believe it should 
be.   
 
6.5.6 Funding conditions 
This section covers criterion 22 of the analytical framework, the influence of funding agencies and 
funding conditions on the EIA process.  
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Disaster risk reduction as a part of funding conditions 
New Zealand is a member country of major multilateral funding agencies such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank. Both these agencies were established in order to 
support development programmes in developing countries. New Zealand, as a member country of 
these agencies, contributes capital by subscribing to shares in both the World Bank and the ADB (The 
Treasury, 2013d) and, therefore, New Zealand is not entitled to borrow from these Banks (The 
Treasury, 2013a). Consequently, unlike Sri Lanka, the funding policies of these agencies do not affect 
New Zealand development or environmental planning. 
The regional planner, elaborating on the investment flow into development activities in New 
Zealand, stated: “… [New Zealand] do[es] not have any developments financed by the World Bank or 
the ADB. So it would then come back to either government funding or by some …private sector 
banks”. For instance, in the government budget for 2013/2014 financial year, $3,627 million is 
estimated for the National Land Transport Programme and other roading projects (The Treasury, 
2013c). The government expects to fund this investment principally (i.e., approximately 75 percent of 
total investment) by using road tax revenue collected by the Crown. “$970 million of the balance 
relates to loans from the Crown” (The Treasury, 2013c, p. 232). According to Note 24 to the financial 
statement of the Government’s budget, these loans primarily are obtained from core crown12, crown 
entities and other state-owned enterprises (The Treasury, 2013b). Therefore, the development 
activities carried out in New Zealand, despite which sector they belong to (e.g., infrastructure; 
energy; social development), are independent from policies of external agencies and can be 
executed under the existing domestic policy framework.  
Summary 
The findings show, criterion 22 is not relevant in New Zealand context. There is minimal or no 
influence from multi-lateral or bi-lateral funding agencies on environmental planning in New 
Zealand. Table 6.12 summarises the criterion findings for funding conditions in New Zealand.  
Table 6.12 A summary of the criterion findings for funding conditions 
Criteria Evaluation Justifications 
(22) Funding agencies carry 
specific funding conditions 
to curtail the disaster risk of 
the project. 
Not 
relevant 
There is no visible influence from external funding agencies on 
the New Zealand EIA process. Development and environmental 
planning is fully controlled by the domestic legal framework.   
                                                          
12 “Core Crown” means the Crown, departments, Offices of Parliament, the NZ Super Fund and the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand. It does not include Crown entities, State-owned Enterprises, or local government 
(Treasury, 2013, p.2). 
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6.6 Chapter Summary  
This chapter reports on the effectiveness of the New Zealand EIA process in addressing project-
induced disaster risk. The findings show that the criteria relevant to procedural effectiveness and 
contextual effectiveness are generally ‘fully’ or ‘mostly’ met. Exceptions to the above two 
effectiveness dimensions can primarily be seen in the criteria relevant to legal requirements of 
including disaster risk in the EIA report, guidance on including disaster risk in the ToR, public 
participation before the EIA report preparation, independent verification of EIA reports, political will 
and coordination among agencies. However, the criteria in relation to policy integration and 
substantive effectiveness are generally ‘reasonably’ or met to a ‘limited’ extent in New Zealand, 
showing there are serious gaps in policy integration and achieving substantive effectiveness of the 
EIA process in terms of addressing disaster risk. It is important to note that most of the specific 
criteria relevant to disaster risk management in the New Zealand EIA process are either ‘reasonably’ 
met or met to a ‘limited’ extent. Table 6.13 summarises the findings of this empirical study under the 
evaluation criteria in the Methodology chapter. The next chapter will analyse the findings presented 
in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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Table 6.13 A summary of the findings for the New Zealand EIA process against the criteria in Table 3.1 
Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Criterion area 
Criterion Evaluation Justifications 
Integration 
Purpose of EIA (1) Disaster risk reduction is 
an integral part of 
environmental assessment. 
Reasonably 
The EIA process is required to address natural hazards risks. However, neither disaster 
risk nor vulnerability of affected people is required to be assessed.  
Procedural Legal Basis  
(2) The EIA system is based on 
clear and specific legal 
provisions. 
Mostly 
The EIA process is based on specific provisions provided in Schedule 4 of the RMA. It is 
the general perception among most planners and experts that Schedule 4 is too broad 
and unspecific.  
(3) The impacts of all 
significant actions are 
assessed. Fully 
Five types of resource consents are listed in the RMA. These theoretically cover all 
possible development activities. Any activity, unless it is permitted or prohibited, should 
require an EIA report to accompany any resource consent application. In addition, 
effects arising from associated activities and cumulative effects are also included in the 
EIA process. 
(4) Alternative methods and 
locations are considered. 
Reasonably 
The RMA is clear about the requirement of alternative methods and locations. 
However, in practice, consideration of alternative methods is weak. The High Court 
ruled out the need for explicit and comprehensive cost benefit analysis on alternative 
options.  
(5) EIA reports contain a 
section on disaster risk. Reasonably 
Hazard (risk) assessments are being done in detail in most cases and presented in a 
separate section of the EIA report or as a separate report. However, neither 
vulnerability assessment nor disaster risk is estimated and included in the EIA report.   
(6) There is an opportunity for 
appeal or legally challenge the 
process or decision output. 
Fully 
Provisions are available for any aggrieved party to appeal against the decision or part of 
it to the Environment Court.   
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Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Criteria area Criteria Evaluation Justifications 
Procedural Guidance  
(7) EIA reports are subjected 
to public review. Fully 
The public can review and make submission on notified applications. The public 
notification decision is taken by the consent authority, which can be challenged only in 
the High Court. 
(8) ToR for EIAs carries 
specific requirements 
regarding hazard assessment 
and vulnerability assessment. 
Limited 
Setting up the ToR for the EIA report is the responsibility of the applicant. There is no 
mechanism for public review or independent review of the ToR. Social issues, especially 
vulnerability assessments are not conducted in any of the reviewed projects, which 
suggests that such requirements are not included in the ToR. 
(9) Guidance is available to 
support compliance 
monitoring taking place and it 
is being implemented. 
Mostly 
The RMA explicitly requires local authorities to conduct compliance monitoring. In 
addition, Schedule 4 implicitly requires developers to conduct monitoring. In practice, 
both the interviewed developer and consent authorities conduct compliance 
monitoring.    
Substantive 
Level of 
Assessment 
(10) Screening of actions for 
disaster risks is taking place. Limited 
Screening is based on the classes of activities (i.e., permitted, controlled, discretionary, 
restricted discretionary, non-complying, prohibited). The findings suggest that the 
above classes of activities are not based on systematic risk assessments.   
(11) Hazard and vulnerability 
assessments are conducted as 
a part of impact identification. 
Limited 
Hazard assessments are done in detail. Social impacts are left out in most cases. 
Therefore, vulnerability is not assessed in such cases. Social impact assessments are 
also disconnected from hazard assessments in the reviewed projects.   
Decision 
Making  
(12) Findings of the EIA 
influence the final decision. 
Mostly 
The influence of the EIA report on final consent depends on the decision pathway that a 
consent application takes. Local councils primarily rely on the EIA report. When 
notified, public submissions and an officer’s report are also considered in making final 
decision. At the Environmental Court, the EIA report has quite a low profile. In addition, 
when considering the full EIA process, decisions are based on the EIA process. However, 
provisions of the national environmental standards and plans are superior to the EIA 
findings. 
(13) Planners use the EIA 
report as a reference 
document in project planning. 
Fully 
The findings of the EIA process are translated into conditions of the resource consents. 
Many believe that the EIA process influences the shape of the development activity. 
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Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Criteria area Criteria Evaluation Justifications 
 
 
 
 
Contextual 
Consultation 
and Public 
participation 
(14) Consultation and 
participation are taking place 
before and following EIA 
report publication. 
Reasonably 
Public participation in early stages (i.e. screening, scoping, ToR setting) of the EIA 
process is not legally required.  However, the case law and guidance recommend the 
public participation in scoping. Similarly, public participation at monitoring stage is also 
not required under the RMA. There is clear guidance on public participation once an 
application is notified.  
(15) Feedback from 
consultations is incorporated 
into project planning. 
Mostly 
Public submissions are considered together with the EIA report and officer reports in 
decision-making processes at the hearing. However, public views cannot override 
provisions in the plans.  
Policy context  (16) Legal provisions given by 
other legislation to control 
development-induced 
disaster risks do influence the 
outcome of the EIA process. 
Mostly 
All four Acts (i.e., LGA, CDEMA, The Building Act, LGOIM) reviewed have direct 
provisions to avoid and mitigate natural hazards. However, the inter-linkages between 
the above Acts is weak, especially between the CDEMA and the RMA. 
Transparency 
and 
accountability  
(17) EIA assessment processes 
and EIA reports are subjected 
to independent checks and 
verification. 
Reasonably 
There are no clear provisions for an independent review of the EIA reports. In some 
cases, councils commission a report, which provides an independent verification of EIA 
findings. During public hearings and in the Environment Court proceedings, EIA report 
findings are often subjected to independent review through the submissions of 
different experts. 
(18) Decision-making and 
approval stages, (setting out 
what is required of 
proponents and government 
agencies and when) are made 
clear to all. 
Fully 
Once the decision is made, it is considered a public document. The RMA requires local 
councils to make available consent decisions. The provisions of the LGA and the 
LGOIMA promote open government concepts, which require all information related to 
consent decisions and conditions be made publicly available. 
Political Will (19) Political support is 
available for the EIA process. 
Reasonably 
Political pressure is presents for some consents. However, such political interest does 
not affect the approval decision. The presence of the Environment Court in the process 
is crucial in reducing such influences. Political support is not consistent for the RMA and 
is currently weak. 
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Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Criteria area Criteria Evaluation Justifications 
Contextual 
Coordination 
(20) Inter-agency coordination 
and cooperation is available 
across sectors and different 
levels (national/local) of 
government departments at 
all stages of the EIA process. 
Reasonably 
There is no mechanism to inform all relevant agencies on consent applications other 
than where consent of such agencies is required to make a decision. Therefore, 
coordination among different agencies is not assured in the process. 
(21) Disaster management 
agency is involved (receive 
information and get 
coordination) in all stages of 
the EIA process. 
No 
The MCDEM is not apparently involved in the EIA process. Most planners and experts 
believe it should be.   
Funding 
conditions 
(22) Funding agencies carry 
specific funding conditions to 
curtail the disaster risk of the 
project. 
Not relevant 
There is no visible influence from external funding agencies on the New Zealand EIA 
process. Development and environmental planning is fully controlled by the domestic 
legal framework.   
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Chapter 7 
Discussion  
7.1  Introduction 
Chapter 2 concluded by presenting the disaster risk incubation model (Figure 2.5), which illustrates 
the relationships among mal-development, governance context and disaster risk. It was argued in 
Chapter 2 that both mal-development and poor governance incubate disaster risk through increased 
hazard risk and vulnerability until their convergence ultimately leads to the actual onset of disaster. 
Development controls, such as EIAs, should therefore be designed to assess and address the disaster 
risk of development projects. In this context, the effectiveness of EIAs in addressing development-
induced disaster risk plays a crucial role in preventing risk incubation in a given location.  
Chapter 3 provided the methodology adopted in this study and Chapter 4 outlined the environmental 
and disaster management contexts in Sri Lanka and New Zealand. Chapters 5 and 6 evaluated the 
effectiveness of the EIA processes of Sri Lanka and New Zealand. The performance evaluation of the 
two EIA processes shows that neither country’s process is fully equipped to address the disaster risks 
of development projects (Table 7.1). The Sri Lankan EIA process is consistently weak in all 
effectiveness dimensions and most evaluation criteria either have not been met or met to only a 
limited extent. In contrast, in the New Zealand EIA process, most evaluation criteria relevant to 
contextual effectiveness and procedural effectiveness have either been fully or mostly met. 
However, the criteria most relevant to risk integration and substantive effectiveness have only been 
met either to a reasonable or limited performance level.  
It is important, therefore, to critically evaluate the findings of the two countries in order to 
understand the reason behind the poor effectiveness and also to understand the wider theoretical 
and policy implications of the findings in terms of addressing development-induced disaster risks 
beyond the countries investigated in this study. 
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Table 7.1 Summary of Findings 
Effectiveness 
Dimension 
Evaluation Criteria (Operationalization of the research) 
Extent criteria met13 
Sri Lanka New 
Zealand 
Policy 
Integration 
(1) Disaster risk reduction is an integral part of environmental 
assessment. 
Limited Reasonably 
Procedural 
Effectiveness 
 
(2) The EIA system is based on clear and specific legal 
provisions. 
Mostly Mostly 
(3) The impacts of all significant actions are assessed. Limited Fully 
(4) Alternative methods and locations are considered. Limited Reasonably 
(5) EIA reports contain a section on disaster risk. Limited Reasonably 
(6) There is an opportunity for appeal or to legally challenge 
the process or decision output. 
Limited Fully 
(7) EIA reports are subjected to public review. Limited Fully 
(8) The ToR for EIAs carries specific requirements regarding 
hazard assessment and vulnerability assessment. 
No Limited 
(9) Guidance is available to support compliance monitoring to 
take place and those are being implemented. 
Limited Mostly 
Substantive 
effectiveness 
(10) Screening of actions for disaster risk takes place. Limited Limited 
(11) Hazard and vulnerability assessments are conducted as a 
part of impact identification. 
Limited Limited 
(12) The findings of the EIA influence the final decision. Limited Mostly 
(13) Planners use the EIA report as a reference document in 
project planning. 
Limited Fully 
Contextual 
effectiveness 
(14) Consultation and participation are take place before and 
after EIA report publication. 
Limited Limited 
(15) Feedback from consultation is incorporated into the 
project planning. 
Unclear Mostly 
(16) Legal provisions given by other legislation to control 
development-induced disaster risks influence the outcome of 
the EIA process. 
Limited Mostly 
(17) EIA assessment processes and EIA reports are subjected 
to independent checks and verification. 
Reasonably Reasonably 
(18) Decision-making and approval stages are made clear to 
all. 
Limited Fully 
(19) Political support is available for the EIA process. Limited Mostly 
(20) Inter-agency coordination and cooperation is available 
across sectors and different levels (national/local) of 
government departments at all stages of the EIA process. 
Limited Reasonably 
(21) The disaster management agency is involved (receives 
information and gets coordination) in all stages of the EIA 
process 
No No 
(22) Funding agencies carry specific funding conditions to 
curtail the disaster risk of the project. 
Reasonably Not relevant 
                                                          
13 Criteria findings were rated on a 1-5 scale, where ‘fully’ is highest level (5) and ‘no’ is the lowest (1). ‘Mostly’ 
is above average, ‘reasonably’ is average and ‘limited’ is below average. 
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procedures are not effectively applied in the field, which is measured by procedural effectiveness. 
Even though substantive effectiveness is defined as the extent to which EIA meets the purpose for 
which it is designed (Sadler, 1996; Wang et al., 2012), in practice, it is measured in terms of the EIA’s 
contribution to decision making (e.g., Heinma & Põder, 2010; Runhaar & Driessen, 2007; Sadler, 
1996; van Doren et al., 2013). Consistent with the above, it is argued here that informed decision-
making results in increased performance, which ultimately leads to realization of the objectives of 
EIA, in this case, reduced disaster risk. Therefore, the extent to which the EIA process contributes to 
informed decision-making in order to address disaster risk is considered here as substantive 
effectiveness. Finally, the influence of context on procedural and substantive effectiveness is 
consistent with contextual effectiveness. The following sections compare the findings against the 
four effectiveness dimensions and discuss the theoretical and policy implications of the findings. 
7.3 Policy integration 
Poor emphasis given to disaster risk and a lack of clear, explicit guidance on assessing disaster risk in 
the EIA process in turn reduces the ability of the EIA to be an effective risk management tool. 
Therefore, integration of disaster risk into the EIA process is at the centre of the discussion on 
reducing development-induced disaster risks. However, a plausible definition for disaster risk 
integration is currently non-existent. Using Bührs’ (2009, p. 10) definition of environmental 
integration as a basis for developing a definition, DRR integration can be described as incorporating 
DRR knowledge, values, and interests in policies and actions (policy dimension), rules and 
organizations (institutional dimension), and human thinking (cognitive dimension) and as well as 
promoting consistency and coherence among disaster risk management efforts. This section 
discusses the level of DRR integration into EIA processes, while investigating the applicability of the 
above definition. 
As stated in Chapter 2, scholarly work on DRR integration and into the EIA processes is extremely 
rare in environmental and disaster management literature. However, addressing disaster risk in 
environmental assessment has been recognized and given significant emphasis in various agency 
reports, especially from development agencies (e.g., Benson & Twigg, 2004, 2007; Caribbean 
Development Bank (CDB), 2004; Mitchell, Van Aalst, & Silva Villanueva, 2010; UNDP, 2004; UNISDR, 
2011). Many scholars have explicitly discussed the integration of DRR into development planning 
(Blaikie et al., 1994; Schipper & Pelling, 2006; Wamsler, 2004, 2006). Wamsler (2006) emphasises the 
importance of compliance with EIA legislation in order to address disaster risks. However, the 
findings of this study show that Wamsler’s argument applies only when disaster risk is already 
integrated in the EIA process. The findings also show that explicit reference to disaster risk is absent 
in environmental management policies in both researched countries.  
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In Sri Lanka, neither disaster risk nor hazard risk is explicitly included within the NEA 1980. Moreover, 
the Act does not include people as a part of the environment (NEA, 1980, s.33). There are 
ambiguities among interviewed planners and experts on the provisions of the Act. For instance, the 
CEA planner argued that disaster risk is implicitly mentioned under “…avoidable and unavoidable 
adverse environmental effect” (NEA, 1980, s.33(b)), but the experts disagreed and demanded explicit 
reference to disaster risk in the legislation. Both case studies and interviews revealed that disaster 
risk is not addressed in practice.  
In contrast, the term ‘environment’ has been given a broad definition in the RMA and people and 
communities are explicitly referred to as being a part of the environment. Therefore, when the Act 
under its purpose requires avoiding, remedying and mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the 
environment, it also refers to the people and communities as well. This is an important dimension of 
DRR. In addition, the term ‘effect’ is also broadly defined in the RMA, but “…in a non-exhaustive 
way…” (Dye v Auckland RC (2001) 7 ELRNZ 209). Under s.3 of the RMA 1991, “any potential effect of 
high probability” and “any potential effect of low probability which has a high potential impact” are 
also included as aspects of effects. These aspects are partially in line with the UNISDR’s definitions of 
‘extensive’ and ‘intensive’ disasters (see Chapter 1). However, interviews with planners and experts 
clearly showed ambiguities in the use of such provisions of the Act. For instance, according to the 
regional planner, disaster risk is explicit in Schedule 4, but most experts argued that disaster risks are 
only implicitly referred to in Schedule 4. A social scientist described Schedule 4 provisions and stated, 
“…those are on physical hazards, not on disaster risk”. It is clear such vagueness in the legislation 
leads to poor attention to disaster risk in the EIA process. However, everyone agreed that hazard risk 
is explicit in Schedule 4. As a result, hazard risk is explicitly addressed in all EIA reports studied.  
There is clear evidence from the Acts and EIA reports reviewed and interviews undertaken that 
legislative structure and guidelines in New Zealand are more inclined towards a hazard management 
approach than disaster management. As discussed in Chapter 2, this approach belongs to the 
‘behavioural paradigm’ of disaster management, which is generally characterised by over reliance on 
land-use planning and other engineering solutions to reduce disaster risk (Smith, 2013). As it will be 
argued in following sections, the implications of such an approach can be seen in various stages of 
the EIA process, including screening and impact identification.   
In addition, it is clear that integration of DRR concerns into organizations that oversee the project 
appraisal processes is also crucial in addressing disaster risks. Clear guidance and assigned 
responsibilities to such organizations are required to achieve this. However, it is evident that, 
because of poor policy integration, clear and explicit guidance on DRR for environmental 
management agencies is absent in both countries. The lack of such guidance has led to increased 
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tensions between environmental management and disaster management agencies, adding more 
challenges to already problematic EIA procedures. In New Zealand, having both DRR functions and 
environmental management functions at the local authority level provides local authorities with a 
better chance to handle DRR associated with development projects. However, it was also revealed by 
the interviews with planners and experts that, as a consequence of lack of national guidance and 
inconsistency between legislation, neither the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
nor CDEM Groups play an active role in the EIA process. This concurs with Becken & Hugheys’ (2013) 
conclusion in relation to tourism that disaster risk management is currently poorly integrated in the 
existing land-use planning, civil defence and emergency management structure. Therefore, the level 
of disaster risk reduction inputs in the EIA process depends on the capacity of the consent authority 
and its understanding of DRR.  
Finally, it is clear from the interviews with the experts in both countries that incorporating disaster 
risk concerns into the knowledge [cognitive framework] of everyone, including council officers, 
developers, EIA practitioners/consultants, and community members in a way that inspires their 
thinking, behaviour and actions will make the most impact on the reduction of development-
induced-disaster risks. As they argued, this will influence how they approach the pre-assessment, 
appraisal, evaluation and risk management stages of the EIA process and also engage in risk 
communication and participation. Bührs (2009) argues that integration efforts are limited and 
ineffective if not undertaken consistently across all three dimensions (i.e., policy, institutional and 
cognitive). The findings of this study support the above argument but give more emphasis to policy 
integration as a starting point. A more detailed analysis of the factors that influence the cognitive 
dimension of decision makers, developers, practitioners and affected groups is beyond the scope of 
this research (see Schijf (2003)). 
7.4 Procedural effectiveness 
The effectiveness of the EIA process in addressing disaster risk is directly related to how well the 
different phases of the EIA process are designed and implemented. As reported in Chapter 2, it is 
clear that procedural effectiveness is the most commonly addressed dimension of effectiveness and 
many scholars have included one or more indicators related to procedural effectiveness in their 
research (e.g., Ahmad & Wood, 2002; Baker & McLelland, 2003; Boyle, 1998; Gallardo & Bond, 2011; 
Marara et al., 2011; Noble, 2009; Pölönen et al., 2011; Sadler, 1996; Wang et al., 2012; C. Wood, 
1995). However, Morgan (2012, p. 9) argues that problems with procedural effectiveness persist and 
“…there is every reason to expect this [practice issue] to continue and grow as new challenges come 
from new areas of application and new forms of impact assessment”. Recent literature identified a 
number of issues related to procedural effectiveness including screening, scoping, consideration of 
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alternatives, public review and monitoring (IEMA (Institute of Environmental Management & 
Assessment) 2011; Morgan, 2012; Panigrahi & Amirapu, 2012; Pölönen et al., 2011; Rajaram & Das, 
2011).  
Even though the above scholars paid limited attention to gaps in legal provisions, the findings of this 
study suggest that a lack of clarity and gaps in legislation play a fundamental role in practice. For 
instance, even though most interviewed experts and planners described the EIA processes of both 
countries as sufficiently backed with clear and well-defined legislation, others identified gaps. In New 
Zealand, lack of clarity in Schedule 4 is the only major weakness in the legislation highlighted in the 
interviews with both planners and experts. One expert argued that the implementation of the EIA 
process therefore, depends on how the diverse practitioner community understands and interprets 
provisions. In Sri Lanka, the lack of provision for public participation in the early stages of the EIA 
process and the lack of provision for the public to legally challenge approval decisions are 
emphasised as major weaknesses. The next sections discuss screening, scoping, consideration of 
alternatives, public review and monitoring of the two EIA processes.  
Screening 
Screening is central to the effectiveness of the EIA process because it determines whether the 
proposed development activity is subjected to environmental scrutiny (Morgan, 1998; G. Wood & 
Becker, 2005). G. Wood & Becker (2005) argue that the screening decision requires a discretionary 
judgement of the potential effects of the proposed activity and Weston (2000) argues such decisions 
are more political than ‘rational’ or ‘non-political’. According to G. Wood & Becker (2005), the 
significance of environmental effects is highly context-specific and therefore an approach that 
reflects the political dimension of land-use planning decision-making, as well as being influenced by 
the values of local people, is both practical and effective in screening. The screening process of the 
New Zealand EIA process corresponds to such criteria.  
New Zealand has a dual approach in resource management where policy statements and plans 
dictate the resource use conditions and the EIA process provides a check against the set standards 
and rules. The policies and plans are developed with significant public involvement and participation 
(Perkins & Thorns, 2001), thus the public’s views and values are often included. Such an approach 
enables local authorities to dictate the terms of resource use limitation in a particular area. Under 
the RMA 1991, all development activities other than prohibited and permitted require an EIA before 
approval is given. Thus, local differences can be easily incorporated into project screening and any 
significant development activity is subjected to environmental scrutiny. However, the experts 
interviewed argued that classification of activities into different classes in relevant district and 
regional plans (i.e., permitted, controlled, restricted discretionary, discretionary, non-complying and 
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prohibited) is often not based on a full and explicit risk assessment. A recent study by GNS Science 
showed the overwhelming majority of regional policy statements and district plans are not explicitly 
based on systematic risk assessments and vulnerability is often not assessed in such policies and 
plans (Saunders et al., 2014). According to the study, currently only 2.0% of district plans and 12.5% 
of regional policy statements refer to a risk-based approach (Saunders et al., 2014, p. 55).  
There are isolated initiatives in New Zealand to introduce a more risk-based approach to planning 
(Saunders, Beban, & Kilvington, 2013). Both the Ministry for the Environment in its ‘Preparing for 
Future Flooding: A Guide for Local Governments in New Zealand’ (MfE, 2010) and GNS Science’s 
‘Risk-based Land Use Planning for Natural Hazard Risk Reduction’ (Saunders et al., 2013) propose 
similar approaches for risk-based planning. These initiatives provide a hazard centred approach, in 
which development actions are categorised into different consent classes of activities based on the 
existing hazard risk of the environment. The above guidelines, however, are different from effects 
(risks) based planning, where development actions are categorised into different consent classes 
based on the level of effects, especially the risks they pose to the environment. Currently, guidance 
for the latter is absent in New Zealand. Experts suggested that such guidance should ideally come 
from higher-level planning including national standards or national policy statements with enough 
room for both local adoption and adaptation. A national policy statement on disaster risk 
management would seem essential for this to occur.  
In Sri Lanka, screening of proposals takes place at two different stages. First, project proposals are 
screened based on the prescribed project list provided in the Gazette. This is similar to Annex I and II 
projects listed in European Council Directives 97/11/EC (European Council, 1997). Three different 
aspects are considered in this process. These are the scale of the proposed activity, nature of the 
activity and nature of the receiving environment; for instance, any flood area declared under the 
Flood Protection Ordinance No 4 of 1924. In addition, some highly fragile receiving environments are 
not included in Part III of the Gazette. This means development projects in such environments can 
proceed without environmental scrutiny if their scale is deemed to be lower than the permitted scale 
in the Gazette. For example, the National Building Research Organization has published landslide risk 
maps for six highly vulnerable districts in the country (National Building Research Organization, 
2013). Use of those in the screening process is not mandatory because they do not have any legal 
status in environmental legislation. Deciding whether an IEE or EIA is required is left to the discretion 
of the appointed Project Approval Agency (PAA) and is done during the scoping process. Therefore, 
choosing between an EIA and IEE is an opaque process without any guidance and, as reported in 
Chapter 5, this is a clear limitation of the procedures. It is also clear that the Sri Lankan approach 
does not concur with the approach proposed by G. Wood & Becker (2005). Of the three aspects that 
should be considered in screening, the scale of the project can easily be manipulated and experts 
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argued that developers commonly downplay the scale of projects to bypass in-depth environmental 
scrutiny. This conclusion is consistent with Zubair’s (2001) finding that developers downplay the scale 
of projects to bypass environmental scrutiny.  
Consideration of alternatives   
Consideration of alternative locations and technologies (methods) is the first step in the EIA process 
(Steinemann, 2001; C. Wood, 1995). Steinemann (2001, p. 3) argues that “The quality of a decision 
depends on the quality of alternatives from which to choose”. According to C. Wood & Dejeddour 
(1992), genuine consideration of certain types of alternatives, especially alternative methods, is 
difficult in the EIA process. They argue that such alternatives should be considered at policy or plan 
level using strategic environmental assessment. Steinemann (2001) supports this argument saying 
that, at the strategic level, agencies could consider more alternative approaches (e.g., hydro energy v 
wind energy) rather than just evaluating alternative designs (e.g., dam v run-of-the-river) for an 
action. The findings of this study support Steinemann’s (2001) argument on consideration of 
alternative approaches at a strategic level and also show that when alternative approaches are 
evaluated at the project EIA level, they are superficially assessed and merely used to promote the 
pre-selected project approach (e.g., hydro-power) rather than genuinely investigating more 
appropriate alternative designs. Therefore, the study’s findings lend support to the implementation 
of SEA at policy and plan levels. According to Steinemann (2001), at the strategic level, detailed 
assessments are not required, but an examination of different alternative approaches provides a 
basis for further assessments in project EIAs.  
In Sri Lanka, the National Environmental Act 1980 is vague regarding the consideration of alternatives 
and does not specify what types of alternatives should be considered (i.e., location or method). The 
experts argued that consideration of alternatives is weak in practice because of ambiguities in the 
legislation. For example, the EIA of the Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) investigated 
alternative locations and also an alternative approach to the planned expressway (i.e., improvement 
of the railroad). However, even though 40% of the expressway lies on a flood plain (University of 
Moratuwa, 1999a), alternative designs for constructing the expressway in order to reduce flood risk 
have not been considered. Interviews with community members and experts revealed that most 
flood and drainage issues caused by the expressway would have been avoided if the expressway had 
been constructed on piers instead of on an embankment. It is clear that though the EIA failed to 
investigate the best alternative design for the proposed action, it attempted to investigate an 
alternative approach. Even though Zubair (2001) does not differentiate between alternative 
approaches and designs, his argument on consideration of alternatives in Sri Lanka is supported by 
this study’s findings. Zubair (2001, p. 474) argues that the UKHP EIA report avoided more viable 
options in analysing project alternatives (i.e., run-of-the-river); instead, other non-viable alternatives 
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(i.e., coal power and diesel energy) were “cursorily” examined. It is clear that such alternative 
approaches should have been assessed at higher planning levels. Even though the Sri Lankan Cabinet 
of Ministers issued a directive in May 2006 requiring all new policies, plans or programmes to be 
subjected to SEA (Central Environmental Authority, n.d.), it is clear from the interviews that SEAs are 
yet to be fully implemented. 
New Zealand’s legislation is explicit on the need to investigate alternative locations and methods. 
Under Schedule 4 of the RMA 1991, an EIA report should include a description of possible locations 
and methods for undertaking the proposed activity if the activity is likely to have any significant 
adverse effects on the environment. Again, though, Schedule 4 is vague about requiring alternative 
approaches and designs. Examination of the EIA processes of both the Transmission Gully Project 
(TGP) and the Waitohi Irrigation and Hydro Scheme (WIHS) suggest that consideration of alternatives 
in the EIA process is still weak and incomplete in practice. For example, the focus of the WIHS’s EIA is 
largely on alternative locations for different dam types; there is no consideration of alternative 
designs for undertaking the activity. Although exploring its effectiveness was not a part of this 
research, it is clear that s.32 of the RMA has provisions for conducting SEAs in developing plans and 
policies. These provisions, however, do not explicitly include hazard or disaster risk assessment and, 
currently, only a fraction of district plans and regional policy statements are based on risk-based 
assessments (Saunders et al., 2014).  
Public review 
The importance of public participation in environmental decision-making is widely accepted (Beierle 
& Cayford, 2002; González, Gilmer, Foley, Sweeney, & Fry, 2008; Hartley & Wood, 2005; Jay et al., 
2007; Morgan, 2012; Sheate, 1992). According to C. Wood (1995), consultation and public 
participation are an integral part of the EIA process; Jay et al. (2007, p. 288) argue that EIA is “…an 
anticipatory, participatory environmental management tool”. Most scholars who have investigated 
the procedural effectiveness of the EIA process have included indicators of public participation 
(Ahmad & Wood, 2002; Fischer, 2003; Sadler, 1996; C. Wood, 1995). In most relevant literature, 
public participation in EIA is defined as “…the process by which proposed developments and plans 
are subject to public review and comment in order to improve the integration of socio-economic and 
environmental concerns” (e.g., González et al., 2008, p. 304). However, this study’s findings support 
the need for a broader concept of public participation both at the early and post-approval stages of 
the EIA process in order to address disaster risks effectively (see Section 7.2.4). This section discusses 
public review of the EIA report.  
Both Sri Lanka and New Zealand have provisions for public review of EIA reports. However, in Sri 
Lanka, despite legislative requirements for public participation in all EIAs (but not IEEs) the practice is 
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considered weak, because sufficient measures are not taken to make it effective. According to one 
expert, public review of EIA reports is a “…very quiet” process. On the other hand, community 
members interviewed argued that project teams and authorities attempted to educate affected 
groups on the benefits of the project rather than listening to their concerns. A community member 
expressed his frustration saying, “It is like playing the Veena to deaf elephants”. It is clear that public 
review is often ineffective because EIA reports are too technical for the general public and the CEA 
does not take adequate measures to get the public actively involved in reviewing EIA reports (e.g., 
providing a summary of the EIA in simple language for the general public). This corresponds with 
Hartley & Woods’ (2005) argument that technical complexity of the project proposal is a barrier to 
effective participation. Therefore, current practice does not qualify as public participation defined in 
the EIA literature (i.e. González et al., 2008). The 2000 amendment of the NEA 1980 to allow IEEs to 
be approved without being subjected to a public review was seen by many as a drawback in the 
system. It is clear that developers downplay the scale of projects to avoid public scrutiny and this is a 
danger to the effectiveness of the EIA process.  
In New Zealand, public notification of EIA reports is clear and explicit in legislation. As per the 
provisions, only publicly notified applications are required to be made available for public review and 
comment (see Figure 4.6). The decision on public notification is usually made by local authority staff 
and can be challenged in the High Court only on points of law, which, according to an interviewed 
expert, is a drawback of the legislation. The Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 
(LGOIMA) 1987 also has provisions for the public to request information related to proposed 
development activities, which provides opportunities for public scrutiny of the processes followed 
and information used. It is also clear that public submissions are considered in decision-making and 
project design is amended where required. Therefore, in the New Zealand EIA process, public 
participation meets the requirements in the literature definition (i.e. González et al., 2008). However, 
since consent approval is based on plans and policies, some experts argued that there is a limited 
opportunity for the public to influence the consent decision if such activities with given effects are 
already allowed in the relevant plans. Even though plans and policies are subjected to public review, 
it appears that the public do not pay enough attention when the plan [regional and district] is being 
made.   
Scoping  
Scoping provides an initial assessment to identify significant issues related to proposed development 
activity (Morgan, 1998) and to determine the range of issues to be addressed in the EIA process (C. 
Wood, 1995). Therefore, scoping also influences the type of assessments carried out as impact/effect 
assessments (i.e., social impact assessment, cultural assessment and risk assessment) during impact 
identification. If a particular impact or effect is not identified at this stage, then it may not be further 
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assessed or treated at later stages of effect assessments (Standards Australia Limited/Standards New 
Zealand, 2012). Therefore, scholars argue that scoping is fundamentally important for the 
effectiveness of the EIA process to be properly achieved (Morgan, 1998; Mulvihill, 2003). However, it 
is clear that scoping received limited attention in both countries.  
In Sri Lanka, according to the National Environmental Regulations 1993, Terms of Reference (ToR) for 
EIA should be developed by respective PAAs in consultation with the Central Environmental 
Authority (CEA). As per CEA (2006), ToR is the final product of the formal scoping process and it 
recommends having informal scoping activities with affected groups and the public, in line with the 
formal process. However, the experts argued that the current mechanism has been ineffective, 
because the scoping committee has to rely on only preliminary information given by the developer, 
which is often weak at this stage of proposal development. As a result, a general ToR is issued to 
developers irrespective of the type and nature of their proposed development activity. The lack of 
public participation in the process has generally limited the opportunity to improve the quality of the 
ToR, resulting in a weak and non-comprehensive ToR for EIA reports.  
In contrast, scoping in New Zealand is the responsibility of the developer. Clauses 1 and 2 of Schedule 
4 of the RMA 1991 provide a general structure and also the matters that should be considered in the 
EIA report. Even though this can be considered as a general ToR for an EIA report, planners and 
experts are concerned about the poor clarity of Schedule 4 and the lack of clear guidance on scoping. 
It is clear that such weak guidance mixed with the influence of developers in the scoping process 
often leads to neglecting socially and environmentally vital aspects in EIA reports.  
This study’s findings demonstrate that even though the two countries have completely different 
approaches to scoping (i.e., an agency driven approach in Sri Lanka compared with a developer 
driven approach in New Zealand), neither has proven effective in terms of its ability to provide a 
sound scope for the EIA. The findings also support the conclusions of Snell & Cowell (2006, p. 373) 
who say “…scoping is conducted in ways which meet the needs of the project, less tangible and 
secondary environmental effects are usually ignored, and opportunities for public involvement are 
minimal”.  
Monitoring  
Monitoring plays a key role in the effectiveness of the EIA process (Ahammed & Nixon, 2006; 
Morgan, 2012; Sadler, 1996; C. Wood, 1995). Post approval monitoring involves two important 
components. First, monitoring checks that the developer is meeting the conditions specified in the 
approval. Secondly, monitoring checks whether the environmental effects of the activity are as 
initially predicted in the EIA report (MfE, 1996). 
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In Sri Lanka, experts, planners (including the CEA planner) and community members all agreed that 
the current mechanism for compliance monitoring is weak and ineffective. Even though the prime 
responsibility for compliance monitoring lies with the CEA, a lack of guidance on compliance 
monitoring and a lack of tolerance standards have affected compliance monitoring efforts. The NEA 
1980 (s.10 (1)) gives the responsibility of project monitoring to the CEA. As per s.32 of the NEA 1980, 
the Minister may make regulations with respect to levying fees to carry out necessary monitoring 
duties and a “…requirement of specific environmental monitoring duties by the developer” (NEA 
1981, s.32(2)(r)). However, such regulations have not been issued. Zubair (2001) points out a lack of 
staff and financial and technical resources as the major reasons for weak monitoring in the Sri Lankan 
EIA process. This study’s findings contradict Zubair’s and argue that a lack of interest by and 
motivation of the CEA are the major reasons for weak monitoring. Moreover, the lack of provisions 
for public participation in project monitoring, including unavailability of approval conditions, also 
hinder compliance monitoring efforts.  
In New Zealand, as per s.35 of the RMA, the responsibility for monitoring lies with local authorities. 
However, Schedule 4 of the RMA is not clear and explicit about the responsibility for monitoring 
between the consent authority and the applicant. According to the local council planners 
interviewed, in practice, both the local authority and the developers take responsibility. The 
provisions of the RMA enable any member of the public to apply to the Environment Court for an 
order to enforce a consent condition or to abate an adverse effect that is not covered by conditions. 
It is also clear that having project approval, including conditions readily available in the public 
domain, makes the developers obliged to implement conditions, monitor and take action on project 
impacts to safeguard their long-term financial interests.  
7.5 Substantive effectiveness 
As discussed in Chapter 2, substantive effectiveness is the least researched area in effectiveness 
research (Cashmore et al., 2004; Jay et al., 2007; Theophilou et al., 2010). This is primarily because of 
the difficulties in empirically exploring substantive effectiveness (Jay et al., 2007) and the plurality in 
interpretation of the objectives of EIAs (Cashmore et al., 2004). Cashmore et al. (2004) argue that 
such plurality is problematic in evaluation research and suggest evaluation of effectiveness should be 
based on a researcher’s clear interpretation of the objectives and the meaning of effectiveness. This 
study defined substantive effectiveness as “Whether the EIA process results in DRR?”. In order to 
address this question, the study investigated the level of disaster risk assessment in the EIA process 
and the influence of the EIA on decision-making and its influence on project planning.  
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7.5.1 Level of assessment 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that both hazard risk and vulnerability should be equally considered to 
understand the disaster risk of development projects (Birkmann, 2006; Blaikie et al., 1994; Tobin & 
Montz, 2009; UNISDR, 2005; Wisner et al., 2004). Accordingly, Chapter 2 listed three steps for risk 
assessment: 
1) Identification and, if possible, quantification of hazard; 
2) Assessment of exposure and vulnerability; and 
3) Estimation of risk based on hazard risk, exposure, and vulnerability.  
The term ‘hazard’ is commonly used, often interchangeably, with disasters in both Sri Lanka and New 
Zealand, but neither the term ‘vulnerability’ nor vulnerability assessment has the same level of 
recognition. Here, it is argued that this lack of understanding and weak attention to the condition of 
vulnerability, in turn, affects how disaster risk is treated in both countries. This section thus discusses 
hazard and vulnerability assessments in the EIA process.  
Hazard assessment  
As discussed in Chapter 2, hazard assessments should cover the frequency, intensity and severity of 
hazards (Alcántara-Ayala, 2002; Alexander, 1993; Wisner et al., 2004). This should occur in the early 
stages and for each component of the project. Chapter 2 also emphasized that hazard assessments in 
the EIA process should examine both the existing hazardscape and any potential changes in the post-
project hazardscape of the environment.  
As reported in Chapter 5, detailed hazard assessments are not conducted as a part of the EIA process 
in Sri Lanka. However, the EIA processes of the STDP and the UKHP did examine easily observable 
hazards such as flood and landslide risks. Close scrutiny of the two EIA reports of the above projects 
further revealed that such assessments are not sufficiently detailed to provide a clear picture of 
project-induced hazard risks. For example, the EIA report of the STDP identified the increased 
potential flood risk in upstream areas because of the earth embankment of the expressway but 
limited its analysis to a statement, which says “The choking of flood openings would cause delays in 
the passage through the proposed road embankment thus creating increased duration of the 
inundation period” (University of Moratuwa, 1999a, pp. 6-18) without giving any further analysis on 
increased flood risk. In the two case studies, hazard assessments are largely based on qualitative 
assessments, but an estimation of potential changes in the hazardscape (i.e., new hazards and 
frequency, intensity and severity of existing hazards) is not provided in the studied EIA reports, thus 
they do not meet the basic requirements of hazard assessments cited in the literature (e.g., 
Alcántara-Ayala, 2002; Alexander, 1993; Wisner et al., 2004). Some project components were also 
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neglected in the EIA reports of the above projects, including resettlement sites, soil mining, and 
dumping sites. All these aspects made hazard assessment in the two case studies critically 
incomplete and weak.   
In contrast, in New Zealand, detailed hazard assessments have been carried out in all seven studied 
projects. Hazard assessments are often based on quantitative analysis and have been conducted for 
all components of the project, including those arising from associated activities. It is clear that 
explicit reference to hazard risk in Schedule 4 strongly influences how local council planners and 
practitioners approach hazard risk in development projects. Both the WIHS and the TGP have 
separate sections in their EIA reports dedicated to hazard assessments. Considering the potential 
disaster risk of the WIHS, a separate dam break analysis has been conducted (Rivett et al., 2012). 
Even though the assessment is not comprehensive, substantial detail is included in the report. This 
information was further supplemented by the project consultants in response to a request for 
further information under s.92 of the RMA. However, given the fact that the WIHS is located on an 
active fault line (Rivett & Morgan, 2012), the dam break assessment has not gone into sufficient 
detail about the likelihood or magnitude of the potential hazard. This was raised by an independent 
expert report commissioned by the Canterbury Regional Council (Shaw, 2012).  
Vulnerability assessment  
The condition of vulnerability has two dimensions: biophysical (place) vulnerability, characterized by 
exposure or proximity to hazard source; and social vulnerability, characterized by susceptibility of the 
community and its assets to the hazard because of their capacity, resources and other social, political 
and economic conditions (Cutter et al., 2008; Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003). However, vulnerability 
assessments are not conducted even in their simplest forms in the process of impact identification in 
both countries.  
Most literature reviewed does not explicitly report the influence of development on increased 
vulnerability. An exception is seen in UNDP (2004) (see Table 2.2). Findings from the two case studies 
and community interviews in Sri Lanka provide overwhelming evidence that hazards and the 
vulnerability of the people are reshaped as a result of implementing development projects. However, 
neither project EIA report reviewed in Sri Lanka identified such changes. For example, the EIA report 
of the STDP identified that 20,834 houses are located in the project-affected area and the report 
further estimated that the population in the district in which the proposed project is located is 
growing faster than the rest of the country. This means there will be more pressure for productive 
land in the project area and more people, often the poor, are likely to be pushed to unproductive 
and flood affected areas. However, no analysis has been done on what percentage of the above 
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houses are in the current flood zone and what percentage of houses will be added to the flood zone 
as a result of increased flood levels.  
It was also revealed from the two Sri Lankan case studies that changed exposure of affected groups 
can make them more vulnerable to the altered hazardscapes of the project area. For instance, the 
EIA report of the UKHP identified that the banks of the reservoir will be unstable and landslides will 
be induced by fluctuations of the water table in the reservoir altering the existing hazardscape. 
However, as reported in Chapter 5, people have been resettled in those unstable areas by the 
project, increasing the place vulnerability of a number of people. It is widely accepted that internally 
displaced or relocated people are highly vulnerable to shocks in their new environment (Ayata & 
Yükseker, 2005; Mooney, 2005). However, the EIA reports of both projects failed to capture either 
the existing vulnerability or the changed vulnerability of the affected group. The above two EIA 
reports are dominated by biophysical impacts. The socio-economic impacts in the EIA reports are 
limited to impacts on employment, property values, education, and health and nutrition. Social 
impacts have not been analysed against the hazards identified in the project area. Therefore, the Sri 
Lankan EIA process is not designed to assess the vulnerability of affected groups.  
Like Sri Lanka, none of the seven cases studied in New Zealand has had vulnerability assessments 
conducted for the EIA reports, despite the fact that all projects are considered to have substantial 
hazard risks for affected groups. It was revealed from the expert interviews that the vulnerability of 
affected groups could be assessed if Social Impact Assessments (SIAs) were conducted. However, it is 
clear that conducting an SIA for every development project is very unlikely even though social effects 
are identified in the scoping process. In only four of the seven projects reviewed (including the TGP) 
have specifically stand-alone SIAs been conducted. However, there is no visible link between the 
hazard assessment and social impact assessment in any of the four projects for which SIAs are 
available. For instance, the SIA of the TGP is limited to noise and vibration, air quality, traffic and 
access, amenity, recreation, and other socioeconomic issues (Rae & Crack, 2011). 
Conversely, local council planners argued that current checks in the EIA process are sufficient to 
address issues such as vulnerability (i.e., public hearings and s.92 provisions). However, in the WIHS 
EIA process, it is clear that vulnerability-related information has not surfaced except via the expert 
report commissioned by the consent authority on dam break analysis, which states that critical 
information relevant to ‘consequences’ of a dam failure is not available in the dam break analysis. 
The expert report also failed to emphasize the details of the critical information required to assess 
the consequences of a dam failure. Similarly, according to an expert, the use of s.92 provisions 
depends on the technical expertise and commitment of the staff of the consent authority. Most 
experts believed that councils are more inclined towards biophysical issues rather than social 
  
 204 
aspects. Experts believed that better provision in the regional and district plans and national 
guidance are required to take care of social effects, including the vulnerability of affected groups. It 
was revealed from the interview with the hearing commissioner that the public often does not pay 
enough attention to local plans when those are notified, thus the role of regional and district plans in 
dictating the terms for vulnerability assessment in EIA reports is limited.  
Interview findings showed also that the term ‘consequences’ is often used to describe the condition 
of vulnerability in New Zealand. For instance, different guidance notes reviewed under section 7.2.2 
include a consequences table (i.e. MfE, 2010; Saunders et al., 2013; The Department of Building and 
Housing, 2008). Close scrutiny of the consequences tables provided in all three guidance notes 
suggest that the approach is more appropriate for a homogenous community and does not provide a 
clear picture on interpersonal differences in vulnerability. However, as argued in Chapter 2, hazards 
have differential impacts on different people and groups (Tobin & Montz, 1997). Therefore, 
consequences tables provided in the above documents are more about the potential severity of a 
hazard not the disaster risk. This issue has been recognized in Saunders et al. (2014, p. 21); they 
argue that the “…vulnerability of a community is just starting to be considered in relation to natural 
hazards” in current planning practice in New Zealand. This study’s findings show that low 
consideration of vulnerability in planning practice is a result of the type of disaster management 
approach that has been adopted in New Zealand (i.e., the behavioural paradigm). This hazard based 
approach recognizes the behaviour of humans as the primary cause in exacerbating hazards, thus 
leading to over reliance on land-use planning and other engineering solutions to reduce disaster risk 
(Smith, 2013). 
Assessing vulnerability in EIA is not a novel discourse. Several authors have worked on integrating 
vulnerability assessment into the EIA process (Kværner et al., 2006; Toro et al., 2011). These 
attempts are more concerned with the ecological vulnerability14 of the receiving environment but 
vulnerability of people to development-induced hazards is rarely discussed in the literature. 
However, it is clear in this study that the disaster vulnerability of people should also be incorporated 
in to the EIA process to assess a development project’s disaster risks. A number of scholars have 
discussed the factors influencing the social vulnerability of people (Aysan, 1993; Bankoff, 2004; 
Cutter et al., 2003; Kværner et al., 2006; Mustafa, Ahmed, Saroch, & Bell, 2011; Wisner, 2004; Wisner 
et al., 2004). Saunders et al. (2013) suggest seeking opinions from experts and the community in the 
process of vulnerability assessment, but this study suggests that it requires a detailed assessment 
against the hazard and its likelihood and severity. Wisner (2004) proposes four approaches to 
                                                          
14 Vulnerability of an ecosystem to stresses over time (Woods, 2008). 
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assessing vulnerability. He used Aysan’s nine types of vulnerability under a ‘taxonomic approach’. 
However, further investigation is required to assess the best approach for vulnerability assessment 
under existing EIA practice. It is, however, clear that low consideration of vulnerability leads to 
several implications including over or under estimation of the disaster risk of development projects, 
and missed opportunities of vulnerability reduction as a risk management option. As discussed 
earlier, the findings reported in Chapter 5 and 6 show that the vulnerability assessments are ignored 
and, therefore, the above implications apply to both studied countries.  
7.5.2 Decision making 
The question about the substantive purpose of the EIA has attracted considerable research attention 
(Bartlett & Kurian, 1999; Cashmore et al., 2004; Cashmore et al., 2010; Morgan, 2012; van Doren et 
al., 2013). In the literature, two distinct perspectives on the substantive purposes of the EIA are 
identified: one is described as using an information processing (rationalist) model and the other is a 
political/behavioural model (Heinma & Põder, 2010; Morgan, 2012). According to Heinma & Põder 
(2010, p. 272), the former emphasizes the direct influence of EIA on decision making, while the latter 
stresses “…indirect consequences, such as environmental education bringing out changes in the 
values of decision-making authorities, institutional changes, and building consensus”. Heinma & 
Põder (2010) further argue that even though more emphasis has recently been on the political 
model, the influence of an EIA on project approval decision-making is still a valid question to probe in 
effectiveness research (see Figure 7.1). Several scholars have investigated this question in order to 
assess substantive effectiveness (e.g., Heinma & Põder, 2010; Runhaar & Driessen, 2007; Sadler, 
1996; van Doren et al., 2013; C. Wood, 1995). This section discusses the influence of an EIA on 
project approval and the influence of the EIA process on project planning.  
Project approval  
In Sri Lanka, Technical Evaluation Committees (TECs) are appointed by relevant Project Approval 
Agencies (PAA) to support them in project evaluation. It was the common perception among the 
interviewed experts and planners that having a multi-stakeholder mechanism in place for project 
evaluation is a positive point of the Sri Lankan EIA process. However, the absence of the Disaster 
Management Centre (DMC) in the process and the lack of transparency of the TEC process have 
reduced the effectiveness. According to the CEA planner, the TEC process is an internal decision 
support mechanism, but most experts want to see the TEC as an open and transparent mechanism 
for project evaluation.  
It is also clear from all interviews that most government-sponsored projects are not subjected to 
environmental scrutiny. According to the planners interviewed, government projects are increasingly 
not being subjected to EIAs or the decisions have been taken beforehand. However, project EIAs 
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have some influence, especially in projects proposed by non-state actors. Given that the government 
is a major investor in the country (U.S. Department of State, 2013), all experts interviewed believed 
that the influence of EIA on project approval is low and argued the influence on project approval has 
been diminishing over the years.  
The interview with the CEA planner indicated that the CEA is also unclear and unhappy about the 
project approval process under the NEA 1980. According to the planner there is an over reliance on 
CEA’s decisions from other agencies concerned in making project approval decisions. A close analysis 
of development planning in Sri Lanka (see Chapter 4) and the findings from this thesis reveal that the 
reason for the above concern of the planner lies not on over reliance on environmental scrutiny, but 
on the overall decision-making process. First, there are no tolerance standards except for discharge 
and emissions. Sri Lanka does not have an active development-planning framework, either at the 
national or local level, that controls certain developments while allowing others. According to the 
National Environmental Regulations 1993, PAA shall have regard to the EIA report, submissions made 
by the public, and any other relevant details in determining whether to grant approval and the 
approval should be given with the concurrence of the CEA. Therefore, the approval should be solely 
based on the merits of the EIA and the CEA has a key role to play in each and every decision. 
However, it is clear that the findings in the EIA are often suppressed by many other factors, including 
political influence in decision-making, resulting in increased pressure on CEA planners from outside 
critics based on ‘rational’ or ‘non-political’ arguments. Jay et al. (2007) identify these issues as 
common critiques of the techno-rational approach in decision making. 
In contrast, in New Zealand, the EIA is more closely integrated into the development planning 
framework and most experts and planners interviewed described the influence of EIA as ‘very high’ 
in decision-making. However, the value and importance of the EIA report in decision-making depends 
on the decision pathway that the consent application takes in the decision-making process and on 
the amount of information decision-makers received from the EIA report. As per the RMA 1991, 
there are three possible routes for a resource consent application to follow (i.e., public notification, 
limited notification and non-notification) (see Figure 4.6). If an application is not notified, then the 
decision is usually based on the council officer’s report and the EIA report. Therefore, the influence 
of the EIA report is often very large in the decision. However, when an application is notified more 
evidence starts to build into the process, through submissions and public hearings. Moreover, 
planners can obtain additional information by commissioning expert reports and further information 
requests in both the above scenarios. Therefore, the importance of the EIA report shrinks in the 
decision-making process under the notified route. Schijf (2003, p. 305) concludes that “…the 
effectiveness of EIA [EIA report] as an environmental management tool depends on the degree to 
which it is able to provide decision-makers with the information they need, in a format that they 
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understand”. This study’s findings suggest that the above statement is true only in non-notified 
applications. It is clear that decisions are based not only on the findings of the EIA report, but on 
various information sources generated in the EIA process. 
One limitation identified in the Sri Lankan EIA process is the lack of national and local tolerance 
standards. As argued earlier, in contrast to Sri Lanka, New Zealand has a dual approach to resource 
management, where policy statements and plans dictate the resource use conditions through 
standards and rules and the EIA process provides a check against the set standards and rules. These 
are considered highly effective for project screening as local differences can easily be considered in 
the development planning process. Section 104 of the RMA requires that the consent authority 
‘must’ have regard to the provisions of these policies and plans. According to the EC judge, decision 
makers are required to give weight to objectives of relevant policy statements and plans and “…those 
are actually the determining factors”. Section 104 of the RMA 1991 clearly specifies that national 
environmental standards or plans are superior to any actual and potential effects on the 
environment of allowing the activity. Section 104(2) reads: “When forming an opinion for the 
purposes of subsection (1)(a), a consent authority may disregard an adverse effect of the activity on 
the environment if a national environmental standard or the plan permits an activity with that 
effect”. It is clear that this provision is valid only for a permitted activity thus s. 104(2) provides a 
permitted baseline. In Tairua Marine Ltd v Waikato RC (CIV-2005-485-1490), the High Court ruled 
that section 104 provides a broad discretion to the consent authority. However, as revealed in this 
study, regional and district plans are not based on explicit risk assessments, therefore actual and 
potential risks due to different development activities might not be captured in these policies or 
plans. This research has not gone into an in-depth investigation of regional and district plans in New 
Zealand to assess the impact of permitted baselines on DRR. However, the study’s findings support 
Saunders et al. (2014) and suggest that provisions in s. 104 (2) give more weight to regional and 
district plans in decision-making compared with EIA findings and should be investigated further to 
assess their implications on overall risk reduction.  
Influence of EIA process on project planning  
There is a clear difference between Sri Lanka and New Zealand on how the EIA processes influence 
project planning. In Sri Lanka, the EIA findings are often not considered in project planning, whereas, 
in New Zealand, there is a high likelihood of EIA findings being used in project planning. In Sri Lanka, 
the two case studies revealed that adequate attention is not given during project planning to the 
findings of the EIA reports and the implementation of approval conditions. In the STDP, mitigation 
measures recommended in the EIA report have not been taken into account in the project design 
(e.g., flood mitigation). Even though the EIA report clearly identified that the road is passing over 
“Kalu Ganga” flood plain and also emphasized community concerns about aggravated flood risk due 
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to the road, and according to a RDA planner, the project-design team failed to recognize that the 
project actually passes over a flood plain. This means the project-design overlooked the findings of 
the EIA report. Similarly, in the UKHP, landslide risk was emphasized in the EIA report, but that risk 
was not considered in the resettlement of affected people.  
In contrast, most planners and experts interviewed in New Zealand suggested that the conditions 
attached to resource consents are usually implemented and the EIA process is articulated in a way 
that the EIA influences the shape of development activity. According to the regional planner, even 
though the conditions are not in place in the approval, developers are still required to take measures 
to curtail negative effects of the project. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the conditions placed on a 
resource consent are often dominated by biophysical effects management; attention to social effects 
management is weak. Consistent with the Disaster Risk Incubation Model (see Figure 2.5), having 
strong conditions to manage social impacts is crucial in vulnerability reduction and reducing disaster 
risk incubation. Therefore, lack of attention to social issues in the early stages of the EIA process (i.e., 
scoping and impact identification) can impede the effectiveness of EIA as a risk management tool.  
7.6 Contextual effectiveness 
The influence of context or governance quality on substantive effectiveness is an important question 
in effectiveness research. Alshuwaikhat (2005), Marara et al. (2011) and Wang et al. (2012) conclude 
that governance quality is a key aspect in why some EIA systems deliver better results than others. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the influence of contextual factors on the EIA process and 
essentially, how robust is the EIA system to its context and the variable governance quality. As 
reported in Chapter 2, different scholars have considered different contextual dimensions in building 
their argument about the importance of context on EIA effectiveness. It is practically impossible to 
consider all those different dimensions in a single research project of this type. It is however, 
important to carefully select the most relevant contextual dimensions to a particular research 
context (Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir, 2007). Therefore, in this study, public participation, 
institutional capacity, policy and political context, good governance and conditions of international 
funding agencies are considered relevant and important.  
7.6.1 Public participation  
Public review of the EIA report is a legal requirement in many countries including Sri Lanka and New 
Zealand. Most EIA effectiveness literature overwhelmingly focuses on the public review phase of the 
EIA process, but several scholars have argued for public participation in the early stages especially in 
scoping (e.g., Gallardo & Bond, 2011; Hartley & Wood, 2005; Nadeem & Fischer, 2011; Pölönen et al., 
2011). These researchers argued that public participation in the early and later stages of the EIA 
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process is not legally required, but encouraged. However, genuine opportunities for full public 
participation throughout the process manifests the level of governance quality and democracy 
existing in a particular country (Shepherd & Bowler, 1997). This study’s findings correspond with 
Shepherd and Bowlers’ (1997) conclusion that public participation beyond legislative requirements 
can benefit both the public and even the project. The findings also suggest that public participation in 
the early stages of the EIA process as well as in post approval stages is fundamental to ensure that 
disaster risks are adequately addressed and identified measures are effectively implemented. This 
section discusses public participation in the early stages and post approval stage of the EIA process.  
It is clear from the interviews in both countries that public participation in the early stages of the EIA 
process, especially in scoping, is very important to broaden the scope of the EIA report and prioritize 
the important impact areas on which the EIA should be developed. This corresponds with the 
findings of Gallardo & Bond (2011), Nadeem & Fischer (2011) and Pölönen et al. (2011). In Sri Lanka, 
the National Environmental Regulations (1993) state that the PAA may consult the public in 
developing ToR for an EIA report. This requires the PAA to get the affected groups involved in 
scoping, but interviews with the legal expert revealed that this requirement is ignored in practice and 
the affected groups are not invited into scoping meetings.  
In New Zealand, there is no statutory requirement for an applicant to consult the public or affected 
parties before an application is lodged for resource consent. According to the RMA, the nature and 
type, if any, of public participation is at the discretion of the applicant. However, the Environment 
Court has commented that it is “…foolish for a party not to consult with those with a known interest 
in a proposal...” (Watercare Services Ltd v Auckland Council [2011] NZ EnvC 155 p. 33). It is clear from 
the interviews with the regional planner and the experts that there is no formal mechanism to get 
the public involved in scoping and there is no requirement for the scope of an EIA report to be 
subjected to a public review before the full assessment is started and therefore public consultation is 
often absent during scoping.  
Public participation during impact identification is not legally mandated in either of the two 
countries. This has not been explicitly discussed in the literature. In Sri Lanka, interviews with 
community members suggested that affected groups should not be considered as passive receivers 
of information by authorities and developers, but should be engaged actively in impact identification. 
Interviewed experts also believed that the community has a key role to play in impact identification. 
However, the two case studies revealed that public participation in impact appraisal is completely 
ignored. It was also evident from the two case studies that the public possess a great deal of 
knowledge on the existing hazardscape of the environment and the public’s knowledge can be used 
to identify potential changes of existing hazards by the proposed development projects. However, 
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the EIA processes in both cases had little regard for local knowledge. The lack of public consultation 
and participation has also led to poor understanding of the social issues, including the vulnerability of 
the community.  
In New Zealand, impact identification is an expert driven process and the level of public participation 
in impact identification is not clear in the two case studies. As per Schedule 4 (1)(h) of the RMA 1991, 
an EIA should include details of the persons affected by the proposal and, if they were consulted, any 
response to the views of the consulted parties. However, according to the first social scientist, the 
affected groups are often not consulted in impact identification and poor representation of social 
issues in the scope of the EIA report also leads to weaker incorporation of public views in impact 
identification.  
Finally, and like the early stages of the EIA process, consultation and public participation is not legally 
required in later stages of the EIA process in both countries. Therefore, the public has little input to 
risk management, especially in compliance monitoring in both countries. Public participation in post-
approval monitoring does not occur in Sri Lanka. Community members interviewed were ready and 
willing to take part in compliance monitoring, since such involvement enables them to get first-hand 
experience of the implementation of risk management initiatives by the project. Even though most 
planners and some experts were sceptical about the technical know-how and commitment of the 
community for project monitoring, the disaster management expert argued that public participation 
in monitoring should be promoted. Under the community-based disaster preparedness strategy of 
the DMC, the public has a distinct role to play in vigilance groups (Weerasinghe, 2013), which 
requires them to monitor new risks in their environment. This study’s findings support the need for 
such public involvement in compliance monitoring. However, lack of transparency in project approval 
and the unavailability of approval conditions in the public domain restrict affected groups from 
participating in impact monitoring. A lack of interest among authorities, especially in the CEA, in 
public involvement in impact monitoring, is a major constraint if such initiatives are to be promoted.  
In contrast, New Zealand, through its open, transparent governance policy, supported by the 
LGOIMA 1987, ensures that the public has ready access to full information on project approvals and 
conditions. Even though local authorities are required to monitor the exercise of resource consents 
in their regions or districts (RMA, 1991, s.35), they are not required to get the public involved in 
project monitoring. However, the public can submit their complaints on the effects of projects to the 
local authority and can even take action in the Environment Court to have conditions enforced and 
adverse effects (not covered in conditions) to be abated. The consent authority can review the 
conditions of an approval at any time under s. 128 of the RMA. It was revealed that, in some cases, 
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approval decisions require public consultation to finalize conditions and establish monitoring 
committees with the participation of the affected groups.  
7.6.2 Institutional capacity 
Lim (1985) and Ebisemiju (1993) discuss two main categories in relation to cooperation and 
coordination between different agencies in EIA: centralized and decentralized institutional 
arrangements. In decentralized arrangements, the roles of EIA are shared among various tiers of 
government (i.e., hierarchical) or among various lead agencies (i.e., functional) (Ebisemiju, 1993). 
Both Sri Lankan and New Zealand EIA processes are consistent with the decentralized model. 
Therefore, genuine decentralization of environmental management functions to the local level and 
the resources and technical expertise available at such levels are important for the effectiveness of 
the EIA to be achieved. As reported in Chapter 6, the findings from New Zealand also suggest that 
decentralization of environmental management functions to local levels facilitates the process of 
managing a broad spectrum of development activities. Moreover, the ability of the agency that 
oversees the EIA process to coordinate all relevant parties is also an important aspect of capacity. 
Under this section, decentralization and coordination among agencies are discussed.  
Decentralization  
In Sri Lanka, the lack of capacity of the CEA to deal with disaster risk and post approval monitoring 
were mentioned and discussed earlier in this chapter. In Sri Lanka, both functional (i.e., project 
approval agencies) and hierarchical (i.e., provincial level) decentralization prevail. It is clear that some 
functions, especially proposals that require IEEs, are now being handled by the provincial offices of 
the CEA to address capacity gaps. According to the CEA planner, this development is not for 
devolution of powers but to delegate some responsibilities to provincial level. It was revealed that 
even though functional decentralization is well integrated into the system, hierarchical 
decentralization has made little progress. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka 
listed environmental management as a concurrent subject, which means both central government 
and provincial governments hold the responsibilities for environmental management, including 
project approval. However, only the North Western Provincial Council has used these provisions and 
has established a provincial environmental authority (i.e., North-Western Environmental Agency]. 
Some experts and planners showed their concern about having a separate provincial environmental 
authority. According to the legal experts, this is a failure of the legislation since the provincial agency 
has added to the existing coordination challenges of the project approval process.  
In contrast, New Zealand has a decentralized environmental management system that enables 
coverage of a wider spectrum of development activities. It was evident from the interview with the 
first social scientist that despite having a stronger local governance system, New Zealand’s risk 
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governance process is constrained by a lack of technical expertise at local levels especially for dealing 
with social effects. According to the regional planner, local governments often rely on external 
experts through commissioning expert reports to deal with the shortages of technical expertise. 
However, according to many experts, it is also important to have an appropriate internal capacity to 
understand resource consents and their implementation effects on society; this is essential in order 
to access the right expertise from external sources for risk management. However, it is clear from the 
interviews with the first EIA expert and the district planner that maintaining skilled personnel is a key 
challenge for most rural district authorities.  
Coordination  
In Sri Lanka, scoping committees and TECs comprise multi-layered and multi-agency participation. 
Moreover, functions are decentralized among project approving agencies. Therefore, appropriate 
coordination among these agencies is vital to make those mechanisms effective. Better coordination 
among decision-makers and planning and development authorities can play a decisive role in the 
consideration of concerns early in the EIA process (Panigrahi & Amirapu, 2012). Like other countries 
in the region (Nadeem & Hameed, 2008; Panigrahi & Amirapu, 2012), the lack of coordination and 
cooperation among development planning agencies in Sri Lanka was well evident during the 
interviews with different agencies’ planners. According to the DMC planner, lack of support from the 
CEA has compelled them to look for other strategies to tackle development-induced disaster risks. 
On the other hand, the CEA planner blamed the DMC and claimed that the support of the DMC is not 
available for the EIA process. According to the second EIA expert, poor coordination is a common 
issue in Sri Lankan public administration. The expert claimed that the current coordination issue 
between the DMC and the CEA is a good example of the above. 
In New Zealand, several regional and district councils are often required to get involved in any 
significant resource consent application. According to the planners and experts, matters get more 
complicated when there are differences in regional or district plans. It was also revealed from the 
interviews with the regional planner and the hearing commissioner that the inconsistencies among 
regional plans and regional and district plans make coordination difficult at the local level. The 
Technical Advisory Group report for the next phase of RMA reforms also claims that one of the 
reasons for ineffectiveness of local authorities to plan for natural hazards is “Shortcomings in 
governance and inter-governmental cooperation – including a lack of effective coordination between 
district and regional councils, and the activities of planners and emergency management staff…” 
(Dormer et al., 2012, p. 24). The provisions of the RMA require consent applications to be referred to 
other relevant agencies, where appropriate (e.g., Ministry of Primary Industries, Maritime New 
Zealand, and Department of Conservation). Therefore, inter-agency coordination is explicitly 
required among these agencies under such provisions. However, according to one expert, 
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coordination is weak because of the compartmentalized nature of these organizations. For example, 
all experts and planners argued that the MCDEM is currently not involved in the resource consent 
process and the MCDEM should be more involved in the EIA process. Irrespective of the social and 
economic development status of New Zealand, these findings correspond with the experience of 
other developing countries of poor coordination and communication among different agencies 
(Ahmad & Wood, 2002; El-Fadl & El-Fadel, 2004; Nadeem & Hameed, 2008; Panigrahi & Amirapu, 
2012). 
7.6.3 Policy and political context  
As argued in Chapter 2, political support and policy context shape the environmental management 
mechanisms and influence the approaches pursued by different agencies for dealing with risk. This 
section discusses the political support for the EIA processes and the policy context in which the EIA is 
implemented in Sri Lanka and New Zealand.  
Political will  
Marara et al. (2008) emphasizes the importance of political will in achieving effectiveness in EIA. 
Even though the political influence of the government agenda towards development is not 
uncommon in both studied countries, how such influences materialize within the established legal 
framework of the country make the difference between good and bad governance. New Zealand 
shows high respect for the rule of law, but Sri Lanka has a very poor record on the same (The World 
Bank Group, 2013). As reported in Chapter 5 (see pages 128-129), the Sri Lankan EIA process is often 
subjected to political interference putting its effectiveness at risk. According to most interviewed 
experts, the EIA process usually lacks the blessing of the political authority. The second EIA expert 
rated political support for the EIA process as “zero”. Such a lack of political support, according to C. 
Wood (1995), is the biggest constraint to effective EIA in developing countries. Experts further 
argued that the feasibility of some projects is not being studied because the decisions have already 
been taken to implement those projects. However, according to the CEA planner, a more adversarial 
approach is taken for some private investment proposals. Government agency planners refrained 
from answering any questions related to the political will in the EIA process.  
In New Zealand, according to the experts, even though political pressure can be seen on some 
development activities, political influence does not affect decisions on resource consents. The 
experts and planners claimed this is because of open governance, respect for the rule of the law and 
opportunities available in the EIA process to contest and appeal decisions. Experts further believed 
that having the Environment Court in the process is a major advantage to make the EIA a more 
transparent and accountable process.  
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Policy context 
Even though it is not explicitly required under the NEA 1980, it is clear from the interview with the 
CEA planner and the interviewed experts that provisions of other legislation (i.e., the Urban 
Development Authority Act No 41 of 1978, the Soil Conservation Act, No. 24 of 1996, the Mines & 
Minerals Act No. 33 of 1992, etc.) are also considered in decision-making. According to the CEA 
planner, the approval of relevant agencies is required with the EIA report, if such approval is 
mandatory under the provisions of the above Acts. However, there is no legal requirement to obtain 
the approval of the DMC in the EIA process. As reported in Chapters 4 and 5, the DM Act No. 13 of 
2005 is emergency management legislation, but the Act does not have provisions on risk reduction. 
On the other hand, the National Strategy of Disaster Management (MDM&HR (Ministry of Disaster 
Management and Human Rights), 2006) recommends assessing the disaster risk of development 
projects through a disaster impact assessment process. Nevertheless, the national strategy is not yet 
legally enforced. In addition to the NEA 1980, both the Coast Conservation Act No. 57 of 1981 (CCA) 
and the Fauna and Flora Protection (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 1993 (FFPA) also have provisions for 
separate EIA processes. A comparison of the three EIA processes was given in Chapter 4 (see Table 
4.2). Even though these three (i.e. The NEA 1980, CCA 1981, FFPA 1993) do not overlap, none of the 
three Acts has explicit provisions to assess disaster risk of development projects.   
In New Zealand, in addition to the RMA 1991, the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA), the Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEMA), The Building Act (2004), and the Local 
Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 (LGOIMA) all have provisions related to 
natural hazard management. Except for the RMA, none of the above has any direct or explicit 
provisions related to the EIA process, and all but the CDEMA pay attention to natural hazard risk in 
development planning. The Building Act has provisions to enforce a dam safety assurance 
programme for medium and high potential dams, which includes, among other things, safety reviews 
of the dam, a monitoring plan and an emergency action plan. The lack of consistency between the 
above Acts was discussed earlier in this chapter; such inconsistencies have also been raised in the 
Technical Advisory Group report (Dormer et al., 2012), which recommends improving linkages among 
relevant legislation.  
Private property rights  
There is a considerable debate among experts and planners in New Zealand about private property 
rights. This is mostly attached to the neoliberal policies promoted in the country. According to 
consent authority planners, local governments’ ability to dictate terms on resource use is generally 
constrained by the private property rights of the owners. It is generally accepted that an owner of 
property rights possesses the consent of the community to exercise his/her rights without 
interference, provided that his/her actions are in keeping with the rule of Law (Demsetz, 1967, p. 
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347). This study did not attempt to go into the detail of private property rights and their implications 
for land use planning, however, it is important to look at the context in which such limitations 
emerge for local authorities. Neo-liberalism and private property rights has been a subject of 
international discourse over the last few decades as physical property rights of owners make 
traditional matters of land use planning much more difficult for governments in contexts where neo-
liberal policies are promoted (Hatcher, 2010).  
The RMA 1991 is clear and explicit on the use of land and property rights. According to section 85(2) 
of the RMA, any person can challenge a plan or proposed plan in the Environment Court if he/she 
believes that the provision or proposed provision would limit reasonable use of land. This protects 
the owners’ rights of use of the property. However, reasonable use is defined in section 85 (6) as 
“…the use or potential use of the land for any activity whose actual or potential effects on any aspect 
of the environment or on any person other than the applicant would not be significant”. Therefore, 
according to the RMA, the owner can enjoy private property rights as long as the use of the land does 
not make any significant negative effect on the environment. The High Court in Coleman vs. Kingston 
(AP103-SW00) ruled that property rights and other provisions of the Property Law Act 1952 do not 
conflict with the RMA. The Court further stated that the exercise of property rights needs to fall into 
line with the RMA. This is consistent with the arguments presented in the literature (Demsetz, 1967; 
Friedman, 2002). The property rights issue in New Zealand can be explained using an example of 
owning a car. You can drive the car as long as you obey the rules and do not harm others. In order to 
protect the general public and other road users from any misbehaving act of drivers, specific 
standards and rules are in place. Ownership rights do not supersede the rights of others to live 
without being subjected to any harm. Therefore, the findings in Chapter 6 suggest that the private 
property rights issue among planners is more a politically constructed obstacle than a real issue. 
Good governance principles  
As argued in Chapter 2, well-conceived EIAs should reflect many of the elements of good governance 
principles (Kakonge, 1998). This chapter has already discussed various good governance principles, 
including openness, participation and accountability, and will not repeat that discussion here. It is, 
however, important to reemphasize the importance of access to information. Like other research 
(e.g., Baker & McLelland, 2003; Hartley & Wood, 2005; Transparency International, 2003), access to 
information is identified in this research as the key influence on accountability, transparency and 
effective participation in risk governance and in the battle against corruption.  
According to the UNISDR (2011), access to information is effective only when governments actively 
support the right to information through established legislation and when citizens are aware of their 
legal rights and are willing to claim them. Hartley & Wood (2005) argue that the public should have 
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access to a wider range of information if effective participation is to occur. In this context, New 
Zealand’s LGOIMA 1987 plays an important role in promoting open and participative governance by 
local authorities. Therefore, provisions in the RMA and LGOIMA are together expected to ensure all 
information about resource consents, decisions and conditions are made available for the public, as 
of right. It is clear from the interviews that planners respect the rights of the public to access relevant 
information. According to an environmental commissioner, once the decision is made “It is a public 
document”. New Zealand’s open government policy is clearly evident in two case studies and in the 
interviews with planners and experts. It is also clear that such openness has facilitated public 
participation and has influenced accountability and regulatory quality of consent authorities.  
In contrast, the right to information is heavily compromised in Sri Lanka through a lack of such 
legislation (Transparency International Sri Lanka, 2011). It is clear from the two case studies and 
interviews that neither the public nor the experts have access to project related information, in most 
instances. Even though the NEA is clear and explicit about the disclosure of approval decisions, the 
conditions attached to the approval are not legally required to be made public. Therefore, lack of 
access to information has affected every step of the EIA process in Sri Lanka and has eventually 
reduced the overall effectiveness of the EIA process in addressing disaster risk.    
7.6.4 International governance context 
Dependency theorists have for many years been arguing about the influence of multi-lateral aid on 
economic, social and environmental management policies in developing countries (Bornschier et al., 
1978; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Shandra et al., 2004; Shandra et al., 2011). Some scholars argue 
multi-lateral and bilateral should not be considered equally because their motives and policies would 
be different (Alesina & Weder, 1999; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984). Maizels & Nissanke (1984) conclude 
that bilateral aid allocations for developing countries largely depend on donors’ foreign economic, 
political and security interests, whereas multi-lateral aid is allocated chiefly on a recipient’s need 
criteria. Since 2009, Sri Lanka has increasingly sought bi-lateral funding especially from China and, 
therefore, the influence of Chinese economic and political interests can be seen in all spheres of 
domestic governance (see Chapter 4). However, it is the influence of Chinese funding on 
environmental management, especially on the EIA process of Sri Lanka that is the subject for 
discussion here.  
Examining the influence of bi-lateral and multi-lateral aid on the EIA process is not novel. A number 
of scholars, over many years, have pointed out the influence of aid agencies on environmental 
management practices of recipient countries (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Ortolano & Shepherd, 
1995). Like other international examples, the influence of multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid policies on 
the Sri Lankan EIA process is obvious. According to the CEA planner, they are more comfortable 
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handling projects funded by such agencies because the foreign expertise and technical support is also 
attached to those development programmes, which reduces the burden on the officials. However, 
the legal expert disagreed with the planners and argued that such influences show the 
ineffectiveness of the domestic EIA process.  
As reported in Chapter 4, China, through its increased role as a bi-lateral funder in Sri Lanka, has 
gained the largest share of total Sri Lankan foreign aid contributions. Besides the international 
suspicion that China is increasingly funding rogue nations (Woods, 2008), increased Chinese loans, 
mostly of a purely commercial nature, have created a substantial impact on the Sri Lankan EIA 
process. It is evident from the interviews with the planners and the experts that this influence is two 
pronged. First, it has taken away the positive influence traditionally exerted on the EIA process by 
other multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies. Secondly, the projects funded by Chinese loans are 
politically influenced, thus are not usually subjected to environmental and public scrutiny. Therefore, 
it is clear that the increased role played by bi-lateral aid from China could have substantial negative 
effects on the EIA process of Sri Lanka both in the short and long term.  
Compared with Sri Lanka, New Zealand does not depend on foreign aid. Moreover, the funding 
sought to implement projects that are planned and implemented under the domestic development-
planning framework is largely through private investors with risk borne by insurers and international 
re-insurance agencies. Therefore, the conditions of bi-lateral funding have little or no influence on 
New Zealand’s environmental management efforts and any influence that might be exerted by 
international re-insurers was not assessed as part of this research.  
7.7 Chapter Summary  
This chapter presented a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the EIA processes of Sri Lanka 
and New Zealand in addressing disaster risk using the modified effectiveness triangle presented in 
Figure 7.1. The comparative analysis of the findings shows that DRR is not explicitly integrated into 
either country’s EIA processes. However, general provisions and guidance are better provided for in 
the New Zealand EIA process than in Sri Lanka. Even though the legal provisions of the Sri Lankan EIA 
process are considered clear and explicit, except for a few gaps, the practice is weak in many aspects. 
This shortcoming results in limited procedural effectiveness in Sri Lanka compared with New Zealand. 
Explicit integration of hazard risk leads to including a detailed assessment of natural hazard risks in 
the New Zealand EIA process, which is, in many aspects, weaker in the Sri Lankan process. However, 
in both countries, vulnerability assessments are not conducted and, therefore, the potential disaster 
risk of development activity is not properly estimated. Even though the approval decisions in New 
Zealand are often based on the EIA process, the lack of disaster risk assessment in the EIA process 
does not provide sufficient information for decision makers, reducing the substantive effectiveness 
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of the EIA process. In the Sri Lankan context, neither is disaster risk estimated nor is project approval 
consistently based on the EIA process.  
In addition, the domestic governance context of Sri Lanka does not provide a conducive environment 
to ensure the current legislative provisions are implemented effectively and efficiently. Poor 
institutional capacity, weaker policy and political context and weaker adherence of governance 
principles all lead to poor contextual effectiveness and, in turn, poor procedural effectiveness. In 
contrast in New Zealand, even though some provisions of the legislation are vague and implicit, many 
potential malpractices are avoided because of the high level of accountability and transparency of 
the process. The lack of disaster risk integration into the EIA legislation is common in both countries. 
This is further aggravated by inconsistency and lack of coherence between disaster management 
legislation and EIA legislation. As a result, institutional and cognitive integration suffers. Even though 
both environmental management and disaster management functions at local level are assigned to 
local authorities in New Zealand, lack of guidance (i.e., national environmental standards on disaster 
risk) on addressing disaster risk of development programmes limits the potential of such institutions 
to address the disaster risk of development projects. Funding conditions play a significant role in the 
Sri Lankan EIA process to ensure that EIAs are conducted and the provisions of the Acts are 
implemented adequately, at least in the projects funded by some multi-lateral and bi-lateral 
agencies. This leads to increased procedural effectiveness. However, recent changes in the external 
funding flow have reduced such positive influences on the EIA process. The conclusions derived from 
this discussion are presented in the next chapter, together with policy and theoretical implications 
and limitations of the research. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions  
8.1   Introduction  
As shown in Chapter 1, there has been an exponential increase in extensive disaster risks over the 
past 20 years, especially in the low and middle-income countries (UNISDR, 2011). Previous research 
suggests that extensive disaster risk is a direct result of mal-development and poor governance (see 
Chapter 2). Even though Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is conducted as a development 
control to address the environmental effects of development projects, the effectiveness of EIA 
processes in addressing disaster risk has not previously been evaluated. This study set out to explore 
the effectiveness of EIA processes in addressing development-induced disaster risk. In order to 
achieve this, the research focussed on four questions:  
1. Policy Integration: how well, if at all, is disaster risk reduction integrated into EIA processes? 
2. Procedural Effectiveness: assuming it is integrated then how well is it practised? 
3. Substantive effectiveness: does the EIA process achieve the objectives set and result in 
disaster risk reduction? and 
4. Contextual effectiveness: what influence does the risk governance have on substantive 
effectiveness? 
Consistent with the above four research questions, the study conducted a comparative analysis of 
the effectiveness of EIA processes in Sri Lanka and New Zealand. This chapter draws the key 
conclusions from the above research questions based on the overall analysis carried out in Chapter 7. 
The chapter also revisits the disaster risk incubation model and discusses how this study contributes 
to disaster risk management theory as well as policy development in the context of Sri Lanka and 
New Zealand, and potentially also globally. Finally, the chapter highlights the limitations of the study 
and points out key recommendations for future research.  
8.2  Evaluation against the research questions 
Details of the empirical findings were presented in Chapters 5 and 6. In this section the main 
empirical findings are evaluated against the four research questions. 
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8.2.1 Policy integration: how well, if at all, is disaster risk reduction integrated into 
EIA processes? 
The empirical findings show that explicit reference to disaster risk is absent in environmental 
management legislation in both Sri Lanka and New Zealand. In Sri Lanka, the National Environmental 
Act (NEA) 1980 does not cover impacts on people; so technically, disaster risk does not come under 
its purview. However, in practice, effects on people are assessed and disaster risk is implicit under 
“…the avoidable and unavoidable adverse environmental effect” in the NEA 1980. In New Zealand, 
according to the regional planner interviewed, disaster risk is implicitly mentioned under “…any 
potential effect of low probability which has a high potential impact” (RMA, 1991, s.3(f)). Despite 
these views, most planners and experts interviewed argued for more explicit reference to disaster 
risk in the EIA process in both countries. The vagueness of such provisions has led to ambiguous and 
inconsistent or sometimes even conflicting practices (see section 8.2.2).  
Lack of consistency and coherence between environmental legislation and disaster management 
legislation is common in both countries. In New Zealand, the Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (CDEM) strategy (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008b) expects risk reduction to be 
carried out under the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) provisions, but the RMA does not have 
any explicit reference to the CDEM strategy nor DRR requirements. Similarly, the National Disaster 
Management Policy of Sri Lanka (Ministry of Disaster Management, 2013a) requires assessing the 
disaster risk of development projects but the role of disaster management authorities in the project 
approval process is not recognized in its environmental legislation.  
Lack of guidance and poor coordination among environmental management and disaster risk 
management agencies of both countries have led to insufficient attention to disaster risk in the EIA 
process.  
8.2.2 Procedural effectiveness: assuming it is integrated, then how well is it 
practised? 
As argued in Chapter 7, sensitivity to disaster risk should be present in all steps of the EIA process in 
order to ensure that the disaster risk of development projects is assessed and treated effectively. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of EIA in addressing disaster risk is directly related to how well these 
steps are designed and implemented. However, it has been revealed that there are many gaps in 
how those steps are implemented in both countries. For instance, even though provision for 
consideration of alternative locations and technologies (methods) is clear and explicit in the RMA 
1991 in New Zealand, both the interviews and case studies revealed that consideration of 
alternatives for a proposed development activity appears weak in practice. In Sri Lanka, both the 
policy and practice is weak in the consideration of alternatives.   
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Project screening in both Sri Lanka and New Zealand is not effective in terms of considering 
development-induced disaster risk. Providing a list of prescribed projects at the national level has 
proven ineffective in Sri Lanka because of its inability to take local differences into account during 
screening. In New Zealand, screening is done against the different classes of activities listed in 
relevant district and regional plans (i.e., permitted, controlled, restricted discretionary, discretionary, 
non-complying and prohibited), but the experts argued that the above classification is often not 
based on a full and explicit risk assessment. Recent studies also show that neither regional policy 
statements nor district plans are explicitly based on systematic risk assessments and vulnerability is 
often not assessed in such policies and plans (Saunders et al., 2014). In addition, even though the 
two countries have different approaches to scoping (i.e., an agency driven approach in Sri Lanka 
compared with a developer driven approach in New Zealand), neither has proven effective in terms 
of its ability to provide a sound scope for the EIA to address disaster risk effectively.  
Compliance monitoring is weak and ineffective in Sri Lanka because of a lack of clear, explicit 
guidance and the legal requirements on post approval monitoring. This has been aggravated by the 
lack of transparency of the process, insufficient resources and poor motivation of the authorities. In 
contrast, in New Zealand, both developers and local authorities are legally required to do compliance 
monitoring and both local authorities and developers usually meet the requirements of compliance 
monitoring. It is clear that transparency of decision-making and availability of all relevant information 
on approval decisions, including conditions of the approval, in the public domain play a significant 
role in increased monitoring effectiveness. 
8.2.3 Substantive effectiveness: does the EIA process achieve the objectives set 
and result in disaster risk reduction? 
In explicit reference to disaster risk in the EIA process, procedural deficiencies of the EIA process 
have led to a low level of substantive effectiveness in both countries. Neither EIA system effectively 
addresses the disaster risk of development projects. The case studies researched show that there is 
inconsistency in how disaster risk is assessed and treated in the EIA processes. Hazard assessments 
are conducted in both countries to a varying degree, but vulnerability has either been minimally or 
narrowly (as a part of social impact assessment or as a separate assessment), or not assessed in any 
of the studied cases. Hazard assessment in Sri Lanka is weak and falls short in terms of its depth and 
width; in New Zealand, it is more detailed and extensive. However, neither country has vulnerability 
assessments conducted even in their simplest forms. Moreover, social impacts are given weaker 
attention in both countries and such assessments are independent of hazard assessment, leaving 
little opportunity for assessing the disaster risk of development projects. In New Zealand, the 
execution of social impact assessments is not consistent in practice. For instance, even though a 
Social Impact Assessment (SIA) has been done for four of the studied projects, including the 
  
 222 
Transmission Gully Project (TGP), a SIA has not been done for another three including the Waitohi 
Irrigation and Hydro Scheme (WIHS), which is considered a project that potentially increases the 
vulnerability of many downstream communities.  
In Sri Lanka, the EIA process is often not a decisive tool in approving most government-sponsored 
projects. However, decisions on development activities proposed by non-state developers usually are 
subjected to environmental scrutiny and decisions are based on the evidence from the EIA process. 
In New Zealand, the level of influence of the EIA report (called an AEE) on project approval varies 
depending on the decision pathway taken for the consent application and the quality of information 
provided by the report. However, when the full EIA process is considered, approval decisions are 
based on the EIA process and are also based on whether the effects identified in the EIA process fit 
with the provisions of relevant standards or plans. Therefore, effects, including disaster risks of an 
activity, may be disregarded if relevant standards or the plans permit an activity with that effect. As 
argued earlier in this section, the New Zealand EIA process is not often based on systematic disaster 
risk assessments. Therefore, even though the EIA process provides the most up-to-date information 
compared with plans, disaster risks identified and assessed in the EIA might show lower risks than 
the actual disaster risk of the activity. Since plans may not be based on current information and 
generally are not based on systematic risk assessment, the above provisions and procedures in 
decision-making reduce the substantive effectiveness of the entire process.  
There is a clear difference between Sri Lanka and New Zealand in how the findings of EIA reports are 
used in project planning. In Sri Lanka, EIA reports are often not considered in project planning, 
especially in government-sponsored projects, whereas, in New Zealand, there is a high tendency that 
EIA findings are used in project planning. There is clear empirical evidence that the two projects 
studied from Sri Lanka have increased disaster risk in the environment, proving that the EIA 
processes in these two projects had been ineffective in reducing disaster risk. Similarly, in New 
Zealand, the disaster risk of the studied projects has not been assessed adequately. In the WIHS, 
community members have already raised their concerns about increased disaster risk in their 
submissions to the regional council. Even though the real implications of such inadequate 
assessments will only be realized in the future when the project impacts are actually felt, experience 
from other poorly planned infrastructure projects in New Zealand such as Opuha Dam15 in 
Canterbury and around the world (see Chapter 2) suggests that such impacts are imminent.  
                                                          
15 The Opuha Dam in South Canterbury, New Zealand, had collapsed during a flood in 1997. The dam was under 
construction when the breach happened. 
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8.2.4 Contextual effectiveness: what influence does risk governance have on 
substantive effectiveness? 
The influence of governance on substantive effectiveness is an important question in effectiveness 
research. Several scholars have concluded that the governance context is a key aspect in why some 
EIA systems deliver better results than others (Alshuwaikhat, 2005; Marara et al., 2011; Wang et al., 
2012). In this study, a number of good governance principles including public participation, political 
will, transparency, accountability and access to information were considered as factors that directly 
influence EIA processes.  
There is a clear difference between Sri Lanka and New Zealand in the level of the quality of their 
governance and this has implications for the respective EIA processes. Based on interviews with 
experts, planners and community members, public participation in Sri Lanka appears as 
“manipulation” or pursuing public education on project benefits. Any attempt to gain public 
participation is seen only in reviewing EIA reports; public participation during other steps of the EIA 
process is absent. Even though the NEA 1980 is clear and explicit about public participation in the EIA 
report review, it is weak in practice. In contrast, public participation in reviewing EIA report is 
encouraged in the New Zealand EIA process, but it is again weak in other stages. In New Zealand, 
public participation usually takes place in terms of public consultation. From the High Court definition 
of consultation, “…the party obliged to consult, while quite entitled to have a working plan already in 
mind, must keep its mind open and be ready to change and even start afresh” (Wellington 
International Airport Ltd v Air New Zealand [1993] 1 NZLR 671). Therefore, the public is given greater 
negotiation power in the process of public consultation. However, it is still possible to have poor 
consultation in practice and there are cases where a public outcry emerges because of a lack of 
adequate consultation.  
Even though political influence on development planning is common in both countries, political 
influence in the Sri Lankan EIA process affects even the project approval decision. This is uncommon 
in New Zealand. Lack of transparency and lack of access to information has made public participation 
weaker in the Sri Lankan EIA process than in New Zealand. On the other hand, in New Zealand, 
respect for the rule of law and accountability of the authorities encourages them to follow the 
legislative provisions and therefore increases procedural effectiveness. However, the findings of this 
research have revealed that such contextual factors do not have a significant influence on the level of 
substantive effectiveness in New Zealand. Therefore, the level of quality governance affects only 
procedural effectiveness, but does not have a direct influence on substantive effectiveness. 
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8.3   Theoretical and methodological implications 
This section explains how the findings of this research contribute to existing knowledge on disaster 
risk management and effectiveness research at both theoretical and methodological levels. Based on 
the findings of this study, this section first revisits the disaster risk incubation model presented in 
Chapter 2 and then evaluates the modified EIA process of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). 
Finally, the section also evaluates previous research findings on the influence of the governance 
context on the effectiveness of the EIA process.  
Chapter 2 concluded by presenting the disaster risk incubation model. The model represents the 
relationship among mal-development, governance context and disaster risk. The model was 
constructed based on the disaster incubation theory developed by Turner (1976). Turner (1976, p. 
381), after investigating a sequence of events associated with a major disaster, described an 
‘incubation period’, which he explained as the time period in which “…accumulation of an unnoticed 
set of events” leads to the actual onset of disaster. Later, a number of scholars have applied the 
disaster incubation theory in different contexts. For instance, Mulvihill and Ali (2007) apply this 
concept to explain the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and argue that the higher 
casualties among vulnerable groups can be traced back to years-long risk incubation in Greater New 
Orleans region because of poor land use planning and bad political decisions that put such groups in 
harm’s way. Therefore, in Chapter 2, it was argued that both mal-development and poor governance 
incubate disaster risks in contemporary society. The scholars who promoted the disaster incubation 
theory have also argued that a wide-ranging assessment, which covers both social and biophysical 
dimensions, is required to capture the complex set of factors and processes that lead to disaster risk 
incubation (Ali, 2004, 2009; Mulvihill & Ali, 2007; Rydin, 2006; Seager, 2006). Mulvihill and Ali (2007) 
emphasize that the objective of employing environmental assessments in development planning is to 
assess such factors and processes. Therefore, the ability of EIA to assess both biophysical and social 
factors that lead to disaster should be a critical feature of any EIA system to address disaster risk (Ali, 
2009; Mulvihill & Ali, 2007).  
Turner (1976) and the above scholars, however, applied disaster incubation theory in post-disaster 
contexts to understand the causal factors and processes behind a particular disaster. Environmental 
impact assessment is a predictive tool, which is employed to evaluate potential effects of a 
development project. Therefore, this study argues for a more systematically designed EIA process to 
investigate potential biophysical and social factors and processes that incubate disaster risk in order 
to avoid any such risk incubation. It is in this context that the research evaluated the effectiveness of 
EIA processes of Sri Lanka and New Zealand. The research also investigated the domestic governance 
context in which EIA is implemented and the influence of funding conditions, which is a part of the 
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international governance context. Figures 8.1a and b show the influence of the domestic governance 
context and the funding conditions of multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies. 
It is clear that, though the conditions of funding agencies play a major role in determining the 
development planning process in Sri Lanka, they are of little or no importance in New Zealand 
(Shown in a . On the other hand, the domestic governance context in New Zealand has a higher 
perceived governance quality and more elaborate environmental policy framework than Sri Lanka. 
However, the lack of DRR integration into EIA legislation leads to insufficient attention to disaster risk 
in both Sri Lanka and New Zealand. The New Zealand EIA process is skewed towards biophysical 
assessment; substantial assessments are conducted to identify hazard risk. However, little attention 
is given to social effects and the absence of vulnerability assessments make the New Zealand EIA 
system fall short of assessing and treating disaster risks adequately (Figure 8.1a). In contrast, even 
though there is some attention on more obvious hazards, the Sri Lankan EIA process is, in general, 
weak in assessing both hazard risk and the vulnerability of development projects. Based on the 
findings of this study, the generic disaster risk incubation model presented in Chapter 2 can be 
redrawn as presented in Figures 8.1a and b. Figure 2.5 in Chapter 2, depicts the relationships 
between the different concepts discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to disaster risk incubation in 
contemporary societies. Figures 8.1a and b present the strength of such relationships in the two 
studied countries based on empirical findings.  
In both Sri Lanka and New Zealand, poor substantive effectiveness means the two EIA processes are 
not systematically designed to address disaster risks incubated in the environment due to mal-
development. In New Zealand, higher contextual effectiveness due to a stronger domestic 
governance context and higher procedural effectiveness through stronger EIA legislation proved 
ineffective in addressing disaster risk incubation because of a lack of disaster risk integration into the 
EIA legislation and poor substantive effectiveness. In Sri Lanka, even though there are some 
promising provisions in the legislation (e.g., having technical evaluation committees for independent 
verification of information), lower contextual effectiveness because of weaker domestic governance 
has led to poor procedural effectiveness. Moreover, inadequate disaster risk integration into EIA 
legislation and poor substantive effectiveness makes the EIA process fall well short of addressing 
disaster risk incubation due to mal-development. Therefore, ineffectiveness in both countries in 
addressing disaster risk leads to risk incubation in the societies. The results of such processes have 
already been witnessed in both countries. Therefore, the findings of this study demand disaster risk 
integration and improved procedural, substantive and contextual effectiveness of the EIA process to 
address the disaster risk of development projects and to avoid risk incubation.  
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In general, the findings of this research highlight the importance of conducting hazard and 
vulnerability assessment as a part of impact identification in the EIA process. This agrees with the 
modified EIA process promoted by the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), which requires 
vulnerability and hazard assessments to be carried out as a part of impact identification (see Figure 
2.3). However, the findings also emphasize that conducting hazard and vulnerability assessment does 
not alone guarantee that the disaster risk of development projects is effectively addressed by the EIA 
process. That requires a comprehensive EIA process with more explicit provisions on disaster risk and 
also a higher level of substantive and contextual effectiveness.  
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 7, it is the established premise in the literature that the effectiveness 
of impact assessment systems depends on the context within which environmental assessment 
legislation and guidelines are understood and implemented (Alshuwaikhat, 2005; Bina, 2008; El-Fadl 
& El-Fadel, 2004; Marara et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012). This study suggests that such general 
conclusions need to be more nuanced. The quality of governance affects the procedural 
effectiveness of the EIA in both Sri Lanka and New Zealand. However, the findings also show that 
governance quality has little influence over the substantive effectiveness of EIA in addressing disaster 
risk. The latter requires more explicit disaster risk integration into the EIA legislation as well as the 
institutional and cognitive integration of disaster risk.  
As argued in Chapter 2, there is a substantial literature on effectiveness research. However, a set of 
evaluation criteria to assess the effectiveness of EIA in addressing disaster risk was not available. As a 
methodological contribution, this study developed a set of evaluation criteria that proved useful in 
investigating EIA processes in two quite different countries. This set of evaluation criteria may be 
used in evaluating the effectiveness of the EIA process in other countries and should be tested more 
widely.   
Further to the above, a modified effectiveness triangle was developed based on Sadler’s 
effectiveness triangle and used in this study (see Figure 7.1). Sadler’s effectiveness triangle (Figure 
2.4) has been used to explain general performance of an EIA system. However, it does not provide an 
analytical framework to investigate the performance of a specific aspect of the EIA process (e.g. 
disaster risk reduction). The modified effectiveness triangle used in this study showed its applicability 
to explain the performance of an EIA system in addressing specific aspect in two different countries. 
However, its wider use for other aspects (i.e. gender integration, social and cultural integration) 
would require further testing on different aspects in different contexts.   
In summary, the findings of this study concur with the disaster incubation theory and argue that the 
EIA processes of both Sri Lanka and New Zealand are not systematically designed to address disaster 
risk of development projects. Therefore, they are unable to avoid disaster risk incubation due to mal-
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development. Even though the findings of the research concur with the modified EIA process of the 
CDB, the study findings clearly show that assessment of hazard and vulnerability alone does not 
reduce disaster risk of development projects. The findings support the need for a more 
comprehensive approach of looking at policy integration, procedural, substantive and contextual 
effectiveness of the EIA process. Despite the established knowledge on the influence of governance 
on EIA outcomes, the study’s findings show that the governance context has little influence on the 
substantive effectiveness of the EIA process. However, it does have significant influence on 
procedural effectiveness.  
8.4  Policy implications 
There are several policy and practice changes that are implied by the study if the potential for 
disasters is to be further reduced.  
It is evident from the UNISDR’s HFA progress reporting that disaster management authorities around 
the world consider an EIA as an effective tool to address the disaster risk of development projects 
(PreventionWeb, 2014). Under the HFA, the progress reporting framework of the UNISDR, core 
indicator 6, under priority for action 4 of the HFA, requires member countries to report whether 
“Impacts of disaster risk taken account in [sic] Environment Impact Assessment (EIA)” (UNISDR, 2014, 
p. 30). Over 87 countries, including New Zealand and Sri Lanka reported in the 2009-2011 reporting 
cycle that EIAs are in place to address the disaster risk of development projects (PreventionWeb, 
2014). However, this study’s findings revealed that EIA is not effective in addressing the disaster risk 
of development projects in either country. Since the general steps in carrying out an EIA are more or 
less similar throughout the world (Saengsupavanich, 2012; Toro et al., 2010), it is logical to infer that 
the above experience from Sri Lanka and New Zealand may apply to most countries that employ EIA 
to address disaster risk. Therefore, the results generated from the current HFA progress reporting 
framework of the UNISDR may be misleading; it is important to take into account the effectiveness of 
such EIA processes in addressing disaster risk in the HFA progress reporting framework.  
Despite the fact that at least 87 countries, especially low and middle income ones, rely on EIA to 
address the disaster risk of development projects (UNISDR, 2011), there is little research on disaster 
risk integration and EIA processes. This study shows the importance of policy integration into 
environmental legislation and EIA procedures. The findings also show the importance of institutional 
integration and creating DRR thinking among all parties involved in the EIA process to ensure that 
disaster risk is assessed and treated effectively. It is clear that the EIA processes in Sri Lanka and New 
Zealand require deliberate and consistent actions to integrate disaster risk reduction concerns into 
policy, institutions and human knowledge, supported by good governance principles to achieve 
better risk governance. 
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Both Sri Lanka and New Zealand should undertake a number of policy adjustments in the EIA 
guidelines and environmental management legislation to ensure disaster risk is explicitly integrated 
into the legislation and EIA procedures. This study reveals that vague phrases in legislation, such as 
“…the avoidable and unavoidable adverse environmental effect” (NEAA, 1988, 12(b) or “…any 
potential effect of low probability which has a high potential impact” (RMA, 1991, s.3(f)), do not 
compel planners and practitioners to address the disaster risks of development projects. Therefore, 
such phrases should be clear and more explicit about what is intended and leave little room for 
ambiguities.  
8.5  Limitations of the study 
The findings and analysis of this research were constrained by three key limitations. First, the study 
was based on four case studies, two from each country, which limited the empirical data for the final 
analysis. The number of case studies was determined for financial reasons and time constraints. 
However, data from multiple sources and wide geographical locations were collected and the results 
appear robust.  
Secondly, the set of evaluation criteria developed for the study is not exhaustive. It could be argued 
that the evaluation criteria regarding the governance context are too simplistic for more complex 
contextual factors that affect the operationalization of an EIA. As argued in Chapter 2, many 
contextual factors affect the implementation of an EIA system ranging from public participation to 
government corruption. However, it was clear from the literature that investigating the effectiveness 
of an EIA system against all such contextual factors was not practical, within the resources available 
for this study.  
Thirdly, the linkages between disaster risk and anthropogenic climate change are increasingly 
recognized (IPCC, 2012). Therefore, the disaster risk of development projects should include the 
influence of climate change in disaster risk and its implications on the effects of development 
projects. This research deliberately avoided discussions of the effects of anthropogenic climate 
change on project-induced disaster risk to keep the objectives manageable under the given time 
frame and financial resources. However, the approach adopted in this research can be used in 
assessing the effectiveness of EIA in addressing climate change induced risks in future research. For 
current purposes, it is sufficient to note that the existing weaknesses in the EIA processes are likely to 
be exacerbated by inclusion of climate change considerations.  
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8.6  Recommendations for future research  
This research suggests two key areas for further investigation. One is on the effectiveness of the 
modified EIA process used in the Caribbean region by the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) to 
address disaster risk. As discussed in Chapter 2, the modified EIA process of the CDB is designed to 
address disaster risk of development projects by deliberately investigating hazard risk and 
vulnerability assessment. Currently, no evaluation of this process is available and it was difficult to 
include one of the Caribbean countries in this study for financial reasons and time constraints. 
However, as argued earlier, the findings of this study partly support the modified EIA process of the 
CDB.  
Secondly, the current discourse on climate change and EIA is increasingly recognized in a number of 
countries and among multilateral agencies (Agrawala, Kramer, Prudent-Richard, Sainsbury, & 
Schreitter, 2012). Agrawala et al. (2012) investigated the feasibility of incorporating climate change 
considerations into the EIA process. However, knowledge on the effectiveness of the EIA process in 
addressing climate-induced risk is yet to be thoroughly explored and such knowledge will be 
increasingly demanded because of increased interest in climate change impacts. The knowledge 
generated from the research suggests that further research on the effectiveness of EIA in addressing 
climate risk will need to consider both procedural and substantive effectiveness.   
8.7 Conclusion  
This study found that the EIA processes in Sri Lanka and New Zealand are not effective in addressing 
the disaster risk of development projects. The research further shows that the inadequacy of DRR 
practices, procedures and knowledge across environmental and disaster management policies, 
institutions and actors and weak procedural and contextual effectiveness contribute to the poor 
substantive effectiveness of an EIA. Thus, the study’s findings contest the established practice of 
using EIAs to address disaster risk and demands evaluations of EIA systems elsewhere to assess their 
effectiveness in disaster risk reduction.  
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Heinma, K., & Põder, T. n. (2010). Effectiveness of Environmental Impact Assessment system in 
Estonia. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 30(4), 272-277. 
doi:10.1016/j.eiar.2009.10.001 
Hettiarachchi, K., Silva, D., & Thambiah, M. (2010, 22, July 2013). How many more floods before 
something’s done? Sunday Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.sundaytimes.lk/101121/Plus/plus_02.html 
Hilding-Rydevik, T. (2006). Environmental Assessment - Effectiveness, quality and success. In Lars 
Emmelin (Ed.), Effective Environmental Assessment Tools - Critical reflections on concepts and 
practice (Vol. Research Report No 2006:03): Bleckinge Institute of Technology Retrieved from 
http://www.bth.se/tks/mist.nsf/(WebFiles)/7E8527DC14A688C1C125717200338E52/$FILE/E
ffective Environmental Assessment Tools - critical reflections on concepts and practice, MiSt 
BTH.pdf 
Hilding-Rydevik, T., & Bjarnadóttir, H. (2007). Context awareness and sensitivity in SEA 
implementation. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 27(7), 666-684. 
doi:10.1016/j.eiar.2007.05.009 
  
 240 
Hilhorst, D., & Bankoff, G. (2004). Introduction: Mapping vulnerability. In G. Bankoff, G. Frerks & D. 
Hilhorst (Eds.), Mapping vulnerability: disasters, development, and people: Earthscan. 
Retrieved from http://books.google.co.nz 
Hughey, K. (1997). Big business and the mountain environment: Focus on mining. Retrieved from 
http://www.mtnforum.org/sites/default/files/pub/317.pdf 
Hunter, D. (1998). International Environmental Law: Sources, principles, and innovations. In P. G. 
Harris (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Global Environmental Politics. Retrieved from 
http://scholar.google.co.nz/scholar?q=international+agreements+affecting+the+environmen
tal+planning&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart&sa=X&ei=wj6YU56UBISjkAXCkoHwCQ
&ved=0CB4QgQMwAA 
Hurunui Water Project. (2013). Latest on Waitohi proposal. Retrieved 21, March, 2014,from 
http://www.hurunuiwater.co.nz/ 
IAIA (International Association for Impact Assessment). (1999). Principles of Environmental Impact 
Assessment best practice. Retrieved from http://www.iaia.org/publicdocuments/special-
publications/Principles of IA_web.pdf 
IAIA (International Association for Impact Assessment). (2002). Strategic Environmental Assessment: 
Performance criteria. Special Publications: Series 1. Retrieved from 
http://www.iaia.org/publicdocuments/special-publications/sp1.pdf 
IAIA (International Association for Impact Assessment). (2009). What is Impact Assessment? 
Retrieved from http://www.iaia.org/publicdocuments/special-publications/What is 
IA_web.pdf 
IEMA. (2011). Special Report-The State of Environmental Impact Assessment Practice in the UK. 
Retrieved from http://www.iema.net/iema-special-reports 
IPCC. (2007). Climate change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
2007. Retrieved from http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/contents.html 
IPCC. (2012). Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change 
Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. Stocker,D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. 
Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S.K. Allen, M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA, 582 pp. 
IRGC. (2008). An Introduction to the IRGC Risk Governance Framework. Retrieved from 
http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/An_introduction_to_the_IRGC_Risk_Governance_Framework.
pdf 
IUCN Sri Lanka, & the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources. (2007). The 2007 Red List of 
Threatened Fauna and Flora of Sri Lanka. Colombo, Sri Lanka: IUCN Sri Lanka. 
Jacobson, M. (2004). Review of the New Zealand Costal Policy Statement 1994 - Coastal Hazards. 
Retrieved from http://doc.org.nz/documents/conservation/marine-and-coastal/coastal-
management/nzcps-hazards-review-1.pdf 
Jay, S., Jones, C., Slinn, P., & Wood, C. (2007). Environmental impact assessment: Retrospect and 
prospect. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 27(4), 287-300. 
doi:10.1016/j.eiar.2006.12.001 
  
 241 
JICA. (2010). Guidelines for Envrionmental and Social Considerations Retrieved from 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/social_environmental/guideline/pdf/guideline1003
26.pdf 
Kakonge, J. O. (1998). EIA and good governance: Issues and lessons from Africa. Environmental 
Impact Assessment Review, 18(3), 289-305. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2007). Worldwide Governance Indicators Project: 
Answering the Critics. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4149. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965077 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2008). Governance matters VII: aggregate and individual 
governance indicators 1996-2007. 
Klein, R. J. T., Nicholls, R. J., & Thomalla, F. (2003). Resilience to natural hazards: How useful is this 
concept? Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards, 5(1-2), 35-45. 
Klinke, A. (2009). Deliberatie transnationalism - Transnational governance, public participation and 
expert deliberation. Forest Policy and Economics, 11(5 - 6), 348-356. 
Kodituwakku, D. C., & Moonesinghe, V. (2005). The EIA Process and the Upper Kotmale Hydropower 
Project. Retrieved from http://sarid.net/sarid-journal/2004-Kodituwakku-Moonesinghe.pdf 
Krueger, R. A., & Casey, M. A. (2009). Participants in a Focus Group. In R. A. Krueger & M. A. Casey 
(Eds.), Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. Retrieved from 
http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/24056_Chapter4.pdf 
Kværner, J., Swensen, G., & Erikstad, L. (2006). Assessing environmental vulnerability in EIA - The 
content and context of the vulnerability concept in an alternative approach to standard EIA 
procedure. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 26(5), 511-527. 
Langbein, L., & Knack, S. (2010). The worldwide governance indicators: six, one, or none? The Journal 
of Development Studies, 46(2), 350-370. 
Lapan, S. D., Quartaroli, M. T., & Riemer, F. J. (2012). Introduction to qualitative research. In S. D. 
Lapan, M. T. Quartaroli & F. J. Riemer (Eds.), qualitative Research: An introduction to 
methods and designs. CA 94104-4594: Jossey-Bass. 
Leitan, G. R. T. (2010). Context  Study and Actor Mapping in the South Asian Region 2010: Overview 
of decentralized and local governance in Sri Lanka. Retrieved from 
https://http://www.google.co.nz 
Liberatore, A. (2013). The management of uncertainty: learning from Chernobyl (Vol. 10). Retrieved 
from http://books.google.co.nz 
Lidskog, R., Uggla, Y., & Soneryd, L. (2011). Making Transboundary Risks Governable: Reducing 
Complexity, Constructing Spatial Identity, and Ascribing Capabilities. AMBIO: A Journal of the 
Human Environment, 40(2), 111-120. 
Lim, G.-C. (1985). Theory and practice of EIA implementation: A comparative study of three 
developing countries. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 5(2), 133-153. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0195-9255(85)90039-3 
Lincoln University. (2010). Human Ethics Committee: Application Form Guidebook. Retrieved from 
http://library.lincoln.ac.nz/Documents/RCO/Human-Ethics-Guidelines.pdf 
  
 242 
Lockwood, M. (2010). Good governance for terrestrial protected areas: A framework, principles and 
performance outcomes. Journal of Environmental Management, 91(3), 754-766. 
Lynch, H. (1997). Evaluating RMA performance: The role of section 35(2) (Report presented in partial 
fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters of Science in Resource 
Management). Lincoln University, Lincoln, New Zealand. 
Maassen, J. (2010). Cumulative Effects. In Brookers (Ed.), DSL Environmental Handbook. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.brookersonline.co.nz.ezproxy.lincoln.ac.nz/databases/modus/environmentallib/
handbook/DISC-ENVHB!54?tid=2112554&si=1878974479 
MacQueen, K. M., McLellan, E., Metzger, D. S., Kegeles, S., Strauss, R. P., Scotti, R., . . . Trotter, R. T. 
(2001). What is community? An evidence-based definition for participatory public health. 
American journal of public health, 91(12), 1929-1938. 
Maizels, A., & Nissanke, M. K. (1984). Motivations for aid to developing countries. World 
Development, 12(9), 879-900. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(84)90046-9 
Manyena, S. B. (2006). The concept of resilience revisited. Disasters, 30(4), 434-450. 
doi:10.1111/j.0361-3666.2006.00331.x 
Marara, M., Okello, N., Kuhanwa, Z., Douven, W., Beevers, L., & Leentvaar, J. (2011). The importance 
of context in delivering effective EIA: Case studies from East Africa. Environmental Impact 
Assessment Review, 31(3), 286-296. doi:10.1016/j.eiar.2010.10.002 
MCDEM (Ministry of Civil Defense and Emergency Management). (2011). National progress report on 
the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2009-2011). Retrieved from 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/16374_nzl_NationalHFAprogress_2009-11.pdf 
MCDEM (Ministry of Civil Defense and Emergency Management). (2013). National progress report on 
the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2011-2013). Retrieved from 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/28748_nzl_NationalHFAprogress_2011-13.pdf 
McGimpsey, P., Crack, C., Rickard, A., & Hall, M. (2011). Transmission Gully Project Assessment of 
Environmental Effects report. Retrieved from 
http://www.nzta.govt.nz/projects/transmission-gully-application/docs/aee-full-report.pdf 
MDM&HR (Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights). (2006). Towards a safer Sri Lanka: 
Road map for disaster risk management. Volume 2: Project proposals. Retrieved from 
http://www.dmc.gov.lk/Publications/Road_Map_Volume_2.pdf 
Memon, P. A., & Perkins, H. C. (2000). Environmental Planning and Management: The Broad Context. 
In P. A. Memon & H. Perkins (Eds.), Environmental Planning & Management in New Zealand. 
Palmerston North, NZ: Dunmore Press Ltd. 
MfE. (1996). The Monitoring Guide: A Practitioner’s guide to Section 35 of the RMA 1991. Wellington, 
New Zealand: Ministry for the Environment. 
MfE. (1999). A Guide to Preparing a Basic Assessment of Environmental Effects. Retrieved from 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/aee-guide-aug06/aee-guide-aug06.pdf 
MfE. (2004). Making Good Decisions: A training, assessment and certification programme for 
resource management Act decision makers. Wellington, New Zealand. 
  
 243 
MfE. (2006). A Guide to Preparing a basic Assessment of Environmental Effects. Wellington: Ministry 
for the Environment. Retrieved from http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/aee-guide-
aug06/aee-guide-aug06.pdf 
MfE. (2010). Preparing for future flooding: A guide for local government in New Zealand. Retrieved 
from http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/preparing-for-future-flooding-guide-for-
local-govt/preparing-for-future-flooding.pdf 
MfE. (2012). An Everyday Guide to the RMA, Series 1.1: Getting in on the Act. Retrieved from 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/everyday/overview/ 
MfE. (2013a). National Environmental Standards. Retrieved 25, July, 2013,from 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/laws/standards/ 
MfE. (2013b). Resource Management summary of reform proposals 2013. Retrieved from 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/resource-management-summary-reform-
proposals.pdf 
MfE. (2014). Proposals of national significance under the Resource Management Act. Retrieved 18, 
June, 2014,from https://http://www.mfe.govt.nz/rma/central/minister/national-
significance.html 
Miller, A. J. (2011). Identifying landslide activity as a function of economic development: a case study 
of increased landslide frequency surrounding Dominical, Costa Rica. Environment, 
Development and Sustainability, 1-21. 
Ming’ate, F. L. M., Rennie, H. G., & Memon, A. (2014). Potential for co-management approaches to 
strengthen livelihoods of forest dependent communities: A Kenyan case. Land Use Policy, 
41(0), 304-312. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.06.008 
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management. (2011). New Zealand: National progress report 
on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2009-2011). Retrieved from 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/16374_nzl_NationalHFAprogress_2009-11.pdf 
Ministry of Disaster Management. (2005). Towards a Safer Sri Lanka: A Road Map for Disaster Risk 
Management. Retrieved from http://www.dmc.gov.lk/Publications/Roadmap Vol.1.pdf 
Ministry of Disaster Management. (2013a). National Policy on Disaster Management. Retrieved from 
http://www.disastermin.gov.lk/web/images/pdf/draft dm policy.pdf 
Ministry of Disaster Management. (2013b). National Policy on Disaster Management (Draft). 
Retrieved from http://www.disastermin.gov.lk/web/images/pdf/draft dm policy.pdf 
Ministry of Highways, P. S. (2013). Expressways: Southern Transport Development Project. Retrieved 
27, August, 2013,from 
http://www.mohsl.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52&Itemid
=59&lang=en 
Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs of Sri Lanka. (2013). Grama Niladhari 
Administration division. Retrieved 15, September, 2013,from 
http://www.pubad.gov.lk/web/index.php 
option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Itemid=173&lang=en 
  
 244 
Mitchell, T., Van Aalst, M., & Silva Villanueva, P. (2010). Assessing progress on integrating disaster 
risk reduction and climate change adaptation in development processes. Retrieved from 
http://mobile.opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/2511 
Modak, P., & Biswas, A. K. (1999). Conducting environmental impact assessment in developing 
countries. New York: United Nations University Press. 
Mohamed, S. M. (2013). Disaster Impact Assessment (DIA): Experiences of Road sector DRR 
investment in Sri Lanka [Presentation at the side event on Economics of Disaster Risk 
Reduction – Promoting Sustainable Development through DRR investments at the Global 
Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (GPDRR) on 21st May 2013. Geneva, Switzerland]. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/globalplatform/519b8d83c190fSri_Lanka_Presentation
_for_JICA_side_event-Final.pdf 
Momtaz, S. (2002). Environmental impact assessment in Bangladesh: A critical review. Environmental 
Impact Assessment Review, 22(2), 163-179. 
Mooney, E. (2005). The concept of internal displacement and the case for internally displaced 
persons as a category of concern. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 24(3), 9. 
Morgan, R. K. (1998). Environmental impact assessment: a methodological perspective. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic. 
Morgan, R. K. (2012). Environmental impact assessment: the state of the art. Impact Assessment and 
Project Appraisal, 30(1), 5-14. 
Morgan, R. K., & Memon, P. A. (1993). Assessing the environmental effects of major projects: a 
practical guide. Dunedin, N.Z: Environmental Policy & Management Research Centre, 
University of Otago. 
Mulvihill, P. R. (2003). Expanding the scoping community. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 
23(1), 39-49. 
Mulvihill, P. R., & Ali, S. H. (2007). Disaster incubation, cumulative impacts and the urban/ex-
urban/rural dynamic. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 27(4), 343-358. 
Munaweera, C. (2008, February 28). Environmental and Social Issues due to the Upper Kothmale 
Hydropower Project. Lakbima. 
Mustafa, D., Ahmed, S., Saroch, E., & Bell, H. (2011). Pinning down vulnerability: from narratives to 
numbers. Disasters, 35(1), 62-86. 
Nadeem, O., & Fischer, T. B. (2011). An evaluation framework for effective public participation in EIA 
in Pakistan. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 31(1), 36-47. 
doi:10.1016/j.eiar.2010.01.003 
Nadeem, O., & Hameed, R. (2008). Evaluation of environmental impact assessment system in 
Pakistan. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 28(8), 562-571. 
doi:10.1016/j.eiar.2008.02.003 
National Building Research Organization. (2013). Landslide Hazard zonation mapping. Retrieved 18th 
December, 2013,from 
http://www.nbro.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=173&Itemid
=133&lang=en - zonation 
  
 245 
New Zealand Parliament. (June 25, 2013). Daily debates: Volume 691, Week 46 - Tuesday, 25 June 
2013. Retrievedfrom http://www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/pb/debates/debates/daily/50HansD_20130625/volume-691-week-46-tuesday-25-june-
2013 
New Zealand Society on Large Dams. (2000). New Zealand Dam Safety Guidelines. Retrieved from 
http://www.ipenz.org.nz/nzsold/Resources/GuidelinesMainText.pdf 
NewsFlavor. (2011, 25 June). Officials accused of natural disasters create at South Korea. NewsFlavor. 
Retrieved from http://newsflavor.com/world/asia/officials-accused-of-natural-disasters-
create-at-south-korea/ 
Nixon, C., & Peterson, R. (2011). National Policy Statement on Renewable Electricity Generation 
Evaluation under Section 32 of the Resource Management Act with additional information on 
various policies. Retrieved from http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/nps-renewable-
electricity-generation-2011/docs/nps-reg-section-32.pdf 
Noble, B. F. (2009). Promise and dismay: The state of strategic environmental assessment systems 
and practices in Canada. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 29(1), 66-75. 
NPPD (National Physical Planning Department). (2010). National Physical Planning Policy and Plan. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/15417_nationalphysicalplanningpolicyplan.pdf 
Nykvist, B. r., & Nilsson, M. n. (2009). Are impact assessment procedures actually promoting 
sustainable development? Institutional perspectives on barriers and opportunities found in 
the Swedish committee system. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 29(1), 15-24. 
NZTA. (2009). Transmission Gully Project. Retrieved 21, October, 2013,from 
http://www.nzta.govt.nz/projects/transmission-gully/ 
OCDESC (Officials’ Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination). (2007). National 
Hazardscape Report. Retrieved from 
http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf/Files/National-hazardscape-
report/$file/NATHAZ-complete.pdf 
Ortolano, L., & Shepherd, A. (1995). Environmental impact assessment: challenges and opportunities. 
Impact Assessment, 13(1), 3-30. 
Panigrahi, J. K., & Amirapu, S. (2012). An assessment of EIA system in India. Environmental Impact 
Assessment Review, 35, 23-36. 
Pelling, M. (2003). The vulnerability of cities: natural disasters and social resilience. Sterling, VA: 
Earthscan Publications. 
Pelling, M., & Holloway, A. (2006). Legislation for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction. Retrieved 
from http://www.tearfund.org/webdocs/website/Campaigning/Policy and research/DRR 
legislation.pdf 
Pelling, M., & Uitto, J. I. (2001). Small island developing states: natural disaster vulnerability and 
global change. Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards, 3(2), 49-62. 
Perkins, H. C., & Thorns, D. C. (2001). A decade on: reflections on the Resource Management Act 
1991 and the practice of urban planning in New Zealand. Environment and Planning B, 28(5), 
639-654. 
  
 246 
Petty, N. J., Thomson, O. P., & Stew, G. (2012a). Ready for a paradigm shift? Part 1: Introducing the 
philosophy of qualitative research. Manual Therapy, 17(4), 267-274. 
Petty, N. J., Thomson, O. P., & Stew, G. (2012b). Ready for a paradigm shift? Part 2: Introducing 
qualitative research methodologies and methods. Manual Therapy, 17(5), 378-384. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.math.2012.03.004 
Pölönen, I., Hokkanen, P., & Jalava, K. (2011). The effectiveness of the Finnish EIA system - What 
works, what doesn't, and what could be improved? Environmental Impact Assessment 
Review, 31(2), 120-128. 
PreventionWeb. (2012). National HFA monitor 2011-2013. Retrieved June 25, 2012,from 
http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/hfa-monitoring/national/?pid:73&pih:2 
PreventionWeb. (2014). HFA National Porgress Reports. Retrieved April 14, 2014,from 
http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/progress/reports/ 
Prowse, M., & Scott, L. (2008). Assets and Adaptation: An Emerging Debate. IDS Bulletin, 39(4), 42-52. 
doi:10.1111/j.1759-5436.2008.tb00475.x 
Radio New Zealand. (May 27, 2013). RMA architect says changes could threaten environment. 
Retrieved August 24, 2013,from http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/136135/rma-
architect-says-changes-could-threaten-environment 
Rae, G., & Crack, C. (2011). Transmission Gully Project: Social Impact Assessment, Technical Report 
17. Retrieved from http://www.nzta.govt.nz/projects/transmission-gully-
application/docs/technical-report-17.pdf 
Rajaram, T., & Das, A. (2011). Screening for EIA in India: enhancing effectiveness through ecological 
carrying capacity approach. Journal of Environmental Management, 92(1), 140-148. 
Ray, G., & Crack, C. (2011). Transmission Gully Project: Social Impact Assessment ,Technical Report 
17. Retrieved from http://www.nzta.govt.nz/projects/transmission-gully-
application/docs/technical-report-17.pdf 
Renn, O. (2008). Risk Governance: Coping with Uncertainity in a Complex World. London, UK: 
Earthscan. 
Renn, O., & Graham, P. (2005). White paper on risk governance: Towards an integrative approach. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/IRGC_WP_No_1_Risk_Governance__reprinted_version_.pdf 
Renn, O., Klinke, A., & van Asselt, M. (2011). Coping with complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity in 
risk governance: a synthesis. AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment, 40(2), 231-246. 
Retief, F., Jones, C., & Jay, S. (2008). The emperor's new clothes ‚Äî Reflections on strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA) practice in South Africa. Environmental Impact Assessment 
Review, 28(7), 504-514. 
Rich, B. (2013). Mortgaging the earth: The World Bank, environmental impoverishment, and the crisis 
of development. Retrieved from http://books.google.co.nz 
Rivett, P., & Morgan, P. (2012). WAITOHI IRRIGATION RESOURCE CONSENT APPLICATION RESPONSE 
TO SECTION 92 REQUEST - ENGINEERING. Retrieved from 
http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/Consent Notifications/hwp-waitohi-s92-appendix-j.pdf 
  
 247 
Rivett, P., Morgan, P., & van Dusschoten, A. (2012). Waitohi Irrigation and Hydro scheme: 
Engineering Report. Retrieved from http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/Consent 
Notifications/appen-g-hwp-waitohi-dam-engineering-report.pdf 
Roberts, S. M., Wright, S., & O'Neill, P. (2007). Good governance in the Pacific? Ambivalence and 
possibility. Geoforum, 38(5), 967-984. 
Robinson, W. C. (2003). Risks and rights: The causes, consequences, and challenges of development-
induced displacement. Retrieved from 
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/articles/didreport.pdf 
Runhaar, D. H., & Driessen, D. P. P. J. (2007). What makes strategic environmental assessment 
successful environmental assessment? The role of context in the contribution of SEA to 
decision-making. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 25(1), 2-14. 
Rydin, Y. (2006). Justice and the geography of Hurricane Katrina. Geoforum, 37(1), 4-6. 
Sadler, B. (1996). Environmental Assessment in a Changing World: Evaluating practice to improve 
performance-Final Report. Retrieved from http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/Content/2/B/7/2B7834CA-
7D9A-410B-A4ED-FF78AB625BDB/iaia8_e.pdf 
Saengsupavanich, C. (2012). Unwelcome environmental impact assessment for coastal protection 
along a 7-km shoreline in Southern Thailand. Ocean & Coastal Management, 61, 20-29. 
Sarantakos, S. (2005). Social research. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Saunders, W. S. A. (2012). Innovative land-use planning for natural hazard risk reduction in New 
Zealand : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy in Resource and Environmental Planning at Massey University, Manawatu, New 
Zealand. Massey University. Retrieved from http://muir.massey.ac.nz/handle/10179/3270 
Saunders, W. S. A., Beban, J. G., & Coomer, M. A. (2014). Analysis of natural hazard provisions in 
regional policy statements, territorial authority plans, and CDEM Group Plans. GNS Science 
Report 2014 (28), 70  
Saunders, W. S. A., Beban, J. G., & Kilvington, M. (2013). Risk-based approach to land use planning. 
(67), 97. Retrieved from http://www.gns.cri.nz/Home/RBP/Risk-based-planning/A-toolbox 
Saunders, W. S. A., Forsyth, J., Johnston, D., & Becker, J. S. (2007). Strengthening linkages between 
land-use planning and emergency management in New Zealand. Australian Journal of 
Emergency Management, 22(1), 36-43. 
Schenker-Wicki, A., Inauen, M., & Olivares, M. (2010). Unmastered risks: From crisis to catastrophe: 
An economic and management insight. Journal of Business Research, 63(4), 337-346. 
Schensul, J. J. (2012). Methodology, methods, and tools in qualitative research In S. D. Lapan, M. T. 
Quartaroli & F. J. Riemer (Eds.), Qualitative Research: An Introduction to Methods and 
Designs (pp. 69-106). CA 94104-4594: Jossey-Bass. 
Schijf, B. (2003). Assessing the effect of EIA: The influence of environmental effects information on 
resource consent decision-making in New Zealand (A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy). University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand. 
  
 248 
Schipper, L., & Pelling, M. (2006). Disaster risk, climate change and international development: scope 
for, and challenges to, integration. Disasters, 30(1), 19-38. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9523.2006.00304.x 
Scholz, R. W., & Tietje, O. (Eds.). (2002). Embedded Case Study Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, Inc. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412984027. Retrieved from 
SAGE Research Methods database. 
Seager, J. (2006). Noticing gender (or not) in disasters. Geoforum, 37(1), 2-3. 
Shandra, J. M., Nobles, J., London, B., & Williamson, J. B. (2004). Dependency, democracy, and infant 
mortality: a quantitative, cross-national analysis of less developed countries. Social Science & 
Medicine, 59(2), 321-333. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2003.10.022 
Shandra, J. M., Shircliff, E., & London, B. (2011). World Bank lending and deforestation: A cross-
national analysis. International Sociology, 26(3), 292-314. 
Shaw, H. (2012). Section 42A Officer’s Report. Hearing Panel appointed by the Vanterbury Regional 
Council in the matter of the RMA 1991. Retrieved from 
http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/Consent Notifications/hwp-waiitohi-evidence-appendix-
11.pdf 
Sheate, W. R. (1992). Lobbying for effective Environmental Assessment. Long Range Planning, 25(4), 
90-98. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0024-6301(92)90012-Q 
Shepherd, A., & Bowler, C. (1997). Beyond the requirements: improving public participation in EIA. 
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 40(6), 725-738. 
Shiva, V. (1988). Staying alive: women, ecology, and development. London: Zed Books. 
Smith, K. (2013). Environmental Hazards: assessing risk and reducing disasters (Sixth Edition ed.). 
Oxon: Routledge. 
Snell, T., & Cowell, R. (2006). Scoping in environmental impact assessment: Balancing precaution and 
efficiency? Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 26(4), 359-376. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2005.06.003 
Sriramachari, S., & Chandra, H. (1997). The lessons of Bhopal [toxic] MIC gas disaster scope for 
expanding global biomonitoring and environmental specimen banking. Chemosphere, 34(9-
10), 2237-2250. 
Standards Australia Limited/Standards New Zealand, &. (2012). Australian/New Zealand Handbook: 
Managing environment-related risk  Sydney / Wellington SAI Global Limited  
Statistics NZ. (2013a). New Zealand in the OECD, Population. Retrieved 15, July, 2013,from 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/government_finance/central_government/nz-
in-the-oecd/population.aspx  
Statistics NZ. (2013b). Top Statistics. Retrieved 15, July, 2013,from 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/snapshots-of-nz/top-statistics.aspx 
Steinemann, A. (2001). Improving alternatives for environmental impact assessment. Environmental 
Impact Assessment Review, 21(1), 3-21. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0195-
9255(00)00075-5 
  
 249 
Taylor Baines and Associates. (2013). Ruataniwha Water Storage Scheme: Social Impact Assessment, 
Technical Report No. WI 12/06. Retrieved from http://www.hbrc.govt.nz/HBRC-
Documents/HBRC Document Library/RWSS A6 (Social Impact Assessment) - Taylor Baines 
(May 2013).pdf 
The Department of Building and Housing. (2008). Dam Safety Scheme: Guidance for regional 
authorities and owners of large dams. Retrieved from 
http://www.dbh.govt.nz/UserFiles/File/Publications/Building/Building-Act/dam-safety-
scheme-guidance-for-regional-authorities-and-owners-of-large-dams.pdf 
The Department of Census and Statistics Sri Lanka. (2011). Sri Lanka Census of Population and 
Housing, 2011: Population of Sri Lanka by District. Retrieved from 
http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index.php?fileName=CPH 
2011_R1&gp=Activities&tpl=3 
The Institute of Engineers Sri Lanka. (2013). Case study of Upper Kotmale Hydropower project. 
Retrieved 22, June, 2014,from http://iesl.lk/page-1648085? 
The OFDA/CRED. (2014). EM-DAT: International Disaster Database.  Retrieved August 15, 2014 
http://www.emdat.be 
The Treasury. (2013a). Asian Development Bank. Retrieved December 15, 2013,from 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/topics/international/ifi/adb 
The Treasury. (2013b). Financial Statements of the Government of New Zealand for the Year Ended 
30 June 2012; Audited Financial Statements, Notes to the Financial Statements, Note 24: 
Borrowings. Retrieved December 24, 2013,from 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/government/financialstatements/yearend/jun12/057.htm  
The Treasury. (2013c). Performance Information for Appropriations Vote Transport: Economic 
Development and Infrastructure sector - Information supporting the estimates 2013/14 B.5A 
Vol.1. Retrieved from http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/2013/ise/v1/ise13-v1-pia-
trans.pdf 
The Treasury. (2013d). Statement of Financial Performance for the year ended 30 June 2012, 
Financial Statements of the Government of New Zealand – B.11. Retrieved from 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/downloads/pdfs/fsgnz-year-jun12-2.pdf 
The World Bank. (1999). OP 4.01 - Environmental Assessment. Retrieved from 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,co
ntentMDK:20064724~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:5021
84,00.html 
The World Bank. (2011). Worldwide governance indicators. Retrieved May 26, 2012,from 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp 
The World Bank. (2013a). Data: Land Area. Retrieved 25, August, 2013,from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2 
The World Bank. (2013b). Data: New Zealand. Retrieved 16, July 2013,from 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/new-zealand 
The World Bank. (2013c). Data: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population). 
Retrieved 25, August, 2013,from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC 
  
 250 
The World Bank. (2014). Data: Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved July 30, 2014,from 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators 
The World Bank Group. (2013). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrievedfrom 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx - reports 
Theophilou, V., Bond, A., & Cashmore, M. (2010). Application of the SEA Directive to EU structural 
funds: Perspectives on effectiveness. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 30(2), 136-
144. doi:10.1016/j.eiar.2009.08.001 
Therivel, R., & Morris, P. (2009). Introduction. In P. Morris & R. Therivel (Eds.), Methods of 
Environmental Impact Assessment (3rd ed.). London and New York: Routledge. 
Thomas, M. A. (2010). What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure&quest. European 
Journal of Development Research, 22(1), 31-54. 
Thomsen, C. (2013). RMA issues deserve ardent, studious debate. Retrieved August, 24, 2013,from 
http://www.odt.co.nz/opinion/opinion/258988/rma-issues-deserve-ardent-studious-debate 
Tobin, G. A., & Montz, B. E. (1997). Natural hazards: explanation and integration. New York: Guilford 
Press. 
Tobin, G. A., & Montz, B. E. (2009). Environmental Hazards. In International Encyclopedia of Human 
Geography (pp. 521-527). Oxford: Elsevier. 
Toro, J., Duarte, O., Requena, I., & Zamorano, M. (2011). Determining Vulnerability Importance in 
Environmental Impact Assessment: The case of Colombia. Environmental Impact Assessment 
Review, 32(1), 107-117. 
Toro, J., Requena, I., & Zamorano, M. (2010). Environmental impact assessment in Colombia: Critical 
analysis and proposals for improvement. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 30(4), 
247-261. 
Transparency International. (2003). The Global Corruption Report 2003: Access to information. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/global_corruption_report_2003_access_to_in
formation 
Transparency International. (2014). Corruption Perception Index 2013. Retrieved 16, June, 2014,from 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/ 
Transparency International Sri Lanka. (2011). Right to access the information with regard to Colombo 
Municipal Council and the Country as a whole. Retrieved January 14, 2013,from 
http://www.tisrilanka.org/?p=8611 
Turner, B. A. (1976). The organizational and interorganizational development of disasters. 
Administrative science quarterly, 378-397. 
TVNZ. (2012). PNG mountain disaster asks questions of Exxon. Retrieved April 15, 2012,from 
http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/png-mountain-disaster-asks-questions-exxon-4761879 
U.S. Department of State. (2013). 2013 Investment Climate Statement - Sri Lanka. Retrieved August 
14, 2014,from http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204735.htm 
  
 251 
UKHP (Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project). (2004). Project History. Retrieved 14, July, 2013,from 
http://www.ukhp.lk/projecthistory.html 
UNDP. (2004). Reducing Disaster Risk: A challenge for development. Retrieved from 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis 
prevention/disaster/asia_pacific/Reducing Disaster risk a Challenge for development.pdf 
UNDP. (2013). Summary: Human Development Report 2013, The Rise of the South: Human Progress 
in a Diverse World. Retrieved from 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR2013_EN_Summary.pdf 
UNEP. (2005a). After the Tsunami: Rapid Environmental Assessment. Retrieved from 
http://www.unep.org/tsunami/reports/TSUNAMI_report_complete.pdf 
UNEP. (2005b). Sri Lanka: Post Tsunami Environmental Assessment Retrieved from 
http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/dmb_srilanka.pdf 
UNESCAP. (n.d.). Country Reports on Local Government Systems: Sri Lanka. . Retrieved from 
http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/new-countrypaper/SriLanka/SriLanka.pdf 
UNISDR. (2005). Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and 
Communities to Disasters. Extract from the final report of the World Conference on Disaster 
Reduction (A/CONF.206/6). Retrieved from 
http://www.unisdr.org/files/1037_hyogoframeworkforactionenglish.pdf 
UNISDR. (2009a). UNISDR Terminology on disaster risk reduction. Retrieved from 
http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf 
UNISDR. (2009b). Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction: Risk and poverty in a 
changing climate. Retrieved from 
http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/report/index.php?id=9413 
UNISDR. (2010). Summary of Mid-term online debate. Retrieved from 
http://www.unisdr.org/files/18197_504onlinedebate4summaryandtranscrip.pdf 
UNISDR. (2011). Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2011: Revealing risk, redifining 
development. Retrieved from 
http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2011/en/home/index.html 
UNISDR. (2014). HFA Monitor Template: HFA monitoring and review through a multi stakeholder 
engagement process 2013 - 2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/hfa-monitoring/national/?pid:73&pih:2 
United Nations. (1989). Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its 44th session: 
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/549/95/IMG/NR054995.pdf?OpenElement 
University of Moratuwa. (1999a). Environmental Impact Assessment Report: Southern Expressway 
Development Project. 
University of Moratuwa. (1999b). Environmental Impact Assessment Report: Southern Expressway 
Development project. Colombo, Sri Lanka: University of Moratuwa. 
  
 252 
van Buuren, A., & Nooteboom, S. (2009). Evaluating strategic environmental assessment in The 
Netherlands: content, process and procedure as indissoluble criteria for effectiveness. 
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 27(2), 145-154. 
van Doren, D., Driessen, P. P. J., Schijf, B., & Runhaar, H. A. C. (2013). Evaluating the substantive 
effectiveness of SEA: Towards a better understanding. Environmental Impact Assessment 
Review, 38(0), 120-130. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2012.07.002 
Vanclay, F. (2003). Social Impact Assessment: International Principles. Special Publications (Series No. 
02). Retrieved from http://www.iaia.org/publicdocuments/special-publications/SP2.pdf 
Vial, T., & Hill, B. (2012). Cultural Impact Assessment: Hurunui Water Project, The Waitohi Scheme 
Retrieved from http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/Consent Notifications/append-k-hwp-
preliminary-cultural-impact-assessment.pdf 
Wamsler, C. (2004). Managing urban risk: perceptions of housing and planning as a tool for reducing 
disaster risk. Global Built Environment Review, 4(2), 11-28. 
Wamsler, C. (2006). Mainstreaming Risk Reduction in Urban Planning and Housing: A Challenge for 
International Aid Organisations. Disasters, 30(2), 151-177. doi:10.1111/j.0361-
3666.2006.00313.x 
Wang, H., Bai, H., Liu, J., & Xu, H. (2012). Measurement indicators and an evaluation approach for 
assessing Strategic Environmental Assessment effectiveness. Ecological Indicators, 23(0), 
413-420. doi:10.1016/j.ecolind.2012.04.021 
Weerasinghe, S. (2013). Achieving Disaster Resilience through the Sri Lankan Early Warning System: 
Good practices of Disaster Risk Reduction and Management. Retrieved from 
http://www.buildresilience.org/2013/proceedings/files/papers/473.pdf 
Weston, J. (1997). Introduction: EIA in the UK. In J. Weston (Ed.), Planning & Environmental Impact 
Assessment in Practice. Essex CM20 2JE, England: Addison Wesley Longman Limited. 
Weston, J. (2000). EIA, decision-making theory and screening and scoping in UK practice. Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management, 43(2), 185-203. 
Wisner, B. (2004). Assessment of capability and vulnerability In G. Bankoff, G. Frerks & T. Hilhorst 
(Eds.), Mapping vulnerability: disasters, development, and people (pp. 183-193). London: 
Earthscan. 
Wisner, B. (2009). Vulnerability. In International Encyclopedia of Human Geography (pp. 176-182). 
Oxford: Elsevier. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780080449104001292 
Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., & Davis, I. (2004). At risk: natural hazards, people's vulnerability 
and disasters. London: Routledge. 
Withanage, H. (2004). Towards Good Governance and Environmental Justice: Update 01, DREAM 
ROAD that destroys sustainable livelihood. Nugegoda, Sri Lanka. 
Wood, C. (1995). Environmental impact assessment: a comparative review. Harlow, England: 
Longman Scientific & Technical. 
Wood, C., & Dejeddour, M. (1992). Strategic environmental assessment: EA of policies, plans and 
programmes. Impact Assessment, 10(1), 3-22. 
  
 253 
Wood, G., & Becker, J. (2005). Discretionary judgement in local planning authority decision making: 
screening development proposals for environmental impact assessment. Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management, 48(3), 349-371. 
Woods, N. (2000). The challenge of good governance for the IMF and the World Bank themselves. 
World Development, 28(5), 823-841. 
Woods, N. (2008). Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in 
development assistance. International Affairs, 84(6), 1205-1221. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
2346.2008.00765.x 
World Nuclear Association. (2012). Fukushima Accident 2011. Retrieved June 26, 2012,from 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/fukushima_accident_inf129.html 
Yin, R. K. (2011). Qualitative Research from Strat to finish. NY 10012: The Guilford Press. 
Zhang, K., Pei, Y., & Lin, C. (2010). An investigation of correlations between different environmental 
assessments and risk assessment. Procedia Environmental Sciences, 2(0), 643-649. 
Zubair, L. (2001). Challenges for environmental impact assessment in Sri Lanka. Environmental 
Impact Assessment Review, 21(5), 469-478. 
 
 
  
  
 254 
Appendix A 
Hyogo Framework for Action (based on UNISDR (2005, p. 23)) 
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. 
 The substantial reduction of disaster 
losses, in lives and in the social, 
economic and environmental assets of 
communities and countries. 
 
Strategic Goals 
The integration of 
disaster risk reduction 
into sustainable 
development policies 
and planning. 
The development and 
strengthening of 
institutions, 
mechanisms and 
capacities to build 
resilience to hazards. 
The systematic 
incorporation of risk 
reduction approaches 
into implementation of 
emergency 
preparedness, 
response and recovery 
programme. 
Priorities for Action 
1. Ensure that 
DRR is a national 
and local priority 
with a strong 
institutional 
basis for 
implementation. 
2. Identify, 
assess and 
monitor 
disaster 
risks and 
enhance 
early 
warning.  
3. Use 
knowledge, 
innovation 
and 
education to 
build a 
culture of 
safety and 
resilience at 
all levels  
4. Reduce 
the 
underlying 
risk factors.  
5. Strengthen 
disaster 
preparedness 
for effective 
response at all 
levels.  
Cross-cutting issues 
Multi-hazard 
approach 
Gender 
perspective and 
cultural 
diversity 
Community and 
volunteers’ 
participation 
Capacity building 
& technology 
transfer 
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Appendix B  
Human Ethics Committee Approval Letter  
 
 
 
 
Application No: 2012-42 7 December 2012 
Title: Effectiveness of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in mitigating development induced 
disasters: A comparison of the EIA processes of Sri Lanka, Jamaica and New Zealand 
 
Applicant: Arosh Buddika Hapuarachchi 
 
 
The Lincoln University Human Ethics Committee has reviewed the above noted application.  
 
 
Thank you for your detailed response to the questions which were forwarded to you on the 
Committee’s behalf. 
 
 I am satisfied on the Committee’s behalf that the issues of concern have been satisfactorily addressed. 
 
I am pleased to give final approval to your project.  Please advise Alison Hind when you have completed 
your research and confirming that you have complied with the terms of the ethical approval.   
 
May I, on behalf of the Committee, wish you success in your research. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Professor Grant Cushman 
Chair, Human Ethics Committee 
 
cc Prof Ken Hughey 
Dr Hamish Rennie 
 
PLEASE NOTE:  The Human Ethics Committee has an audit process in place for applications.  Please 
see 7.3 of the Human Ethics Committee Operating Procedures (ACHE) in the Lincoln University Policies 
and Procedures Manual for more information.  
Research and Commercialisation Office 
 
T 64 3 325 3838 
F 64 3 325 3630 
PO Box 84, Lincoln University 
Lincoln 7647, Christchurch 
New Zealand 
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Appendix C 
Questionnaire – Planners and EIA Experts  
C.1 Name of the project:  
Effectiveness of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in mitigating development-induced 
disasters: A comparison of the EIA processes of Sri Lanka and New Zealand. 
C.2 The aim of the project 
EIA is a development control mechanism practiced in many countries including many low and middle-
income countries. But, the extent to which country-specific EIA processes include disaster risk 
considerations and how effective they are in addressing development-induced disaster risk has not 
been researched yet. Contextual factors such as legal and administrative arrangements as well as the 
quality of governance also have a direct bearing on the EIA process. It is generally accepted that such 
contextual and governance factors influence the involvement of participants, transparency and 
nature of EIA processes, and very importantly EIA outcomes. This research aims to investigate the 
effectiveness of the EIA system in different risk governance contexts, taking Sri Lanka and New 
Zealand as case exemplars.  
You may at any time withdraw your participation in the interview, including withdrawal of any 
information you have provided until 31st of May 2013.  If you complete the questionnaire, however, 
it will be understood that you have consented to participate in the project and consent to publication 
of the results of the project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
C.3 Questionnaire  
In your country:  
1) Do the project proponents / funding agencies carry specific guidelines or funding conditions 
around minimising disaster risk of the project? 
2) Is disaster risk reduction an integral part of environmental assessment? 
3) Is disaster risk explicitly mentioned in the EIA legislation? 
4) Is the EIA system based on clear and specific legal provisions? 
5) Are the disaster impacts of all significant actions assessed? 
6) Does EIA report/ statement contain a section on disaster risk? 
7) Is there an opportunity for appeal or to legally challenge the process or decision output? 
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8) Do EIA reports get publicly reviewed and does the proponent respond to the points raised? 
9) Does the ToR for the EIA carry specific requirements regarding hazard assessment and 
vulnerability assessment? 
10) Is monitoring taking place as a part of the EIA process? To what extent is monitoring carried 
out? 
11) Does the screening of project activities for disaster risk take place? 
12) Are hazard and vulnerability assessments conducted as a part of scoping of the 
environmental impacts? 
13) Do decision makers refer to the EIA during the planning process? 
14) If yes, to what extent, and does the EIA function as a reference point during the decision-
making process? 
15) Do the findings of the EIA influence the final decision? 
16) If yes, how do you rate the causal relationship between the EIA and the alterations in the 
project plan?  
17) Does public participation take place prior to, and following EIA report publication? 
18) Opportunities for public involvement - throughout the process? Or at specified stages only? 
19) How do you describe stakeholder participation in the EIA process? 
20) Are the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and decisions amended to incorporate 
feedback from consultations? 
21) Do legal provisions given by other legislation to control development induced disaster risks 
influence the outcome of the EIA process? 
22) Are EIA process and EIS subject to independent checks and verifications? Is there an 
independent body to assess the quality of the EIA and EIS? 
23) Are decision-making and approval stages, (where what is required of proponents and 
government agencies) made clear to all? 
24) EIA reports/ EIS readily available to be viewed 
25) Is there political support available for the EIA process? 
26) Is there inter agency coordination and cooperation available across sectors and different 
levels (national/local) of government departments at all stages of the EIA process?   
27) Does the disaster management agency receive information and get involved in all stages of 
the EIA process? 
28) Are there any other agencies/departments that should be in the EIA process? 
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Appendix D 
Questionnaire – Community Representatives  
D.1 Name of the project:  
Effectiveness of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in mitigating development-induced 
disasters: A comparison of the EIA processes of Sri Lanka and New Zealand. 
D.2 The aim of the project 
EIA is a development control mechanism practiced in many countries including many low and middle-
income countries. But, the extent to which country-specific EIA processes include disaster risk 
considerations and how effective they are in addressing development-induced disaster risk has not 
been researched yet. Contextual factors such as legal and administrative arrangements as well as the 
quality of governance also have a direct bearing on the EIA process. It is generally accepted that such 
contextual and governance factors influence the involvement of participants, transparency and 
nature of EIA processes, and very importantly EIA outcomes. This research aims to investigate the 
effectiveness of the EIA system in different risk governance contexts, taking Sri Lanka and New 
Zealand as case exemplars.  
You may at any time withdraw your participation, including withdrawal of any information you have 
provided until 31st May 2013.  If you complete the questionnaire, however, it will be understood that 
you have given the consent to participate in the project and consent to publication of the results of 
the project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
D.3 Questionnaire  
1) Opening question - How do you best describe your village?  
2) Have you experienced any disasters in the past (before the project A was implemented) and 
what was the nature of those? Damages to infrastructure, assets and livelihoods? Human 
casualties?  
3) To your understanding, what reasons were behind development of this project A in your 
area? And why your area was selected for the project? Who are the beneficiaries?  
4) What are the positive and negative impacts of the project to the village and communities?  
5) What are the potential disasters you face now and how do you describe the nature and cause 
of those?  
6) Have you felt an increase or decrease in the frequency /severity of disasters since project A 
was implemented? 
7) Was an Environmental Impact assessment carried out for the project? 
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8) Was a hazard and vulnerability assessment carried out as a part of the project EIA? How?  
9) Did the community get involved in the EIA process? How did the community get involved in 
the EIA process?  
10) Did everyone get an equal opportunity to participate in the EIA process? 
11) Were the EIA reports made available for the community to view, or was information about 
their contents otherwise made known to you (if the latter explain how)?  
12) Did the community comment on the EIA report? 
13) Are you satisfied with the information provided to you about the impacts on the 
environment due to the project? 
14) Did you or your community foresee any other impacts that were not mentioned in the EIA 
report? 
15) Were you satisfied with the mitigation measures proposed by the project? 
16) Did you recommend any other mitigation measures to reduce the impacts? 
17) Did the project proponent respond to the points raised by the EIA report and by the 
community and how do you describe the changes made to the project design and 
implementation based on the comments made by the community? 
18) When did the community consultation take place? Pre-project? Or post-project? Where did 
the community consultation take place? 
19) At what stages did the community get involved in the EIA process? 
20) To what level did the community get involved in the project EIA?  
21) Was the community informed about the project and its positive impacts?   
22) Did you have an opportunity to express your views?  
23) Did you have an opportunity to plan the mitigation measures? Were those are accepted and 
implemented?  
24) Did you have easy access to project information, EIA report, approval letters and conditions 
on the project?  
25) What else should have been done to reduce the impacts to the environment and village? 
26) If you face any negative impacts (disasters) because of the project now, what actions did the 
community take during and after project implementation?  
27) Is the community involved in the post-project impact monitoring system of the project A? 
 
